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As the black protest movement swept north 
in the middle years of the 1960s, a major 
shift was to take place in its basic theme 
and fundamental direction that transferred 
emphasis from the familiar exhortation to 
demand "freedom now" to an equally urgent 
summons to marshal the formidable, if un­
tapped, resources of "black power" in the 
struggle for liberation. 
This alteration in both informing idea and 
effective method signified conclusively that 
blacks, grown angry and frustrated over the 
slow rate of their social and economic prog­
ress as an oppressed minority, were finally 
prepared to realize their potential force in 
order to exercise a decisive measure of po­
litical control over their own lives. 
As a call to action, black power reflected 
a growing sense of community among blacks, 
a fresh awareness of shared experience and 
a common heritage. More importantly, 
however, it was both a challenge posed by 
blacks to themselves to gain some increased 
measure of control over the institutions of 
that community, and an appeal for black 
solidarity and concerted political action as 
the essential means to that end. An increased 
concentration of blacks in the major cities 
of the northern and western United States 
had come about as the direct result of one 
of the most significant demographic changes 
to occur in the nation in the twentieth 
century. Blacks were rapidly coming to con­
stitute numerical majorities in the popula­
tions of the largest and most important of 
American cities and were in an excellent 
position to influence decisively the outcome 
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Introduction 
Future historians of American society will no doubt characterize 
the 1960s as a decade of unusual social change and dislocation. 
This characterization will be particularly striking if the past decade 
is contrasted with the 1950s, which was a decade largely devoted 
to celebrating the achievements and cohesiveness of America. If 
compared, it is apparent that the intensive turmoil and strife that 
emerged during the 1960s completely shattered the complacency 
and smugness of the 1950s. Those social commentators who main­
tained that America's most pressing problem in an age of non-
ideological conflict was the management of affluence found their 
interpretations rudely undermined by the unprecedented conflict 
surrounding black liberation, women's liberation, the persistence 
of American poverty, the operation of American universities, the 
waging of the Vietnam War, and American foreign policy in gen­
eral. The eruption of widespread civil disorder in black ghettos 
and on university campuses plus the outbreak of urban guerrilla 
terrorism made it abundantly clear that America is not a society 
that has reached consensus on the major issues of human life. 
There are, of course, many complicated factors that have con­
tributed to these developments. Included in virtually all explana­
tions, however, is the spector of the world's most materially afflu­
ent nation utilizing its abundant resources to heap violence on a 
small country halfway around the earth and to send men to the 
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moon while between one-fourth and one-fifth of its own people are 
condemned to a life of hopeless poverty. How and why the Amer­
ican political system produces such results is one of the most fun­
damental issues that has emerged in recent times. 
Among the major contributing factors to the tension and con­
flict pervading contemporary American society has been the quest 
of black Americans, who constitute a large segment of the poverty 
stricken, to break the chains of economic, social, and political pov­
erty. During the 1960s this quest was articulated through a revital­
ized civil rights movement that mobilized thousands of protest 
actions to secure "freedom now" for black Americans; however, 
by the mid-1960s, it became apparent to many civil rights activists 
that despite their efforts the goals of integration and equality re­
mained extremely elusive for the overwhelming bulk of black peo­
ple. As a result of this frustration and a growing understanding 
of power relationships in American society, a new dimension of 
black struggle emerged in the summer of 1966. During a civil 
rights march across Mississippi a young black leader of the Stu­
dent Non-violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), Stokely Car­
michael, urged that blacks shift from an emphasis on civil rights 
to "black power." What Carmichael and other SNCC members 
meant by the concept of black power stimulated much controver­
sial discussion and many interpretations among both blacks and 
whites. The term continues to carry a variety of interpretations; 
however, there are some fundamental aspects that have been 
widely accepted within black liberation circles. These aspects in­
clude: (1) the quest for a political organization that speaks direct­
ly for blacks and represents their needs and interests; (2) recon­
struction of the black community and its identity, with an 
emphasis on racial pride and self-esteem; (3) the development of 
a sense of community and group cohesion; (4) the development 
of black organizations controlled by blacks, before any coalitions 
can be formed with whites; (5) black control for full participation 
in the decision-making processes of institutions that shape the lives 
of black people; (6) the need for whites to work in their own com­
munities in order to fight the racism that exists there; and (7) the 
right to self-defense, due to the ineffectiveness of nonviolent 
tactics in situations where blacks are physically threatened.1 An 
important ingredient of this concept holds that "where black peo­
ple have a majority, they will attempt to use power to exercise 
control. That is what they seek: control."2 
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A year after the emergence of black power as a concept, the 
nation witnessed what many commentators and black citizens 
identified as prime examples of the notion: the election of blacks 
to the mayorship in two major cities of the urban North. In 1967 
Richard G. Hatcher became the first black mayor of Gary, Indiana, 
and Carl B. Stokes became the first black mayor of Cleveland, 
Ohio. These black electoral victories carried a double meaning. On 
the one hand, they represented the end product of a major effort 
by blacks to gain control of the highest governmental office in 
a particular locale.3 These victories also signaled, in the opinion 
of the authors, the beginnings of a new historical era in northern 
urban politics. We suggest that the history of the urban North can 
be broadly divided into three phases: (1) occupation of high mu­
nicipal offices by white Anglo-Saxons; (2) the wresting away of 
this occupation during the 1930s by representatives of European 
ethnic groups; and (3) the initial ascendance of black officials in 
the late 1960s and the growth of black controlled offices through­
out the 1970s and thereafter. 
This study concentrates on analyzing the beginnings of the third 
phase. An effort is made to deal with several fundamental ques­
tions. First, given the harsh social, economic, and political ob­
stacles blacks have faced in this country, how did they overcome 
these obstacles and successfully mobilize for victory in Gary and 
Cleveland? Second, how did the white communities in these 
cities react to the black thrust for the mayorship? Third, what hap­
pened when Hatcher and Stokes took office—were they able to 
solve the critical problems of the black community? Fourth, how 
does the election of black mayors relate to the general struggle 
for black liberation? Finally, we seek to shed light on the crucial 
question of the value and role of electoral politics in the process 
of black liberation. 
To answer the questions raised above we engaged in extensive 
field research in Gary, Indiana, Cleveland, Ohio, and East Saint 
Louis, Illinois. Field research in Gary and Cleveland involved pri­
marily the conducting of a series of oral interviews with select 
groups of citizens. The interviews were conducted between Oc­
tober 1968 and March 1969. Primary respondents were persons 
who had played active roles in the Hatcher and Stokes campaign 
organizations. These respondents were chosen in the following 
manner. One individual from each city who held an official posi­
tion in the campaign organizations of the two black mayoral can­
6 / Electing Black Mayors 
didates was asked to supply an initial list of names of other per­
sons who had played active roles in these organizations. Letters 
were sent to each of these individuals requesting an interview. 
Individuals who held formal positions in the campaign organiza­
tions were interviewed first. Each of these respondents, and each 
subsequent respondent, was asked during the interview to supply 
the names of others who had played active roles in the campaign 
organizations. Through this process of cross selection based on de­
signations as "active participants" made by interview respondents 
a universe of forty-eight active campaign participants in Gary and 
forty active participants in Cleveland was obtained.4 Interviews 
were conducted with forty-four Hatcher campaign workers in Gary 
and thirty-eight Stokes campaign workers in Cleveland. A spe­
cial effort was made to contact all of the persons identified as 
active participants in Gary and Cleveland. Not a single person 
whom we were able to contact turned down our request for an in­
terview. The four persons in Gary and two persons in Cleveland 
not interviewed—none of whom played crucial roles—could not be 
reached during the period in which interviews were conducted 
in the two cities. 
Two additional sets of interviews were done in Gary and Cleve­
land. One of these involved interviews with the officers of promi­
nent community organizations and other individuals singled out 
as being unusually knowledgable about civic and social activities 
in the two cities. Thirteen such persons were interviewed in Gary 
and twelve in Cleveland. 
The other set of interviews involved conversations with members 
of the regular Democratic and Republican organizations in Gary 
and Cleveland. Following essentially the same procedure as that 
used to identify key actors in the Hatcher and Stokes campaigns, 
fourteen leading party figures in Gary and twelve in Cleveland 
were interviewed. Through these interviews, data were col­
lected on subjects such as the development of party organiza­
tions in Gary and Cleveland, demographic changes in the black 
and white communities, the reaction of major party organizations 
to the growing electoral strength of the black community, and 
the reaction of party officials to the mobilization effort mounted 
in the black community in the 1967 mayoral campaign. 
Formal interview schedules were used and each respondent in 
each set of interviews was asked approximately the same ques­
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tions. Questions included in the interview schedule were mainly 
of the open-ended variety, permitting respondents full freedom 
to express opinions on issues raised. Separate interview sched­
ules were used for campaign workers, community leaders, and 
party officials. A list of key questions was also composed for in­
terviews with the black mayoral candidates in Gary and Cleveland. 
All but four of the interviews conducted in Gary and Cleveland 
were recorded on tape. The length of the campaign-worker inter­
view was approximately three hours, although several ran consid­
erably longer. Interviews with community leaders and party of­
ficials ran an average of one hour. When all of the interviews 
were completed, long-hand transcriptions were made. Repeated 
checks on transcriptions were made in order to assure that the 
interview data used in the analysis were as accurate as possible. 
Field research in East Saint Louis was conducted in the fall of 
1967 and spring of 1968 by members of the Public Administration 
and Metropolitan Affairs Program, Southern Illinois University. 
One of the authors was a member of this research team. Inter­
views were conducted with key participants in campaign organi­
zations established to work for candidates in the 1967 mayoral 
election as well as other individuals who had traditionally been 
actively involved in social and civic affairs.5 Research in East Saint 
Louis also involved extensive examination of newspaper files, 
and the collection of historical and demographic data from public 
and private sources. 
In order to treat questions relating to the election of black may­
ors, the study in this volume has been divided into three parts. 
Part one concentrates on illuminating problems blacks have tra­
ditionally faced in their efforts to mobilize for effective political 
action in the electoral process. Emphasis is on the social, economic, 
and political factors that make the surmounting of obstacles to 
effective political mobilization more difficult for blacks today than 
for European ethnics at an earlier period. As a means of illustrat­
ing the unique barriers to black political mobilization, an analy­
sis of the 1967 mayoral election in East Saint Louis, Illinois, is 
included. The East Saint Louis case study is intended to show that 
obstacles to black mobilization continue to exist and affect the 
exercise of black political power even when blacks constitute a 
majority of the electorate. 
Part two contains two extensive case studies of successful black 
8 / Electing Black Mayors 
political mobilization that eventuated in the election of black may­
ors in Cleveland, Ohio, and Gary, Indiana. Detailed accounts are 
included to illustrate how the black communities in both of these 
cities were mobilized to produce record-high voting turnouts and 
voting cohesion for black mayoral candidates. 
Part three focuses on two concluding topics. First, what are 
the key variables in the black mobilization process? Under what 
conditions are blacks likely to secure control of high municipal 
offices and under what conditions are they likely to fail? The 
final two chapters discuss the impact and implications of success­
ful mobilization efforts. Does the election of a black mayor make 
any significant differences in the life situation of the black 
masses? Is the electoral process capable of resolving the grievances 
of blacks in American society? If not, are there relevant alterna­
tive approaches? 
We are deeply indebted to the numerous people in East Saint Louis, Gary, and 
Cleveland who granted us interviews concerning their understanding and expe­
riences in the politics of those cities. Financial and administrative support for our 
research was provided by the Institute of Public Administration and Urban Af­
fairs at Southern Illinois University, and the Institute of Government and Public 
Affairs and Department of Political Science at the University of Illinois. In addi­
tion, we are indebted to the following individuals for their assistance and sup­
port: Samuel R. Gove, Phillip Moneypenny, Joseph Piscotte, Seymour Mann, El­
liot Rudwig, David Ranney, Jane Altes, Robert Mendelson, Curtina Moreland, 
James T. Jones, James Holland, and Emma and Milton Sutton. In addition, we 
are grateful for the extraordinary clerical assistance provided by Jean Baker, 
Yolanda Robinson, Faith Teitlebaum, and Penny Martin. We wish to dedicate 
this study to Delia and Nicholas Fanon Nelson, and to Bruce Sidel, a special 
friend who gave his life in the struggle for human freedom. 
1. See the position paper of SNCC, "The Basis of Black Power" that appeared 
in the New York Times, 5 August 1966; Charles V. Hamilton, "An Advocate of 
Black Power Defines It," New York Times Magazine, 14 April 1966; Stokely 
Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton, Black Power: The Politics of Liberation in 
America (New York: Vintage, 1967). 
2. Carmichael and Hamilton, Black Power, p. 46. 
3. The extent to which the election of a black mayor constitutes control of a 
city is the central focus of our discussion in Part 3 of this study. 
4. By "active" here, we mean individuals who had worked in both the primary 
and general campaign organizations on a continuous and formal basis. Our basic 
strategy was to interview committee chairmen and other campaign officials first, 
and then move on to interview other individuals identified to us through multiple 
designations as key campaign workers. Among the campaign workers interviewed 
in both cities were the black mayoral candidates. 
5. In contrast to the research technique employed in Cleveland and Gary, no 
formal interview schedule was used in East Saint Louis. 
PARTI 
Black Political Mobilization 

1 
Problems of Black Political Mobilization 
INTRODUCTION 
During recent years a number of calls have been made for black 
unity in order to maximize black power in politics. In sounding 
such appeals, frequent reference is made to the rise of other ethnic 
groups to positions of political and economic strength through co­
hesive political action. Consider, for example, the following ex­
cerpt from an editorial published in Ebony shortly before the 1968 
presidential election. 
This year more than any other the Negro American should vote Black 
and should vote bloc. Taking a leaf from the political histories of the 
Irish, the Poles, the Italians and the WASPs, the black man should 
put aside the differences within the race and unite behind men who 
will look selfishly at the black man's interests. . .  . A caucus of 
national leaders from Stokely Carmichael to Roy Wilkins should de­
cide whom black people should support nationally. State and city 
caucuses should be held to endorse the "right man" in state and local 
elections. And once these candidates have been selected the Negro 
voter should religiously support them, even though at times it would 
be against his personal judgment. And the white man should have 
no reason to complain. After all he has been doing this for centuries.1 
A similiar pitch for the exertion of group power by blacks 
through united action was made in 1966 by a committee of black 
churchmen affiliated with the National Council of Churches. Note 
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again the reference to the legacy of earlier groups in mobilizing 
for effective action. 
. . . America has asked its Negro citizen to fight for opportunity 
as individuals, whereas at certain points in our history what we have
needed most has been opportunity for the whole group, not just for
selected and approved Negroes. . . . We must not apologize for the
existence of this form of group power, for we have been oppressed as
a group and not as individuals. We will not find our way out of that
oppression until both we and America accept the need for Negro 
Americans, as well as for Jews, Italians, Poles and white Anglo-
Saxon Protestants, among others, to have and to wield group power.2 
Among the chief proponents and architects of the ideology of 
black power are Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton. 
They, too, place special emphasis on the experience of earlier 
groups in their call for black unity and power. They observe: 
"The black community was told time and again how other im­
migrants finally won acceptance: that is by following the Protes­
tant Ethic of Work and Achievement. They worked hard, therefore, 
they achieved. We were not told that it was by building Irish 
Power, Italian Power, Polish Power or Jewish Power that these 
groups got themselves together and operated from positions of 
strength."3 Given this situation, Carmichael and Hamilton call 
upon black people to recognize "the ethnic basis of American 
politics" and to "consolidate behind their own, so that they can 
bargain from a position of strength."4 
These calls have immense relevance to the problems of black 
political mobilization, analyzed in this chapter. Their relevance de­
rives primarily from two factors. One is that these appeals for 
black political unity indicate the growing awareness among black 
Americans of the value of their heavy concentration and segrega­
tion in the major northern urban centers and their ever-increas­
ing sense of group consciousness, racial pride, and common fate 
as potential political resources in the quest for black power. The 
other factor is the assumption implicit in these appeals that the 
obstacles to black political mobilization today are essentially 
analogous to those faced by earlier groups and can be overcome 
by blacks "getting themselves together" in the same way other 
groups have closed ranks for effective political action in the past. 
The underlying assumptions of what we term here the "black 
analogy" will be subjected to close examination at later points 
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in this chapter. Before such an examination can be made, how­
ever, it is necessary that we take a rather trenchant look at the 
political resources noted above. For it is these resources that give 
meaning and significance to the analysis of prospects for the 
emergence of blacks to power via the electoral process. 
The concentration of blacks in the central cities of the North 
and West represents the end product of one of the most signifi­
cant demographic changes occurring in the United States during 
this century. Blacks began moving from the rural South to the 
urban centers of the North and West in significant numbers 
during the decade immediately preceding World War I. The fac­
tors underlying this geographic shift are strikingly similar to 
those which stimulated the massive migration of Europeans to 
America during the nineteenth century. In this respect we might 
note that the delayed impact of the agricultural and industrial 
revolutions on the southern economy had the effect of displacing 
large numbers of black farm workers from their normal occupa­
tional pursuits.5 Coterminous with these developments was a 
series of natural disasters, including boll-weevil plagues and 
floods during the five-year period between 1910 and 1915, that 
further weakened the southern one-crop economy and uprooted 
blacks from their southern moorings.6 
The outbreak of World War I, coupled with the decline in im­
migration from Europe, created large numbers of unskilled jobs 
in northern industries. Blacks were vigorously recruited through­
out the South to fill these positions in much the same way workers 
in Europe were recruited for American industry during the nine­
teenth century. Black newspapers, especially the Chicago De­
fender, significantly contributed to the effort of attracting blacks 
to the North. The Defender published news of job vacancies in 
northern industry and gave advice on procedures for securing 
these positions. It also stressed the liberal racial climate of the 
North, exhorting blacks to throw off the oppression of the South 
by moving North.7 
Seeking a greater measure of freedom and worthwhile em­
ployment, blacks began moving from South to North in signifi­
cant numbers around 1910. Although receding somewhat during 
the depression, emigration from the South was quickly revived by 
the northern industrial boom sparked by World War II. Since that 
time the stream of blacks from the South has received con­
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tinuous stimulation from the increasing mechanization of agri­
culture and the relatively easy access by blacks to unskilled jobs 
in northern industries.8 like nineteenth-century European im­
migration, black immigration to the North has been spurred by a 
cumulative process. Letters back home by those who migrated 
first have tended to encourage the later immigration of friends 
and relatives who had remained behind. 
The magnitude of the regional shift of blacks since 1910 is 
indicated in table 1. This phenomenon is further illuminated by 
census figures which show that whereas 91 percent of the black 
population lived in the South in 1910, this figure had dropped 
by 1966 to 55 percent.9 As a result of this shift, the number of 
blacks residing in the North and West nearly quadrupled during 
the fifty-year period from 1910 to 1960. 
TABLE 1 
BLACK OUT-MIGRATION FROM THE SOUTH, 1910-1966 
Net Black Out-Migration Annual Average 
Period from the South Rate 
1910-1920 454,000 45,400

1920-1930 747,000 74,900

1930-1940 348,000 34,800

1940-1950 1,597,000 159,700

1950-1960 1,457,000 145,700

1960-1966 613,000 102,000

SOURCE: Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (New York: Bantam Books, 1968), 
p. 240. 
It is significant to point out that the bulk of blacks who left 
the South settled in large urban centers rather than small towns 
and suburbs. Indeed, statistics show that blacks are more highly 
urbanized than whites. In 1960, about 70 percent of the black popu­
lation as compared to 64 percent of the white population lived in 
metropolitan areas.10 The differential between black and white 
residence in northern central cities is even greater. While the black 
central city population increased significantly between 1950 and 
1960, the number of whites living in central cities during this same 
period decreased by 5.8 million.11 Moreover, since 1960 the rate of 
white out-migration from the central cities has shown an even 
higher increase. Between 1960 and 1966 the white population of 
the central cities decreased by 4.9 million.12 This dramatic out-
migration of whites no doubt reflects in part an attempt by whites 
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to flee the advancing black tide. It also probably reflects the in­
creasing income of whites and the accompanying urge to secure all 
the trappings of middle-class life, including a home in the sub­
urbs, a yard, better schools, and a two-car garage.13 
Perhaps the most significant consequence of these trends is 
the fact that blacks are rapidly becoming a numerical majority 
in the largest and most important cities in the country. Blacks 
already make up more than 50 percent of the population in 
Washington, D.C., Newark, New Jersey, and Gary, Indiana. 
Estimates indicate that in 1968 seven of the nation's largest 
cities were more than 30 percent black. By 1970 blacks consti­
tuted 43 percent of the population in Detroit, 46 percent in Balti­
more, 38 percent in Cleveland, 41 percent in Saint Louis, and 33 
percent in Philadelphia.14 
The significance of this growing black concentration in urban 
centers as a political resource is fairly self-evident. Politically, 
what the present statistics on black residence in central cities 
obviously mean is that blacks by virtue of their numbers are now 
in a better position than any other ethnic group to influence 
decisions and the outcome of elections in major municipalities. 
In fact, they presently stand in a better politically strategic posi­
tion than any other ethnic group has stood before, except in 
isolated cases.15 No other ethnic group has become so rapidly 
urbanized or has generally constituted as high a percentage of 
the population of major American cities as do the black Ameri­
cans today. Where they are now in the majority, blacks have the 
opportunity to take over city administrations by electing mem­
bers of their own group to major offices in city government. In 
those places where they are not a majority but are rapidly be­
coming one, the policy preferences of blacks can probably no 
longer be ignored. Furthermore, their percentage of the electorate 
practically guarantees that black neighborhoods will be essential 
campaign targets for every serious candidate and that party 
platforms will reflect the pressing needs and aspirations of a 
cross section of the black population. In sum, their concentra­
tion in major cities in the North has put within the reach of black 
Americans the capacity to overcome their historically powerless 
status and to operate in the political system from a position of 
greater strength. However, numbers and geopolitical concentra­
tion are not sufficient to accomplish the political mobilization pro­
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cess. Consequently, it is necessary to discuss the development of 
two additional political resources among blacks: group conscious­
ness and racial pride. 
The expanded development of black consciousness and racial 
pride during the decade of the 1960s enhanced the possibility of 
the development of black political activity in cities that would 
take advantage of the resource of black numerical strength. The 
surge toward black consciousness received its greatest stimula­
tion from the series of mass-based protest movements mounted 
in behalf of civil rights during the 1950s and 1960s. The political 
assaults against southern segregation led by Dr. Martin Luther 
King stirred the emotions of blacks throughout the country; the 
success of the King movement was viewed not as just a triumph 
for those physically involved in the protest movement but as a 
solid victory for all blacks. For all strata of the black population, 
the southern protest movement represented an assertion of their 
human worth—an affirmation of their value as human beings and 
their determination to remove the yoke of racism whatever the 
cost. In the wake of clear signs that gains were being made through 
protest action by blacks in the South, the apathy and sense of 
hopelessness that had so long paralyzed the energies and emo­
tions of the black masses—North and South—began a swift and 
decisive dissipation.16 
The student sit-in demonstrations with their emphasis on 
confrontation through direct action, contributed significantly 
to the growth of political consciousness in the black community. 
Under the guidance of the leaders of the Student Non-violent 
Coordinating Committee (SNCC), protest activity began to be 
viewed as a power resource by which concessions could be ob­
tained through the use of force rather than persuasion.17 As con­
cessions were made to student protestors and the symbols of 
southern white supremacy came tumbling down, blacks through­
out America learned a lesson of enormous political importance: 
power when strategically applied can produce results in situa­
tions where all the efforts at persuasion in the world will have 
little, if any, effect. The success of the student sit-in movement 
in the South created among black Americans everywhere a keen 
sense of their power potentialities. 
Northern blacks were especially influenced by the emphasis on 
power produced by the student protest movement. Consequently, 
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when the protest movement swept North during the middle years 
of the 1960s, embracing the involvement of masses of the urban 
poor, the basic theme of the black rebellion shifted from "Free­
dom Now" to "Black Power". This new theme symbolized the 
growing group consciousness of blacks and their frustrations 
with the slow pace of their social and economic progress in the 
face of rising aspirations to enter the mainstream of American 
life. It represented a growing sense of community, of common 
situation, and common fate. It was a call for black control over 
social, economic, political, religious, and cultural institutions in 
the black community. And, fundamentally, it represented a recog­
nition of the urgent need for black solidarity in politics—the 
necessity for blacks to "build political strength around the 
vote."18 In this sense, black power denoted the use of ethnic or 
racial consciousness among blacks to build unity of action in the 
political process. It also prescribed independent black political 
action—the organization of cohesive voting blocs by blacks and 
their expeditious employment to elect public officials dedicated 
to the overall progress of the black community rather than to 
individual achievement. These various dimensions of black power 
—black pride, black unity, self-help, cohesive political action—have 
all played major roles in laying the attitudinal foundation es­
sential for the political mobilization of blacks in city politics. 
The basic question, of course, is whether these attitudinal de­
velopments can be translated into political action. 
THE ETHNIC ANALOGY 
In assessing the potential political value of the key black 
resources of numerical concentration and racial consciousness, 
some analysts have attempted to draw an analogy between blacks 
and earlier white ethnic groups. From this perspective, blacks 
are seen simply as the most recent arrivals in a long list of 
ethnic groups that have flocked to the teaming cities of America. 
Accordingly, it is suggested that the most fundamental task 
facing black people is that of carving out their fair share of the 
social, economic, and political pie in the cities as had the Irish, 
Italians, Poles, and other ethnic groups before them.19 Although 
recognizing that skin color is an added obstacle for blacks, this 
view holds that other ethnic groups were successful in achieving 
their goals through the building of internal group unity, hard 
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work, and the establishment of a broad network of political in­
fluence and that blacks will be able to achieve the same results 
if they pursue a similar course of action. Thus, though race might 
be a hindrance to black mobilization, it need not necessarily be 
a greater an obstacle than for earlier ethnic groups. In the final 
analysis, writes James Q. Wilson, resistance to black demands 
for power and recognition is no different than "the general re­
sistance put up by [for example] the Irish political leadership of 
the big city to the demands for political recognition expressed 
by Poles, Italians or Germans."20 The logic of this view suggests, 
in essence, that blacks will be able to overcome the political 
barriers imposed by prejudice as easily as the European ethnics 
who migrated to the cities in large numbers before them. 
Implicit in the ethnic analogy is the assumption that America is 
a democratic and pluralist society open to effective competition 
by all groups who wish to use the political process as a lever to 
social and economic progress. But this assumption does not take 
into account the unique position of blacks in the American social 
order—a fact that renders the ethnic analogy totally inappropriate 
as a frame of reference for the analysis of black political develop­
ments in American cities. A number of recent studies have pointed 
to a "mobilization of bias" in the political system that denies to 
blacks sufficient access to resources to allow the black community 
to effectively compete for important benefits.21 Thus, whereas 
the Irish, Italians, Poles, Jews, and other ethnic groups have been 
able to mobilize resources within the political process, and to 
make their collective weight felt on policymaking, no such oppor­
tunity for resource mobilization has been available to the black 
community. Blacks have, in large measure, been systematically 
locked out of the political process by institutional procedures 
and mechanisms that foster white success at the expense of 
less favored nonwhite groups. 
The crucial difficulty with the ethnic analogy is that it ignores 
or deemphasizes race as a fundamental factor in the distribution 
and exercise of power in American politics.22 That race does play 
this crucially important role, however, is a truism too important 
to be lightly brushed aside. In this regard, the point should be 
underscored that European immigrants could improve their status 
in America because they were white people operating in a white-
dominated political system that was relatively open to them and 
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responsive to their quest for important social, economic, and po­
litical benefits. By building community-based organizations and 
mobilizing the ethnic vote, they were able to compete with other 
interests for control over decision-making in city politics. Only 
during the era of reconstruction has black participation in Amer­
ican politics—because of racially oriented institutionalized bar­
riers—approximated the experience of European ethnics. The Irish 
were able to move out of their segregated ghettoes into the com­
fortable surroundings of middle-class suburbia because they had 
the franchise, access to ward clubs, and incentives to compete 
for larger shares of political capital. And it is interesting to note 
that the Irish rise to power in New York City coincided with the 
post-reconstruction moves by whites to strip blacks of their voting 
rights in the South and to deny them entrance to important arenas 
of political influence in the North. 
THE BLACK COMMUNITY AS INTERNAL COLONY 
A more realistic and useful approach is one that sees black 
people not as just another ethnic group but as a group that oc­
cupies a unique position as an oppressed internal colony within 
the larger social, economic, and political system. Fundamental to 
this view is the historical fact that black people did not willingly 
migrate to this country as did other ethnics. They were forcibly 
removed from their African homeland, chained in the holds of ships, 
and sold as slave laborers in the southern economy. In contradic­
tion to the national creed that all people are created equal and 
are endowed with certain unalienable rights, blacks were denied 
equal status, and their most basic human rights were flagrantly 
and violently disregarded. Indeed, the institution of slavery was 
such a blatant contradiction in a society that prided itself on prin­
ciples of human dignity and freedom, that a vast ideological ra­
tionalization had to be constructed in order to justify the treat­
ment of blacks. Basic to the ideology that emerged was the 
contention that black people were subhuman, and therefore not 
entitled to the rights and freedoms normally accorded to individuals 
in civilized society. In the minds of the slave master, the black 
slave was bereft of human qualities and was valuable only as a 
commodity to be brought, sold, and exploited.23 Long after the 
Civil War era when fonnal slavery was destroyed, racist ideas, 
attitudes, and patterns of behavior were continued, taking vari­
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ous forms ranging from Jim Crow laws to physical brutality by 
the Ku Klux Klan in the South and mob violence in the North, to 
the use of I.Q. tests to maintain segregation in education through­
out the country. Over the years racism has penetrated the deep­
est levels of American society. Ingrained organically in American 
culture, and permeating every facet of the nation's life, racism 
shapes the attitudinal predispositions of Americans more power­
fully than any other single force.24 Today the notion of white 
superiority—black inferiority has become so pervasive that the 
"normal" operation of every major institution produces and per­
petuates racist results.25 
There is no denying the fact that nineteenth-century immigrants 
from Europe faced numerous obstacles in constructing a decent 
life for themselves.26 However, they could always take comfort 
in the knowledge that no matter how severe or desperate their 
socioeconomic situation, there was always one group that perma­
nently occupied a position below them—black people. The factor 
of the superior group position of white ethnics over blacks has 
driven an enduring wedge between the two groups. Although there 
have been some instances when white people have joined together 
with blacks in a common struggle to improve their mutually de­
grading situation, the more usual relationship has been one in 
which whites of various backgrounds have united against black 
efforts for progress and liberation. The historical and contempo­
rary evidence shows that even economically marginal whites, only 
a half a step above the poverty level, have generally mobilized 
against poor blacks—with whom they have a great deal in common 
economically—rather than join with them in a common struggle 
against the wealthy elites who have continuously exploited both 
groups.27 The assault of white working-class Irish people on black 
school children in Boston is only the most recent example of this 
phenomenon. Consequently, black people experience a double 
source of oppression in this society—oppression based on their 
class position as the bottom sector of the working class, and the 
unique oppression of racism practiced against them by white 
Americans—including many white ethnic members of their same 
working class. To ignore this reality and view black people as 
just another ethnic group seeking its niche within the American 
socioeconomic system is to close one's eyes to the basic realities 
of American society. 
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One of the main results of this situation is that black commu­
nities exist as subsystems of the larger white society. That is, 
most of the land, housing, business, institutions, media outlets, 
health facilities, education centers, welfare agencies, political 
organizations, and police forces within black communities are con­
trolled by white people and white institutions outside of the com­
munity. This outside control places black communities and their 
residents in a position of subordination and exploitation to the 
whole of white America. Economically, blacks are used by profit-
seeking multinational corporations and middle-sized businesses 
(which make up the economic base of major cities) as a source of 
cheap labor—last to be hired, first to be fired or layed off. As the 
profits accummulated under the wage system are reinvested in 
advanced technology, unskilled and semiskilled jobs are eliminated, 
and blacks are increasingly viewed as "obsolete labor"—that is, no 
longer needed for profit-making.28 However, the black commu­
nity is still viewed as a potential market for the gluttonous con­
sumption that is urged upon all Americans. Despite considerable 
talk during the Nixon years of black capitalism (which boiled down 
to black ownership of small businesses), little in the way of mean­
ingful economic development in the black community has taken 
place. The great bulk of the job sources and the nature of economic 
activity continue to be controlled by white monopolies, a fact 
that substantially reduces the possibilities of black control over 
the economy of the black community.29 
Socially, blacks are confronted with the fact that schools are 
controlled by a predominantly white middle class that imposes 
its standards and values on black children. Efforts by blacks to 
replace middle-class whites as administrators and teachers in 
black schools have often produced vociferous and virulent resis­
tence in the white community.30 Primarily because of strong 
white political opposition, community control of schools remains 
one of the most illusive items on the black agenda. 
Blacks are also the continuing victims of social segregation. 
When blacks move to the city, they are typically forced to settle 
in areas with the worst housing, worst public facilities, and the 
most expensive food prices and credit loans. Isolated in the ghetto, 
blacks are extremely vulnerable to manipulation by powerful white 
forces external to the black community. The major television 
systems, movies, radio programs, and newspapers which bom­
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bard the black community, are controlled by wealthy whites and 
perpetuate white middle-class standards and values. Having no 
control over information in the black community or in the larger 
society, blacks often find themselves accused by whites who do of 
being the originators and major perpetrators of social problems 
in America. Indeed, in recent years some white intellectuals have 
built careers and gained national reputations by arguing that the 
structure of the black family and black life-style, rather than the 
socioeconomic characteristics of U.S. capitalism, are the primary 
factors that underly the oppressed condition of blacks in Amer­
ica.31 
Politically, blacks have either been shut out of political decision-
making and administrative processes through repression, decep­
tion, and discrimination, or victims of various so-called reforms 
that make it extremely difficult for blacks who truly represent 
the needs of the black community to get elected.32 In cities where 
political machines continue to exist (such as Chicago, East Saint 
Louis, and Gary) the black community operates as submachine 
that is subordinate to the white machine, and black politicians 
are generally "bought off" for far less in rewards than the com­
munity contributes in voter support to keep the white-controlled 
machine in power.33 This relationship of the black community 
to the political machine is in marked contrast to the role played 
by machine politics in the political life of European ethnics dur­
ing their rise to power in American society. For European ethnics, 
the political machine was one of the primary institutions that 
helped to promote their social, economic, and political integra­
tion into the wider political community. In its vigorous pursuit 
of the European immigrant vote, the machine served the latent 
functions of inducting the immigrant into the political culture, stim­
ulating his political consciousness, and socializing him into new 
political roles.34 These latent political functions of the machine 
lay at the heart of the process of ethnic political mobilization 
and the rise of formerly powerless ethnic groups to positions of 
improved power in American society. Over time, immigrants were 
absorbed into meaningful positions within the structure of the 
machine, and given an opportunity to compete for power and in­
fluence with the Yankees who had previously dominated the elec­
toral process.35 Ultimately, European ethnic groups (especially 
the Irish and the Italians) were able to parlay their strategic posi­
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tions within the structure of the machine into party nominations 
to major elective offices and appointments to key positions 
within city bureaucracies.36 
In contrast, the leaders of contemporary political machines 
have been quite unwilling to share power with the black commu­
nity. Blacks are rarely given important posts within the machines 
themselves, and even more rarely appointed beyond the token 
level to key positions in city government or slated as candidates 
for major city and county offices. Because of the critical state 
of the black economy in the cities, machine leaders have been 
able to count upon solid support from the black community with­
out providing much in return beyond welfare handouts and low-
level patronage positions to a few select black politicians. Lack­
ing an independent base of power, leaders of the black submachine 
must accommodate themselves to the exploitative relationship of 
the white machine to the black community or face banishment 
into political obscurity. The unavailability of the machine as an 
instrument of power for blacks vividly illuminates the posture of 
the black community as an internal colony devoid of control over 
vital social, economic, and political resources. 
Contemporary political and governmental reforms have contrib­
uted significantly to the maintenance of the colonial relationship 
between the black community and the larger society. For exam­
ple, the switch from ward-based partisan electoral systems to non­
partisan at-large electoral systems by a number of cities means 
that black candidates must be able to attract significant white 
as well as black support—and they must do so without benefit of 
party label. In many cases, it is impossible for black candidates 
to get more than marginal white support, regardless of their qual­
ifications or their political posture. In others, they can obtain 
considerable white support only by assuming political positions 
likely to alienate potential black supporters. Thus, at-large arrange­
ments arbitrarily dilute the political impact of black numerical 
concentration, and render nearly impossible the election of black 
candidates who are commited to the advancement of the interests 
of the black community. Similar results are also produced by the 
consolidation of central cities into regional or "metropolitan" 
governmental units. Whatever else its assets might be, metropoli­
tan government has the distinct liability of offsetting the political 
importance of heavy black concentrations in major urban centers 
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by shifting the boundaries of local government to the county or 
regional level where elected officials (mainly white) will be re­
sponsive to a dominant political coalition made up of suburban and 
inner-city whites.37 Unquestionably, many proponents of metro­
politan government are more concerned about maintaining white 
control over the central city—in the face of declining white resi­
dency in the central city—than finding rational and efficient solu­
tions to the problem of urban governance. For these individuals, 
metropolitan government is no more than a convenient mechanism 
for institutionalizing and perpetuating white domination over 
political and governmental activity in the black community. 
When black people have rebelled against their social, economic, 
and political domination by white colonials, they have often faced 
the armed might of local and extralocal police forces. As the black 
thrust for liberation gained new momentum during the 1960s and 
1970s, virtually every black leader was either killed, jailed, or 
harassed by the police. No white ethnic group has encountered 
the pervasive and severe repression that has been heaped upon 
black militants. The racial makeup of almost any jail or prison in 
the country is a testimony to the racist impact of the socio­
economic system, the double standard of legal "justice" under 
the system, and political repression of militants. 
It is important to understand that these socioeconomic arrange­
ments not only repress the individual and community development 
of blacks, but simultaneously grant material and psychological 
benefits and privileges to whites.38 White superiority and black 
inferiority within this system exist in dialectical relationship to 
one another. That is, the early plantation owners, industrialists, 
and bankers could never have made the money they did if blacks 
had not been held captives as slaves for two hundred years, and, 
once freed, pushed to the bottom of the urban working class—a 
position they still occupy. Although at a much lower level of ma­
terial benefit, it is also true that white production and profession­
al workers would not be able to have the jobs, wages, consump­
tion levels, and various other benefits they derive from the 
American economy if blacks were not contained below them and 
if U.S. multinational corporations and the U.S. military were not 
successful in reaping super profits from Third World people in 
Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Most working-class white peo­
ple have overcome many obstacles to obtain the marginal bene­
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fits they have under American capitalism; yet their efforts to 
overcome these obstacles have been generally expressed in a 
framework in which their own economic advancement and security 
are placed above the injustices perpetrated against blacks and 
people of color throughout the world. Basically, they have inter­
nalized the economic and political ideology of the society as a 
whole and therefore have tended to view blacks as their enemies 
rather than potential allies in a common struggle that would im­
prove the lives of all working-class Americans. 
In short, powerful white businessmen and politicians have con­
tinuously secured great benefits out of the colonial relationship 
that exists between white and black societies in America. In their 
quest to develop the country and its cities so as to expand their 
own benefits, the powerful have used black people as expendable 
objects within the development process and have created a social 
system that has successfully socialized large numbers of white 
working class people to accept and support the racism inherent 
in the system. This alliance between both powerful and relatively 
powerless whites against the black masses invalidates the notion 
that black people are just another ethnic group attempting to join 
the "great American melting pot," and is the main means by 
which black people are subjugated as a national minority within 
the confines of this society. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR BLACK POLITICAL MOBILIZATION 
The position of the black community as an internal colony of 
white society has a number of important implications for black 
political mobilization. Control over black life by whites has had the 
effect of stifling the development of resources necessary for po­
litical mobilization in the black community. As we have seen, 
demographic shifts in the urban population since World War II 
have invested black communities with the important political re­
sources of numbers and concentration. The point must be made, 
however, that the factors of large numbers and urban concentra­
tion are only potential resources at the command of ethnic groups 
seeking to advance in American society via the process of politics. 
Numbers and concentration do not automatically translate into 
political influence. These resources, if they are to be translated 
into political influence commensurate with their magnitude, must 
be supplemented by at least four other political resources: 
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1.	 Group cohesion—a feeling among people that they are in a 
common situation and face a common fate. 
2.	 Leadership—individuals from the group who gain support 
for their suggestions as to how the group may improve its 
common fate. 
3.	 Political consciousness—the realization by the group and its 
leadership that their common fate can be influenced by 
group political action. 
4.	 Organization—the building of political organization to 
achieve group goals. 
In order for a group to wield political power, it is not enough 
that it be concentrated in large numbers in a limited geopolitical 
area. Political power (the ability to influence the allocation of 
governmental resources), in so far as it flows from electoral 
action, is achieved only if numbers are augmented by group cohe­
sion, leadership, political consciousness, and organization. With­
in this context the political mobilization process means the utili­
zation of these resources to achieve group political goals.39 The 
fundamental point to be noted is that when a group manifests 
potential strength in numbers and high concentration, it does not 
automatically manifest the latter four resources. These support­
ing resources develop only after the group has surmounted cer­
tain barriers to its effective emergence in the political process. 
They also develop over considerable periods of time, if at all, and 
often at uneven rates. Indeed, some groups may never mobilize 
themselves for political action because, for a variety of reasons, 
they are unable to muster the latter four resources. Political mo­
bilization only results when all of the mentioned resources con­
verge at a particular point in time. 
Racism has been a pivotal stumbling block to the development 
of supporting resources for political mobilization in the black 
community. One manifestation of racism that has served as a for­
midable obstacle to black political mobilization has been the system 
of social control that has effectively locked blacks out of the arena 
of influence and competition in which important public policies 
are made. Professor Michael Parenti has described the operation 
of this system in Newark, New Jersey. He found that despite con­
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stant protests by blacks against the exorbitant rent they paid for 
substandard housing, and in behalf of the installation of a traffic 
light at an extraordinarily dangerous corner, the black commu­
nity received little in the way of positive action from city officials40 
Essentially, their aspirations and needs never entered into the rel­
evant sectors of the political process where serious grievances 
were heard and positive corrective action taken. Their position 
conformed perfectly with William Gamson's heuristic model of 
stable unrepresentation in which some groups are described as 
occupying a status outside the arena of decision-making on a more 
or less permanent basis.41 The condition of stable unrepresenta­
tion that characterizes the political posture of the black commu­
nity has lead to the development of a high sense of cyncism and 
futility by blacks regarding the responsiveness and legitimacy of 
the political process. Alienated from the political system, blacks 
have lacked the motivational incentives necessary for the devel­
opment of group solidarity, effective organizations and selfless 
leadership. 
Black victimization in the American social and economic 
system has also greatly hampered the process of political mobiliza­
tion in the black community. Faced with problems of unemploy­
ment, underemployment, on the job discrimination, and deterio­
rated physical environments, many blacks consider involvement 
in political activity a luxury they can ill afford. These persons are 
so caught up in the sheer struggle to survive that political matters 
generally cannot stir their interest; and even if they did, they would 
have little time to devote to them. 
Most critically, the political mobilization of working-class blacks 
is rendered difficult by their lack of a sense of political efficacy 
(a feeling of competency to affect the course of political events 
and decisions). The lower-class status of the black community 
has meant that in comparison with "better off" Americans the 
communications networks of black citizens are poor. They are less 
likely to belong to community organizations with direct, continu­
ing interest in politics, read newspapers or consult other public 
media, have informal group associations that stimulate their in­
terest in politics, or have educational skills enabling them to cope 
with complex political issues.42 They are, so to speak, on the pe­
riphery rather than the center of society and are less likely to re­
ceive political messages that can be translated into concrete po­
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litical terms. Relatively uninformed about political matters, they 
are also less likely to feel they can affect the outcome of elections 
or the making of public policy. "Quite understandably," writes 
Lester Milbrath, "a person who knows more about the political 
world is more likely to feel that he can do something to manipu­
late it. In addition, he sees others in his social milieu take politi­
cal action with the obvious expectation they will get result."43 
Pushed to the bottom of the economic order, and insulated from 
arenas of influence in American politics, low-income blacks are 
likely to view government as remote and unresponsive and to feel 
themselves powerless to derive significant payoffs from their po­
litical participation.44 They are, in the phrase of Penn Kimball, 
disconnected from the political system and are therefore among 
the most difficult of all Americans to mobilize for effective politi­
cal action.45 
The position of the black community as an economic colony 
of white America has stifled the process of black political mobili­
zation in other ways. Money is a key resource in politics. How­
ever, because of the dire economic situation of blacks in America, 
it is a resource sorely lacking in the black community. Only a 
tiny fraction of the Black population has sufficient capital to help 
subsidize the cost of high-powered political campaigns—cam­
paigns that rely more and more on the mass media, a costly 
political instrument. Most black entrepreneurs are small busi­
nessmen with little capital to invest in matters not directly related 
to their business interests. Furthermore, many black professionals 
prosperous enough to underwite such ventures have tended to be 
apolitical. Those willing to invest in political activities have often 
been shackled by nonpolitical policies adhered to by the institu­
tions for which they work. The paucity of economic resources 
capable of being diverted to effective political use constitutes a 
powerful constraint on black political power. 
The colonial experience of black America has produced intra-
communal rivalry and tension that has tended to mitigate against 
the development of viable organizational structures and unified 
group activity required for effective political mobilization. This 
situation stems, in part, from the fact that political influence 
within the internal environment of the black community is aggre­
gated through a variety of institutions organized around the needs 
of leaders and constituents who seek to maximize their impact 
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on community decision-making. To be effective, each of these in­
stitutions must keep in its possession a minimum amount of orga­
nizational resources that can be employed in pursuit of social, 
economic, and political objectives. Professor Matthew Holden 
has identified these resources as: (1) technical bureaucratic 
skills; (2) money; (3) internal attention; and (4) external recogni­
tion.46 Competition over these resources, which are constantly in 
short supply in the black community, constitutes a prime motiva­
tional force for factional disputes that tear black communities 
apart. Adopting the ageless strategy of divide and conquer, white 
political leaders sagaciously manipulate badly needed organiza­
tional resources in ways intended to intensify rivalry and compe­
tition between black political factions. In an atmosphere charged 
with suspicion spawned by competition over scarce resources, 
collective or community decision-making becomes a virtual im­
possibility. Prominent black organizations whose political stakes 
lie in different directions find themselves adversaries rather than 
allies in the political arena, despite their expressed desire for unity 
and sincere commitment to black liberation. 
Competition over organizational resources does not take place 
in a vaccum; generally underlying such disputes are deep-seated 
ideological differences concerning ends and means of black po­
litical action. Ideological beliefs in the black community are broad, 
varied, and diffuse, running the gamut from extremely conserva­
tive to extremely militant. 
Given the mosaic of ideological positions and approaches in 
the black community, it is hardly surprising that unity is difficult 
to obtain, and conflict and competition represent the more normal 
conditions of black life. Disparities in ideological outlooks result 
in internal feuding and jealousies that render the mounting of 
unified political movements extremely difficult. Thus, an aspir­
ing black politician may find that the greatest resistance to his 
political success will emerge not from the white community but 
from the black community among forces with whom he is in sharp 
philosophical and political disagreement. Black conflict of this 
sort grows out of the fact that the ideological distance between 
two black factions is sometimes far greater than the distance be­
tween these factions and political activists in the white commu­
nity. Sharing a community of interests with compatible whites, 
black leaders are sometimes prone to prefer whites to blacks as 
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partners in political alliances.47 Passionate calls for black unity 
have rarely contravened the pragmatic calculation by black lead­
ers of where their best interests reside at any particular point in 
time. 
Social-class tensions have been a further source of factional dis­
putes in the black community. Such disputes have resonated both 
within and between classes. The most virulent tension, historically, 
has flashed between low-income and middle-income blacks. This 
tension has generally centered around the rejection of middle-class 
black leadership by lower-class blacks on the grounds that middle-
class leaders have been "out for themselves" and accepted the mul­
tiple rewards of white society at the expense of their low-income 
black brothers. 
Distrust of black leadership has been a pervasive phenomenon 
in the black community and has served to substantially retard the 
development of an effective black political-leadership structure. 
Black political leaders are frequently accused of selling out the 
black community for the sake of obtaining highly valued benefits 
for themselves. This charge undoubtedly is rooted, in large mea­
sure, in the widespread practice of black political leaders coming to 
the fore as handpicked choices of dominate white forces. Many 
blacks view such persons as illegitimate and harbor a deep suspi­
cion that they are working in the interest of their white patrons 
rather than that of the black community. The difficulty with such 
labeling is that it is often applied indiscriminantly and does not 
distinguish between black politicians who are deeply committed to 
using their political positions to advance the social, economic, and 
political welfare of the black community and those that are not.48 
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter we have attempted to establish the proposition 
that blacks face more formidable obstacles to their mobilization in 
the electoral process than those faced by earlier white ethnic groups. 
Unlike European ethnics who have, over time, gained access to in­
struments of power in the American political system, blacks have 
been excluded from meaningful participation in the electoral pro­
cess and denied entrance into the arenas of vital decision-making 
on a continuous basis. This condition of stable unrepresentation in 
the political process is one component of a more comprehensive 
system of racial oppression that has relegated the black community 
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to the position of an internal colony of white society. The glaring 
disparities in access to the instruments of power between white 
ethnics and blacks makes an analogy between the political mobili­
zation of white ethnics and blacks both invalid and inappropriate. 
Black leaders seeking to mobilize the black community for effec­
tive political action must, of necessity, come to grips with a range 
of important factors that help to establish and perpetuate the colon­
ial relationship of the black community to the larger society. In­
vidious racist practices that result in widespread black poverty, un­
employment and underemployment, psychological stress and low 
self-esteem, and an inadequate sense of political efficacy, are for­
midable barriers to political participation that cannot be overcome, 
in the contemporary context, through ordinary means. Similarly, 
the absence of black control over community resources and insti­
tutions means that the mechanisms for power—so crucial to the rise 
of other ethnic groups—tend to be permanently beyond the effective 
management of black leaders seeking to advance the political inter­
est of blacks via the electoral process. More likely than not, they 
will find community-based civic groups, churches, financial and 
commercial institutions, and political organizations controlled by 
outsiders and used as impediments to the effective mobilization of 
the black community for independent political action. Thus, black 
political mobilization, perforce, involves more than an effort to 
assimilate into the ongoing political structure; it involves an attack 
against the entire panoply of colonial relationships that serve to 
repress the emergence of a politics of liberation in the black 
community. For this reason, the issue of black political mobilization 
provides for the black politician a host of demands and challenges 
never faced by the white ethnic politicians who led the effort to 
mobilize European ethnics for effective political action at an earlier 
time. 
In light of the obstacles to effective black political emergence 
examined in this chapter, two crucial questions arise: (1) can blacks 
overcome these obstacles and mobilize successfully in the electoral 
process; and (2) if so, what are the ingredients of the mobilization 
effort that must be undertaken. To shed penetrating light on these 
questions, case studies of black political action in three cities are 
presented. In the final chapter in this section, a case study of the 
1967 mayoral election in East Saint Louis, Illinois, is presented to 
illustrate in graphic terms the multitude of problems blacks have 
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traditionally encountered in their efforts to mobilize effectively. 
Part two contains six chapters that analyze the sociopolitical en­
vironments of Cleveland, Ohio, and Gary, Indiana, and offer case 
studies of the 1967 mayoral campaigns in these cities. The stress 
in these chapters is on the identification of factors that contribute 
to the success of mobilization efforts in the black community. 
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The Defeat of an All-Black Ticket 
in East Saint Louis 
INTRODUCTION 
East Saint Louis, Illinois, is one of the northern cities that provides 
a setting in which a successful black mobilization process could 
theoretically result in black control of the local governmental sys­
tem. Except for Washington, D.C., which traditionally has lacked 
local government, East Saint Louis (ESL) was one of the largest 
northern cities in 1967 to have a black majority in both population 
and registered voters. This majority resulted from an absolute 
loss of white population and a gain of black population in ESL be­
tween 1950 and 1967. In the former year 54,725 whites resided in 
ESL; by 1960 this number had decreased to 45,309, a decline of 
17 percent. In contrast, the black population was 27,570 in 1950 
and increased to 36,403 in 1960, which meant that blacks consti­
tuted 45 percent of the total 81,712 inhabitants in 1960. Estimates 
made in 1967 indicated that the total population had increased 
to 83,890 and that the black proportion of the total population 
had increased to about 60 percent. In terms of registered voters, 
blacks constituted close to 50 percent of all voters in 1960 and 
about 58 percent by 1967.1 
The social and economic characteristics of ESL blacks are sim­
ilar to those of blacks in other central cities and in some respects 
are worse. For example, in 1964, about 33 percent of black males in 
the labor force were unemployed; the median family income for 
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blacks was $2,509; a full 52 percent of employed blacks earned 
less than $3,000 per year; the median school year completed for 
adults was 8.1; and only 32 percent of the blacks lived in sound 
housing units. In short, a large segment of the black community 
in ESL lived in poverty-stricken circumstances.2 
Until the 1964 establishment of the federal antipoverty program, 
virtually no public action was being conducted in the community 
to improve the circumstances of the black population. Neither the 
city government, the business community, nor the labor unions 
had made any notable efforts to widen the opportunity structure 
or eliminate the oppressive conditions of ESL blacks. The few 
advances that had been achieved in recent years occurred during 
the summer of 1963. Stimulated by the action of the national 
civil rights movement, a group of blacks boycotted and picketed 
several businesses in the city until blacks were hired; the group 
also conducted sit-ins against the banks for alleged employment 
and loan discrimination. On the whole, however, the ESL black 
community did not generate a sustained local civil rights move­
ment nor did it operate as an organized, cohesive, demand-mak­
ing force in the city. Some black spokesmen accused their people 
of being grossly apathetic compared with the civil rights activity 
of blacks in other cities. 
During the spring of 1967 a group of young black politicians, 
who publicly pledged themselves to improve the depressing condi­
tions of ESL blacks, attempted to rally the black community be­
hind them by challenging the incumbent officials in the city elec­
tion for mayor and council.3 Since this election took place in a 
city with a majority of black voters and pitted an all-black ticket 
against four white incumbents and a hand-picked black incum­
bent, it provides a good opportunity to explore the difficulties en­
countered in attempting to mobilize the black masses for indepen­
dent electoral action. 
THE EAST SAINT LOUIS MAYORAL ELECTION OF 1967 
The black ticket was headed by the mayoral candidate, Elmo 
Bush, a director of adult and vocational education in East Saint 
Louis. No neophyte to East Saint Louis politics, Bush had accumu­
lated an unusual mixture of both formal and practical political ex­
perience. In addition to earning a master's degree in political 
science at the University of Illinois, he had served as a Democratic 
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precinct committeeman in ESL for seven years, a county super­
visor for three years, and had accepted a political appointment in 
the state capital to work in the Motor Vehicle Department. The 
other members of the Bush ticket included A. Wendell Wheadon, 
a part-time law student and civil-service engineer employed by 
the Illinois Division of Highways; William "Bill" Ray, an elemen­
tary school teacher and Democratic precinct committeeman; and 
Joe Lewis, a past president of the Metropolitan Republican Club, 
a black Republican organization in ESL. 
The incumbent ticket was led by Mayor Alvin G. Fields, who 
was first elected to the office in 1951. Fields had run unopposed 
and won three consecutive terms since that year and was widely 
regarded as an important Democratic politician in the state of Il­
linois and certainly the top politician in the ESL area. Included on 
his ticket were three other long-time public officials: police com­
missioner, Russell Beebe; finance commissioner, Dan Foley; 
building commissioner, Robert Keeley; and fire commissioner, 
Ester Saverson, the only black on the incumbent slate and the only 
incumbent in his first term of office. 
Saverson, who was chairman of the black Democratic organiza­
tion in ESL (the Paramount Committeemen's Club), was added to 
the Fields ticket in 1963 when one of the former commissioners 
passed away. He was considered by many of his fellow blacks as 
the most influential black politician in the city because of his 
closeness to Mayor Fields, but a man who was so subservient 
and loyal to Fields that he was unwilling (or unable) to exert 
much independent pressure on behalf of his people.4 
According to Saverson, however, others overestimated what a 
black politician could accomplish for the black community in a 
strongly white-controlled city and political organization. He em­
phasized the point that he had been elected to an office that would 
have been out of reach without white organizational support and 
therefore he had to operate within that framework. Recalling his 
feelings on this issue prior to his election in 1963, he stated: 
I wanted to become commissioner, but I didn't push it. After all, 
what could I do to push it? If the city machine didn't support me, I 
couldn't get elected, could I? Fields is my friend and has been for 
over thirty years. He told me around 1956 that the first time there 
was a vacancy I would be the one considered. I couldn't have won 
without the Fields machine, and no Negro can win now without the 
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machine. . .  . Do you know that I got 3,000 white votes and I would 
have lost if those 3,000 white votes had gone to my opponent? 
It was that sort of black dependency that the Bush campaign 
hoped to eliminate. On 4 December 1966, Bush held his first press 
conference and formally announced his candidacy. At that time he 
accused the city council of reacting to progress rather than mak­
ing progress; claimed that city hall had politically dominated the 
school system, which had resulted in bad and unequal education; 
contended that the city government was part of a corrupt political 
machine that dominated Saint Clair County; and attacked the city 
council for failing to provide improvements in urban renewal and 
for filling key office positions with incompetent personnel. He 
also stated that he did not expect to receive the backing of the 
twenty-nine black Democratic committeemen because he realized 
that most of them depended on the political machine for their 
livelihoods through jobs with the city, county, Levee Board, 
and school board. He was particularly critical of the city adminis­
tration's personnel practices and singled out the director of the 
Urban Renewal Program as a prime example of "the haphazard, 
backslapping manner in which responsible offices are filled by 
irresponsible parties, whose only qualification for office is loyalty 
to the machine." Asked whether this criticism also applied to Com­
missioner Ester Saverson, Bush replied: "Where has Saverson 
been during all of the years of mismanagement, what has been 
his position on the issues of lagging urban renewal and incompe­
tent city officials?"5 
During the second week of January 1967 both Mayor Fields and 
his challenger Elmo Bush went through the traditional ritual of 
presenting their campaign platforms to the citizens of East Saint 
Louis. The Fields platform attempted to denote a city on the move. 
It called for the initial implementation of a $750 million redevelop­
ment plan, the erection of 1,000 new housing units per year, the 
securing of state and federal funds to develop the river front, the 
goal of having East Saint Louis declared a Model City, additional 
efforts to establish an industrial park, and the securing of more 
federal funds to continue the local war on poverty. The platform 
also pledged racial equality in hiring and promoting practices, 
the enactment of a civil service measure for city employees, the 
adoption of a code of ethics for the city council, the development 
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of a scientific code enforcement program, the establishment of 
neighborhood councils to assist the police department, and sev­
eral other measures that would supposedly keep the city on the of­
fensive. 
According to the Bush platform the city administration was 
viewed in exactly opposite terms—as a do-nothing administration. 
The platform was prefaced by a statement asserting that East 
Saint Louis needed a change from the "unscrupulous and domi­
neering political machine which has eliminated all opposition 
. . . [and] has run our city for its own good—politics as usual— 
without regard to the needs of our people, our neighborhoods, 
our schools, our children or our senior citizens." Among other 
things, the platform pledged to eliminate the political domination 
of city hall over the schools, to develop the abandoned urban-
renewal land lying waste in the heart of the city, to erase the 
city's critical need for low- and middle-income housing, to 
strengthen the city's depressed financial status, to support a strong 
ordinance on air pollution, to enact measures that would aid the 
victims of unemployment, and, interestingly enough, to work to 
change the commission form of government to the aldermanic 
plan, which would eliminate the jobs the commissioner candidates 
were running for. In fact, this last item was pushed by the Bush 
ticket as one of the key campaign issues in an effort to gain some 
white support.6 
During the same period that the platforms were announced, it 
was revealed that A. Wendell Wheadon, the civil engineer on 
Bush's slate, was fired from his job with the Illinois Division of 
Highways because he refused to withdraw as a candidate in the 
election. Citing the Hatch Act, which prohibits certain public 
employees from becoming involved in partisan political activity, 
a spokesman for the state agency said that "Wheadon was fired 
because he declined to end participation in political activity."7 
Bush, however, argued that the firing of Wheadon was strictly a 
political move ordered by Mayor Fields. He noted that Fields 
was the vice-chairman of the Democratic state central committee 
and that the director of the state agency involved was politically 
appointed. Both Bush and Wheadon pointed out that the Hatch 
Act bars partisan activity and that the city election was conducted 
on a nonpartisan basis; thus the law was not applicable. The 
same point was made in an editorial that appeared in the city's 
40 / Electing Black Mayors 
daily newspaper, the Metro-East Journal. The editorial called for 
a public hearing on the matter, as well as the issuing of a state­
ment by state officials that made it clear that the prohibition 
against political activity applied to everyone "and not just to a 
highway engineer who happens to run against the East St. Louis 
city hall organization."8 
During the week of 22 January the incumbent city council ticket 
received the endorsement of three black political organizations. 
The Metropolitan Republican Precinct Committeemen Organiza­
tion voted unanimously to back the incumbents and the Para­
mount Democratic Precinct Committeemen Organization, headed 
by Chairman Ester Saverson, also passed a resolution backing the 
Fields slate. Bill Ray, running mate of Elmo Bush, cast the lone 
dissenting vote. Support was also extended to the ticket by the 
Paramount Democratic Women. 
These announcements were made with little fanfare and cre­
ated little public comment since it had been assumed by many 
in the community, including the members of the Bush ticket, 
that these black organizations would come out for Fields since 
their members were politicians who were indebted to the city hall 
organization. However, the announcement made a week later that 
the Baptist Ministerial Alliance, a black religious organization, 
had voted to endorse the Fields slate, evoked a much more criti­
cal reaction in the black community. Although it eventually be­
came known that the Baptist ministers had privately split over the 
issue, a number of outspoken blacks expressed dismay that the 
leading religious spokesmen of the black community had turned 
their backs on the Bush ticket and had gone on record for the 
Fields slate. The strongest reaction came from Eugene Redmond 
in a column in the East Saint Louis Monitor, pointing out that at 
least five of the ministers who endorsed the Fields ticket held 
city jobs and that one was on city, county, and state payrolls. 
Redmond denounced the members of the Black Ministerial Alli­
ance as the kind of spiritual leaders that shamed all blacks, and 
whose primary political function was that of helping to keep black 
people in their place.9 
As the primary election of 14 February approached, most of the 
excitement of the campaign had centered around the firing of 
Wheadon and the action of the Baptist ministers. The only sub­
stantive issue that gained unusual attention concerned the form of 
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government in East Saint Louis. Citing the conclusions of a 1963 
report issued by Southern Illinois University dealing with the 
government of East Saint Louis, Bush argued that the commission 
form of government was obsolete and should be replaced by an 
aldermanic structure to effectuate a more equitable representation 
of the city's neighborhoods. In an apparent effort to gain some 
white backing for his all-black slate, Bush implied that he was not 
attempting to head an effort that would result in black domina­
tion of the city by stating: "In view of the city's biracial structure, 
I don't see any other system which would provide the people with 
fair representation. The aldermanic form of government allows for 
representation in the City Council. Under the present system, you 
can have either an all-Negro or all-white council since all com­
missions are elected city wide." Mayor Fields took the opposite 
position by presenting the "good government" argument that the 
ward system encouraged parochialism whereas the commission 
form allowed representatives to take a citywide view in de­
termining decisions. He also stated that the quality of officials 
was much more important than the structure of government. If 
officials were good the government would be good. 
The primary election was conducted on 14 February 1967 and 
the entire Fields ticket was nominated by a substantial margin; 
all the incumbents received at least 60 percent of the citywide 
vote with Fields leading the ticket by gathering 67 percent of the 
total votes cast (see table 2). Bush also led his slate by collecting 
33 percent of the vote and all but one of his running mates, Ray 
Willis, were nominated, although they ran about three to one 
behind the members of the Fields ticket. Relatively speaking, Bush 
did somewhat better than the rest of his slate since Fields col­
lected 10,499 votes to his 5,154, a margin of about two to one. 
Jack Houston, a white independent candidate for commissioner, 
obtained 3,115 votes and ran ahead of three members of Bush's 
slate, thus knocking Willis out of the election. 
An analysis of the primary vote by precincts shows that 5,796 
votes or 36 percent of the total were cast in the twenty-two 
predominately white precincts. In these precincts the white candi­
dates on the Fields ticket gathered an overwhelming proportion 
of the votes, ranging from a high by Fields of 5,128 or 88 percent 
to a low by Keeley of 4,459 or 77 percent (see table 3). The lone 
black on the Fields ticket, Ester Saverson, received only 2,987 votes 
TABLE 2

EAST SAINT LOUIS PRIMARY ELECTION, 1967

(Total Votes Cast—15,653)

Fields ticket: 
Fields

Beebe

Foley

Keeley

Saverson
Bush ticket: 
Bush
Lewis
Ray
Wheadon
Willis
Total Percentage of

Votes Total Votes

 10,499 67 
 10,055 64 
 10,367 66 
 9,338 60 
 9,367 60 
 5,154 33

 2,842 18

 2,949 19

 3,803 24

 2,728 17

Independent candidates: 
Brewer 1,616 10 
Houston 3,115 20 
SOURCE: Computed from Board of Election statistics and population projec­
tions of the Metropolitan Affairs Program of Southern Illinois University, 
Edwardsville campus. 
TABLE 3 
EAST SAINT LOUIS PRIMARY ELECTION, 1967:

BY BLACK AND WHITE PRECINCTS

WHITE PRECINCTS (N—22)
(Total Votes—5,796)
Percentage of
Total Votes Votes Cast in
Received White Precincts
Fields ticket: 
Fields 5,128 88

Beebe 4,952 85

Foley 5,006 86

Keeley 4,459 77

Saverson 2,987 52

Bush ticket: 
Bush 668 12
Lewis 293 5
Ray 339 6
Wheadon 485 8
Willis 310 5
Independent candidate: 
Brewer 498 9

Houston 2,330 40

 BLACK PRECINCTS (N—29) 
 (Total Votes—9,857) 
 Percentage of 
 Total Votes Votes Cast in 
 Received Black Precincts 
 5,371 54

 5,103 52

 5,361 54

 4,879 49

 6,380 65

 4,486 46

 2,549 26

 2,610 26

 3,318 34

 2,418 25

 1,118 11

 785 8

SOURCE: Computed from Board of Election statistics and population projections of the Metropolitan Affairs
Program of Southern Illinois University, Edwardsville campus. 
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in the white precincts but these votes were enough to give him a 
majority, and they represented a total that was more than four 
times what any member of the Bush ticket was able to achieve in 
the white precincts. In fact, Bush led his running mates in these 
twenty-two districts with a scant 668 votes or 12 percent of the 
total votes. 
In the twenty-nine black precincts 9,857 votes were cast, which 
constituted 64 percent of the total votes. As might be expected, 
Saverson led the Fields ticket by receiving 6,380 votes or 65 per­
cent of the total. The mayor obtained 54 percent of the black vote; 
his running mate Keeley was the only member of the ticket who 
did not receive a majority of the black vote, although he did ob­
tain 49 percent. None of the candidates on the Bush ticket re­
ceived a majority of the votes cast in the black districts. Bush 
came the closest to a majority by gathering 46 percent of the vote 
and Wheadon followed with 34 percent. The other members of his 
ticket, however, were able to attract only about one-fourth of the 
votes cast in black-populated precincts. 
To summarize, then, the primary election resulted in a sub­
stantial victory for the incumbents. All of them were able to attract 
at least 60 percent of the citywide vote. With the exception of 
Saverson, they won overwhelmingly in the city's white districts 
and with the exception of Keeley, they were able to fashion 
majorities in the black districts. The Bush ticket, in contrast, was 
not nearly as successful. The candidates were overwhelmed in the 
white neighborhoods and were unable to achieve at least a ma­
jority in the black neighborhoods. 
Ordinarily these results would be considered a landslide; but in 
the context of East Saint Louis politics where, for example, the 
mayor had run unopposed for three consecutive terms, the show­
ing by Bush was viewed by some political observers as somewhat 
of a victory. One veteran politician was quoted as saying, "I 
wouldn't have given Bush more than 3,000 under any circum­
stances. I guess the machine is in trouble." 
Bush did not choose to interpret the primary results pessimisti­
cally, particularly in the white neighborhoods. While admitting 
that his men had expected to lose heavily in the north end of the 
city (where white voters were concentrated), he stressed the point 
that "we did receive votes in all-white neighborhoods, and it's 
very gratifying to me that so many white residents of the city 
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considered the issues in the election." He continued by stating, 
"We have to get some communication with the white voters. If 
I have an opportunity to talk with them, I think I can persuade 
them we deserve their votes."10 
Bush's emphasis on extending more lines of communication into 
the white neighborhoods was based on the obvious fact that it 
was virtually impossible for him to win the election unless a larger 
proportion of white voters backed him. He felt that he had a 
reasonable chance to reverse the 900-vote margin that separated 
him and Fields in the black precincts. Therefore, he was confronted 
with the dual tasks of obtaining at least one-third of the white 
votes and of gaining a substantial margin in the black precincts, 
which had cast 64 percent of the primary votes. That he and his 
running mates might do both was possible, but the odds were 
clearly against them. 
The Bush slate was given an opportunity to gain greater ex­
posure to white voters through the invitation of the local NAACP 
to hold public town meetings for all the candidates in both the 
north and south sections of the city. The members of the Bush 
ticket announced immediately that they would attend both meet­
ings. However, when the invitation was extended by the NAACP 
to the incumbents at a city council meeting, Mayor Fields stated 
that he could not promise to appear. "I'll have to check my 
schedule before I can tell you if I will come to your meeting. I'm 
working night and day right now carrying out my duties as mayor 
of this city." Mrs. Mildred L. Sammons, president of the local 
branch of the NAACP, responded to the mayor by saying, "I 
don't think, your Honor, that you have any duties to the citizens 
of this city that are more important than meeting the voters and 
informing them about your programs . . . giving time to your citi­
zens is part of your job."11 
Despite the urgings by Mrs. Sammons, none of the members of 
the Fields ticket appeared at any public meetings during the entire 
election campaign. The Bush ticket and Houston, in contrast, 
appeared at several question-and-answer sessions in both the 
white and black sections of the city. At these meetings, which 
were generally attended by small crowds (less than 100), the 
candidates expounded on and reiterated what they considered to 
be the many failures of the city administration and then pre­
sented their proposals for dealing with the past shortcomings. 
Although the meetings did give the challengers some publicity 
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through newspaper coverage, it is doubtful that many votes were 
gained since attendance was meager and was made up, to a con­
siderable extent, by many of the same people. In fact, some of 
Bush's advisors felt that the time devoted to the meetings would 
have been better spent on door-to-door campaigning. Certainly 
such a suggestion was persuasive. When questioned on this point, 
Bush stated that he decided that such an approach in the white 
community was simply too risky. "The one thing I didn't need 
was an incident in the white neighborhoods. That's all that had 
to happen was for me to go to some white's house and have them 
start something that might have gotten out of hand, and I 
wouldn't have gotten any white votes." Due to this possibility, 
Bush and his running mates were put at a disadvantage of not 
being able to do the kind of grass-roots campaigning that has 
proven valuable in many local elections. 
A series of articles appearing in the Metro-East Journal disclosed 
another serious disadvantage that confronted the Bush ticket. The 
Journal charged that wholesale vote fraud occurred in the 14 
February East Saint Louis primary. Citing specific precincts and 
names of voters, election judges and committeemen, the paper 
demonstrated that as many as fifty illegal votes were cast in 
each of several black precincts by individuals voting for deceased 
persons or voting for voters who had moved out of the precincts 
but had not had their names removed from the register. It was 
also noted that such action could not occur unless the election 
judges, who were hired through the efforts of their precinct com­
mitteemen, cooperated with the committeemen. For example, the 
paper reported specific instances of election judges allowing 
committeemen to enter the voting booth with healthy voters. 
The members of the East Saint Louis Board of Election Com­
missioners, Clifford Easton, Alvin G. Fields, Jr., and Mead E. 
Dowling, responded to these accusations by promising to in­
vestigate any irregularities. In a formal statement the commis­
sioners also argued that many of the voting cases that may have 
appeared fraudulent were clerical errors. "It should be noted 
that a clerical mistake made by a judge of election at the precinct 
polls on election day should not be confused with violations of 
the Election Code. The board supports its judges of election, al­
though from time to time, clerical errors are committed and 
precise election procedure is not followed."12 
The Journal replied to the commissioners' statement in a strong 
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editorial that called for a vigorous investigation of illegal voting 
practices and the resignation of the mayor's son from the board, 
neither of which occurred before the final election. 
Both the mayor and Bush condemned the apparent illegal voting 
that had occurred. The mayor pointed out that although the num­
ber of votes involved would not have made any difference in the 
outcome of the primary, he felt that one fraudulent vote was 
one too many. He noted that many of the irregularities occurred 
in one area of the city and suggested that the mobile population 
in that area was probably a contributor. As to the question of his 
son being on the Board of Election, the mayor maintained that 
he did not see any conflict of interest. Bush stated that the voting 
disclosures were symptomatic of "the disease" that had gripped 
the election process in East Saint Louis and argued that voting 
fraud "is part of the political pattern in the city that has contributed 
to voter apathy over the years." He called for a complete canvass 
of every precinct and the immediate resignation of Alvin G. Fields, 
Jr., from the Board of Election. Bush also emphasized the linkage 
between the city hall-controlled political machine and the elec­
tion judges. "In East St. Louis the precinct committeeman 
names the election judges in his precinct. They serve as long as 
he wants them to and the $25.00 they get paid is a lot of money 
to many of them."13 Bush contended that an honest election was 
impossible as long as the precinct committeemen was boss at the 
polling place. 
As the final election day of 4 April approached, the chances 
of an upset seemed to slip away. The Bush ticket did not attract 
large, enthusiastic crowds in any of the city's neighborhoods, and 
their reception in the white sections of town was particularly 
meager and cool. Moreover, and more importantly, the all-black 
slate did not gain the overt support of any of the leading, non­
political blacks or black organizations in the city. Bush and his 
running mates had hoped that as the election approached, more 
and more black people would publicly support them and create 
a bandwagon effect. However, the anticipation that the black com­
munity and whites who were dissatisfied with the city hall ad­
ministration would rally together around the anti-Fields ticket was 
not realized, for reasons discussed below. 
Two days before the election, Elmo Bush shared a rally plat­
form with Stokely Carmichael, chairman of SNCC, who drew a 
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crowd of over one thousand people into East Saint Louis's Lincoln 
High School auditorium. Bush made a plea to the crowd for 
electoral support and noted that "some people told me not to 
come here today. They told me it would cost me votes, that the 
white people wouldn't vote for me. Well, I see white people in 
this audience. The people who won't vote for me because of Mr. 
Carmichael won't anyway—they didn't in the primary." Carmichael 
delivered a blistering speech against white America and strongly 
endorsed Bush for mayor. 
Although the 1967 mayoralty election provided ESL blacks with 
a unique opportunity to gain governmental control of the city, 
and thus make ESL the first city in the nation an example of 
black control, few residents of the community were surprised by 
the election results. Despite strenuous efforts by Bush and his run­
ning mates to mobilize the black community behind their candi­
dates, the incumbent ticket won a landslide victory. Fields re­
ceived over 70 percent of the citywide vote, and his running mates 
collected between 60 and 69 percent of the vote (see table 4). A 
TABLE 4 
EAST SAINT LOUIS MAYORALTY ELECTION, 1967 
(Total Votes Cast—20,212) 
Total Percentage of 
Votes Total Votes 
Fields ticket: 
Fields 14,430 71 
Beebe 13,703 68 
Foley 14,025 69 
Keeley 12,417 61 
Saverson 12,036 60 
Bush ticket: 
Bush 5,782 29 
Lewis 4,074 20 
Ray 4,021 20 
Wheadon 5,157 26 
Independent candidate: 
Houston 6,292 31 
SOURCE: Board of Election statistics. 
breakdown of the vote by the racial composition of precincts shows 
that Fields received 88 percent of the votes cast in predominantly 
white precincts whereas Bush was able to capture only 12 percent 
of such votes. The other members of the Fields ticket, with the 
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exception of Saverson, gathered at least 75 percent of the white 
votes. Although Saverson did much better in the white neighbor­
hoods than any of the blacks on the Bush slate, the white inde­
pendent, Houston, did outpoll him by almost 1,000 votes in the 
twenty-two white precincts, thus contributing to the speculation 
rumored around the city that some of the white precinct commit­
teemen were not pushing Saverson along with the rest of the in­
cumbent ticket because of his race. In the black precincts, where 
59 percent of all votes were cast, Fields obtained 60 percent of the 
black vote while Bush received only 40 percent. Fields's running 
mates also gained majorities in the black precincts with Saverson 
leading by gathering 69 percent of the vote (see table 5). In sum­
mary, not only did the black challengers fare poorly in the white 
precincts, but they failed to attract even half of the votes cast by 
the city's black majority. 
TABLE 5 
EAST SAINT LOUIS MAYORALTY ELECTION, 1967: 
BY BLACK AND WHITE PRECINCTS 
WHITE PRECINCTS BLACK PRECINCTS (Total Votes-8,243) (Total Votes—11,969) 
Total Votes
Received in
 Percentage of
 Votes Cast in
 Total Votes
 Received in
 Percentage of 
 Votes Cast in 
White Precincts White Precincts Black Precincts Black Precincts 
Fields ticket: 
Fields
Beebe
Foley
Keeley
Saverson
 7,264
 6,939
 7,005
 6,204
 3,798
 88
 84
 85
 75
 46
 7,166
 6,764
 7,020
 6,213
 8,238
 60 
 57 
 59 
 52 
 69 
Bush ticket: 
Bush
Lewis
Ray
Wheadon
 979
 769
 746
 975
 12
 9
 9
 12
 4,803
 3,305
 3,275
 4,182
 40 
 28 
 27 
 35 
Independent: 
Houston 4,606 56 1,686 14 
SOURCE: Computed from Board of Election statistics and population projections of the Metropolitan Affairs
Program of Southern Illinois University, Edwardsville campus. 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE ELECTION RESULTS 
In view of the most recent phases of the "Black Revolution" 
in American society, the basic question that emerges from the re­
sults of the 1967 East Saint Louis mayoralty election concerns the 
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failure of the black majority to capture political power when they 
clearly had the numbers to do so. What went wrong with the sim­
ple equation that states a majority of black voters equals the elec­
tion of black candidates? Why were the black candidates unable 
to mobilize the black community behind them? 
There were several factors that obstructed the transformation 
of numbers into political control in East Saint Louis. These fac­
tors included the existence of a powerful, white-controlled political 
machine in the city, a considerable amount of internal conflict 
and mistrust of politicians within the black community, the failure 
of a majority of registered black voters to participate in the elec­
tion, and the low level of white support for black candidates. 
The discussion below illustrates how each of these conditions 
contributed to the defeat of the black candidates. 
The Persistence of a Political Machine 
Our discussion of the 1967 mayoralty election hinted at the fact 
that ESL was one of the few American cities that continued at 
that time to be governed by a political machine. The machine 
style of government (with its emphasis on the exchange of material 
rewards for political support devoid of ideology), which was com­
mon in many cities during the period between the Civil War and 
the Second World War but has since disappeared in most cities, 
continued to operate in ESL for a variety of historical and con­
temporary reasons.14 
The persistence of the machine may be explained in part by the 
historical role played by the city within the larger Saint Louis 
metropolitan area. Since at least the turn of the century, ESL has 
had a reputation as the "sin city" of the area, controlled by cor­
rupt and graft-ridden politicians. In his analysis of the 1917 ESL 
race riot, Elliott Rudwick observed that: 
During the years before the race riot (1917), East St. Louis had a
national reputation as a wide-open, wild and woolly gambling town.
For convenience of patrons, politicians and the police, activities
were centralized in the valley, a congested district of saloons, gam­
bling parlors, and houses of prostitution.15 
Apparently this reputation had the dual impact of attracting a 
wide assortment of undesirable characters to ESL and of discour­
aging upright individuals from residing in the community. Conse­
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quently, the composition of the population promoted the existence 
and operation of a less than honest city government, which in 
turn allowed the conditions that contributed to the city's bad rep­
utation to continue. These developments meant that the existence 
and action of political reform type individuals, which were common 
in many cities during that period, were unusually scarce in ESL. 
The more affluent businessmen and professionals who earned a 
living in ESL and who were potential reform supporters did not 
reside in the city. Further, it was common knowledge that a con­
siderable number of managers and businessmen tolerated the op­
eration of the political system because it was beneficial to their 
financial interests in a variety of manners, particularly in terms 
of the low taxes they paid relative to the value of their property.16 
In short, the widespread reputation of the city did not attract 
reform-oriented individuals as settlers, and segments of the popu­
lation both in and around the community developed an interest 
in maintaining the existing governmental system. 
Another characteristic of East Saint Louis's historical develop­
ment that has contributed to the endurance of machine politics 
is the early and continuous influx of a highly dependent type pop­
ulation. The restrictive immigration laws of the 1920s combined 
with the federal welfare programs enacted during the New Deal 
period and the general economic affluence of the society eventu­
ally reduced the number of city dwellers interested in the rewards 
of the old-time machines as they operated in most cities. As a 
consequence of these developments, many machine organizations 
declined because they lacked the necessary clientele base. The 
major influx of southern blacks into the cities came after many of 
the machines had already declined or after the internal immigrants 
could be effectively assimilated into the organization and there­
fore fill the vacuum left by the earlier ethnic groups. This was 
not the pattern in ESL. Being situated as the closest northern city 
that was a terminal point for major railroads, ESL had experi­
enced a relatively heavy immigration of southern blacks for over 
a half a century. For the past thirty-five years, blacks have consti­
tuted a larger proportion of the population in ESL than they have 
in any other major northern city except Washington, D.C. In 1940, 
for example, approximately 25 percent of the population of East 
Saint Louis was black, whereas the black proportion of the popu­
lation in other cities at that time was as follows: New York—6 
Defeat of All-Black Ticket in East Saint Louis / 51 
percent; Chicago—8 percent; Philadelphia—13 percent; Detroit— 
9 percent; Cleveland—10 percent; Pittsburgh—9 percent; Buffalo 
—3 percent.17 Consequently, the machine in ESL did not sustain 
a shrinking clientele base in the sense that other city machines 
did. The early and steady arrival of a large number of dependent 
blacks provided the organization with a continuous flow of needy 
individuals who were quite willing to exchange votes for assis­
tance. 
The ESL political system not only experienced an uninter­
rupted supply of dependent people who desired tangible political 
rewards, but the system was also very adept at furnishing the 
necessary inducements. The fact that the city operated without a 
general civil service law until 1967 meant that many city jobs 
could be utilized for patronage purposes. The organization's con­
trol of Saint Clair County, including the Levee District, produced 
additional sources of patronage; and even the city's independent 
school district was a significant source of patronage, both in 
jobs and contracts, for the political organization. Ties between 
city hall, organized crime, and local labor unions have been docu­
mented by several studies.18 Machine intervention with the police 
department and welfare department was common; and, of course, 
the five-dollar vote and protection for illicit business operations 
had been the norm for many years. 
The distribution of these favors in a manner that supported the 
organization was facilitated by the centralization of power. 
Although there had been periods of intrasystem conflict for the 
boss position, by 1959 Mayor Alvin Fields had solidified his po­
sition so that there was little question among observers that he 
"called the shots." As noted earlier, he ran unopposed until chal­
lenged in the 1967 election. Although ESL was formally governed 
under the commission system of government, it was clear that 
nothing of significance occurred without the backing or tolerance 
of Mayor Fields.19 The fact that Fields had this amount of power 
was functional for the persistence of the machine in another way. 
It made the organizational accommodations to changing situa­
tions easier to accomplish than if power were dispersed. For 
example, when it became expedient to allocate additional patron­
age to some of the black politicians and to include a black candi­
date on the machine's slate in 1963 to solidify the support of the 
growing black population, the mayor possessed the necessary in­
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fluence to make these decisions without causing serious internal 
conflict within the organization. Some of his fellow white politi­
cians may have disagreed with his action, but none of them were 
willing to outwardly oppose him. 
The machine was also very skillful in strengthening its viability 
by playing the white community against the black community 
and vice versa. In this respect, the memory of the East Saint Louis 
race riot of 1917, which took the lives of nine whites and thirty-
nine blacks, is a crucial fact. According to a long-time particip­
pant-observer of ESL politics, fear among whites and blacks that 
such an episode would be repeated gave the macine a significant 
lever in dealing with and controlling the political behavior of 
both races. He states that: 
For decades the machine has told the Negro that the whites
don't want change and that there could be another race riot if Ne­
groes pressed too hard. The machine for years presented itself to
Negroes as [their] protector, who would see that no new riot oc­
curred. And the machine has presented itself to whites as the insti­
tution which would see that the Negroes didn't make trouble. The
Negroes have been kept in poverty, thus making it easier to con­
trol them. 
Finally, the ESL machine continued to function because, even 
if there had been some potential white reformers residing in the 
community, they and most of the affluent whites had left the cen­
tral city as the black population became a majority. Of the whites 
who remained in the city, many were linked to the machine in 
some manner and therefore were not about to contribute to its 
decline. Likewise, although some blacks would have liked to have 
seen the machine demolished, many blacks in ESL, as the follow­
ing section illustrates, supported its continuation because of the 
rewards they had been able to derive from it. 
The Machine and the Black Community 
As noted earlier, a large segment of the blacks in ESL can be 
classified in the poverty-stricken category. The population has all 
of the characteristics of a highly dependent one that has lacked 
the means for combating the so-called poverty cycle. In every 
sense of the concept, the black community of ESL exists as an 
economic colony of white society. Until the establishment of the 
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Saint Clair County Economic Opportunities Commission under 
the federal antipoverty program, the political machine was vir­
tually the only instrument of assistance available to blacks. As a 
result, blacks with a wide variety of needs turned to the machine 
for help, which they generally received, and they therefore recipro­
cated with political support. Some blacks (generally middle class) 
viewed this heavy reliance on the machine for aid in a paradoxical 
manner. On the one hand, they recognized that the machine pro­
vided many lower-income blacks with the necessities of life when 
other institutions did not. However, on the other hand, they were 
distressed by the fact that along with machine assistance went 
subordination to the white machine leaders and the reality that it 
was not wise for black politicians to buck the machine in an ef­
fort to gain greater amenities for the general black community. 
According to one long-time black resident of ESL: 
We are at the brute level, the pure level of existence, so politics
means money, a job, or placement on relief. The politicians have 
exploited us and our fears, so Negroes do as they are told. . . . 
The machine has the power to stop progress by threatening people
with loss of jobs. [It] can get almost every family in East St. Louis.
Somebody [in the family] has a job. 
Within this context, the development of independent black 
leadership was extremely difficult. Potential leaders were con­
stantly bought off by the machine and were encouraged to think 
of political participation only as a stepping stone for personal am­
bition, not as a means for group improvement. In exchange for 
political jobs and other favors, potential leaders had tradition­
ally become controlled. They were placed in positions of apparent 
influence, such as precinct committeemen or city inspectors; but 
due to their subordination to white organization leaders they were 
unable to use their positions for the advancement of the black 
masses. The emphasis was on what the machine could do for them 
individually and what they could do for the machine, not on what 
could be done to help alleviate the problems of average black citi­
zens. 
This inability of blacks to wield independent influence in the 
city was intensified by the fact that the machine was operated 
on a bipartisan basis. Machine leaders saw to it that the orga­
nization overarched both political parties (the city is only nomi­
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nally nonpartisan) and included members from both parties. Prior 
to the election of Mayor Alvin Fields in 1951, for example, Dan 
McGlynn was the boss of both Republicans and Democrats and 
could dictate a political slate for both parties. After Fields's elec­
tion, Republican influence sharply declined, but Fields still worked 
closely with them and controlled both Republican and Democratic 
committeemen. This arrangement worked to the disadvantage of 
black politicians who pointed out that their rewards for political 
work would have no doubt been far greater if competition among 
whites for their support had existed. However, with the exception 
of a few instances, the white politicians displayed enough cohe­
sion to prevent the blacks in ESL from having the opportunity to 
play the swing role by delivering votes to the side that would prom­
ise the most to the black community. As one black politician com­
mented: "We don't have whites in East St. Louis who will take 
the initiative to oppose the Fields machine and form an inde­
pendent political machine, consequently we don't have any place 
else to go." This virtually undisputed control by the Fields ma­
chine forced black politicians, if they desired any favors from 
the political system, to be subordinate to the white leaders of the 
organization. 
Although ESL black politicians often used such terms as "graft 
ridden," "corruption," "bloated contracts and patronage" to de­
scribe the political system ruled by the whites, they readily ad­
mitted that their subsystem was largely a reflection of the white 
system. Patronage was their major concern and the thing that both­
ered many of them was that they lacked sufficient bargaining 
power to capture a proportionate share of the prizes. White lead­
ers constantly reminded them that they would have even less if 
the machine did not work on their behalf. This point is well illus­
trated by the fact that prior to 1963 when black political leaders 
asked to have a black commissioner candidate on the Mayor's 
ticket, they were told "no Negro can get elected—if the organiza­
tion came out for a Negro, the North End [the white community] 
wouldn't support the organization candidates." Given this stance, 
no black was able to achieve high public office in a city with a 
nearly black majority. When the mayor decided, however, that it 
was appropriate to include a black candidate for commissioner 
on the organization ticket, he tapped Saverson. With the organi­
zation's backing Saverson, as we noted earlier, was able to gain 
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3,000 white votes in the 1963 election, which assured him of victory 
—a feat he could not have accomplished on his own. 
Despite the fact that some blacks personally profited through 
machine efforts, many black civic leaders in ESL believed that 
the machine had not appropriately repaid the general black com­
munity for the electoral support provided by blacks. They particu­
larly condemned black politicians for placing their personal goals 
and the goals of the Fields machine above those of the black com­
munity. The politicians were accused of being fearful of doing 
anything for their people that would cause displeasure among 
the white leaders and thus endanger their personal privileges. 
They fear that the machine will get back but they don't know where
to expect the revenge. It is not necessarily a political job they'll
lose—there are other privileges they get, such as free gas from the
city or the privilege of getting their girl friends on ADC. 
Not only were black politicians and some of their constituents 
indebted to the machine, but also the machine took considerable 
pains to gain the favor of nonpolitical black leaders. There was 
general agreement among the black respondents, for example, that 
the leadership within the East Saint Louis NAACP had been 
closely tied to the machine and had therefore largely ignored dis­
crimination in public accommodations, labor unions, and city hall. 
NAACP leaders were described as being bought off by petty 
favors extended by Mayor Fields and other white politicians. To 
illustrate the point one respondent recounted the following epi­
sode. 
You know after a meeting of the Coordinating Council, Randolph,
X [NAACP president], and I were walking to our cars and we 
chatted briefly. I said that X had better hurry on because he had to 
phone Fields and tell him what we were doing. I told X that he 
shouldn't rush so, though, and he might want to wait until tomorrow
morning to call Fields, but knowing him I knew he couldn't delay
one more minute. Then Randolph asked X why he had to tell Fields
everything. X denied it and said that it was unfair that he had this
reputation—he was simply friendly to Fields who had been kind to
him. X then told us how he had built his house on Fourth Street, 
some years ago, and had very little money. One day two men brought
bathroom fixtures and the next day they came back to install them.
When X asked where they came from the plumbers said that Alvin
Fields had sent them. X said he went to see Fields and told the mayor: 
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"Thanks for sending the men, but I wish you had told me before you 
did it because I don't have much money and. . . .  " Fields told him 
that he didn't owe anything and that it was a gift. X told Randolph 
and me this story to show how kind Fields was. Randolph, after 
listening to this tale then said to X, "So, the mayor bought you for a 
shithouse!" 
The support of ESL ministers was cultivated by the machine in 
a similar manner. Through contributing money to church causes, 
appointing selected ministers to certain "prestigious" public 
committees, and providing some ministers with jobs, among other 
things, the machine successfully gained the backing of the Baptist 
Ministerial Alliance, the most influential back religious organiza­
tion in the city. The long-time president of this organization, 
generally referred to as "Dean" of ESL Baptist ministers, the 
Reverend X, was viewed as a supporter of the Fields organization. 
"Fields made a pawn out of him . . . whatever Fields wants, X 
will do." He was accused by some respondents of using the pulpit 
to endorse machine candidates. One parishioner stated: "Oh, X 
was sneaky. I remember going to his church years ago and he'd 
stand in his pulpit before an election and say I've given the sub­
ject careful thought and I think I'm going bo support those in 
office now. I'm not going to name names, but you know who I 
mean.' " Other respondents pointed out that the backing of the 
machine by Reverend X and other black ministers was usually 
more indirect. Rather than actively working for the machine, they 
were urged "not to work against the politicians—certainly not to 
get involved in any crusades for better government." 
The entrenchment of the machine within the black comunity 
in 1967 is further indicated by the fact that Clyde Jordon, the 
black publisher and editor of the major black newspaper in ESL, 
wrote a lengthy editorial the week before election day endorsing 
Fields. Jordon's statement is particularly interesting because it 
articulates the dilemma that confronted many East Saint Louis 
blacks as they weighed the value of their linkage to the machine 
against an opportunity to strike a blow for their race. Observing 
that Elmo Bush was his close personal friend and former business 
partner, an outstanding black leader, and a highly qualified 
mayoral candidate, Jordan stated that he would nevertheless 
vote for Mayor Fields "because I work as his administrative aide 
and believe in the age-old philosophy of loyalty. He has been 
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my friend and done so much for me that I would be less than a 
man to do otherwise. I think my friend Elmo Bush understands 
this better than anyone else."20 
The fact that a close friend like Jordon, who had often written 
editorials that demanded equal rights and greater political repre­
sentation for blacks, was unwilling to support Bush because of his 
indebtedness to the machine is illustrative of the great difficulty 
Bush and his running mates encountered in gaining support from 
both so-called black leaders and rank-and-file blacks. 
In summary, then, the existence of a machine style of govern­
ment, the tight control of the organization by Mayor Fields for 
over fifteen years, and the machine's strength in the black com­
munity gave the members of the Fields ticket an impressive array 
of political resources that simply could not be matched by the 
members of the Bush slate. The organization's distribution of 
jobs, contracts, money, protection from the law, and numerous 
other favors to a countless number of blacks meant that a sub­
stantial segment of the ESL black population had concrete stakes 
in the organization's continued control of the city government. 
Due to the machine's ability and willingness to exchange these 
rewards for votes, the principal potential advantage of the black 
challengers, the number of black voters in the city, was seriously 
diluted. The implicit appeal that blacks should vote for blacks 
could not overcome the past and promised rewards doled out by 
the machine to the large number of dependent blacks. The chal­
lengers did not have comparable tangible rewards to lure voters 
away from the incumbents, nor could they match the manpower 
of the machine's organization in either the white or black sections 
of the city. As one participant in the Bush campaign put it: "The 
machine had everything going for them, not only money, but time 
and people. Policemen, firemen, inspectors, practically all the 
city employees were out working for them. They were all over the 
place at all times of the day and night. How the hell can you 
beat that?" 
Internal Conflict in the Black Community 
Another factor that contributed to the defeat of the all-black 
ticket in ESL is, in a sense, an outgrowth of the historical relation­
ship of the black community to the white-controlled political ma­
chine. The general subordinate status of blacks as a minority 
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within the general society and the reinforcement of this subordina­
tion within the political system seems to have fostered a con­
siderable amount of distrust and jealousy between the black 
electorate and black politicians, and among the political leaders 
themselves.21 Given a situation where whites have had a virtual 
monopoly over amenities, and the only blacks able to share in 
these amenities have been those willing to come to terms with 
whites, it is understandable that many blacks are suspicious of 
any black leader who claims to place group interests above his 
own personal interests. Based on past experiences, many ESL 
blacks developed the notion that there is no such thing as a sin­
cerely independent black leader; devious motives were always 
thought to be lurking in the background. Few blacks were willing 
to go out on a limb to support a declared independent because, 
as the following quotation illustrates, they could not be certain 
he was truly on their side. 
These would-be leaders make trouble because they know that if
they act as if they're going to fight the machine, the machine will
call them in to give them a job or a better job . .  . and after that you
don't hear from them. People have been sold down the river so often. 
. . . Who is going to lead, which Negro, none of them is sincere? 
That not a single black institutional leader or organization 
endorsed Bush and his ticket can be attributed in part to the fear 
of machine reprisal, but perhaps just as importantly to the wide­
spread uneasy suspicion that Bush would sell out sometime before 
the election campaign was over and leave many public supporters 
holding the bag.22 Since Bush and two of his running mates 
carried the stigma of having been members of the Fields organiza­
tion in the past and having been involved in some political 
maneuvering, it was difficult for them to convince potential 
supporters that such a development would not occur. Conse­
quently, many blacks were extremely reluctant to openly support 
Bush for fear that they would be "hustled." In order to protect 
themselves in both directions, however, some blacks (such as bar 
owners) secretly slipped Bush a modest sum of money to help 
finance his campaign but they provided no public support. 
Other segments of the black community also found reasons for 
not supporting Bush and his ticket. Some of the small number 
of militant blacks in the community distrusted him because they 
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believed that during the 1963 demonstrations in East Saint Louis 
he at first had led them and urged them on but then backed off. 
The more conservative church-going blacks disapproved of him 
because of his reputation as a playboy, a ladies' man, a drinker, 
and so on. Others simply mistrusted him because of his political 
background. As one black respondent put it: "I don't trust the 
man, but I don't trust the boy either." 
Not only did some of the black electorate mistrust the black 
candidates, thus weakening their chances of gaining solid support 
in the black precincts, but other black politicians refused to 
support them. The fact that the black politicians were members 
of the Fields organization was, of course, important, but the high 
degree of jealousy and mistrust among the black politicians them­
selves was also relevant. A history of competing with one another 
to gain greater favors from the white leaders meant that any black 
politician who seemed to be moving ahead of the pack would be 
resented by the others. This was particularly the case with Bush 
who had the reputation as a climber because he was able to by­
pass many of the black committeemen when he was part of the 
organization, and he was consequently disliked by some of them 
for that reason. 
He is the biggest farce in the world and he is a friend of mine. He 
is loud, everything is "I" and "me." He tries to push himself. He is 
an educated fanatic, who looks down his nose at non-degree people.
The committeemen resent him and dislike his education. They didn't
want him to have the Springfield job but he had to get it because
of the rule that committeemen have first crack at jobs . . . and none 
of them was qualified to take that Springfield job—only Bush was. 
In this respect, the black politicians in ESL not only faced the 
prospect of losing their jobs and whatever influence they may 
have had in the political arena by backing Bush and his mates, 
but their own prestige and status within the black political sub­
system would also have been threatened by a Bush victory. 
The chances of the Bush ticket attaining a victory were further 
eroded by the development of dissension among the black candi­
dates over the use of campaign funds and advertisements. Some 
of the members of his slate felt that Bush was not using the 
limited contributions he received to elect the entire ticket, but only 
for his own election. Obviously, this kind of internal bickering 
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among the candidates could only reinforce the distrust and sus­
picions of the black electorate. 
Given these factors, it is not surprising that only 49 percent of 
the registered black voters bothered to participate in the election. 
The fact that an all-black ticket headed by Bush was on the ballot 
did not stimulate a greater black-voters turnout over earlier 
mayoralty elections (the black turnout in 1963 was 52 percent and 
in 1959 it was 37 percent). It appears that this relatively low turn­
out resulted from the fact that the Bush slate did not have the 
necessary resources in terms of time, money, and manpower to 
build a grass-roots movement that would produce a solid black 
vote and overcome the strength of the Fields machine in the black 
community. The lack of such resources, however, must be traced, 
in part, to the mistrust and fear of a sell out that lingered in the 
minds of many black voters. 
The combination, then, of the indebtedness of many blacks to the 
Fields organization, the considerable degree of distrust of black 
politicians throughout the black community, and the failure of over 
one-half of the registered black voters to vote when given an 
opportunity to back an all-black slate, clearly indicates that the 
numerical majority of blacks in ESL constituted only a potential 
political resource for the independent black candidates. Their 
failure to unite the black community behind them in a common 
assault to gain command of the government is illustrative of the 
difficulty that confronts blacks seeking political power. The task 
of mobilizing the black community to produce a bloc vote for 
black candidates is, to say the least, not easily accomplished. 
Inability to Attract Substantial Support 
The weak showing of the black candidates in the white neighbor­
hoods of the city constitutes a final factor underpinning the de­
feat of the Bush ticket. If the black candidates were unable to 
gain the support of a large proportion of the black community, 
why were they unable to attract a larger number of white voters? 
The answers to this inquiry duplicate, to some extent, what has 
already been said. First, a long history of strained race relations 
in ESL meant that there were many whites in the city who simply 
would not vote for a black man. Although it is difficult to isolate 
and assess the extent of such feelings, it is worth noting that even 
with the endorsement of the Fields organization Saverson received 
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less than a majority of white votes and trailed the lowest vote-
getting white candidates on the incumbent ticket by some 30 per­
cent of the white vote. Second, many whites, as was the case with 
numerous blacks, were indebted to the Fields organization and 
consequently partially repaid their debt to the organization by 
supporting the incumbents in the election. Concerning those 
whites who may have been predisposed to campaign and vote 
against the machine, they could not be sure that Bush and his 
running mates were sincere, for the same kinds of reasons that 
blacks mistrusted politicians formerly tied to the machine. The 
pat question often posed was: "Why should whites support corrupt 
black politicians against corrupt white politicians?" 
CONCLUSION 
In 1967 the black community in East Saint Louis was enmeshed 
in a web of social, economic, and political relations corresponding 
closely to the model of internal colonialism discussed in chapter 
one. For years major decisions affecting the lives of black citizens 
had been controlled from the outside by white power-brokers who 
sought to exploit the resources and potential power of the black 
community for their own purposes. Entering ESL at the bottom of 
the economic ladder, blacks were not afforded the opportunity to 
compete with whites for jobs, government contracts and subsidies, 
and other forms of economic benefits essential to the elevation 
of minority groups into the mainstream of American society. In 
sheer desperation, blacks turned to the only agency prepared to 
effectively respond to their urgent need for social and economic 
assistance—the political machine. 
White leaders of the ESL machine courted the black vote 
through assistance and promises of assistance. Over time, their 
control over political matters in the black community became so 
complete that black leaders were compelled to compromise the 
interests of their constituents for the sake of cultivating and 
maintaining the minimum level of machine support necessary for 
the perpetuation of a public career. Co-optation of black leader­
ship led inexorably to the subordination of the entire black 
community to the commanding influence of the political machine 
in the ESL political system. In those rare instances where black 
politicians sought to challenge the machine for support in the 
black community, they found themselves confronted with an in­
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penetrable wall of opposition constructed by both blacks and 
whites caught up in the pervasive network of machine politics. 
The colonized position of the black community was clearly 
manifested in the failure of an all-black slate in 1967 to win the 
city election, despite the existence in the city of a black electoral 
majority. Black politicians running independent of the ESL 
machine found black voters unwilling to sacrifice the material 
benefits they had customarily received from the mchine in order 
to elect to public office blacks committed to the social and eco­
nomic improvement of the community as a whole. Given the 
dependent political position of the black community in the politi­
cal system, efforts to mobilize the community to translate black 
potential power into black control were doomed to failure. 
This case study of East Saint Louis illuminates some of the 
critical obstacles facing blacks in their quest for political power. 
Specifically, this discussion demonstrates that though the con­
centration of blacks in central cities and the current emphasis on 
racial solidarity may increase the possibilities of greater political 
influence, they are not sufficient to insure the development of 
cohesive black political action leading to the election of black 
candidates to high public office. In this context, it should be 
stressed that a number of factors associated with the phenomenon 
of internal colonialism act as intervening variables between the 
naked numerical strength and growing racial awareness of blacks 
and the translation of these resources into concrete political 
power. Among the most important of these variables is white 
control over the electoral decisions of blacks, a factor that serves 
to hamper the mobilization of the black vote as an effective in­
dependent force in the electoral process. 
Part two of this volume provides evidence that obstacles to 
black political mobilization are not necessarily insuperable. 
Chapters in part two focus on the cities of Cleveland, Ohio, and 
Gary, Indiana. In-depth case studies of the 1967 mayoral elections 
in Cleveland and Gary are undertaken for the purpose of identify­
ing the factors that enabled black politicians in those cities to 
overcome a range of obstacles and successfully mobilize the black 
community for independent political action. 
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PART II 
Cleveland and Gary: 
The Ingredients of Successful Mobilization 

Cleveland: The Economic, 
Social, and Political Setting 
INTRODUCTION 
Throughout their history as citizens of the United States, blacks 
have been isolated from the levers of power in American politics. 
Despite extensive black involvement in American electoral politics 
dating back to the reconstruction era of the nineteenth century, 
at no point have blacks exercised sufficient control over the elec­
toral process to demand that the priorities of governmental 
decision-making shift in a fundamental way toward issues and 
problems affecting the black community. As we have seen in 
chapters one and two, the influence of the black community in 
the electoral process has been diluted by a welter of institutional 
barriers that discourage black registration and stifle the organiza­
tion of the black vote as an independent force.1 Lacking suffi­
cient economic, technical, bureaucratic, and organizational re­
sources to overcome these institutional barriers, blacks have gen­
erally been locked out of public and private arenas where impor­
tant policy issues are debated and resolved. If E. E. Schatt­
schneider is correct in his assumption that some issues are orga­
nized into politics while others are organized out, it is clear that 
issues relating to the social and economic interests of the black 
community have been among those most often "organized out."2 
The election of black mayors in Cleveland and Gary in 1967 
provided the first important contemporary sign that the historic 
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pattern of black powerlessness in the political process might be 
fundamentally changing. Carl Stokes and Richard Hatcher were 
not, of course, the first blacks in modern times to hold high pub­
lic office. They were preceded in office by a number of black 
congressmen, among them William Dawson, Adam Clayton 
Powell, Charles Diggs, Robert Nix, and Augustus Hawkins. 
However, their elections as the first black mayors of major Amer­
ican cities were uniquely significant for two reasons. First, they 
represented the coming to power of blacks in northern urban 
politics. Prior to 1967, European ethnics, exercising tight control 
over local party organizations, had successfully blocked the as­
cension of blacks to high local offices. In 1957 it would have been 
as irrational for a black person to aspire for the mayorship of a 
major northern city, as it is for a black person to aspire for the 
presidency today. Black political-career prospects in local politics 
ended with a seat on the city council. To move beyond the coun­
cil to the mayorship, or a top county post, was unthinkable. Sec­
ond, the black victories in Cleveland and Gary in 1967 were 
achieved on the strength of the mass mobilization of the black 
vote for independent political action. In these elections, black vot­
ers appeared to turn their backs on white-controlled political or­
ganizations in order to vote for politically independent black 
candidates dedicated to expanding black control over broad sec­
tors of local government. Thus, coming on the heels of massive 
urban uprisings by the black under class, and a spectacular growth 
in black political consciousness generally, these elections ap­
peared to represent the opening events in a campaign of black re­
volt against domestic colonialism through the electoral process. 
This chapter begins our analysis of the 1967 campaigns and elec­
tions in Cleveland and Gary. The principal focus of this analysis 
will be on the factors that enabled blacks in Cleveland and Gary 
to overcome obstacles to the successful mobilization of blacks 
for independent action in the political process. Since it is impos­
sible to understand contemporary events without an adequate 
comprehension of prior developments, we cast our analysis in the 
context of the political history of the two cities, particularly those 
aspects of that history pertaining to changes and continuities in 
black-white political relations. The central emphasis, however, is 
on the 1967 primary and general campaigns and elections. In 
the following four chapters on the campaigns and elections in both 
cities, we attempt to analyze the dynamics of political organiza­
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tion in the black community. This discussion enables us to at once 
take a trenchant look at the array of factors that impede the 
mobilization of the black vote, as well as the social, economic, 
psychological, and organizational factors essential to the success­
ful surmounting of such obstacles. 
Much of the material in the chapters on the 1967 elections 
will relate to the issue of strategies and techniques for activat­
ing and organizing the black vote. Although the examples used 
will be drawn from Cleveland and Gary, we are convinced that 
they are applicable to many communities where blacks are search­
ing for the keys to a successful mobilization effort. We have 
therefore attempted to make our analysis of the Cleveland and 
Gary experience both detailed and lucid, with the hope that the 
facts and interpretations presented will be of great practical 
value to community leaders actively involved in the process of 
power transformation. 
CLEVELAND: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The development of Cleveland began in 1796 when a surveying 
party for the Connecticut Land Company arrived at the juncture 
where the Cuyahoga River empties into Lake Erie. The surveying 
team, under the direction of Moses Cleaveland, proceeded to sur­
vey the entire Western Reserve of Connecticut and lay out a capi­
tal town. Both of these tasks were accomplished by late 1797.3 
During the early years the settlement grew slowly. By 1815 only 
about 150 people had survived the frontier hardships of travel, 
land clearance, food production, war, and disease. The popula­
tion increased to 1,075 during the next decade and a half as the 
community shifted from a frontier settlement to one that had the 
appearance and characteristics of a small New England village. 
Growth was stimulated by improved transportation facilities, the 
emergence of steam craft on Lake Erie, harbor improvements, 
and, most importantly, the completion of the Erie Canal in 1825 
and the opening of the Ohio Canal in 1827, which linked Cleve­
land to Akron and eventually to the Ohio River. Traffic on both 
canals and Lake Erie throughout the 1830s and 40s transformed 
Cleveland into a flourishing mercantile center. By mid-century 
the population had spurted to 17,034 as "every stage, every canal­
boat and ship which entered port added to the population of the 
thriving community."4 
During the second half of the nineteenth century Cleveland 
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emerged as an important and booming industrial center. Situated 
between the Marquette iron-ore range in upper Michigan and the 
coal of southern Ohio and Pennsylvania, the city was ideally located 
for the numerous industries interested in providing iron and steel 
for the Civil War and postwar market. Throughout this same peri­
od, the growth of industrial activity was supplemented and stimu­
lated by the extension of railroads to Cleveland. The first rail­
road line reached the expanding community in 1851, and within 
a decade Cleveland "became the terminus of lines from the south 
and an important way station on the level lakeshore route to the 
west."5 Cleveland's industrial growth was also spurred by the oil 
magnate John D. Rockefeller and his associates who decided 
that the city was ideally located for oil refining. Thus, by the 
1880s Cleveland was a thriving industrial and railroad center, 
which became known as the oil capital of the world. 
The combination of post-Civil War industrial development and 
transportation expansion transformed Cleveland into a classic 
boom town. Between 1860 and 1890 the population increased 600 
percent to a total of 261,351 residents, thus making Cleveland 
the tenth largest city in the nation. 
An extremely important component of Cleveland's economic 
growth and rapid population growth consisted of European immi­
grants who were attracted by the wide variety of economic op­
portunities associated with Cleveland's industrialization. An ac­
count of the 1890s reads: 
Into the industrial districts the immigrants swarmed with their large
families, eager to work for small but alluring wages. Labor laws and
factory protective devices were few. Factories and still more fac­
tories rose around downtown Cleveland, southwest to Newburgh
and along the lakeshore, blanketing the congested areas with soot
and smoke. As workers crowded together in old dwellings and tene­
ments, housing facilities became wholly inadequate, and unhealth­
ful living conditions developed. The more fortunate families escaped
to the suburbs and the country, but the poor hurried into their places
in the blighted sections. Here they struggled to keep body and soul
together in communities where even trees had died.6 
By the turn of the century representatives of virtually every 
nationality group in the world resided in Cleveland, and one out 
of every three Clevelanders were foreign born. The combination 
of that third of the population and those inhabitants who had at 
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least one foreign-born parent constituted about 75 percent of the 
city's population in 1900.7 This large, cosmopolitan segment of the 
population obviously had a significant impact on the social, 
economic, and political life of the community. 
Each nationality group tended to congregate within certain 
neighborhoods throughout the city. Within these neighborhoods, 
immigrant institutions such as churches, schools, newspapers, 
political and civic organizations, social clubs, coffee houses, 
and food specialty stores and restaurants fortified a culture and 
life-style distinctively European in character. Ethnic festivals and 
celebrations, which often featured parades composed of individ­
uals in homeland costumes, also contributed to the European 
flavor of the city. 
Economically, the immigrant groups supplied the great bulk of 
the city's labor force. Their abundance furnished the cheap labor 
that was a necessary ingredient of the tremendous economic ex­
pansion experienced by Cleveland's industrial firms. In addition, 
some members of each group became small businessmen who 
tended to specialize in products and services for their own nation­
ality group, although there were also instances in which their 
clientele was citywide in scope. 
Their great numbers made the immigrants an important politi­
cal resource. This fact, of course, was not ignored by the political 
leaders in the city. Since the trains that carried immigrants into 
the city were almost never on time, it was difficult for friends 
and relatives to meet the newcomers. Consequently, their places 
were often taken by agents of various ward politicians. The fol­
lowing description illustrates how the new arrivals were initiated 
into the local political system and linked to it within the neighbor­
hood wards. 
The political boss of the foreign wards in Cleveland was the same 
type to be found in most American cities. He was either a naturalized 
citizen or native born of the first generation, a resident of the ward 
he ruled, spoke the mother tongue, and of common race and religion 
with the people he controlled. The new arrival was gathered into the 
fold at the railway station and through further services was made to 
feel his obligation to the ward boss. Among these services were 
boarding houses and hotels to which the stranger was guided, aid in 
getting a job, small loans, and saloons and eating houses which served 
as clubs. Within the community, donations to charity, contributions 
for the celebration of various local and racial holidays, bail and legal 
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aid for the immigrant in court, acting as mediator in domestic and
community disputes, and supporting all projects for church and 
community welfare added to the [ward leader's] influence and 
power within the ward.8 
Around the turn of the century, then, Cleveland, like many 
other American cities at that time, was governed by a machine 
style of politics that relied heavily on the immigrant vote to keep 
the bosses in office. Being unfamiliar with the American political 
system and extremely grateful for the services extended to them 
by the political machine, most of the immigrants were more than 
willing to trade their votes for the favors received. Indeed, this 
exchange was based in many instances on a personal relationship 
that was completely devoid of political ideology. The newcomers 
generally voted for the candidates endorsed by their ethnic lead­
ers because they were personally indebted to the leaders and 
trusted them as friends, not because they weighed the political 
posture of the various politicians. 
OVERVIEW OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 
A possible exception to this pattern, at least at the mayoralty 
level, occurred between 1901 and 1909 when Tom Johnson served 
as mayor. Prior to his mayorship, Johnson was a street-railroad 
magnate who had made a fortune by the usual corrupt methods 
that were characteristic of the period and machine-style govern­
ment. However, during a railroad trip Johnson read the work of 
socialist Henry George, who argued that although the nation 
was prospering the masses of people were becoming increasingly 
impoverished. George identified the private ownership of land 
as the main root of injustice and called for a "single tax" on in­
creased land value that was not derived from the labor of the 
owner. Johnson found George's arguments so convincing that he 
joined the progressive reform movement, won four succes­
sive terms as mayor of Cleveland on antibusiness platforms, bat­
tled for municipal ownership of utilities and the single tax, and 
became one of the most famous mayors in the nation. During his 
reign reformers from all over the country visited Cleveland to ex­
change information with Johnson and learn his methods of opera­
tion. 
The Republican machine in Cleveland finally beat the Demo­
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crat Johnson in 1910. Under the direction of Maurice Maschke, 
the son of German Jewish immigrants, the party selected Herman 
Baehr, a candidate with German ancestry, to run against Johnson. 
As one of the largest ethnic groups in the city, the Germans had 
solidly backed Johnson in previous elections; but in 1910 Baehr 
carried the German wards, which proved to be the difference.9 
From that time until the early 1930s, with the exception of the 
years 1912-15 when Democrat Newton Baker was mayor, the 
Republican party machinery, directed by Maschke, controlled 
city hall and elected a string of Republican mayors. 
Republican domination of city hall included the years 1923-31, 
during which time Cleveland became the largest city in the nation 
to adopt the city-manager plan. The plan was approved by the 
voters after a crime commission exposed numerous city hall scan­
dals in the early 1920s. The political bosses, however, did not 
allow the new form of government to curtail their influence. 
Maschke and Burr Gongwer, the Democratic leader, agreed to 
join forces by having their respective councilmen, who numbered 
twenty-one of the twenty-five members on the city council, vote 
for the same city-manager candidate. As part of the same deal, 
Maschke was given control over 60 percent of the available pa­
tronage jobs and Gongwer the remaining 40 percent.10 This ar­
rangement continued until the Republicans achieved majority 
control of the city council in 1929. However, in that same year a 
new series of city hall scandals were uncovered, and several Re­
publican councilmen were indicted for their involvement in 
shady city-land deals. As a consequence, during the following two 
years the city-manager plan was voted out and the fifteen-year 
Republican hold on city hall was broken in 1932 by the mayoral 
victory of Democrat Ray T. Miller. Miller was propelled into the 
political limelight of the time as the county prosecutor who had 
successfully handled the graft cases and exposed Republican 
corruption. 
Despite the Roosevelt victory at the national level (Cleveland 
delivered a large Democratic majority for him) and additional Re­
publican scandals that led to indictments against Maschke, the 
Democrats were able to control city hall for only two years. In 
1934, Harry Davis, the Republican mayor between 1915 and 1919, 
defeated Miller, who was hampered by internal splits within the 
Democratic ranks.11 Davis, however, also encountered discord­
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ance within his party, and two years later he was defeated in 
the Republican primary by Harold Burton. 
Burton proceeded to defeat Miller, who was once again the 
Democratic candidate, and became known as the first of a suc­
cession of what has been termed the "independent-newspaper 
mayors" of Cleveland. With strong newspaper backing, Burton 
played down the importance of party affiliation by conducting his 
campaign out of an independent headquarters and a Republican 
headquarters. During his tenure in office the local newspapers 
began to supersede the political parties as the dominant political 
influence in selecting and electing Cleveland mayors. According 
to a political reporter with the Cleveland Press since 1932, 
Eagle-eyed criticism was the newspaper rule for Miller and Davis,
but Burton became sort of a sacred cow. During hisfirst term, every
action he took won him praise. He played a cagey game. His ear was
always cocked toward the editors' offices. He kept in constant touch
with the three editors, and carried his problems to their door steps.
. . . Reporters found that stories they uncovered about him often had
already been divulged to the "front office" by the mayor and were
being held subject to his release. He was a terrific worker, both at
City Hall and on the stump, and often would climb the steps of news­
paper offices at night delivering himself statements he had written
out in longhand.12 
Burton served three successive terms and was elected to the 
United States Senate while still in his third term. Edward Blythin, 
his law director, filled his unexpired term and sought the mayor­
ship in the election of 1941. Blythin's Democratic opponent was 
Frank J. Lausche, a well-known judge and son of immigrant 
Slovenian parents. The Cleveland Press vigorously backed 
Lausche, who garnered a solid vote from the various ethnic wards 
(precincts populated by European immigrants) and became one 
of the first ethnic mayors of a major American city. 
Lausche's triumph represented the beginning of a new political 
era in Cleveland's history. Prior to his election the political system 
was generally dominated by Republican WASPs. Ethnic voters 
and politicians were important influences, particularly at the 
ward level; but up until that time, despite their large numbers, 
the southern and eastern European ethnics never had a repre­
sentative in the highest political spot—the mayorship. Thus 
Lausche's ascendance to the mayor's seat signaled at least the 
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symbolic conclusion of Republican WASP control and symbolized 
for many of the ethnic voters a vicarious achievement of accep­
tance into the American political system. "For the first time, one 
of their boys had made it to the top." From that time on, each 
of the succeeding mayors was in some sense a representative of 
the ethnic voters. Lausche's successor was Thomas Burke, an 
Irish Roman Catholic, who served from 1945 to 1951. He was 
followed by Anthony Celebrezze, an Italian-American who won 
five straight mayoralty elections (1953-61) before he joined the 
Kennedy administration as Commissioner of Health, Education, 
and Welfare. Celebrezze was succeeded in 1962 by his law direc­
tor Ralph Locher, a Lithuanian, who serve as mayor until 1967. 
Each of these Democratic, ethnic mayors was sustained by heavy 
support among ethnic voters and the newspapers, particularly the 
Cleveland Press headed by Louis B. Seltzer. The relationship 
established between the mayor's of&ce and the newspapers during 
the Burton administration became even stronger throughout the 
next four decades. The prevailing political lore of the city main­
tained that "if you don't have the backing of the Press, you can't 
win." Seltzer as editor of the Cleveland Press gained the informal 
title of "Mr. Cleveland," and in political circles the universal opin­
ion was that he personally selected who would be mayor and then 
utilized the full resources of the newspaper to promote the candi­
date among the ethnic voters and successfully elect him. Why 
the Press was able to exert such influence is partially explained 
by the following observation: 
Here was the situation. The Hannas, the Rockefellers, the Boltens, the 
owners of the mills, the coal mines, and the railroads—the people 
who built Cleveland and brought these people over here to work 
looked to the Plain Dealer. It was their paqer, the Vales were their 
people. Francis Bolten, who served twenty-two years in Congress and 
whose husband was there twenty years before was for many years 
the principal owner of the Plain Dealer. It was the Establishment 
paper. Now as the mill workers and ethnic community grew, Louie 
Seltzer saw that his audience was not going to live in Pepper Pike 
or the other suburbs, but that he was going to appeal to the ethnic 
community. So the Press was written in simple language with a rea­
sonable amount of pictures. It was specifically directed toward these 
communities and did a first-class job of gaining their loyalties. For 
example, he would sponsor a Slovenian Day in Rockefeller Park, and 
his carriers would get out and sell in those neighborhoods. The ethnic 
community was Seltzer's prime audience.13 
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In addition, Seltzer employed a special "ethnic affairs" re­
porter named Dominic Andrika, who not only covered ethnic 
events in Cleveland but also spent about six months each year 
touring Europe to visit the relatives of Clevelanders and report 
news about the hometowns of various immigrant citizens. Con­
sequently, although the Press was an American newspaper, it 
provided a direct linkage for many hyphenated Americans to the 
old country and therefore: "Whatever the Press said politically 
was gospel to these people—it was like the bible." Within this 
context, it is understandable that the front-page, banner editorials 
endorsing a particular candidate for mayor and numerous favor­
able news stories about him generally resulted in impressive 
electoral majorities within the ethnic wards. 
As the political influence of the Cleveland Press increased, the 
ability of the political parties to control city hall diminished. 
Emulating the posture first assumed by Burton, each of the 
successive mayors emphasized their independence from the party. 
Their newspaper endorsement was generally accompanied by a 
mayoralty campaign platform that was antiparty and antibossism 
in content. The objective of this political posture was to project 
an image of honesty and independence that contrasted with the 
historical party image of corruption and bossism. Thus, although 
all of the mayors since Burton were Democrats, "they were news­
paper candidates first who happened to be Democrats, they were 
not selected by the party leaders." The usual pattern was one in 
which the Press would select a candidate, the Democratic party an 
opposing one, the newspaper candidate would receive strong 
media backing and would win, and the party would then support 
the incumbent mayor when he ran a second time. In each instance 
it was clear to all political observers that the party came to the 
man, rather than the man to the party and that the key political 
resource was the endorsement by the Press. 
This situation had the obvious effect of splitting the Democratic 
party organization into at least two factions, one centering around 
the mayor and the other around county and state offices and, to 
some extent, city council positions. Whereas the Press was par­
ticularly successful at selecting and electing Cleveland mayors, 
the Democratic party was generally quite successful at electing 
its candidates to the other local offices and state offices. However, 
despite its greater degree of success at these other levels, the fact 
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that the party was unable to control the mayorship clearly weak­
ened its position within the city's political system. Without cen­
tralized party control over city-hall patronage, it was difficult for 
the party to exert its influence at the ward level. As a result, each 
councilman tended to develop his personal political organization, 
and his ward was operated more as an individual fiefdom than 
an integral part of a well-oiled, citywide party organization. This 
is not to say that the Democratic party organization was not im­
portant at the ward level—it was in the sense that its endorsement 
helped a candidate; but the party lacked the potency to command 
ward-level politics and city council decision-making. In contrast 
to Chicago, for example, where the party organization is highly 
integrated and power-centralized, the Cleveland Democratic party 
was not united and thus power was highly decentralized. 
During this period the Republican party in Cleveland experi­
enced a greater decline in influence than did the Democratic party. 
Republican councilmen never constituted a majority on the coun­
cil, and no Republican mayoralty candidate ever received more 
than 43 percent of the vote. Indeed, on three occasions the Re­
publican party did not even bother to slate a mayoralty candidate, 
and numerous other offices went uncontested to the Democrats. 
In many instances, winning the Democratic primary (and it was 
on that occasion that the party organization was most influen­
tial) was tantamount to winning on general election day. In 
sum, the Democratic organization was hampered by factionalism, 
but the Republican organization was even weaker. 
The regime of mayors beginning with Lausche produced a city 
administration that was characterized by party independence, 
honesty, low taxes, low service levels, and, in the words of a long­
time observer, "a caretaker type government that never really 
appreciated the tremendous changes taking place in the city and 
never moved to really respond to them." Although some com­
mentators criticized the city government for the above-mentioned 
characteristics, it was a government that largely reflected the 
nature of its primary constituency. As noted earlier, the bulk of 
the population was composed of European immigrants and their 
offsprings. For the most part, these were working-class people 
who opposed high taxes and were not particularly convinced that 
the city government should become involved in a wide range of 
costly activities. They appeared to be quite satisfied with a gov­
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eminent that provided traditional municipal services in a modest 
and honest manner. Whether this type of government was appro­
priate for the times is a subjective question not easily answered. 
It is apparent, however, that after World War II Cleveland did 
experience significant changes that the city government found 
extremely difficult to cope with. Indeed, the changes were of such 
magnitude they eventually led to the end of the regime ushered 
in by Lausche. 
POSTWAR CHANGES 
Similar to many other northeastern and midwestern cities, 
Cleveland experienced a dramatic population transformation in 
the post-World War II period. Table 6 illustrates the most sig­
nificant aspect of this shift—the decrease in white inhabitants and 
increase in black residents. Between 1930 and 1965 almost 300,000 
whites left the city while the black population increased by 
204,000; thus by the latter date one out of every three Clevelanders 
was black. This simultaneous shift began in the 1930s but was most 
pronounced during the 1950s when the white population decreased 
by 142,000 and the black population increased by 103,000. 
TABLE 6 
WHITE POPULATION DECREASE AND BLACK POPULATION

INCREASE IN CLEVELAND, 1930-1965

Total White Percentage Black Percentage of 
Year (000) (000) Change (000) Total 
1930 900 828 +8.6 72 8.0

1940 878 793 - 4.2 85 9.7

1950 915 765 - 3.5 148 16.2

1960 876 623 -18.6 251 28.7

1965 811 523 -14.7 27(3 34.0

SOURCE: U. S., Bureau of the Census, U. S. Census of Population: 1960 and Current Population 
Reports: Special Census of Cleveland, Ohio, 1965. 
Two basic population trends contributed to this pattern. On the 
one hand, the white decline was largely due to the migration of 
whites into the surrounding suburbs. As was the case in other 
cities, the more affluent, well-educated whites selected suburbia 
as a more pleasant residential setting for raising their families.14 
This preference left Cleveland with an unusually small, white-
collar, middle class. Indeed, among the twenty-one cities with 
populations over 500,000, Cleveland ranks last in percentage of 
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white-collar workers. Another indication of the middle-class 
exodus to the suburbs is the generally accepted figure that the 
Jewish population of Cleveland is 500, compared to 85,000 for the 
surrounding suburbs.15 Most of the whites left behind in the core 
city could not afford the move to suburbia or they were so at­
tached to their working-class, ethnic neighborhoods that they 
were reluctant to leave. Complementing this suburbanization of 
the more affluent whites was the in-migration of southern blacks. 
The multitude of industrial jobs in Cleveland and the active re­
cruiting in southern communities by several Cleveland firms 
resulted in the fact that in 1960 nearly 50 percent of all of the 
blacks in Cleveland were southern born, giving Cleveland a higher 
proportion of black migrants from the South than any other north­
ern city with a large black population.16 
Approximating the experience of the immigrant groups before 
them, the masses of the new black arrivals found that they were 
confined to the bottom rung of Cleveland's socioeconomic ladder 
and that they faced pervasive discrimination. In the area of hous­
ing, for example, the black newcomers found it virtually impossible 
to buy or rent homes in Cleveland suburbs, although many whites 
with similar incomes were successful.17 Not only were blacks 
restricted to the core city, but within the city they were pressed 
into an overcrowded area of Cleveland's East Side. As a result 
of this process Cleveland began to resemble two cities: one that 
was largely populated by blacks and located on the east side of 
the Cuyahoga River (which runs through the middle of Cleveland) 
and the other that was largely populated by white ethnic Ameri­
cans and located on the west side of the Cuyahoga River. That 
housing discrimination was practiced against blacks is indicated by 
the fact that none were able to rent housing in the forty-nine 
census tracts on the West Side that had median rents comparable 
to the black neighborhoods. Their confinement to the overcrowd­
ed section of the East Side resulted in 9,000 black families living 
in substandard units, 13,100 living in overcrowded units, and 
23,400 families paying more than a quarter of their income for 
rent.18 
Black workers confronted similar difficulties in their search 
for employment. Their unemployment rate in 1965 was 8.9 per­
cent compared to 2.4 percent for white workers. In some sections 
of the black ghetto, the unemployment rate for young black males 
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(fourteen to twenty-five) ranged from 23 percent to 38 percent.19 
Among the blacks that were employed, most were confined to 
the most menial and low-paying jobs. This was not only the case 
in private industry but also in public employment. The city of Cleve­
land, for example, had a work force that consisted of 28.6 percent 
black employees; but one-half of them worked as laborers for the 
Division of Streets.20 Despite federal compliance laws requiring 
equal employment opportunities, the membership of most unions 
that worked on federal construction projects in the Cleveland area 
contained virtually no blacks. In 1966, for instance, the iron­
workers had 1,786 members and no blacks; the pipefitters 1,319 
members and 1 black; the electricians 1,258 members and 2 
blacks; the plumbers 1,482 members and 3 blacks; and the sheet 
metal workers 1,077 members and 45 blacks.21 In this regard, the 
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights concluded that the Bureau of 
Apprenticeship and Training, U.S. Department of Labor, had failed 
to meet its responsibility for insuring nondiscrimination in fed­
erally registered apprenticeship and training programs in Cleve­
land.22 
One obvious consequence of this dismal employment situation 
was that the average black family earned $2,500 less than the 
average white family: $4,768 compared to $7,350. Further, 28 per­
cent of black families contrasted to 9 percent of white families 
earned less than $3,000 (in the 1960s, an often-used poverty index). 
These income figures indicate that a majority of blacks in Cleve­
land were living in poverty or the close fringes of poverty in 1960. 
Those blacks who were forced into the welfare assistance pro­
gram found no relief from poverty there. The Cuyahoga County 
Welfare Department (the welfare agency in the Cleveland area) 
established in 1960 that an Aid to Dependent Children family of 
four required $200.95 per month to maintain a "decent" living 
level. Yet the Welfare Department provided only $170.81 a month 
in 1960 (only 70 percent of its own minimum standard); and de­
spite the cost of living increase of 11 percent by 1966, the agency 
provided 81 cents less to ADC recipients.23 Since any earnings 
from work were subtracted from the monthly welfare check even 
when earnings and welfare assistance together added up to less 
than 100 percent of the minimum standard, the welfare recipients 
could not realistically undertake full- or part-time work to over­
come their poverty existence. Needy children of an employed 
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father who earned less than the standard were ineligible for sup­
plementary aid. The children would become elgible for assistance 
only if the father left home and the welfare department was sat­
isfied that there was "no man in the house." Individuals on 
welfare not only received less than the minimum standard (a 
standard that was 20 percent less than the federal government's 
poverty level) but were also made to suffer numerous indignities 
and inconveniences in order to receive their assistance. Eligibil­
ity, for example, was established through a personally embar­
rassing process and was continuously challenged. Welfare recip­
ients, most of whom received their checks on the same day, had 
difficulty cashing their checks at Cleveland banks; had to wait 
in long lines at the two food-stamp distribution centers; and then 
were restricted in their purchases with food stamps—for example, 
they could not use the stamps to purchase soap and cleaning 
supplies. Thus, the welfare system in Cleveland, rather than oper­
ating to assist blacks out of poverty, more often than not con­
demned them to a life of poverty. 
Some salient characteristics of the Cleveland school system sug­
gest that it was making little progress toward insuing that the 
younger generation of blacks would fare any better in the com­
munity than their parents. Despite onsiderable research show­
ing the detrimental impact of segregated education on black stu­
dents, the Cleveland school system, by adhering to a neighbor­
hood school-attendance policy, maintained highly segregated 
schools. In 1965, for instance, about 91 percent of elementary 
students attended schools that were 95 to 100 percent white or 
black. Further, although black teachers constituted 43 percent of 
the staff, over 80 percent of them taught in all-black schools.24 
A study of the school system in 1956 found a marked difference 
in the academic performance of black and white students in Cleve­
land. This study reported that black students consistently scored 
lower on standardized achievement tests, and suggested that the 
gap between black and white performance tended to grow wider 
at each successive stage in the educational process.25 In com­
paring the annual student dropout rate between black and white 
students, the same report found that the dropout rate in predomi­
nantly black schools was more than double what it was in white 
schools, 14.6 percent to 6.5 percent. In addition, it was found that 
among the thirty-two school districts in the Cleveland metropoli­
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tan area, the city system ranked twenty-eighth in per pupil ex­
penditures and had the highest teaqher-pupil ratio. Consequent­
ly, many of the black students who did graduate from Cleveland 
schools found that the quality of education provided did not pre­
pare them adequately for either the labor market or higher edu­
cation. 
In addition to the problems faced in the above mentioned areas 
of life, many blacks found the Cleveland police department to be 
anything but a friendly and helpful agency. The prevailing atti­
tude among most ghetto residents was that the police were prej­
udiced, discourteous, unwarrantedly brutal towards blacks, per­
mitted prostitution and gambling to flourish in black neighbor­
hoods, and discriminated in their treatment of white and black 
citizens.26 These beliefs were well justified, given the experiences 
of numerous blacks with the police department. A statistical study 
of police practices, for example, strongly supported the pervasive 
feeling among blacks that the police responded more slowly to 
their calls for help than they did to calls for assistance in white 
neighborhoods. The investigator found that in every crime cate­
gory the police responded more slowly to calls in black neighbor­
hoods than white neighborhoods and that in some categories, 
such as robbery, it took the police almost four times as long to re­
spond to calls in black areas. After considerable testimony and 
investigation, the U.S. Civil Rights Commission concluded that 
black residents in Cleveland were "often arrested without a war­
rant, without probable cause, and without an offense being com­
mitted in the presence of the police officer, and are detained for 
as long as 72 hours under a nonexistent charge known as 'investi­
gation' which makes them ineligible for bond."27 Many persons 
arrested in this manner were denied the right to make a telephone 
call to an attorney or their family—a violation of state law. It was 
found that such unlawfully detained persons were not charged 
with a violation of law, but that before being released they were 
required to sign a waiver. This waiver was a police department 
form on which the signer pleaded guilty to a charge, usually that 
of being a "suspicious person," and waived his right to sue the 
city for unlawful arrest and detention. If a citizen chose to com­
plain about such practices, the complaints were handled by the 
district commander of the officer against whom the charge was 
filed. The Commission also discovered that Cleveland had no 
central complaint system; no policy that complaints be funneled 
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to the Chief of Police; and no written or publicized procedure 
for review of complaints. 
One black citizen testified before the Civil Rights Commission 
that he and a friend were arrested for no apparent cause, taken 
to the fourth floor of a police station, and beaten by several police­
men. While being beaten his friend was told to bark like a dog: 
"Hill wouldn't, at first, so I could hear them punching on him 
harder and harder and pretty soon he started to bark and he said, 
'That is right, you bark like a black dog.' "28 
Prior to the emergence of the civil rights movement in the early 
1960s, blacks found that they had little political leverage to alter 
the oppressive conditions they lived under. It is true that as each 
ward shifted in composition from white to black another black 
councilman would eventually be elected to the city council; how­
ever, this process did not result in any basic redress o$ black 
grievances. If any fundamental race policy was placed before the 
council, the blacks (who held only ten of the thirty-three seats) 
were decisively outnumbered and outvoted by the white council­
men. Further, the black councilmen, except for one or two of 
them, rarely pushed race issues at the council meetings. Reflec­
tive of the highly decentralized political system of the city, black 
councilmen "never worked together to push or block legislation. 
Each one was concerned only with his own image, his own ward 
organization, his own petty patronage, his own hustle—they never 
got together to help the entire black community. . . . The average 
black would support a politician they thought would help them in­
dividually, but concerning collective Negro political power—it 
was never seriously considered by them because it was never 
practiced by the so-called leaders." Consequently, although Cleve­
land did not have a machine-type political system as was the case 
in East Saint Louis, black politics was still characterized by an 
emphasis on individual advancement and benefit, notbgroup 
progress. Virtually all of the black politicians were primarily in­
terested in what tangible rewards they and their close associates 
could secure from the system, not what they could do collective­
ly to improve the living conditions of average blacks. Black 
councilmen were described by one respondent in the following 
manner: 
The major black politicians were all councilmen, except Stokes, and 
each of them had his own principality. They were divided and only 
had support within their limited areas. Few of the Negro councilmen 
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were any different from the county political people who were basi­
cally concerned with control and their own personal betterment. 
They were not concerned with community issues or the improvement 
of their neighborhoods. Frequently, in Council, these black politi­
cians supported special interests who were after liquor permits, or 
housing and zoning exceptions and variations which were opposed 
by the bulk of the people in the neighborhood. 
Little wonder, then, that many blacks felt that the Cleveland 
political system "offered them no real alternatives—the Repub­
licans were out of the question but white and black Democrats 
weren't much better from the black man's point of view. A lot 
were naturally cynical about politics." 
RACIAL POLARIZATION 
The depth of the black plight was apparently unknown or sim­
ply ignored by most white Clevelanders until the early 1960s. This 
lack of awareness or concern resulted from several factors. First, 
as was noted earlier, the city was highly segregated, thus blacks 
and whites had few contacts with one another. Second, at a sym­
bolic level individual blacks seemed to be doing quite well in 
Cleveland. This success of highly visible blacks cultivated the no­
tion among many whites (who had themselves, together with 
members of their immediate families, experienced numerous hard­
ships in industrial Cleveland) that blacks as the newest immi­
grants were progressing from the depths as did the other ethnic 
groups before them. The prevailing image among whites was 
that Cleveland was a good town for blacks. The observations of 
a white, life-time resident of Cleveland illustrates the point and 
indicates how the myth was first shattered: 
Cleveland prided itself on quote, "good relations," even as late as
the 1960s. The head of steam that Cleveland built up in the 1920s 
and 1930s as a good city for Negroes lulled many people into a sense 
of false pride. Cleveland had Negro judges, Negro councilmen and 
Negroes working in milk delivery trucks and things like that long 
before many other cities. . . . Larry Doby was the first Negro to 
play baseball in the American League, and he played here in Cleve­
land. The Cleveland Browns was the first major professional foot­
ball team to have Negroes. Paul Brown went out and actively re­
cruited Bill Willis and Marion Motely. So the fact that Cleveland had 
Negroes in sports and had Negro judges and councilmen created an 
image of good relationships. . . . And earlier Cleveland never had 
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a concentrated ghetto as such. Negroes were spread, in clusters nev­
ertheless mind you, but they were spread in various parts of the city 
—Glenville, Mount Pleasant, Fairfax, places like that in the central 
area. However, with the rapid exodus of whites from the city in the 
late 1950s and the increasing number of Negroes coming into the city 
and the development of a black belt and overcrowding of the schools, 
things started to come to a head. All of a sudden, the presumed 
good relations turned sour—arising out of the school crisis. [Before 
then] the NAACP was the major civil rights group in town and it 
made a quiet, low-key effort to redress long-standing grievances. 
The thing that got the civil rights movement in active gear in this 
town were the newer groups, groups like CORE. It was CORE that 
precipitated the show down with the school board. They were much 
more militant and began to define the problem in terms of housing, 
jobs, and schools. This took the discussion from the level of the suc­
cessful individuals to the problems of the masses—it got down to the 
nitty-gritty. And when you got down to that level and the Negro 
community let it be known that it wasn't content to have judges and 
football players and baseball players—that there was more at stake 
and brought this to the attention of the white community, then there 
was a hardening of feelings. Then it became a frontal attack and this 
got the backs up of the great middle body of white people who felt 
threatened and who were angered. . .  . So about 1963-1964 a 
change came about in race relations here from passive, low-key 
complaints to militant confrontation; and for the first time in my 
memory, there was open hostility between the races. 
Cleveland, then, like many other northern cities had experi­
enced fairly placid race relations prior to the early 1960s. To be sure, 
the appalling living conditions of blacks were there, and the fes­
tering grievances of the black community boiled below the sur­
face; but for the most part that is where things remained, below 
the surface. The legalistic, diplomatic, behind-the-scenes negotia­
tion approach of the major civil rights organization, the NAACP, 
tended to keep the visibility of black distress low and contributed 
to the conventional assumption among whites that conditions 
were not exceptionally bad among blacks. This deceiving serenity 
was eventually shattered in Cleveland as a result of a new phase 
in the civil rights movement that emerged in the South during 
the late 1950s and early 1960s. The southern emphasis on taking 
to the streets and involving masses of people in direct action be­
came the model for northern activity, and was soon being prac­
ticed in the streets in Cleveland. 
Although it is difficult to pinpoint with any certainty when the 
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new civil rights thrust began in Cleveland, the forming of the 
local chapter of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) in 1962 
is a logical date. As in other northern cities, CORE, with its stress 
on militant, direct-action tactics, became the major competitor of 
the NAACP and pushed the traditional organization into assum­
ing a more militant posture. By early 1963 the Cleveland NAACP 
found that its leadership was being challenged by the newly 
formed CORE chapter and some fifty other civil rights groups in 
the community. Consequently, in part to insure its own survival, 
the NAACP attempted to bring about some unity among the 
groups, and, by the summer of 1963, it was instrumental in forg­
ing a new coalition of civil rights organizations entitled the United 
Freedom Movement (UFM). The new coalition had a membership 
that included "inner-city ministers, leaders of the Jewish commu­
nity, traditional Negro leaders, and some of Cleveland's new 
breed of angry young black men."29 
The UFM's first action was directed against the contractors 
and unions who were involved in building the city's Convention 
Center. In July 1963 the UFM proclaimed that it would picket the 
center unless 3 black electricians and 2 black plumbers were 
hired to work on the project.30 This first threat stimulated a 
series of negotiations but failed to produce any satisfactory re­
sults, because the electricians had only 2 blacks among 1,400 
members, the plumbers no blacks among 1,300 members, and 
neither union was about to admit blacks immediately. Conse­
quently, the UFM announced that it would place 1,000 pickets at 
all entrances to the center project and would attempt to have all 
public funds withdrawn from the apprenticeship-training pro­
grams of all discriminating unions. After this second threat, the 
electrical union agreed to accept 2 black apprentices on the proj­
ect, and the plumbers consented to accept 2 black journeymen. 
The compromise agreement did not end the conflict, however, 
because when the 2 black plumbers showed up for work 11 union 
plumbers, who considered the blacks "house plumbers" walked 
off the job and were followed by 45 pipe fitters and asbestos 
workers. Thereafter, the plumber's union voted to declare a "holi­
day" beginning Monday, 29 July. On that day, no union plumbers 
showed up for work at the center, and 700 other plumbers stayed 
home. This action produced a series of lengthy negotiations that 
finally resulted in a settlement on 4 August 1963. The agreement 
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was a mixed victory for UFM; black journeymen would be ac­
cepted into the union, but not until they passed the standard exam­
ination administered by the plumber's union. 
Immediately after the employment controversy was settled the 
UFM turned its attention to the Cleveland school system. The 
rapid influx of blacks into Cleveland and their concentration into 
already overcrowded East Side neighborhoods placed a great en­
rollment strain on the neighborhood schools. Consequently, by 
1960 many black students, particularly those in the Hazeldell area, 
were attending half-day sessions, and other black students were 
crammed into greatly overcrowded schools. Various civil rights 
organizations and parent groups petitioned the Board of Educa­
tion to provide more schools in the area and to bus children cur­
rently in the overcrowded schools to under-utilized schools. 
Finally, in October 1961 the board responded to these requests by 
authorizing the superintendent of schools to prepare a transpor­
tation plan. The plan was submitted and approved the following 
month. 
Soon after, black students were being bused to vacant class­
rooms in predominantly white schools on the fringes of the East 
Side. The board made it clear that the bussing was only a tempo­
rary arrangement and would be eliminated when new facilities 
were constructed in the overcrowded neighborhoods. The board 
policy also called for the black students not to be integrated into 
the classrooms of the receiving schools, rather they were trans­
ported as "administrative units" with the teacher accompanying 
each class. Thus, black and white students attended separate 
classes. Further, the bussed students were not permitted to use cer­
tain facilities in the receiving schools. At Murray Hill School, for 
example, bussed students were not permitted to use the school 
swimming pool.31 
In August 1963, the UFM presented the school board with a list 
of demands relating to discrimination in the schools, one of which 
called for the immediate integration of transported classes into 
the receiving schools. When the school board failed to meet a 
23 September deadline, the UFM responded by picketing the board 
headquarters. Five days later the board held a public meeting at 
which it pledged to take steps toward the "fullest possible inte­
gration consistent with sound educational practice" in the receiv­
ing schools and to create a citizen's committee to encourage 
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true integration in the schools.32 The policy statement was ac­
cepted, not without internal disagreement, by UFM; the matter 
appeared to be resolved. 
In January 1964, however, the UFM leadership announced that 
in their estimation the board was not fulfilling the agreement. 
Subsequent meetings between the UFM and the board produced 
only frustration; whereupon the UFM decided to picket the receiv­
ing schools. On the first day of picketing the demonstrators were 
met by angry groups of whites, who at one school forced the 
demonstrators off the sidewalks into the path of passing automo­
biles. The following day produced an even more dangerous and 
intensive confrontation. The demonstrators planned to picket at 
Murray Hill School, in the heart of Cleveland's "Little Italy," but 
a crowd of enraged whites had already surrounded the school be­
fore they arrived. It became obvious that picketing might produce 
bloodshed, so the demonstrators did not march on the school. The 
angry whites, however, moved to a busy intersection and began 
to attack blacks driving by in their automobiles. During this ac­
tion the Cleveland police simply stood between the demonstrators 
and the whites, making no arrests, "despite the fact that for an 
entire day the Murray Hill mob roamed the streets beating Ne­
groes, newsmen, anyone who enraged them, and throwing rocks 
and bottles at passing automobiles."33 The response from city 
hall was not particularly encouraging; Mayor Ralph Locher main­
tained that the school conflict was outside his jurisdiction. 
The struggle was escalated further on 3 February 1964, when 
the UFM staged a sit-in at the Board of Education building and were 
forcibly removed by the police. Matters were temporarily re­
solved, however, the next day when the board publicly announced 
that it would take immediate steps to integrate the bussed stu­
dents. 
Two months later the controversy was reopened once again 
when the UFM directed its protest against the construction of new 
schools within the black areas of the East Side. They maintained 
that constructing schools in those areas would only resegregate 
schools, not desegregate them. Consequently, the UFM joined 
the Hazeldell Parents Association, a group of Glenville residents, 
in picketing one of the school construction sites. In their efforts 
to stop construction, some of the demonstrators placed them­
selves into construction pits and in front of construction equip­
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ment. Whereas bloodshed was averted in Murray Hill, it was not 
avoided on this occasion. In the confusion of the demonstrations, 
the Reverend Bruce Klunder, a white minister who had helped to 
organize the local chapter of CORE, was run over by a bulldozer 
and killed. Police attempted to end the demonstration by drag­
ging demonstrators away from the construction site; but as word 
of Klunder's death spread, violence erupted throughout the area. 
"Bands of angry Negroes roamed the streets, looted stores, and 
battled police late into the night."34 
Following the death of Reverend Klunder, the UFM was blocked 
by a court injunction against further interference with school con­
struction. The UFM reacted by calling for a school boycott, and 
on 20 April about 85 percent of the black students stayed home. 
Although the boycott was successful in demonstrating an un­
precedented display of unity in the black community, this action 
and the other demonstrations were unable to reverse the increas­
ing segregation of Cleveland schools. In the final analysis, the 
protests did not alter the board's building plans or the board's 
commitment to neighborhood schools. Consequently, the school 
system was more highly segregated in 1965 than it had been in 
1963. 
If there were any lingering doubts among blacks as to where 
the white-controlled city government stood on their grievances, 
additional proof was provided in May 1965. Testifying before an 
Ohio state legislative committee on the question of the state's 
death penalty, the Cleveland police chief, Richard R. Wagner, 
argued that it should be retained. His rationale was: "In Cleve­
land . .  . we have people saying they intend to overthrow the 
government of the United States and incidentally, shoot all the 
Caucasians. One of these groups is RAM [Revolutionary Action 
Movement]." This statement was widely interpreted in the black 
community to mean that the death penalty should be retained 
as an instrument for keeping black militants in line. Consequently, 
the UFM leadership requested a meeting with Mayor Locher to 
discuss the police chiefs statement. Although they called Locher, 
wrote letters to him, and sent telegrams, they received no reply. 
Therefore, five of the leaders (a black attorney, three ministers, 
and the local director of CORE) began a "wait-in" at Locher's 
office. Each day they asked for an appointment, it was refused, 
and they sat there throughout the day. Richard Gunn, the black 
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attorney, recounts the incident: "We didn't have any signs, and 
we weren't singing; we just sat there quietly. On the third day 
we decided not to go home at five o'clock, when City Hall closed. 
At five-twenty we were arrested and taken to jail."35 
The mayor's refusal to meet the delegation and his order to jail 
them, particularly the ministers, was interpreted as a stinging 
insult to the black community. From that time on "Ralph Locher's 
name became dirt among blacks. That incident became a symbol 
of the badly deteriorated relations between the mayor and the 
black community of Cleveland." The incident also signified be­
yond doubt the growing hostility and polarization of the races in 
Cleveland. Just how intense the racial division had become was 
made abundantly clear by the 1965 mayoralty election. 
THE 1965 MAYORALTY ELECTION: VICTORY IN DEFEAT 
Recruiting a Black Candidate 
Early in 1965 it was obvious to many Cleveland citizens, includ­
ing two politically active black women, Geraldine Williams and 
Jean Capers, that Mayor Locher would seek reelection and prob­
ably win again in the coming fall election, and that the black 
community would be subjected to another two years of Locher 
rule. Both women were officers in the Nonpartisan Voters League, 
a biracial organization that was formed in February 1964 to study 
Cleveland's government and determine how blacks could play a 
greater role in it. They decided that the population shift in 
Cleveland had advanced to the point where it was conceivable 
that a black could be elected mayor. Once that determination was 
made they went over a list of prominent black political figures 
searching for "a man whose name was not unknown, that could 
command a vote, that had demonstrated vote-getting power in 
the past." The man they selected was Carl B. Stokes, a representa­
tive in the Ohio state legislature. 
Stokes had a variety of characteristics that made him a par­
ticularly appealing choice. He had grown up in Cleveland's black 
ghetto and had experienced firsthand all of the hardships it en­
tailed. He was a high school dropout who had returned from the 
army to finish high school and then proceeded to earn a college 
degree and a law school degree. In 1958 he was appointed to 
Cleveland's law department as an assistant police prosecutor, a 
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position he held until 1962. In the latter year he was elected to 
the Ohio House of Representatives, thus becoming the first black 
Democrat to serve in the Ohio legislature. He was reelected to 
his legislative seat in 1964. 
Besides being "a very personable, young black man who was 
knowledgeable about politics," Stokes was considered as an es­
pecially good prospect by the two women because he had been 
elected to the legislature both times by running at-large in Cuya­
hoga County. This meant that he was acceptable to both white 
and black voters, a factor that would be of considerable impor­
tance in the forthcoming mayoralty election, since blacks con­
stituted only 40 percent of Cleveland's voters. In contrast to the 
other leading black politicians in Cleveland, Stokes was the only 
well-known one with a record of biracial support. The ten black 
councilmen had been elected from solidly black wards; there were 
no black congressmen because the congressional districts were 
gerrymandered to include a majority of white voters; and although 
black judges were elected with white support, they generally had 
low political visibility. Further, Stokes was one of the few black 
politicians who had gained support from the entire black com­
munity. Unlike the black councilmen who generally had strength 
only in their own wards, Stokes had been elected twice to the 
legislature with solid support from black voters in all neighbor­
hoods. Consequently, the league members decided that if they 
were going to propose a black to be mayor of Cleveland, Stokes 
was about the only black politician with characteristics that gave 
them a reasonable chance of gaining wide public support for their 
choice. 
After settling upon Stokes as the best prospective candidate, the 
two women journeyed to the state capital and proposed to Stokes 
that he seek the mayorship. According to one of them "he laughed 
and thought the idea was ludicrous." The conversation centered 
upon what it would take to convince Stokes to run. One of the 
women suggested that they return to Cleveland and initiate a draft 
movement, independent of any involvement by Stokes himself, to 
see how much popular support they could generate for him. Stokes 
agreed to the plan but made no commitment one way or the other. 
Whereupon, the two women returned to Cleveland and proceeded 
to collect the signatures of about 25,000 citizens (approximately 
12 percent of whom were white) who pledged to support Stokes 
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if he ran. With this mandate in hand, Stokes officially announced 
on 13 May 1965 that he would run for mayor as an independent 
candidate.36 
The mandate represented by the draft petitions was, of course, 
an important factor in persuading Stokes to run; however, there 
were other compelling considerations that contributed to his 
final decision. Stokes, like the women from the league, was also 
very conscious of the fact that the shifting population composi­
tion of Cleveland had resulted in blacks constituting about 40 
percent of the electorate, which made them the largest single 
ethnic group in the community. Further, there were good reasons 
to believe that he could obtain a solid bloc vote from the black 
community. The national civil rights movement and the local 
movement created a climate that was highly favorable for Stokes's 
candidacy. Local civil rights activity had the double effect of 
creating a higher level of race consciousness and unity within 
the black community and of exposing, in a dramatic fashion, the 
racism of white city officials. This was particularly the case with 
Locher, who had received solid support from the black community 
in his victories of 1961 and 1963. His posture on race issues be­
tween 1963 and 1965 made it certain that few blacks would vote 
for him again; thus those votes were up for grabs, and Stokes 
would clearly be the logical heir. Further, Stokes believed that 
this new awareness and discontent within the black community 
could be transformed into massive political action because this 
had already been demonstrated at least twice. The school boycott 
was one instance; and in early 1965 the black community, at the 
urging of UFM, voted in mass against a new tax levy for the 
school district, on the grounds that it was too small and would be 
an illusion of progress if passed. These two events suggested to 
Stokes and his close advisors that the black community was be­
ginning to close ranks as it had never done before in the face of 
white oppression and was taking the first steps toward inde­
pendent group political action. Finally, there was the high proba­
bility that the white vote would be split among three white 
candidates, which would make it feasible for Stokes to be elected 
with less than a majority of the vote. This possiblity existed as a 
result of the fact that Ralph McAllister, chairman of the Cleveland 
Board of Education, had declared himself as an independent 
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candidate for mayor before Stokes made his own announcement. 
McAllister had gained considerable popularity in the white com­
munity for his hard line during the school crisis and therefore 
was considered a strong contender for the conservative white 
vote. At the time Stokes announced, the Republicans had yet to 
slate a candidate. However, given Locher's declining popularity 
and the emerging racial split within the Democratic ranks, it was 
likely that they would field a major candidate and they did. A 
short time after Stokes entered the race, Republican Ralph Perk, 
the county auditor and the first Republican to win a countywide 
office in nearly thirty years, also announced. As a second genera­
tion Czech-Bohemian, Perk hoped to combine his white ethnic 
appeal and economy-in-government program into a winning com­
bination against the fractionalized Democrats. 
With three white candidates slated to be in the general election 
and the greater than usual strength of the Democratic party in 
the primary elections, it was evident to Stokes and his supporters 
that his chances for victory would be measurably improved if he 
skipped the Democratic primary and ran as an independent in 
the general election. Therefore, Stokes, a life-long Democrat, de­
cided upon the independent route as the most feasible one to the 
mayor's office. This decision meant that it would be necessary to 
collect at least 16,223 signatures on a petition to get Stokes's 
name on the 2 November ballot. As a means for demonstrating 
the seriousness of his campaign and the strength of his support, 
Stokes publicly stated that he would collect 32,000 signatures, 
twice the required number, and file on 20 June, his thirty-eighth 
birthday, which was ten days before the deadline. A close aide 
describes the tremendous push made so that Stokes could fulfill 
his public pledge: 
We counted them [petition signatures] on Friday night the 17th 
and found that we had only about 10,000 signatures; so we were far 
short, but we had the weekend to go. Well the word went out and I 
have never seen a sight like it before. They came in by little children 
bringing in batches that their parents had sent along, they came in by 
taxi, by car, by bicycle, and on foot to his law office on East 55th and 
Woodlawn. They just poured in, people were riding herd on their cars 
and calling in to find out where more were to be picked up and going 
to collect them. . . . Finally, on Sunday night we counted them twice, 
and we had over 30,000 signatures. 
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Campaign Strategy and Execution 
Stokes filed on his birthday and began almost immediately to 
implement a campaign strategy that would hopefully result in 
victory. The overall strategy was based on the thesis that Stokes 
could win in a four-way race if he (1) could produce a solid bloc 
vote within the black community and (2) earned the votes of "fair­
minded" whites. Recent events in the black community mentioned 
earlier suggested that his chances of securing a substantial black 
vote were very good indeed but that the number of fair-minded 
white voters was unknown. This meant that in terms of emphasis, 
Stokes would have to devote most of his time and energy to 
solidifying the black vote; however, at the same time, he would 
have to conduct a campaign that did not write off the white 
community. Indeed, he felt that it was absolutely essential that 
he present himself as a candidate for all the people and not as 
one who represented any special interest groups. Above all else, 
Stokes was determined to sell the idea that he was the best 
qualified candidate to reverse the retrogressive deterioration the 
city had experienced and that both blacks and whites would bene­
fit if he were elected. Stokes harbored no easy illusions about 
how important the race issue would be in the campaign, but he 
hoped to rise above it by projecting himself, to members of both 
races, as better qualified to be mayor than any of the other can­
didates. 
In viewing the black community, the Stokes supporters were 
encouraged by two sets of election statistics. First, voter regis­
tration in the heavily black wards had increased from 88,497 to 
103,123 (a gain of 14,626 voters) between 1963 and 1965. This 
increase was primarily due to a vigorous voter registration drive 
conducted by the Democratic party during the 1964 presidential 
campaign. The political posture of the Republican presidential 
candidate, Barry Goldwater, was particularly offensive to black 
citizens; consequently, most of the registration drive money and 
energy had been expended in black neighborhoods. As a result, 
the increase in registered voters was greater in black wards than 
it was in white wards; and, therefore, although blacks constituted 
only 34 percent of the 1965 population, they composed about 40 
percent of all registered voters. Thus, ironically, the 1964 Demo­
cratic party registration drive assisted the Stokes cause. The other 
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set of encouraging election statistics emerged from the 1965 Demo­
cratic primary. Although Stokes had decided to pass up the 
primary, Mark McElroy, the county recorder, challenged Locher 
and almost beat him (McElroy received 45 percent of the vote 
and Locher 52 percent). In 1963 Locher had run unopposed and 
had received over 80 percent of the vote in the ten black wards, 
but in the 1965 primary his poor showing in those same wards 
(he gathered only 25 percent of the vote) almost gave the primary 
victory to McElroy. The 1965 primary results demonstrated, in 
quantifiable terms, the sharp decline of Locher's support in the 
black community and also indicated once again that the black 
community was beginning to function in a politically cohesive 
fashion against its enemies. Furthermore, the primary results 
clearly suggested that Stokes would have a potential monopoly 
on black voters. Certainly the blacks were not going to vote for 
Locher nor McAllister, who they perceived to be a hardened 
racist, nor in all probability would they vote for Perk, the white 
ethnic Republican. The objective for the Stokes supporters, then, 
was to turn this potential situation into a real monopoly of black 
votes for Stokes. In order to do so, they had to accomplish two 
tasks: (1) persuade black voters to go to the polls on election day 
and (2) convince them to vote for Stokes. 
As has already been indicated, the general racial situation in 
Cleveland, the inept behavior of white officials, the general politi­
cal climate in the black community, the personal characteristics 
of Stokes, and the unattractiveness of the white candidates all 
favored the achievement of the twin goals. However, the trans­
formation of these somewhat intangible factors into maximum 
voter strength on election day required a key ingredient of any 
successful electoral campaign—organization. That is, there is the 
essential need for a structure that has a decision-making apparatus 
and a division of labor that utilizes material and people in a ra­
tional fashion to accomplish the numerous tasks that emerge in a 
political campaign. Somehow voters must be personally contacted 
before and on election day; literature must be written, printed, 
and distributed; money collected and spent; meetings set up and 
attended; speeches written and delivered; transportation and 
information must be provided for the voters; and the polls checked 
on election day. Putting together such an organization in a short 
period of time is obviously not an easy job, nor in some cases 
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possible. Consequently, an alternative is to utilize an already 
existing organization that is capable of fulfilling these essential 
functions. 
The only existing structures within the black community that 
did have such capabilities were the political organizations of the 
ten black city councilmen. It was conceivable that the Stokes 
campaign organization could have as its core the existing ward 
organizations instead of attempting to duplicate them. It was con­
ceivable, but highly unlikely, since none of the major black poli­
ticians were willing to openly support Stokes in his bid for the 
mayorship. There were those "such as Leo Jackson who had fought 
for civil rights for ten years and was viewed as the Negro spokes­
man," who felt they were better qualified than Stokes to be the 
mayor if there was to be a black mayor. Most of the others, 
however, simply "did not think he was a good risk . . . ; they 
decided to do the safe thing which was to stick with the party." 
After all, the limited power that they did wield flowed from their 
positions within the Democratic party organization; why jeopar­
dize it on what would probably be a losing cause? 
Without access to or the support of the existing political struc­
tures within the black community, the Stokes supporters proceeded 
to build their own campaign organization or, put more accurate­
ly, "a quasi-organization grew like Topsy, with no planning and 
virtually no central direction." Stokes and his close associates 
made contacts with their personal friends, whether they had past 
political experience or not (most of them did not), and tried to 
persuade them to join the campaign. The many who did, in turn, 
recruited their friends and, they, their friends. One worker de­
scribed the development of Stokes's organization in the following 
manner: 
It was a real grass-roots campaign in the true sense of the word. As
each person was called in by Mr. Stokes himself or someone close to
him, they stuck and brought in others. In fact, the thing mushroomed
to such an extent that a couple of months before November there
was complete chaos in the campaign. No one knew who was doing
what because so many inexperienced people were involved. 
What the Stokes campaign organization lacked in terms of ra­
tional structure and coordination was supplanted, however, by 
the raw zeal, enthusiasm, and inventiveness of the workers. In 
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contrast to workers in most political campaigns, none of them 
received money or expected personal gain for their efforts. In­
deed, as was the case with the Hatcher volunteers in Gary, it cost 
people money to work for Stokes. The campaign took on a "cru­
sade-like quality," which stimulated the volunteers to work long 
and grueling hours with unbelievable spirit. Reflecting on the 
character of the campaign organization, one of the principal 
workers described it as: 
. .  . a free-wheeling campaign. Everybody was trying to figure out 
what we were doing and hell we didn't even know what we were do­
ing ourselves. It was a real free-flowing, free-wheeling movement. 
Everybody sacrificed and worked their fingers to the bone and 
spent money, you know, to get this guy into office. Everybody's 
ideas were taken into consideration and given some merit. A guy 
would come in with an idea—sounds good, can you do it? Put it into 
effect, let's see what happens. It was a great campaign. 
In summary, Stokes's bid for the mayorship in 1965 was not 
supported by a well-oiled campaign organization, but it was bol­
stered by a dedicated and energetic group of volunteers who were, 
with a few exceptions, political amateurs. These political amateurs 
were recruited from both races. However, most of the key work­
ers in the 1965 Stokes campaign organization were whites, al­
though several blacks were in top decision-making positions. 
The large number of whites in the organization did not mean that 
Stokes lacked black support, it simply reflected the fact that 
whites had more time to devote to the campaign than the aver­
age black. What attracted these people to the Stokes campaign 
varied, of course, from individual to individual; yet there were two 
principal motivating factors that were identified by most respon­
dents. Some workers (particularly the white suburban liberals) 
were attracted primarily, but by no means exclusively, by the 
image of Stokes as a governmental reformer who had the quali­
ties to reverse the physical and social decline of Cleveland. 
They viewed the Stokes effort as essentially a "good government" 
campaign, which would reverse the decline of Cleveland and in­
augurate a new era that was more responsive to the dramatic 
social changes that were occurring in the community. Others 
were stimulated to join, again not exclusively, by the fact that 
Stokes was a black candidate who symbolized many of the goals 
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of the civil rights movement. In their view, electoral politics was 
an extension of the movement; a shortcut to the civil rights goals 
of housing, education, welfare, and so forth. If Stokes were vic­
torious, they would be helping to achieve those ends, and they 
also would be making political history by electing the first black 
mayor of a major American city. 
In their attempt to rally the black community behind Stokes, 
his campaign workers discovered that the most intractable ob­
stacle they encountered was the pervasive attitude among nu­
merous blacks that a black man could not be elected mayor of the 
city. Supporting their general cynicism regarding the possibilities 
of a black occupying the highest position in city government was 
the fact that in 1955 a black man named Alexander Martin had 
run for mayor in the Democratic primary and was overwhelm­
ingly defeated. Despite the various changes that had taken place 
within the black community during the decade since Martin ran, 
there were many blacks who continued to maintain that no black 
man, regardless of his qualifications, could be elected mayor. 
This notion was, of course, prevalent among black politicians and, 
according to campaign workers, more widespread among middle-
class blacks than others. 
To counteract this skepticism, the campaign workers empha­
sized the statistics of the situation. They continuously drove home 
the point that blacks constituted about 40 percent of all registered 
voters. Therefore, if they voted as a bloc for Stokes, if he received 
"the vote of fair-minded white citizens who want the best quali­
fied candidate for mayor," and if the three white candidates 
split the remaining white vote, Stokes could win. The pitch made 
to black doubters went something like the following: 
Many thought he didn't have a chance; but when you started to
spout statistics to them about what could happen if they really
turned out and voted, because they usually were apathetic and sat
home and didn't vote at all, then they started to listen. . . . Look,
nobody ever before had broken down for them the ethnic pockets
in Cleveland and how in a four-man race those ethnic pockets would
work to their advantage—if they would vote as a solid bloc. . . . We
tried to show them that electing Stokes would be a milestone in
black history. We urged them to get rid of their personal hang-ups,
if they had some, and view Stokes as a symbol to prove that we can
do something as a people. 
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Stokes and his workers were aided in selling this argument to 
the black public by the local civil rights organizations, the Call 
and Post (the black newspaper), various black social organiza­
tions, a young student's group, and, perhaps most importantly, 
several of the leading black ministers. Concerning the support of 
the black ministers, one of the workers exclaimed, "we were able 
to get to the ministers because at that particular time Martin 
Luther King was organizing them for his nonviolent movement. 
So we were able to touch the ministers and get them interested 
in politics for the first time." The combination of this support, 
the enthusiasm of Stokes's workers, and the general political 
circumstances of the time, as we shall see, did result in an unprec­
edented turnout and cohesive vote for Stokes in the black commu­
nity. However, before discussing the election results in the black 
community, it is necessary to review the campaign the Stokes 
organization made for white votes. 
As we noted earlier, Stokes had decided that although the black 
community was his major constituency, it was essential to conduct 
a campaign that appealed to the entire electorate of Cleveland. 
If he could gain support of some white voters his chances of vic­
tory would be improved; and, just as important, if he did win with 
whites as part of his electoral coalition, it would certainly make 
the task of governance somewhat easier. There was no question, 
then, about the need to gain white support; however, the means 
for doing so was a confounding question. 
In approaching the white community, Stokes was confronted 
with the difficulty of cutting through the traditional prejudice of 
white ethnics plus the intensified negativism that had resulted 
from the national and local civil rights movement (relative to this 
latter point, it is also important to note that the Watts racial dis­
order occurred in August 1965). He fully understood that although 
he benefited from the increased black consciousness and unity 
induced by the civil rights movement, he also was hindered by 
its negative impact on whites. Whereas his candidacy symbolized 
for many blacks their quest for racial justice, it also symbolized 
for many whites all that they feared and resented about the new 
black thrust. 
Stokes and some of his supporters were convinced that if he 
could get exposure in the white community he would overcome 
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this obstacle and win some whites over to his cause. It was be­
lieved that if whites met Stokes personally, they would see that 
he was not a "black extremist" to be feared but "an intelligent, 
dynamic individual who had the qualifications to be mayor of all 
the people." The resources available for reaching the white com­
munity, however, were meager. Although he was a life-long Demo­
crat, the fact that he had chosen to run as an independent gave 
the West Side ward leaders a good excuse to bar him from appear­
ing at the all-important ward meetings. Thus, he was cut off from 
one of the most crucial instruments for reaching white voters. A 
small group of Stokes workers did pass out some literature, make 
some phone calls, and set up some meetings on the West Side, 
but only a small minority of the voters was reached. According 
to one of the West Side workers: "The response was very nega­
tive, people wondered why we were asking them to vote for him 
—they were really antagonistic." 
Not only did Stokes have little opportunity to personally talk to 
white voters but the lack of money (the entire campaign was run 
on $44,000) severely restricted the utilization of television, radio, 
and newspaper advertisements as a means of reaching whites. 
The campaign organization simply did not have access to the 
amount of money required to launch any kind of public relations 
campaign that would project a positive image of Stokes into the 
white community. The two Cleveland newspapers did little to aid 
Stokes in surmounting this barrier; both endorsed Locher and 
gave Stokes only minimum coverage until the very end of the 
campaign. Stokes did, however, receive wide media coverage on 
the occasions when he made major joint appearances with the 
other mayoralty candidates. During such opportunities, Stokes 
presented a wide-ranging program to improve the quality of life 
in Cleveland and made special appeals to allay the racial fears 
of whites. Note, for example, the following exerpt from one of 
his principal speeches: 
Now, as one running for mayor of Cleveland who happens to be a
Negro—I want to make this one thing clear. I do not run as a Negro,
but as a Clevelander thinking of the best interests of all Cleveland­
ers. My election would not mean "Negro takeover," a "black" cabi­
net or the establishment of a subsidiary office of the civil rights
movement in City Hall. I would be a fair and just mayor. Problems
would be dealt with according to their severity—not their black, 
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white or yellow political impact. Prospective employees of the City 
of Cleveland would be judged solely on their merits. 
I would be a full-time mayor. Before a Watts, Los Angeles, devel­
ops in Cleveland, I would be on the scene—not in my locked office, 
not leaving by the back door, and not just saying, "I will not tolerate 
the disrespect for law and order." 
I want no Negro to vote for me simply because I am a Negro; and 
I would hope that no white person votes against me simply because 
I am a Negro.37 
For the most part, however, the Stokes campaign, as the elec­
tion results indicate, did not penetrate the white community of Cleve­
land. The bulk of his white support came from white liberals who 
lived in the surrounding suburbs, particularly the members of 
Americans for Democratic Action. These whites occupied impor­
tant positions within the Stokes campaign organization and 
worked hard for his election, but they were unable to vote for him 
on election day. 
Despite the obstacles faced by Stokes in both the black and 
white communities, his campaign gained sufficient momentum to 
alarm ail three of his white opponents. Consequently, each of 
them employed a late campaign technique aimed at defeating 
Stokes. All of them conducted a whispering campaign among 
white voters that a vote for the other two white candidates was 
a wasted vote and would result in electing "that Nigger mayor." 
They argued that Stokes would win unless a majority of the white 
community united behind one white candidate just as the blacks 
were uniting behind Stokes. Naturally, each of the white candi­
dates maintained that he was the person white voters should back. 
The election results suggest that this strategy worked best for the 
incumbent, Locher, who had the support of both major news­
papers, the Democratic party, the labor unions, and the downtown 
business establishment. Given this broad institutional support, 
most white voters evidently decided that if they wanted to defeat 
Stokes they had best vote for Locher. 
Election Results and Lessons Learned 
Election night proved to be a tantalizing event. After much see­
sawing back and forth, Locher finally emerged on top, edging out 
Stokes by the wafer-thin margin of 2,458 votes. Given the close­
ness of the results, Stokes filed for a recount, which officially 
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determined that Locher had received 36.7 percent of the vote, 
Stokes 35.8 percent, Perk 17.1 percent, and McAllister 9.5 per­
cent (see table 7). Thus, Locher's final edge over Stokes was 2,142 
votes, a difference of less than one percent. 
TABLE 7 
CLEVELAND MAYORALTY ELECTION, 1965 
Percentage 
Candidate Vote of Vote 
Locher 87,858 36.7 
Stokes 85,716 35.8 
Perk 41,045 17.1 
McAllister 22,650 9.5 
Total 237,269 99.1 
SOURCE: Board of Election voting returns. 
An analysis of the election returns by the racial characteristics 
of the wards shows that, as expected, Stokes gained a solid vote 
(85.4 percent) from the black community, where he received the 
overwhelming proportion of his total vote, and only 3 percent of 
the vote in predominately white wards. In the eight wards that 
contained a mixed racial composition, Stokes received a vote 
that was very close (about a 4 percent variance) to the percent­
age of blacks in the ward. Thus, the election results almost exact­
ly reflected the racial divisions within the city; about 95 percent 
of the white voters voted for one of the three white candidates 
and about 85 percent of the blacks pulled the lever for Stokes. 
With a few minor, but crucial, exceptions, then, the analysis 
and projections set forth by the Stokes workers were realized (see 
table 8). He was able to achieve a substantial bloc vote in the 
black community; however, about 15 percent of the black voters 
TABLE 8 
CLEVELAND MAYORALTY ELECTION, 1965: BY RACE 
Black
Wards
 White
 Wards
 Mixed
 Wards
 City 
 Totals 
Registered voters
Percentage turnout
 103,123
 72.1
 159,419
 69.7
 75,261
 71.7
 337,803 
 70.9 
Stokes votes
Percentage for Stokes
 63,550
 85.4
 3,300
 3J0
 18,866
 35^
 85,716 
 35.8 
SOURCE: Computed from Special Census of 1965 and Board of Election voting returns. 
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still marked their ballot for one of the white candidates. The 
white office-seekers did split up the white vote but not nearly as 
evenly as the Stokes people had hoped they would. Even the 
weakest of past Republican mayoralty candidates, for example, 
had never attained less than 25 percent of the vote, yet Perk was 
able to gather only 17 percent—an all-time low. The proportion of 
white votes for Stokes was also a disappointment. He and his 
workers realized that he would capture only a small portion of the 
white vote but the approximately 3 percent he did receive was 
even lower than they anticipated. 
Despite these drawbacks and his loss at the polls, the Stokes 
campaign was in several respects a victory in defeat. His cam­
paign produced a record-high turnout of black voters for a munici­
pal election. Never before in the history of Cleveland had so many 
blacks journeyed to the polls and voted so cohesively for a mayor­
alty candidate. Just to take one example, in the 1963 mayor's 
election only 57 percent of registered black voters voted, where­
as in 1965 72 percent of them went to the polls. The fact that this 
record black turnout came extremely close to putting Stokes in the 
mayor's seat "was viewed in the black community as an elating 
moral victory and one that meant that the black community would 
have to be seriously contended with in all future elections, par­
ticularly the 1967 mayoralty election." Stokes's narrow miss not 
only stirred his backers, it also made a deep impression on the 
"doubting Thomases" in the black community who had failed to 
support him on the grounds that the "time is not ripe," "he doesn't 
have a chance—why back a loser," or "he will polarize the com­
munity." If Stokes ran again in 1967, and it was obvious that he 
would, these people would be hard pressed not to fall in behind 
him. 
A concrete manifestation of the inspiring effect the near-win 
had on the black community was the amount of money and the 
manner in which it was raised to finance the vote recount. At the 
conclusion of the campaign the Stokes organization was at least 
$4,000 in debt and needed an additional $11,000 to pay for the 
recount. Although the organization had experienced great diffi­
culty in raising money during the regular campaign, it found that 
money poured in from all corners after the word went out about 
the financial situation. The words of an individual on the finance 
committee captures the spirit of the occurrence: 
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The recount in 1965 was an experience that I'll never live through 
again, and I don't think anybody else ever will because it was as ex­
citing as anything that happened. People just started to bring money 
in from all over. Bars would put up big containers—in fact, these con­
tainers were all through the neighborhoods, in the bars, stores, bar­
ber shops, everywhere. . . . People were walking up and down the 
streets collecting nickels and dimes and bringing it all into the of­
fice. It was really exciting, and it was a very moving thing. 
Indeed, the effort to finance the recount was so successful that 
enough money was raised to pay for it and also to liquidate the 
campaign debts that had accumulated. 
As we have already noted, Stokes made very little headway in­
to the white community during the 1965 election campaign. It is 
obvious that the average white voter was not persuaded by his 
approach; however, during the course of his campaign Stokes did 
make a positive impression on some members of an influential 
group within the white community—the downtown business estab­
lishment. Although Stokes was largely unknown to the business 
community in 1965, by the end of the campaign he, in the words 
of a member of the establishment, 
. . . emerged as a fellow who was clearly a cut above the kind of 
candidate for public office that we've had in Cleveland for a num­
ber of years. He was an attractive, imaginative, and even inspiring 
person, and you couldn't help but hear him speak out on the issues. 
He was very well informed on a whole range of issues, not just civil 
rights, but matters of taxes, revenues, city development, and what 
have you. He spoke out on the issues and did his homework well. 
So he was not simply a handsome black candidate for office, but a 
knowledgeable and better informed candidate than most men who 
have run for public office in this community. 
By the time this assessment of Stokes had begun to circulate 
through business circles it was too late to have any impact; the 
downtown establishment, although not particularly satisfied with 
Locher, supported him as the "safe" candidate. But Stokes's 1965 
performance laid the groundwork for the considerable business 
community support that he would enjoy in the 1967 mayoralty 
campaign. 
Another positive outcome of the 1965 campaign was the devel­
opment of a core of Stokes supporters who had gained invaluable 
experience and had learned some important lessons that would be 
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very useful in the next election. One of the fundamental lessons 
learned was that enthusiasm was a necessary but not sufficient 
ingredient to produce victory. The high spirit and zeal of people 
had to be channeled into specific, coordinated campaign tasks; 
and this required a more structured organization than the Stokes 
forces possessed in 1965. In the future, considerable stress would 
be placed upon developing an organization that could fruitfully uti­
lize scores of volunteers in a rational fashion. If accomplished, 
this would be instrumental in obtaining an even greater black 
voting bloc. 
It was also learned that reaching white voters was an extremely 
difficult chore, certainly far more difficult than Stokes had ex­
pected. Given the past and anticipated resistance of the Demo­
cratic party organization and West Side ethnic organizations to 
appearances by Stokes at their meetings, it was clear that any 
future effort would require that Stokes rely heavily on the mass 
media to present himself to white voters. This approach would 
necessitate much more money than was available in 1965 and 
some professional public relations expertise that could project 
to white voters a persuasive mass-media campaign. Consequent­
ly, if success was to be achieved in the future, it could not be 
financed on a shoestring as was the case with the 1965 campaign. 
Finally, the Stokes supporters learned the very hard lesson 
that if they did not want victory stolen from them, they needed 
challengers and election judges in every precinct. In studying the 
election returns, they discovered, for example, that in some pre­
cincts every single registered voter voted (none were sick, out of 
town, working overtime, or simply staying home), and not one 
voted for Stokes. In addition, on election night two ballot bags 
(paper ballots are used in most precincts) from two black wards 
disappeared and were never accounted for. Assuming that Stokes 
received a similar proportion of the vote in the uncounted black 
neighborhoods that he did in other black precincts, it is possible 
that his total vote was higher than Locher's. Indeed, many of 
the Stokes supporters were convinced that he did win the 1965 
election and that it was stolen from him by those who controlled 
the election machinery. The next time they would have to be much 
better prepared to cope with fraud at the polls. 
In summary, although the 1965 endeavor to elect Stokes did not 
succeed, it firmly established that the black community in Cleve­
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land could be mobilized behind him, and it developed valuable 
electoral political experience and insights among his supporters. 
Two years hence, most of them would have another opportunity 
to use their newly acquired experience. 
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Cleveland: The 1967 Primary Election 
THE EXPLOSIVE INTERLUDE: 1965-1967 
On the evening of his defeat in 1965 Carl Stokes announced that 
he would run again in 1967 unless Congressman Charles A. Vanik 
decided to seek the mayorship. In the event that Vanik did run, 
Stokes indicated that he would support him and implied that 
he would pursue Vanik's seat in Congress.1 Despite this consider­
ation for what Vanik would do, most of the core Stokes sup­
porters were convinced that he would seek the mayor's seat again 
in 1967, and they acted upon that premise. They decided to form 
an informal group called "Stokes's Folks," which would meet 
from time to time before the next election and discuss what they 
had learned in 1965 and what they would do differently in 1967. 
Any question about whether Stokes would or would not run 
again was essentially resolved by a series of events that made the 
political climate increasingly ripe for a second Stokes effort. In 
April 1966, for instance, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 
conducted its first hearings on ghetto life in a northern city and 
laid bare the desperate conditions of blacks in Cleveland. "For 
six days radio and T.V. covered the hearings and exposed for all 
to hear and see the boiling grievances of black Clevelanders. 
. .  . I am convinced until that time most whites still did not know 
how rotten things were."2 
Three months later, during the sweltering heat of a July eve­
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ning, the cry of black anguish was raised to a pitch that could 
not be ignored. The white manager of a bar at Seventy-nineth 
Street and Hough Avenue put a sign on the front door that read: 
"No Water for Niggers." As a crowd of enraged blacks began to 
gather in front of the bar, the manager and another white man 
strutted on the sidewalk with a shotgun and a pistol.3 Several 
wagonloads of police arrived and began to disperse the crowd 
by shoving and pushing people down Hough Avenue. Either a 
sniper's bullet or a cherry bomb exploded in the tense atmo­
sphere, and within seconds the police were shooting out street­
lights and into buildings (a women calling for her children was 
killed). The crowd threw bottles and bricks, began to break store 
windows, and sniper shots rang through the air. For a full week 
massive civil disorder—burning, looting, vandalism, sniping, 
police shooting, and National Guard occupation—raged in Cleve­
land's black ghetto. When the violence finally subsided on 24 
July, four blacks had been killed, hundreds of people injured, 
and blocks of buildings gutted. If there were any lingering ques­
tions about racial polarization in the city, they vanished. Cleve­
land had joined Harlem, Watts, Detroit and scores of other cities 
that already had experienced or soon would experience racial 
rebellions in the "hot summers" of 1965 through 1968. 
On 9 August, the grand jury of Cuyahoga County issued its 
investigatory report on the civil disorders. The jury blamed the 
riot on "a relatively small group of trained and disciplined pro­
fessionals at this business . . . aided and abetted, wittingly or 
otherwise, by misguided people of all ages and colors, many of 
whom are avowed believers in violence and extremism, and some 
of whom also are either members of or officers in the Com­
munist Party." Mayor Locher endorsed the conclusion and con­
gratulated the grand jury for having "the guts to fix the approxi­
mate cause which had been hinted at for a long time, that 
subversive and Communist elements in our community were 
behind the rioting."4 
The people of Hough, however, strongly disagreed with the 
conclusions of the all-white grand jury (headed by Louis Seltzer) 
and the mayor. Their biracial review panel conducted their own 
investigation into the events and judged that "the underlying 
causes of the rioting are to be found in the social conditions that 
exist in the ghetto areas of Cleveland." In reference to the in­
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fluence of Communist agitators, their report stated: "We would 
believe that an individual living in such poverty as exists in 
Hough needs no one to tell him just how deplorable his living 
conditions are."5 This position was bolstered by the United 
States attorney general and the FBI, which maintained that there 
was no masterminded plot or communist influence on the riots.6 
However, appearing before a congressional hearing, Mayor 
Locher argued: "I would disagree with the statements of the 
Attorney General, and I would wholeheartedly agree with the 
conclusions made by the grand jury report." 
Locher's refusal to admit that decaying social conditions and 
the lack of governmental response were responsible for the vio­
lence, and his insistence that a small group of extremists were at 
fault, encouraged an increasing "billy-club mentality" in city 
administration-black community relations.7 He and his law direc­
tor, Bronis J. Klementowicz, made numerous public statements 
that a stronger police department and filling of jails were ap­
propriate means for quelling agitation. Police officers were 
publicly urged by the mayor's office and white city council mem­
bers to "get tough" with the "hoodlums." Among other things, 
the police force was expanded, and each night a special police 
helicopter, armed with a Thompson submachine gun, hovered 
over the ghetto and scanned the ground with a searchlight. In 
the early summer of 1967, Locher even went so far as to brand 
Martin Luther King, Jr., an extremist when King arrived in 
Cleveland to preach nonviolence to black high school students. 
Locher refused to meet with King and repeatedly refused to meet 
with other black leaders. Needless to say, these actions merely 
intensified the already pervasive anti-Locher sentiment in the 
ghetto and no doubt increased the growing cohesion among 
blacks. As each event unfolded and was added to the impact of 
earlier ones, it became virtually impossible for any blacks to 
defend the city administration. The black community became 
more and more united against what was perceived by all but a 
small handful of blacks as the common enemy. 
The ineptness of the Locher administration in dealing with 
racial strife not only alienated the black community, it also 
generated considerable discontent within the white business 
community. Racial violence and acute conflict had marred the 
reputation of Cleveland and was "making it more and more 
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difficult to attract new businesses, new employees, and conduct 
business along usual lines." City hall suffered additional loss of 
support in business circles in January 1967, when the then secre­
tary of Housing and Urban Development Robert C. Weaver, took 
the unprecedented step of curtailing all urban renewal funds to 
Cleveland and withdrew $10 million already committed for the 
second stage of downtown commercial renewal. The secretary's 
decision was based on the fact that Cleveland had failed to 
complete a single urban-renewal project in eleven years and that 
it had more vacant land under urban renewal than any other 
city in the nation. Weaver warned that unless substantial prog­
ress was made by July, all funds would be cut off for the ad­
ministration of on-going projects. 
Further lack of administrative leadership and competency was 
exhibited by city hall in May 1967. All of the major cities in the 
nation were competing for a portion of the $900 million available 
under the new federal model-cities program. Under the new pro­
gram, money would be distributed only to those cities which 
indicated in their application that they had the ability to launch 
innovative social and physical programs to improve the quality 
of life for their deprived citizens. Cleveland filed its application 
on the last possible day, it lacked details, and it did not have the 
required approval of the city council. The mayor attached a 
note to the document indicating that he would attempt to have 
the application more fully completed by the end of the month. 
When the cities were selected, few individuals were surprised 
that Cleveland was not among those chosen. 
By early summer 1967, the national media began to focus on 
Cleveland as the classic example of urban malaise. News maga­
zines such as the Saturday Evening Post, The Nation, Time, and 
Newsweek all carried stories highly critical of the Locher ad­
ministration and the consequent decline of the community. Some 
Clevelanders began to circulate the suggestion that the city's 
slogan be changed from "The Best Location in the Nation" to 
"The Mistake on the Lake." Among the businessmen who trav­
eled extensively, some "were becoming ashamed to admit that 
they lived in Cleveland." Even the local press, which had backed 
Locher in 1965, began to levy unrelenting criticism against city 
hall. The atmosphere became so antagonistic that Locher refused 
to talk with out-of-town reporters, reduced press conferences to 
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a minimum, and erected an icy wall between himself and the 
local media. 
This was the political climate that prevailed in Cleveland as 
the time approached for the 1967 mayoralty election. The extent 
to which this climate promoted or impeded the political fortunes 
of the leading candidates was the fundamental question end­
lessly discussed and debated in political circles. Although various 
political camps had radically different interpretations of who 
was gaining and who was losing as a result of the developments, 
they all agreed that the situation had become increasingly com­
plex and that this complexity created a fluid circumstance. 
Few things were certain other than the consensus that several 
candidates would be testing the political winds when the pri­
mary election approached. 
THE CANDIDATES 
Among the potential candidates there was, of course, the in­
cumbent Locher. Given his near complete loss of support among 
blacks, segments of the business community, and elements of 
the local mass media, it is understandable that some leading 
Democratic officials attempted to ease Locher out of the running. 
Albert Porter, the Democratic county chairman, promised 
Locher a federal judgeship, for example, if he would agree to 
step down. Locher, however, despite his eroding political base, 
indicated that he would not be pushed aside and would run on 
the integrity of his administration. "My reelection campaign," 
he announced, "will be based on the record of this administra­
tion. This administration has served all of the people with fair­
ness. I pride myself on being honest. Throughout my career, 
there has been no price tag on honesty in government."8 
In his quest to gain the endorsement of the Democratic party 
for the 3 October primary election, Locher faced stiff competi­
tion from James Stanton, president of the city council. Stanton 
had become council president by defeating Jack Russell, a long­
time powerful figure in Cleveland politics, and his triumph 
established him as one of the brightest young stars on the local 
political horizon. Indeed, he seriously considered running for 
mayor in 1965 but eventually concluded that the time was not 
ripe. There were strong indications that Porter and other leading 
Democratic officials favored Stanton over Locher (Stanton peti­
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tions were being circulated by party workers and it was rumored 
that in a closed party meeting, ten of the seventeen vice-chair­
men preferred Stanton as the party nominee).9 Stanton, how­
ever, found himself in a difficult predicament. If Locher refused to 
bow out, his entrance into the primary race along with Frank 
Celeste (another announced candidate) would no doubt per­
suade Stokes to also enter the Democratic primary instead of 
running as an independent. Such a lineup would clearly give 
Stokes the advantage; consequently, Stanton would run only if 
Locher or Celeste were convinced to drop out—he did not want to 
be the man to insure a Stokes victory. 
Frank Celeste, like Locher, however, was not about to step 
aside for Stanton or anyone else. A sixty-year-old man, Celeste 
had spent eight years as the mayor of Lakewood, a Cleveland 
suburb, and had earned a highly favorable reputation for his 
executive ability. His reputation was particularly attractive to a 
group of Cleveland businessmen who had become deeply dis­
enchanted with Locher's inability to handle the mounting prob­
lems of Cleveland but who were not ready to support a black, 
even one as impressive as Stokes, for mayor of the city. This 
group, including Louis Seltzer who had retired as editor of the 
Cleveland Press, convinced Celeste to move into Cleveland and 
run for mayor. In order to persuade Celeste to do so, they prom­
ised to raise $100,000 for his campaign, attempt to get both news­
papers to endorse him, and try to convince the Democratic party 
to select him as its nominee in the primary. Celeste agreed to 
run and the effort to deliver on the support package was mounted. 
According to a respondent who was intimately involved in at­
tempting to secure the party endorsement for Celeste, the busi­
ness group had decided to take a leaf out of the Duquane Club 
in Pittsburgh, which supports Democratic mayors for the city but 
are still Republicans, and back Republican candidates for of­
fices at higher levels. In line with this strategy, the business 
group made an offer to officials of the Democratic party to supply 
$100,000 to finance the Celeste campaign and two newspaper 
endorsements if the party endorsed the candidacy of Frank 
Celeste. Although some party leaders who knew of the offer 
were inclined to accept it, the deal ultimately fell through when 
it was vetoed by James Carney who favored going with Locher 
for one more term and then supporting Stanton two years hence. 
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The veto by Carney (who was reported to be the most power­
ful behind-the-scenes figure in the Democratic party) was 
known by only a few, thus causing much speculation and jock­
eying concerning who the party would endorse during the first 
week of August. 
The candidate with the slimmest possibility of gaining the 
Democratic endorsement was Carl Stokes. It was inconceivable 
that the party would select a black man, particularly one who 
had run as an independent in 1965 and had endorsed selective 
Republicans in 1966, to carry the banner. Stokes would, however, 
play an important role in the Democratic primary. If he decided 
to run as an independent, as he had in 1965, the primary would 
be wide open, but his entry into it would undoubtedly shrink the 
number of white candidates. Which of these two courses Stokes 
intended to take was a closely guarded secret that was not to be 
revealed until filing day, 5 July. In order to give himself com­
plete flexibility on the matter, Stokes collected two completely 
different sets of petitions; thus he would be able to go either way 
when it came time to file. 
Most respondents were of the opinion that Stokes preferred to 
run as an independent again because he was hopeful that at 
least two, and perhaps more, white candidates (a Democrat and 
a Republican) would be in the race and consequently split the 
white vote. Two factors, however, mitigated against the inde­
pendent route for Stokes. First, there were the urgings of high 
national Democratic officials that Stokes run as a party mem­
ber. If he won under the party label it would help his administra­
tion in obtaining special federal assistance, and it certainly would 
be beneficial if he had higher political ambitions. Second, the 
Republican candidate, Seth Taft, after studying a commissioned 
public opinion poll conducted in May 1967, concluded that he 
would do worse in a three-man than in a two-man race. There­
fore, he explicitly informed Stokes that if Stokes ran as an inde­
pendent he would withdraw rather than be an instrument for 
fragmenting the white vote. Taft made this announcement pub­
licly and reinforced it through a private meeting with Louis 
Stokes, the brother of the candidate.10 Stokes concluded that 
Taft was not bluffing and decided to enter the Democratic pri­
mary where his chances of victory appeared to be greater than 
they would in a head-on general election against one white 
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Democrat who would no doubt draw the overwhelming propor­
tion of white Republican votes. 
Consequently, Stokes appeared at the Board of Elections in the 
late afternoon of 5 July 1967 and filed in the Democratic party 
primary. Fortunately for the Stokes campaign, two aides of 
James Stanton appeared earlier that afternoon to file his 
nominating petitions and were informed that they lacked a mas­
ter petition (a notorized statement that the candidate was a faith­
ful party member). The shaken Stanton backers found their 
master petition in the bottom of a wastepaper basket, and a 
Stokes supporter who happened to observe the incident hur­
riedly relayed the news back to the Stokes headquarters. A mas­
ter petition was quickly filled out there, and Stokes proceeded 
to file a few hours later without a hitch.11 
Stokes's entry into the Democratic primary convinced Com­
mon Pleas Judge Frank D. Celebrezze, who showed up at the 
Board of Elections with the intent to file, that it was not even 
worth the effort. His entry also stimulated a strong movement 
among the Stanton supporters to persuade Locher and Celeste 
to drop out. The movement failed, however, and two days after 
filing Stanton withdrew with the explanatory statement: "I 
simply have to agree with Mr. Stokes that he and Mr. Locher are 
the two major candidates and I cannot win the race."12 Thus, 
the field was reduced to three men (Locher, Celeste, and Stokes) 
and on 1 August the Democratic party, as expected, endorsed 
Locher as their candidate at a meeting in which party chairman 
Porter refused to allow Stokes to present his case.13 
Temporarily out of the limelight was the fourth candidate, 
Republican Seth Taft. When Stokes filed as a Democrat, Taft 
(the grandson of former President William Howard Taft and 
nephew of former United States senator from Ohio, Robert Taft) 
moved into the city of Cleveland from the affluent suburb of 
Pepper Pike and filed as the Republican candidate for mayor. 
He would encounter considerable difficulty in attracting public at­
tention during the Democratic primary, but once it was over he 
would be in the center of an intense campaign. 
THE STOKES PRIMARY STRATEGY AND ORGANIZATION 
The Stokes primary-campaign strategy was straightforward. 
He had to, on the one hand, retain and add to the 1965 black vote 
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and, on the other hand, substantially expand the slight white 
vote he had received. 
Voter statistics once again determined the strategy concern­
ing the black community. Blacks constituted roughly 40 percent 
of the electorate. The 1965 election results proved that the black 
community was undoubtedly Stokes's stronghold, thus "it was 
necessary to aim for total turnout" among blacks, so that they 
would make up a larger proportion of the final vote than they 
were of the electorate. There was no question in the minds of 
the Stokes workers that blacks would vote for Stokes, the issue 
was getting them to the polls. This meant that every conceivable 
effort must be made to contact each black voter about the elec­
tion, especially the traditional nonvoter. The operating assump­
tion within the Stokes camp, according to a key worker, was: 
. .  . we knew we were going to get the black vote, the game plan
was to get it out. The guy who was most alienated, who stayed at
home, was most inclined to vote for Stokes, if we could get him to
the polls. Consequently, a great effort was made to get every eligible
black voter into those voting booths. 
Compounding the usual difficulties associated with such a task 
was the fact that Stokes was running in a primary election. Many 
blacks had traditionally resisted voting in primary elections 
"because it lets people know your politics, which isn't too good 
for people who live on the margin." Therefore, the Stokes work­
ers had to devise a special approach for overcoming this histori­
cal reluctance, one that would result in an unprecedented primary 
election turnout among black voters. 
The other dimension of the primary strategy was based on the 
notion that it was essential for Stokes to do much better among 
white voters than he had in 1965. Improving on his proportion of 
the white vote would be no easy accomplishment; the violence 
that had erupted during the intervening years had heightened 
antiblack feelings among whites, and there was one less white 
candidate in the 1967 campaign. Nevertheless, Stokes knew that 
he needed a larger white vote, and he set out to capture it. 
Fundamentally, Stokes had to reassure white voters, particu­
larly in view of the Hough riot, that he would be a mayor of all 
the people and that he was not a black power advocate. It was of 
the utmost importance that he calm the fears of whites who felt 
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that his candidacy represented a black takeover of Cleveland.14 
Therefore, his strategy called for as many personal appearances 
before white groups as could be scheduled. He hoped that through 
personal meetings he would be able to demonstrate to the whites 
present (and hopefully their friends) that there was no need to 
fear him and that he was the best qualified candidate to turn the 
city around from its doldrums. During these meetings and when 
appealing to whites through the mass media, Stokes planned to 
stress three basic themes. He would attack the ineptness of the 
Locher administration and its failure to resolve the increasing 
problems of the city. The attack would not focus on Locher per­
sonally because "Locher was really a honest kind of fumbler, a 
nice guy, who people liked—but he just couldn't administer the 
city. Stokes therefore criticized the Locher administration through 
some of the people in it, like Klementowicz, instead of Locher 
personally." Supplementing this criticism, Stokes would attempt 
to project himself as a candidate with a firm grasp on under­
standing and knowing how to alleviate the community's pressing 
problems. He would strive to strengthen the image, which began 
to emerge toward the end of the 1965 campaign, that he was not 
only qualified to be mayor but indeed better prepared than the 
average candidate of the recent past. An important dimension 
of this image was the implied notion that Stokes was the one 
man who could fashion a reconciliation between the races in 
Cleveland; he was the one person who could keep the lid on and 
prevent another Hough-like uprising. In short, Stokes hoped to 
assure whites that they had as much as any other group to gain 
through his election; his goal was to resolve the major difficul­
ties confronting the entire city, and he would not do so at the 
expense of one group over another. 
In order to execute this dual strategy, the Stokes campaign 
organization was divided into two basic groups. The group that 
occupied the apex of the command structure and utilized most of 
its time in dealing with the white electorate consisted of Stokes, 
his campaign manager, Dr. Kenneth Clement, and a public rela­
tions expert, Al Ostrow. All basic policy decisions concerning the 
Stokes campaign were made by these three men. In addition, 
Clement (a well-known black physician, who had run Stokes's 
1965 campaign) was given the responsibility of being the liaison 
man between the Stokes organization and the white establish­
118 / Electing Black Mayors 
ment in Cleveland. His primary function was to channel establish­
ment people who were disenchanted with Locher into the Stokes 
corner and to persuade them to contribute money to support a 
public relations campaign among white voters. Clement was an 
individual "who had many IOUs among the white power struc­
ture types and he cashed them all in 1967." Ostrow, who was 
a public relations consultant for Locher in the 1965 campaign, 
was charged with developing Stokes's general campaign ap­
proach, particularly as it related to the white community.15 
It was his task to develop and then project an image of Stokes 
that would favorably impress white voters. Although stress was 
placed on having Stokes personally appear before white audi­
ences, it was Ostrow who was highly influential in determining 
the sort of pitch Stokes would make to white gatherings and the 
kind of Stokes message that would flow from the mass media. 
The other key group within the Stokes campaign organization 
was headed by Geraldine Williams and Kenneth McGhee. Al­
though these individuals were theoretically under the command 
of the central triumvirate, they had virtually complete freedom 
to perform their functions of directing and coordinating the street-
level campaign in the black community. More specifically, they 
were responsible for building enthusiasm for Stokes in the black 
community and tending to all of the detailed tasks—raising 
money, registering voters, preparing voter lists, producing and 
distributing literature, setting up phone committees, canvas­
sing precincts, getting people to the polls, checking the vote 
count, and so on—that would transform enthusiasm into concrete 
votes on election day. While the triumvirate tended to concen­
trate on cultivating white money and voters, the street-level 
people used all of their time and energy in attempting to produce 
a huge black vote for Stokes. Since many of the key individuals 
involved in this latter effort had worked in the 1965 campaign 
and had learned some lessons, their 1967 work was accomplished 
in a more coordinated and organizationally skillful manner than 
was the case in 1965. This time, when people wandered into the 
campaign headquarters volunteering their services, the organiza­
tion had the capacity to channel them into useful tasks. Indeed, 
at the height of the campaign the street-level organization had 
some five thousand volunteers working without bumping into 
each other or duplicating work. Once again, this component of 
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the organization was composed almost entirely of amateur volun­
teers who were attracted to the Stokes campaign because of its 
reformist and civil rights-black power image. 
A similar, but much more limited, street-level organization 
also operated on the West Side. This group, however, was es­
sentially confined to passing out literature and arranging for 
Stokes to speak before white groups. The hostile political at­
mosphere in the white neighborhoods severely restricted any 
door-to-door canvassing or other kinds of grass-roots campaign­
ing. It was this hostile circumstance, in fact, that made it neces­
sary for Stokes to raise a considerable amount of money so that 
he could purchase the required mass media time and space for 
reaching into white homes. 
MOBILIZING THE BLACK COMMUNITY 
The effort by the street-level organization to mobilize the black 
community behind Stokes was promoted by several factors. 
Most important among these factors was the near Stokes victory 
in 1965. As we noted earlier, the 1965 loss was viewed as a moral 
victory by blacks; "it proved that the black community could 
get itself together and with a little more push put one of its own 
people in the mayor's chair." According to one of the few black 
politicians who backed Stokes during both campaigns, the close­
ness of the 1965 election 
. . . gave both the mayor and the people a deep desire to make 1967
different than 1965 through intensive voter registration and cam­
paigning. It completely disarmed those people who said it couldn't
be done. They felt guilty after the 1965 election and were some of
thefirst to come around in 1967. 
In addition to stimulating confidence and overcoming the 
"doubting Thomas" obstacle, Stokes's 1965 performance clearly 
established him as the leading black politician in the city. The 
fact that he had placed himself out on a limb in 1965 and almost 
won, while virtually every other black politician hung back, gave 
him an undisputed claim on being the mayoralty candidate from 
the black community. None of the other black politicians were in 
a position to challenge Stokes; consequently, it was unlikely that 
another black candidate would enter the race and seriously split 
the black vote. In fact, there is reason to believe that any other 
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black politician who did so would have encountered considerable 
ostracism in the black community. This was a very important 
factor because it provided the black community with a single goal 
—to elect Carl Stokes—whereas the white community would be 
seriously split over what to do in the election. 
The mobilization attempt was also advanced by the events dis­
cussed earlier. Although there was no consensus on the desira­
bility of the Hough riot among blacks, the reaction to it on the 
part of white officials contributed to the growing coehsion with­
in the black community. Locher's insistence that the cause of the 
disorder was a handful of extremists, not ghetto living conditions, 
the get-tough behavior of his officials, and his rude treatment of 
Martin Luther King gave blacks all the more reason to back 
Stokes as a means for ousting Locher. These actions, added to 
Locher's earlier civil rights posture, created a political climate 
that was highly conducive to uniting the entire black community 
behind Stokes. The objective of the street-level people was to 
take advantage of this political climate and convert it into elec­
toral action. 
In approaching black voters, the Stokes campaign workers em­
phasized three themes. First, at every opportunity they stressed 
that the near-victory of 1965 could be transformed into a victory if 
each eligible black registered and voted for Stokes. To highlight 
the importance of every single vote, they pointed out that Stokes 
would have won in 1965 if he received two additional votes per 
precinct. Second, they also argued that the 1967 mayoralty elec­
tion offered every black a unique opportunity to take part in mak­
ing black history and to elect a man who would do something 
about black grievances. In the words of a black campaigner: 
We sold blackness. We tried to convince people that this was their
opportunity to vote for a brother and make him mayor of the city.
This was their opportunity to make black history by electing the first
black mayor of any city in the country. The only important and over­
riding issue was the blackness of the candidate and his interest in
the black community. If he won, it would give black people their
first opportunity to have some pride in this city. 
Finally, it was reiterated over and over that the one chance to vote 
for Stokes was on 3 October. None of the campaign literature or 
messages indicated that 3 October was only the primary election 
date and that if Stokes won on that occasion people would have 
Cleveland: 1967 Primary Election / 121 
to vote for him again on 7 November to elect him mayor. The de­
cision to underplay 3 October as only the first of two voting oc­
casions was based on the notion held by one of the chief orga­
nizers that "most black folks don't believe in voting in primaries. 
That's when they usually stay home. So we simply did not mention 
that 3 October would be followed by another election day, be­
cause we knew we had to win then or else there wasn't going to be 
a 7 November for us." This strategy made good sense in terms of 
past primary turnouts and the past thirty years of electoral his­
tory, which showed that the winner of the Democratic primary 
always won the general election. 
A necessary prerequisite to winning the Democratic primary was 
to have every eligible black adult registered to vote; consequent­
ly, one of the first jobs undertaken by the street-level organiza­
tion was to launch a drive to accomplish that objective. This was 
a formidable chore for several reasons, including the fact that the 
number of registered black voters had decreased since 1965 due to 
the Ohio law which holds that a person who does not vote within 
a two-year period is automatically removed from the voter regis­
tration lists. The Stokes workers knew that a list of such dropped 
persons was made available to the Locher camp; however, they 
encountered considerable difficulty in procuring a list to work from. 
Further, the Board of Elections scheduled only one in-ward regis­
tration day. That is, with the exception of one day, a person de­
siring to register would have to journey to the central office in 
downtown Cleveland to do so. According to a Stokes worker: 
"Having only one evening neighborhood registration time is par­
ticularly hard on black people because many black people work 
day and night. If they happened to work the night of the neighbor­
hood registration day, they wouldn't be able to register at all be­
cause the central office closes before they get off work." The 
Stokes organization had no success in convincing the Board of 
Elections to stay open longer hours. Additional difficulties were 
encountered by black voters who were registered but who had 
moved since the last election. According to the chairman of the 
registration committee: "If a person had moved we could give 
them a change of address card and they could send it in to the 
Board. If you were lucky the Board would send it back telling you 
where to vote, but they weren't very good at it. Most of the peo­
ple we knew never got their cards back." 
In attempting to surmount these obstacles, the Stokes workers 
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organized a door-to-door registration drive. Each black ward was 
assigned a captain (except in one or two wards where the black 
councilman put his precinct committeemen to work on registra­
tion) who generally divided the ward into smaller units and assem­
bled a group of workers to systematically canvass each block. 
Each worker had a large folder that was printed on the outside 
in bold type: "Register STOKES, Vote Primary—Vote STOKES." 
This folder, along with a "Stokes" button, proved extremely use­
ful to the worker in making initial contact with people. "You see, 
many blacks don't like to answer the door, for a whole variety 
of reasons. But when they saw we were working for Stokes, most 
of them welcomed us." Included with the folder was a pad that 
the workers used to record the name, address, and telephone num­
ber of nonregistered adults. If a person was not registered and 
could not go to the Board of Elections at that time (baby-sitters 
and car pools generally accompanied the Stokes workers), the 
worker would arrange a date and time for transporting the per­
son to the registration office. One copy of this information would 
be given to the nonregistered voter and another copy would be 
turned in at the ward headquarters to the individual coordinating 
the car pool. This individual was responsible for following up on 
the arrangements and seeing to it that those who made a commit­
ment to register were delivered to the Board of Elections at the 
prearranged time. 
If a person was already registered (and when they became reg­
istered), they were given a bright orange sticker that read: "We're 
Registered, STOKES, Vote Primary, Vote STOKES." It was in­
tended that these stickers be "put in house windows to instill 
some pride and show how many people in the neighborhood were 
registered to vote. But we found that these stickers showed up all 
over the place—on cars, kids' bikes, billboards, poles, everywhere 
—and they helped create a kind of bandwagon effect for register­
ing." This bandwagon effect, according to a seasoned black poli­
tician, attracted many apolitical people into the Stokes move­
ment: 
For the first time since I've been in politics, the black ministers 
united and stayed united. They preached registration and set up car 
pools out of their churches. Surprisingly enough, a lot of people who 
had not participated in politics before—they never even voted be­
cause they were not interested—would admit "No I'm not registered, 
I want to though, where do I go?" It became the thing to do. 
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Indeed, the registration drive gained sufficient thrust in the black 
community to stimulate Ahmed Evans, the leading black national­
ist in Cleveland, to register. Although the black nationalists in 
Cleveland, in the opinion of one ward captain, "felt that politi­
cally there was no way for black people to function in this society, 
Evans made public his registration and set the example for most 
nationalist organizations. It had a great impact; it was one of the 
mayor's [Stokes's] major coups. It influenced many black youths, 
who couldn't vote, to work in the Stokes campaign." 
The voter registration drive conducted by the Stokes campaign 
organization was supplemented by a CORE drive and a Southern 
Christian Leadership Conference drive. However, in the opinion 
of the Stokes workers, the registration effort by the two civil 
rights organizations was not as systematic nor as effective as their 
own. In fact, they felt that the two groups, to some extent, might 
have endangered Stokes's election chances. This hazard was ex­
plained by a Stokes ward captain in the following manner: 
SCLC hurt us at one time. They came here with a voter registra­
tion drive which was going on at the same time as ours and CORE's.
. . . Just prior to the primary they came out with a statement say­
ing that they had registered so many thousands of black people, 
which is what we didn't want because we were afraid that if the white 
community found out that we were registering people at that great
numbers they would begin to organize too. . . . Stokes didn't want
this kind of publicity with SCLC or King because it threatened his
image of being a mayor of all the people, and it would scare the
white community. 
Considering the fact that approximately 30 percent of the black 
registered voters did not vote in the 1965 election and thus were 
dropped from the registration list, the 1967 registration drives 
were quite successful in building the number of eligible black 
voters back up to the high 1965 level. The effort did, however, 
fall about 3,000 persons short of the 1965 figure in the predomi­
nantly black wards. This meant that if the Stokes organization 
was going to achieve a higher number of black votes than they 
did in their losing struggle of 1965, they would have to increase 
the proportion of voter turnout in the black community. Since 
the 1965 turnout occurred in a general election and it constituted 
a historic high, it was clear that it would be no easy accomplish­
ment to surpass the 1965 turnout in a primary election. 
The existence of an organizational structure with experience and 
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skill to produce maximum voter turnout would have been ex­
tremely useful to the Stokes camp. Once again, however, the 
Stokes workers were denied access to the one structure in the black 
community that approximated this function. With the exception 
of a few black councilmen, most of the other black ward leaders 
decided not to support Stokes in the primary; consequently, their 
precinct organizations were not available to assist the Stokes 
campaigners. Indeed, in order to gain access to the voters in 
Ward 10, the Stokes people organized a successful protest march 
against the ward officials who refused to provide Stokes with a 
forum.16 As a result of such resistance, however, the Stokes peo­
ple devised their own organizational structure to insure that vot­
ers were fully informed about the Stokes campaign and that they 
poured into the polls on election day. 
The organizational structure that was eventually constructed 
to perform these functions was the brainchild of Marvin Chernoff, 
an individual who had no prior political experience and who first 
became involved in the Stokes campaign by stuffing envelopes. 
Chernoff proposed that the way to duplicate, and indeed improve 
upon, the precinct committeemen structure was to organize block 
supervisors throughout the black community. These block super­
visors acted as "the direct link between the Stokes campaign or­
ganization and the voters on their block. They specialized in two 
activities: voter education and, most importantly, voter turnout 
on election day." 
The block supervisors were recruited and organized about eight 
weeks before the primary in the following manner. First, the 
workers took a crisscross directory, which lists people by their 
street address and phone number, and cut it up into streets and 
geographic areas. Then they took ward maps and matched the 
street numbers to specific wards. This was followed by identify­
ing the areas populated by blacks, a tedious undertaking in 
transitional neighborhoods. Finally, each of the black areas was 
divided into a "block," a term used to identify thirty to forty 
houses, and the names of the persons living in the block were 
listed. 
Once the lists were compiled, a campaign worker would call the 
first person listed, state that he was calling for Carl Stokes, stress 
the importance of his election to the mayorship, note his need for 
campaign workers to help him win, and invite the person called 
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to accept the responsibility of being the block supervisor in his or 
her neighborhood. The exact duties of the block supervisor were 
explained; it was also emphasized that the supervisor would be 
the personal representative of the Stokes organization in that par­
ticular neighborhood. Seldom did a caller have to contact more 
than two or three people on a list before someone accepted the 
job, a revealing indication of the high enthusiasm for Stokes in 
the black community. 
After individuals agreed to be block supervisors they were 
sent personal letters telling them what they would be doing and 
that they would be receiving further information and materials 
at a later date. Enclosed with the letter was a list of the house 
numbers in their block and a test to find out if they were real 
workers. They were asked to collect the names and addresses of 
all the registered voters (this occurred after the registration drive) 
on their block and return that information to the Stokes head­
quarters. The response to this first assignment was, in the words 
of one of the organizers, "enormous, about 80 percent of them 
did the job and supplied us with the list of voters." Those who 
did not complete the assignment were replaced by calling down the 
original list. 
Approximately 2,050 volunteers were recruited into the Stokes 
organization through this process. In order to make communica­
tions with such a large number of people manageable, a ward 
structure was constructed that had one ward leader, four or five 
ward captains under him, and thirty to forty block supervisors 
reporting to each of the ward captains. Once this structure be­
came operative, the Stokes camp had what many believed to be 
a stronger, more responsive and more respectable precinct com­
mitteemen organization. From the point of view of the Stokes or­
ganization this ward structure was, in effect, a bureaucratic struc­
ture that made possible a continuous up and down flow of 
information. Further, it was projected that even if the structure 
was only 35 to 40 percent effective, the Stokes organization would 
still have eight hundred people working in their own neighbor­
hoods among people they knew. 
As the primary campaign proceeded, constant contact was main­
tained with the block supervisors as a means for preparing them 
to fulfill their ultimate objective of producing a record voter turn­
out on election day. On the weekend before the election they re­
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ceived a package containing a badge, election day instructions, 
and doorknob stickers. The badge, which included the supervisor's 
name and the statement "Official Block Supervisor—Stokes for 
Mayor Committee," identified the supervisor as an official repre­
sentative of the Stokes organization and was viewed by head­
quarters personnel as "a way to give psychological support and 
a feeling of involvement to the supervisors." The instructions called 
for them to canvass their block the day before the election to re­
mind people once more how vital it was that they vote the next 
day. Further, in order to counteract the tendency for people to 
come home from work and not go out again to vote, the super­
visors were provided with door knob stickers which were to be 
placed on each door in their block on election day morning. These 
stickers read: "Stop! Have You Voted Today? Do It Now at [poll­
ing place was inserted]. Vote Carl B. Stokes X." According to 
one of the principal organizers, it was "very important that the 
supervisors inserted where people should vote because they [the 
Board of Elections] changed a lot of voting places immediately 
before the election." The supervisors were also involved, of course, 
in canvassing, phoning, and arranging car pools on election day. 
Virtually every respondent viewed the block supervisor struc­
ture as a tremendous success; indeed, most considered it as the 
very foundation of the street-level organization. In addition to 
the widespread eagerness within the black community to assist 
Stokes, the supervisor concept had some unique characteristics 
that contributed to its success. 
First, they did not have to devote huge chunks of time. It was a small 
enough task so that they could do it without becoming full-time cam­
paign workers. Second, by involving people in their own neighbor­
hoods we got them over the psychological block of having to knock
on unfamiliar doors. People with no past experience are reluctant
to canvass, but by having them do it among their own neighbors it's
possible to overcome their hesitation. Also, we had the feeling that
there were a lot of people out in the community who wanted to help
but didn't know how to go about it because they had never done any
political work before. Well the block supervisor thing was perfect for
getting those people involved in the campaign, for giving them a
concrete way to help. 
The fact that the Stokes camp could establish such a large, suc­
cessful structure in a very short period of time illustrates several 
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characteristics of the Stokes organization: the almost unbelievable 
excitement generated by the organization, its ability to attract 
volunteers with organizational skill who were willing to work long 
hours, its flexibility in allowing political amateurs to organize 
and execute good ideas, and its capacity to rationally utilize the 
energy of rank-and-file blacks who were eager to become in­
volved in the Stokes struggle. As we shall see, this was not the 
only example of these characteristics. 
During the same period that some of the Stokes workers were 
spending virtually all of their time organizing block supervisors, 
other workers were involved in additional mobilizing activities. 
Individuals on the finance committee, for example, were engaged 
in sending out fund-raising letters, making personal solicitations, 
selling buttons, placing cans in business establishments, and 
doing everything legal to raise money. 
One program, entitled "Thins for Stokes," was particularly 
effective in both raising funds and involving women from all 
levels of the black community. It was initiated by one woman who 
convinced one hundred women to contribute a dollar each and to 
recruit ten of their women friends to contribute a dollar who, in 
turn, also got an additional ten women each to do likewise. By 
utilizing this approach, the women were able to raise approxi­
mately $24,000 in about two weeks. This was viewed as an im­
portant mobilizing effort within the black community because 
"it was the kind of activity that gave everyone—from people on 
welfare to white-collar workers—an opportunity to participate. 
. .  . It also meant that there were over twenty thousand people 
who were going to vote on election day if they had to turn heaven 
and hell upside down because in addition to everything else they 
had an investment in Stokes." 
Money to help finance the Stokes campaign was also raised 
by numerous middle-class black organizations, which held cock­
tail parties, teas, luncheons, and so forth. "The doctor's organiza­
tion raised about $5,000 at a cocktail party, the real estate men did 
likewise, and the lawyers and dentists did their own thing. These 
groups really raised large sums of money. In fact, they did so 
well that unlike 1965 we didn't have to have any chicken dinners 
where you only make one dollar for every ten you spend." In 
the opinion of one of the individuals responsible for finances, 
"the money raised in the black community was one of the largest 
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self-help programs of a political nature that a black community in 
America ever got involved in." He estimated that the black com­
munity contributed about forty-five percent of the total one-half 
million dollars raised to finance the Stokes campaign. 
The amount of money collected within the black community is 
a telling reflection of the widespread support that existed for 
Stokes. His candidacy clearly generated a bandwagon momentum 
that attracted virtually every segment and organization in the 
black community (except most black politicians) into his corner. 
The words of a black councilman who campaigned for Stokes 
captures the crusadelike atmosphere that prevailed. When asked 
if he had encountered any difficulty in persuading blacks to sup­
port or work for Stokes, he responded: 
No, it was just the reverse, instead of problems there was enthusi­
asm. It was a very easy thing to do because people were walking in
off the streets wanting to know what could they do. "Just what can I
do in the campaign, how can I be useful? What can I do to help my
man?" You see, Stokes was a symbol. He was a symbol at that time
for black progress. You would see old people walking to the polls and
perhaps they never voted a day in their lives. They considered politics
a white man's business. We could have councilmen and judges, but
they never dreamed that the day would come when a black man
would be mayor of the town. This was a symbol, just like a flower
bursting to bloom. And everybody wanted to be part of it and do his
little bit as far as pushing this man on. Even myself as a professional
politician, I felt a certain degree of pride and enthusiasm and I wasn't 
going to let this year pass by without giving all that I had. If he failed 
it would be because I short-changed him, and I think this was the
attitude of the total community. 
The constant preoccupation of the Stokes forces was how to 
insure that this bounding spirit would produce a maximum num­
ber of black votes on election day. Everything would be for naught 
unless they achieved an unprecedented turnout. The block-
supervisor structure was erected to accomplish precisely that 
objective, but the Stokes organization did not rely on that alone; 
two additional election day programs were established in the quest 
to get every eligible black voter to the polls and to obtain an 
honest vote count. 
The additional program, which focused on turning out voters, 
was based on identifying precincts that appeared to be lagging 
on election day and then saturating them with canvassing college 
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students. Plans for executing such a process were laid out weeks 
before election day. Identifying which precincts to concentrate on 
was accomplished in the following manner. Workers at the cam­
paign headquarters were supplied with a sheet of paper for each 
precinct in the black community. Included on each sheet was a 
precinct identification number, the number of registered voters 
in the precinct, and spaces to write in the number of voters that 
had voted in the particular precinct by 10 A.M., 12 noon, and 
4 P.M. The latter information was supplied by Stokes workers 
who "at the assigned time went to a polling place, checked the 
ballot stub number [which indicated the number of people who 
had voted], wrote it down on their copies of the sheet, and went 
on to another polling place to repeat the operation." When the 
worker completed his run he telephoned the results into head­
quarters where the ballot stub numbers were entered on the ap­
propriate sheet. If, upon inspection, the stub number indicated 
that a precinct was lagging behind what had been previously pro­
jected as an acceptable percentage turnout for that time of day, 
two actions were initiated. The block supervisors were notified 
that their precinct was not turning out at a high enough level and 
that they should "hit it again." Additionally, a call was made to 
an in-ward church where about four hundred college students 
were stationed. A group of the students would be deployed into 
the lagging precinct where they canvassed each house. 
They would knock on every door and tell the people that Stokes was
doing poorly in their neighborhood and that, in fact, he might lose
because of their poor showing. They were to get those people to the
polls and if they had already voted they were encouraged to contact
their neighborhoods. And the kids did everything to get them out—
they babysat, took them to waiting cars, reminded them where to 
vote, cajoled them, begged them, everything. 
After the students completed covering a precinct in their storm-
like manner, they returned to the church and waited for the next 
assignment, which usually came in a few minutes. This process 
was repeated throughout the day and ultimately about 40 to 45 
percent of the precincts in the black community were canvassed 
on election day through this program. 
The students were recruited and organized to operate in this 
fashion by Bill Hunter, a young white college student who spent 
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the six weeks before primary election day visiting over thirty 
college campuses in Ohio. On each of the campuses he attempted 
"to make the students who showed up at a well-publicized meet­
ing feel that it was the most important thing in their lives—at 
that moment—to become involved in the Stokes struggle. This 
would give them a tangible opportunity to work on one of the 
problems—the race issue—that many of them were concerned 
about." Hunter found this approach to be extremely successful 
in persuading the students to join the Stokes campaign. The stu­
dents were not only anxious to participate, but their election day 
work was both impressive and highly valuable. As one Stokes 
worker put it: 
We knew where we were weak, where we needed the work, and where 
the kids would be most valuable. . . . When the areas were identi­
fied they went in and blanketed the area. And what a great and 
marvelous job they did. The whole campaign was exciting, but they 
added that much more excitement and feeling of motion—you just 
can't capture it with words. 
The 1965 election experience taught the Stokes workers that a 
block supervisor and college student program that turned black 
voters out could not guarantee that their votes would be honestly 
counted in the final tally. During the 1965 campaign the Board 
of Elections, for example, shifted polling places in many black 
areas just prior to election day and installed voting machines in 
places where people had never used machines before. Further, 
as we noted earlier, two ballot bags from black wards disappeared 
and were never accounted for. This latter incident occurred be­
cause, in part, the Stokes organization did not have enough work­
ers to cover all of the polling places in the black community, thus 
they were "forced to trust a lot of people in 1965 that couldn't be 
trusted and we paid dearly for it. Our objective in 1967 was to 
cover every polling place and to have someone there when they 
counted the votes." The extensive organizational effort that was 
made to reach that objective is described by the woman who 
was responsible for that portion of the campaign work. 
I decided that it was absolutely necessary that we have a witness and 
challenger at every polling place on election day and that they be 
identified as Stokes people so that they would know that we were 
on the spot. We knew we would have a lot of trouble with people who 
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were registered in one party and who wanted to cross over party 
lines to vote for another candidate. We had a great deal of this with 
Mr. Locher, a lot of Republicans tried to vote for him. Our people 
were instructed to challenge them even though we legally couldn't 
stop them from switching parties. Our challengers also stopped six 
major check-off lists in six West Side wards. They were so effective 
that Mr. Stanton had to go out himself and collect the check-offs 
[a list of voters who had not voted by 2 P.M. and who would be called 
by Democratic party workers and encouraged to vote]. We also had 
challengers in black wards and where black people voted in white 
areas—specifically, Murray Hill. We put John Wooten of the Cleve­
land Browns there to be sure that black voters were not intimidated 
like they had been in the past. We had other black football players 
in some black wards, like Ward 11 where we think votes were stolen 
in 1965. . .  . It is very simple to invalidate paper ballots (anyone can 
do it) so we gave fifteen instruction sessions to over three thousand 
people on all the ways there are to cheat. Additionally, we had a 
pool of lawyers with two-way radios who went to polling places where 
challengers were having trouble. These twenty-five lawyers were 
in roaming cars and they handled about two thousand complaints on 
election day. Finally, when the polls closed at 6:30 P.M., we had the 
vote checked and called in to our headquarters by our people, and we 
had 98 percent coverage by 9 P.M. 
The effectiveness of this operation is suggested by the fact that 
only 15 people out of 3,200 did not show up to man their assigned 
place on primary day; and among those who did, 2,100 returned 
questionnaires describing what occurred in their polling place. 
This intelligence was used to strengthen the ability of the Stokes 
organization to cope with the upcoming general election. Ac­
cording to the worker quoted above, these procedures were highly 
effective in dealing with the innumerable problems that arose, 
and in her estimation "as honest a vote as can be expected was 
achieved." 
APPEALING TO THE WHITE COMMUNITY 
At the same time that the street-level organization was con­
centrating on mobilizing and delivering the black vote, the other 
main branch of the Stokes organization was focusing on ap­
pealing to the white community. This latter dimension of the 
campaign organization was itself divided into two operations, 
one dealing with the white business establishment and the other 
with rank-and-file white voters. 
In approaching the business community, emphasis was placed 
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upon the numerous failings of the Locher administration, how 
these shortcomings undermined Cleveland's business climate, and 
why Stokes was the one candidate that could revitalize the city's 
health. Stokes's campaign manager, Dr. Kenneth Clement, as we 
noted earlier, played an important role in cultivating support 
for Stokes in business circles. There were other individuals, how­
ever, who also performed this function. A respondent, for example, 
who identified himself as the only "real" WASP in the Stokes 
camp described how he exposed Stokes to the power structure: 
This town is run by a group of forty or fifty who make all the major 
decisions. They are the presidents of the utilities and banks, the 
major law firms, the major architects and doctors. I exposed them 
to Carl early in the campaign, in September. I invited them to dinner 
and planned a three-way debate, but the mayor refused to attend. 
We had a guest list like you've never seen, every major corporation 
president, every major civic leader and so forth. I got about 90 per­
cent of them to attend. Some of these people were supporting Frank 
Celeste, but they quickly dropped their financial support for him 
and in some cases actively brought out their financial support for 
Carl. . . . That particular night Celeste was such a poor speaker and 
uninformed and made such a poor showing that the unanimous reac­
tion was "Gee this guy Carl Stokes is quite something." Carl per­
formed just beautifully, the guy simply has great appeal. 
Another respondent related how Stokes was able to gain access 
to and support from traditional Republican strongholds. 
At a cocktail party for Seth Taft I bumped into [X]. [X] is a rock-
ribbed Republican who happens to play tennis and ski with the old, 
old social, monied group in Cleveland. Not the managerial men, but 
the people who really have it socked away. Well [X] came up to me 
at that party and said "Hey, you know I would like to meet Carl 
Stokes." And I said, "You just made a date." I got hold of Carl and 
we set up a lunch. Well [X] got excited about the whole campaign, 
and he ended up getting these people to contribute money and give 
small luncheons with other industrialists being invited. The people 
doing the inviting had never done this sort of thing before. Maybe in 
the inner-circles of the Republican party they had, but it never hap­
pened for a black Democrat. . . . Don't ask me what motivated them 
but I think some felt that Carl Stokes represented some kind of "re­
sponsible" black leadership and that unless the community accepted 
him things would get even worse. 
Stokes's ability to secure backing from the white establishment 
was further enhanced on 3 September when the Plain Dealer, in 
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a front-page editorial, endorsed him for mayor. Given the tradi­
tional clientele of the Plain Dealer and the fact that the editor, 
Thomas Vale, was himself a member of the WASP establishment, 
the Stokes endorsement represented sort of a seal of approval. 
It was a statement to the community by the editor that this man 
had the qualifications to be mayor. The endorsement not only 
aided Stokes's capacity to raise money from white businessmen, 
it also had, according to a Stokes campaigner, "a tremendous 
psychological impact on the campaign workers. They knew it was 
a crucial breakthrough, and it stimulated them to work that much 
harder; you could almost feel the momentum grow." 
In summary, Stokes was very successful in his quest to acquire 
support from Cleveland's business world. Large sums of money 
were donated to the campaign, plus lawyers and other profes­
sionals were recruited to assist in the struggle. This element of 
support was a welcomed addition to the Stokes camp, one that 
was totally absent from the 1965 effort. 
In contrast to this favorable reception, the Stokes forces con­
fronted considerable resistance and hostility in their attempt to 
approach ordinary white voters. The prevailing political environ­
ment that the Stokes workers were operating in is suggested by 
the account of a worker who had conducted interviews for a na­
tional polling concern among white Clevelanders after the Hough 
riot of 1966. 
The level of hostility in the cosmos [ethnic] wards was tremendous,just unbelievable. . . . There's great resentment and absolutely no
desire to be interested or understand. It is strictly "we've worked all
our lives, we've got our own homes, we're hard workers, and we re­
sent that our tax money goes to support those niggers." And that's
exactly the attitude and the only word I can use because I heard it
over and over again. . .  . By the time we got about three-fourths of
the way through the questionnaire they would usually turn on me
and suggest that I was a "nigger lover." It was painful, absolutely
painful. The hostility was just unbelievable.17 
Given this situation, it is not surprising that the white workers 
who directed Stokes's West Side headquarters encountered a 
multitude of obstacles: some of the workers were physically at­
tacked for passing out literature; windows at the campaign head­
quarters were broken several times, once by a molotov cocktail; 
and gun shots were fired at a guard. It was exceedingly difficult 
to recruit anywhere near the large number of people who volun­
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teered to work in the black community; indeed, only forty work­
ers were involved on the West Side in contrast to over four 
thousand on the East Side. According to one of the workers, the 
entire West Side operation was conducted in a climate of fear. 
"We were constantly harassed—threatening phone calls, signs 
ripped off our cars, people spitting and screaming at you, and 
everywhere you looked there were Locher signs." There was no 
way of predicting how many votes Stokes would amass in the 
white community because "people wouldn't talk about it, it was a 
secret. Those who did vote for him did it without anyone know­
ing—they were fearful too." 
It was decided within the Stokes camp that the most effective 
way to combat these barriers was to give Stokes as much per­
sonal exposure to white audiences as possible. Consequently, 
great emphasis was placed upon arranging meetings of any sort 
that would provide Stokes with opportunities to personally pre­
sent himself and his case for being elected mayor. Stokes was once 
again barred by the Democratic party leadership from addressing 
regular ward meetings; therefore, his workers relied heavily on 
individuals and some church groups to sponsor these gatherings.18 
It is likely that such meetings attracted a mixture of individuals. 
That is, those who had already decided to vote for Stokes, those 
who were undecided, and those who were against him. In the 
opinion of persons who observed Stokes in action, the group 
mixture appeared to have little impact on the eventual outcome 
of the meeting—Stokes invariably gave a polished and winning per­
formance. An individual who attended virtually every West Side 
meeting explained: 
He has a terrific amount of political charisma. . . . Many people 
told us that personal exposure was the thing that convinced them. 
They would emphasize to us "get him over here to meet more people 
because he can't help but gain their support if they meet him and see 
him and talk with him." We heard this all the time. . .  . In many of 
the meetings you could feel him winning people over as the meeting 
progressed. You could just feel the audience warming up to him and 
see that they were impressed by him. 
Stokes, of course, was aware of this effect and believed that the 
size of his white vote was likely to determine success or failure; 
consequently, he spent an inordinate amount of time attending 
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meetings of all sizes on the West Side. In fact, some of the East 
Side workers felt that he was spending too much time on the West 
Side, thus neglecting and, in a sense, taking the black community 
for granted. On the other hand, West Side workers felt that he 
should spend even more time in the white community since it 
appeared that only he was capable of reaching the voters. This 
dilemma was never fully resolved to the satisfaction of either 
group; however, Stokes did conserve some time by gaining addi­
tional exposure in the white community through utilization of the 
mass media. During the closing weeks of the primary campaign 
Stokes received considerable television, radio, and newspaper 
exposure, through both news coverage and paid advertisements. 
The money raised through contacts with the business community 
was, of course, instrumental in making this type of exposure 
possible—such resources were dearly lacking in 1965. On all of 
these occasions Stokes continued to reiterate the double theme that 
he would be mayor of all the people and that he had the compe­
tence to pull the city out of the depths it had plunged to under the 
Locher administration. 
As the above account has suggested, the Stokes campaign or­
ganization, considering its amateur and volunteer character, 
was well organized and coordinated. The organization did suffer, 
however, one serious split concerning approaches to white voters. 
After the East Side workers had completed recruiting block su­
pervisors over the telephone, some of the workers felt that the 
freed callers should be used to conduct a telephone canvass of 
West Side homes. Other East Side workers and most of the West 
Side volunteers were opposed to the plan on the grounds that it 
would only antagonize white voters even more and perhaps stim­
ulate some who were going to stay home to go out and vote against 
Stokes. This debate raged back and forth just prior to the primary 
election and was finally resolved against the plan, but not until 
it had split the top echelon of the street-level organization. 
In their quest for white votes the Stokes workers also paid 
special attention to the Latin American segment of the white com­
munity. Historically, the eight thousand Latin Americans in Cleve­
land played a political role very similar to blacks; they voted 
heavily Democratic but received no special recognition nor en­
couragement from party leaders. In fact, because of their small 
numbers their political rewards were even more meager than the 
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token payoffs distributed to blacks. With this in mind and the 
realization that the election could well be decided by a slim 
margin and that the Latin American community had experienced 
oppressions similar to those of blacks, a Stokes worker was as­
signed the task of stimulating support among Latin American vot­
ers. 
This was accomplished by requesting a long-time resident of the 
Latin American community to form a political club that would con­
centrate on registering Spanish-speaking voters and organizing 
them to vote for Stokes and other candidates who promised to aid 
the community. According to the chairman of this club, it was 
not an easy task to get people registered because: 
. . . The people have been suffering for so long that they say that
everyone who is running says the same thing, but when they get in
office they never do a thing about our problems. They got their minds
already made up that anyone who gets in office will do the same as
the past one. 
Despite this barrier, the club was able to get over six hundred 
new people registered, thus increasing the total Latin American 
registered voters to about two thousand, and to produce a solid 
vote for Stokes. The approach used to achieve this result stressed 
that Stokes "was from a minority group and he knows how much 
people have suffered. He would understand better and help us." 
The Stokes candidacy, because of his background, was viewed as 
representing for many of these voters "the first time that they 
had a real choice at the polls."19 
THE LOCHER AND CELESTE CAMPAIGNS 
The Locher campaign organization, in sharp contrast to the 
Stokes group, was not able to generate widespread enthusiasm 
for Locher nor was it sufficiently organized to match the perfor­
mance of the Stokes camp. This condition emanated from several 
factors, not the least being that the Locher administration was 
constantly on the defensive throughout the entire campaign. Num­
erous mass media reports had depicted, for over a year, the various 
shortcomings of the Locher administration and had characterized 
it as one that was simply incapable of dealing with the complex 
problems that plagued Cleveland. All three of the challenging can­
didates (Stokes, Celeste, and Taft) picked up on these criticisms 
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and added some of their own, the effect being that the Locher 
administration was the target of criticism from every angle. 
It was true that, despite this negative image, Locher did receive 
the Democratic party endorsement. However, in assessing the im­
portance of that endorsement, several factors should be consid­
ered. First, it was extended reluctantly; the party hierarchy had 
favored Stanton and had tempted Locher with a federal judge­
ship to step aside. When he refused to retire and Stanton dropped 
out of the race, the party went along with Locher but certainly 
with no great enthusiasm. Second, it must be remembered that 
the party lacked a history of electing mayors. Since the late 1930s, 
whenever the newspapers and the Democratic party had opposing 
candidates (which was often), the newspapers invariably won and 
their candidate invariably ran on a platform that included anti-
party bossism. Consequently, the party had never been able to 
muster enough strength to defeat the newspaper-endorsed candi­
date. This historical pattern became particularly important in 1967 
because the Plain Dealer endorsed Stokes and the Cleveland Press 
(the "political bible" of the ethnic wards) advised its readers to 
vote for anyone but Locher. When the newspapers abandoned 
Locher, the morale of his forces sank even lower; an atmosphere 
of pessimism pervaded his followers. 
The lack of newspaper support not only weakened the morale 
of Locher's backers, it forced him to rely on a party organization 
that had declined over the years in its capability to deliver votes. 
This decline is reflected in the fact that at the time of the cam­
paign there were over 200 vacancies among the 2,156 precinct 
committeemen positions, and many of the precinct people "were 
old, tired workers who didn't beat the bushes." Such a condition 
would never have existed at an earlier time, but the reduction of 
patronage and the spread of general economic prosperity, among 
other developments, undercut the attractiveness of precinct work. 
The deterioration of grass-roots party work was also reflected, 
as noted earlier, by the ability of Locher and his predecessors to 
build their own personal organizations and defeat the party orga­
nization candidates. The success of the mayor's organization, 
however, was greatly aided by newspaper support. Therefore, the 
combination of the mayor's organization without newspaper 
support and an eroded party organization placed Locher in a vul­
nerable situation. His workers were confronted with doing a lot 
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of things that they didn't know how to do because they hadn't 
been forced to do them in so long. Since the first election of 
men like Lausche and Celebrezze they had become soft. 
Within this context, Locher conducted a highly traditional cam­
paign. He made the rounds of the numerous ethnic organizations 
and hammered away at the theme that Ralph Locher had integ­
rity and honesty; no one could accuse him of betraying the pub­
lic's trust. He defended his administration as a solid and frugal 
one. In the words of one of his workers: "Just change the times 
and dates and it was the same old thing." He went lightly on 
the race issue, although he did attack Stokes for attempting to raise 
funds outside of Cleveland. In sum, the Locher campaign simply 
never caught on fire; the zeal and enthusiasm that character­
ized the Stokes effort was lacking. 
Perhaps as a venture to spur enthusiasm into the lagging Locher 
campaign, the Democratic party mailed two intensely racist news­
letters to white voters in the closing weeks of the campaign. One 
of the newsletters stated: "Will Dr. Martin Luther King actually 
be the mayor of Cleveland if Carl Stokes is elected Tuesday? This 
would give the noted racist control of his first city in the United 
States." This ploy, however, apparently backfired since it did not 
appreciably strengthen the Locher effort, but it did stimulate the 
Stokes people to work even harder. In addition, several respon­
dents were of the opinion that the high-handed tactics of the party 
hierarchy may have pushed some fence-sitting whites into the 
Stokes column. 
Mayoral-candidate Frank Celeste encountered even more diffi­
culties than Locher in his effort to obtain the mayorship. Celeste 
had hoped to come across to the voters as the one experienced 
candidate who could succeed, who could make the city work. He 
argued that the election of Stokes would be replacing a sure loser 
—Locher—with an untried executive. He was a third option, a 
tried, experienced executive who had already proven he could be 
a successful mayor. Celeste had, however, no campaign strategy 
or organization for communicating this message to the electorate. 
Indicative of his organizational strength, for example, is the fact 
that he had to pay three councilmen to utilize their organizations 
to collect signatures for his filing petitions. According to one of 
his close advisors, "there never was a clear strategy for muster­
ing votes—he simply hopped from one place to another announc­
ing that he was running for mayor." 
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As an outsider to Cleveland politics, Celeste was not familiar 
with the inner workings of the political system nor did he have a 
political base within the city from which to launch his bid. If he 
had any potential political strength it was within the Italian 
community. His ethnic background, however, did not stir any grow­
ing support among Italians, perhaps because Celeste "had left the 
Catholic Church when he was young, he didn't live in the Italian 
community and wasn't well known there, and his name wasn't a 
popular Italian name—many people probably didn't even know that 
he was Italian." 
Celeste did receive the financial support promised to him by the 
business group that convinced him to run; they did not, however, 
deliver the party nomination or newspaper endorsements. This 
failure in combination with Celeste's nonexistent political base 
reduced his chances of winning the election to near zero. Indeed, 
as it became obvious that the election had boiled down to a duel 
between Locher and Stokes, great pressure was exerted on Ce­
leste to drop out of the race. A public opinion poll released two 
weeks before the election showed that Stokes was leading Locher 
by three percentage points (47.7 to 44.3) and that Celeste would 
capture about 8 percent of the vote, with the overwhelming pro­
portion of his support coming from white voters.20 Consequently, 
his critics accused Celeste of merely staying in the race to split 
the white vote and hand the election to Stokes. At one point he 
was supposedly offered a considerable amount of money to get out, 
but Celeste insisted on finishing what he had started. 
THE PRIMARY RESULTS 
As it turned out the fact that Celeste refused to drop out did 
not affect the final outcome of the primary election. When the 
votes were counted Stokes had beaten Locher by over 18,000 
votes and Celeste had accumulated only 8,509 votes (see table 9). 
TABLE 9 
CLEVELAND DEMOCRATIC PRIMARY ELECTION, 1967 
Candidate Votes Percent 
Stokes . . 
Locher , 
Celeste . 
Total . 
110,769 
92,321
8,509 
211,599 
52.3 
43.7 
4.0 
100.0 
SOURCE: Board of Election voting returns. 
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Thus, even if Celeste had withdrawn from the race and all of those 
who had voted for him would have voted for Locher, Stokes still 
would have won by about 10,000 votes. 
Stokes's surprisingly wide victory over Locher resulted from 
several factors. Most important was the fact that although voter 
registration in black wards was down from 1965, the black voter 
turnout (which amounted to 73 percent of all eligible black voters) 
surpassed the record-high 1965 percentage, and Stokes received 
a significantly greater proportion of the black vote than he had in 
1965 (96 percent compared to 85 percent). In other words, an all-
time high proportion of black voters went to the polls and voted 
with unprecedented cohesion for Stokes, thus providing him with 
about 7,000 more votes in the black community than he had re­
ceived in 1965. These results clearly mirror the tremendous mobi­
lizing effort that was accomplished in the black community. 
Complementing this enormous black voting bloc were two develop­
ments within the white wards. First, the white turnout of 58 per­
cent was considerably below the 73 percent turnout among blacks. 
Whereas only 2 percentage points separated the turnout among the 
races in 1965, the difference in 1967 was 15 percent. Second, not 
only did a large proportion of whites fail to go to the polls, but 
among those who did over 15 percent voted for Stokes, which 
was considerably higher than the 3 percent who did in 1965. Stokes 
also increased his total number of votes and percentage of the vote 
in mixed wards (which probably reflects the in-migration of more 
blacks). In summary, his victory resulted from the ability of his 
organization to produce a historic turnout and number of votes in 
the black community (particularly for a primary), the consider­
able inroads he made among white voters, and the inability of 
the Locher campaign to stimulate a turnout among white voters 
TABLE 10 
CLEVELAND DEMOCRATIC PRIMARY ELECTION, 1967: BY RACE 
Black
wards
 White
 wards
 Mixed
 wards
 City 
 totals 
Registered voters
Percentage turnout
 99,885
 73.4
 152,737
 58.0
 73,421
 66.9
 326,043 
 64.7 
Stokes votes
Percentage for Stokes
 70,575
 96.2
 13,495
 15.2
 26,699
 54.4
 110,769 
 52.3 
SOURCE: Computed from Special Census of 1965 and Board of Election voting returns. 
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that approached the record display of the blacks (see table 10). 
As one of Stokes's aides put it: "We got our people to the polls 
and Locher didn't, it's as simple and complex as that." 
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Cleveland: The 1967 General Election 
THE GENERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN STRATEGY 
The Stokes downtown headquarters was, of course, the scene of 
a jubilant celebration the evening of the primary election. The 
polls had closed at 6:30 P.M.; and by 9:15 P.M. Carl Stokes, rely­
ing on the results called in by his workers, proclaimed victory, 
even though the Board of Elections and NBC computers placed 
Ralph Locher considerably ahead. At 10:35 P.M. Locher, after 
being advised by his campaign manager Bronis Klementowicz 
that he could not win, conceded the election and journeyed with 
his wife to Stokes's headquarters to personally congratulate the 
victor. When asked by a reporter if he would support Stokes in 
the general election, Locher responded, "Traditionally, the party 
has always supported the victor in a primary election." When 
queried further as to whether that meant he would specifically 
support Stokes, Locher replied, "Yes, I will."1 
In his victory statement, Stokes gratefully thanked all who had 
worked so diligently for his election. He pledged to wage a vigor­
ous campaign against his opponent, Seth Taft, and if he were 
successful, to make Cleveland, Ohio, "a model city of the United 
States." Stokes seized the opportunity to begin his general cam­
paign immediately by stating to his followers and the television 
audience that they had vindicated his faith in American democ­
racy. He alluded to the notion that his triumph over Locher and 
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Frank Celeste was in the American political tradition of poor boy 
makes good. This was a conscious appeal on the part of Stokes to 
conjure up, in the minds of white voters in particular, the image 
that his journey was no different than that of the recent Cleveland 
mayors who had preceded him. If their elections had reassured 
their ethnic countrymen that there was substance to the American 
dream of an open opportunity structure for those individuals 
with industry and perseverance, then his primary victory was 
simply the most recent example of that respected principle. His 
success reaffirmed the faith in individualism and the notion that 
the American political system had room for all ethnic groups. 
By striking these familiar chords, Stokes was already putting 
into operation an important component of his general campaign 
strategy. The primary election results had made it abundantly 
clear that the black community was solidly behind Stokes. Con­
sequently, the general election strategy was simply to improve 
upon his highly impressive showing in the black wards by sharpen­
ing up even further the basic appeals and tactics utilized during 
the primary. On the other hand, he was still confronted with the 
problem of appealing to the overwhelming majority of whites who 
had voted for his opponents. This majority, combined with the 
city's Republican voters, could constitute a voting bloc capable 
of defeating him in the general election. His basic task was to 
prevent white Democrats from crossing party lines to vote for 
his Republican opponent, Seth Taft. In an effort to head off 
widespread desertion from the party ranks, Stokes planned to 
employ a strategy which stressed that: (1) he had won the Demo­
cratic primary handily and therefore had earned the support of all 
lifetime Democrats; (2) his commitment was to be mayor of all 
the people (not a black power advocate); and (3) his background, 
in contrast to his opponent's, better qualified him to be mayor 
of Cleveland. 
The personal characteristics of Stokes's competitor, Seth Taft, 
made the latter aspect of the general strategy relatively easy to 
execute. Taft was a Republican in a city where there were ap­
proximately four Democrats to each Republican. He was a wealthy 
suburbanite who had attended the right schools, had the right ac­
quaintances, had joined the right Cleveland law firm, and had 
moved into the city from the exclusive suburb of Pepper Pike to 
seek the mayorship. His uncle, the late Robert Taft, was cosponsor 
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of the antilabor Taft-Hartley law, thus his name was anything but 
revered among the numerous union members in Cleveland. He 
was not well known to the voters, although he had worked on 
numerous civic projects (including an effort to install metropoli­
tan government in the Cleveland area), and he had never held 
any kind of public office. In the words of one respondent: 
Taft, in essence, represented the white Protestant establishment that
Frank Lausche had beaten many years ago. He symbolized all that
the cosmos voters were against. He had all the handicaps; yet in the
final analysis he was white and Stokes was black, and that eventually 
proved to be more important than anything else.2 
Stokes could not attack Taft as he had attacked Locher and his 
administration for the problems plaguing Cleveland, but he did 
plan to emphasize Taft's above-mentioned shortcomings at every 
opportunity, particularly concerning his lack of contact and ex­
perience with the grave social problems of the city. Over and over 
again, Stokes would underscore that he possessed firsthand 
knowledge and daily contact with city problems whereas Taft 
had spent most of his life far removed from them. As in the 
primary, a major thrust of the Stokes's strategy toward white 
voters was to convince them that by any objective standards, he 
was clearly more qualified to be mayor than his opponent. 
Given the characteristics of the two candidates and the exposure 
Stokes had commanded during the primary, it was not surprising 
that a September 1967 public opinion poll showed that if Stokes 
did win the primary, he would emerge with a considerable lead 
over Taft for the mayorship. The results of that poll indicated 
that Stokes would receive 46 percent of the general election vote 
compared to only 19 percent for Taft with 20 percent of the voters 
undecided and 14 percent claiming that they would not vote for 
either candidate. A subsequent poll, conducted about a week after 
the October primary, showed Stokes acquiring 47 percent of the 
vote and Taft increasing his proportion to 31 percent; but 18 
percent of the voters were still undecided and 4 percent planned 
not to vote.3 This latter poll indicated that Taft's growing strength 
flowed from support among those who had voted for Celeste or 
Locher in the primary. The crucial "swing vote" of undecideds 
and nonvoters was described as "white Democrats who probably 
have a strong dislike for both Negroes and Republicans and there­
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fore are under very strong cross-pressures which could easily keep 
them from voting. If they do vote they would probably go for Taft 
by a wide margin."4 
From Stokes's perspective it would have been obviously de­
sirable if these cross-pressured voters decided to vote for him. 
Indeed, the basic thrust of his general strategy was geared pre­
cisely toward attracting these voters to his cause. Short of doing 
so, his bid for the mayor's seat would be enhanced if such voters 
remained at home on election day. Conversely, Taft could not win 
the election unless he was able to encourage the cross-pressured 
voters to vote and vote for him. His dilemma was how to ac­
complish this task without resorting to a racist campaign, which 
he had meticulously avoided during the primary and had vowed 
not to do during the general campaign or election. In fact, Stokes's 
victory in the primary took the Taft camp completely off guard, 
since their operating assumption was that Locher would win the 
primary and that they would inherit the Stokes vote. According 
to one of Taft's campaign strategists, 
Our whole campaign was geared to do one thing—defeat Ralph Locher. 
When Stokes won, the whole campaign had to be scrapped, all of the
literature, the thinking, the approach. Our strategy against Locher was
to get the black vote and the white liberal vote but when Stokes won
he got them and we got stuck with Locher's vote. 
Despite this unexpected development, the Taft strategy called 
for a continuance of the campaign waged during the primary. 
That is, Taft maintained that the resolution of racial strife and 
the social problems underpinning it constituted the most pressing 
problem confronting the city and would require the greatest 
amount of attention on the part of the new mayor. Although Taft 
was in a sense forced to accept former Locher supporters as his 
basic constituency, he decided not to inflame their uglier side but 
instead to project himself as a candidate committed to reconciling, 
not polarizing, the races. As we shall see, this strategy, for the 
most part, was pursued by the Taft camp until about fifteen days 
before the election. 
REMOBILIZING THE BLACK COMMUNITY 
One of the unanticipated outcomes of Stokes's primary victory 
was the serious letdown experienced by both the Stokes organiza­
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tion and the black community as a whole. The Stokes supporters 
had worked themselves up to such a high emotional pitch in their 
quest to defeat Locher that his defeat gave them considerable 
self-satisfaction and complacency. Since the winner of the Demo­
cratic primary invariably won the general election, there was the 
strong temptation among many of Stokes's backers to assume that 
he would beat Taft without much difficulty. This tendency was 
compounded by the presumption among some workers that the 
Democratic party would throw its weight behind Stokes. The 
condition of the Stokes street-level organization immediately 
after the primary was described by a worker responsible for sev­
eral black wards as follows: 
For the first two weeks after the primary we didn't do anything. At 
first we felt that we were going to get support from the Democratic 
party. However, when we found out that they weren't going to do 
anything we went back to tighten up our block supervisor and ward 
captain situation. We notified them that they would have to perform 
one more time for us. The biggest problem was going back and selling 
the black community the idea that they had to go out and vote for 
Carl again. Since he won the primary, many people thought he was 
already mayor. That may seem silly, but remember we sold October 3 
as the one chance to vote for Carl. 
The above quotation is not included to imply that the Stokes 
street-level organization collapsed during the general campaign, 
for the opposite is closer to reality. The organization did experience 
a notable lull, and the zealousness that characterized the primary 
was for a time dampened; however, improvements in the func­
tioning of the organization eventually occurred. For example, 
the block supervisor structure sustained less than a 10 percent 
turnover between the primary and the general elections. Conse­
quently, the vast majority of the block supervisors knew virtually 
every voter in their area, had already contacted each of them 
several times, and had learned how to turn them out for the general 
election—and they did just that. Likewise, the participation of 
college students on election day was improved upon. The co­
ordinator of that operation was able to identify those universities 
that turned out for elections and those that needed more pumping; 
he established more in-ward headquarters from which students 
could be deployed; he recruited assistant in-ward leaders to in­
crease the efficiency of the deployment procedures; and he was 
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able to have more people in motion on general election day than 
on primary election day. In sum, he felt that his component of 
the general campaign was a much more sophisticated operation 
because of the experience accumulated during the primary. The 
primary experience was also very valuable for the workers at­
tempting to decide which precincts the college students should 
canvass. Whereas their estimates as to which precincts were 
lagging on primary day were based on educated guesses, the data 
collected during the primary provided them with empirical 
grounds for deciding where to deploy the student workers during 
the general election. The coordinator for polling-place witnesses 
and challengers also utilized information gathered during the 
primary to polish her operation. Soon after the primary was over 
she sent out 3,500 questionnaires to her workers asking them to 
detail as exactly as possible what occurred in their polling place 
during the primary. Based on the information culled from the 2,100 
completed returns, those workers were able to identify the trouble 
spots and prepare themselves for doing an even better job on the 
general election day. That information also helped them to decide 
which workers needed to be replaced, which needed re-instruc­
tion, and where to reinforce the less solid segments of the work 
force. Since a little over 80 percent of the people who worked on 
that aspect of the campaign during the primary also worked in 
the general, most of the time and energy was devoted to refining 
a fundamentally sound procedure. 
When asked to compare the functioning of the street-level 
organization in the primary and the general campaign, one re­
spondent summarized the difference by noting that: 
We were much more sophisticated in the general election. We shaped
everything up off the primary. Everything was much more efficient.
We shaped up the witnesses and challengers, the block supervisors,
the college out-lets, and the in-ward organization. The grass-roots
campaign was really sharpened up as soon as we got moving again,
although it took some time for us to get off dead center. 
Thus, once the narcotic affect of winning the primary was 
overcome and it became clear that little help would be forthcom­
ing from the Democratic party, the Stokes grass-roots organiza­
tion moved into high gear again and, in the estimation of most 
respondents, functioned in a more well-oiled fashion than it had 
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throughout the primary. The message disseminated throughout 
the black community by the organization stressed that Stokes had 
not been elected mayor yet and that he needed another enor­
mous voter turnout on 7 November, the day of the general election. 
In the words of one campaigner in the black community, "We 
emphasized over and over again that we had to do it one more 
time for Carl. We had come this far, let's not blow it, let's go all 
the way." Despite the early lull in the general campaign, this 
message apparently did get across to the black masses, and they 
did provide Stokes with another huge voting bloc. His almost 
fatal difficulties emerged not from any inability to remobilize 
the black community, but from the tidelike wave of white Demo­
crats crossing party lines to vote for his Republic opponent. How 
and why this phenomenon occurred is discussed below. 
THE RACE ISSUE EXPLODES 
While the street-level organization was engaged in remobilizing 
the black community to turn out for the general election, the 
other components of the Stokes organization were concentrating 
on building further Stokes support among the white population. 
Individuals, for example, who were charged with cultivating 
Stokes support within the white business establishment continued 
to solicit funds, endorsements, and the lending of professional as­
sistance to the Stokes campaign organization. As noted earlier, 
considerable success was achieved in these efforts during the 
primary. However, once Locher was knocked out of contention 
there was a temptation within these circles to waver on strongly 
supporting Stokes in the general election. The basis of this de­
velopment was explained in the following manner by a Stokes 
worker who shared responsibility for that aspect of the campaign. 
A good number of these people were Republicans or friends of Seth
Taft, so they wanted to support him or they couldn't make a choice
between Taft and Stokes. They liked them both, they felt that they
were both equal in ability and that they would both do a fine job.
One of the most difficult things to deal with was the feeling among
these people after Locher's defeat that "Oh, well Cleveland can't 
lose now either way, can it?" The prevalent feeling in these circles
was that it was a toss-up as to which man was best qualified for thejob. People felt that at last we have two good candidates for mayor and 
the town can't really lose no matter who's elected. So we had to 
combat all of this during the general. 
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Although this sort of difficulty did arise, and did cause some con­
cern among his workers, Stokes's support within the establish­
ment did not seriously erode during the general campaign. Ob­
viously, Taft received considerable backing from traditional 
Republican strongholds within the business world, but Stokes did 
not become the victim of widespread defection to Taft's camp. 
In general, the business establishment was split into strong Taft 
supporters, and those who were either neutral or backed both 
candidates. 
Indicative of Stokes's continued promotion among powerful 
elements within the white community was the posture of both 
newspapers that he be selected over Taft for the mayorship. Why 
Stokes remained the continued choice is summarized by the en­
dorsing editorial of the Plain Dealer. In its endorsement the 
Plain Dealer stressed the fact that Stokes was a skilled profes­
sional politician who had grown up in Cleveland, was intimately 
aware of the city's problems, and was actively involved in efforts 
to find solutions to them. The editorial suggested that Taft, on 
the other hand, was a pleasant amateur and an outsider who had 
to move into Cleveland from Pepper Pike (a Cleveland suburb) 
to run for mayor. Fears by whites that, if elected, Stokes would 
limit his concerns to the black community were, according to the 
editorial, unjustified because in his campaign Stokes had appealed 
to "Clevelanders as a whole and has made clear that if elected 
he would serve all his fellow Clevelanders fairly."5 
A problem for Stokes that was far more serious than his rela­
tionship to the white establishment consisted of his relationship 
to the thousands of white Democrats who voted for Locher or 
Celeste in the primary. A major effort to keep such voters within 
the Democratic fold was launched a week after the primary vot­
ing. All of the leading Democrats in the Cleveland area were in­
vited to attend a Democratic unity rally sponsored by the Stokes 
for Mayor Committee, the Cleveland AFL-CIO, the Teamsters 
District Council, and the Democratic party. Virtually every well-
known Democrat, including Senator Stephen M. Young, Congress­
men Charles A. Vanik and Michael Feighan, former governor 
Michael V. DiSalle, and county chairman Albert Porter (whose 
resignation Stokes had called for during the primary) attended the 
mass meeting along with over two thousand of the party faithful. 
If the rhetoric of the speeches was denotative of support for 
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Stokes's candidacy, there was no question that the party was pre­
pared to back him vigorously. The praises grew stronger and 
stronger as each speaker took his turn at the rostrum; by the end 
of the evening it appeared that the Democratic party was one big, 
happy family united behind Stokes and ready to do battle with its 
traditional Republican enemy. 
As is often the case, however, once the enthusiasm of the mo­
ment fades, the nature of political reality reappears. In this case 
the nature of political reality was that the ordinary white voters 
in Cleveland's ethnic neighborhoods were not enthusiastic about 
Stokes; indeed, they were opposed to him, and the Democratic 
party representatives in their wards were not about to become en­
gaged in a strong endeavor to change their inclinations. It soon 
became clear to the Stokes camp that the "big get-together was 
simply paper stuff—they went through the motions but there was 
no real commitment to elect Carl." According to some respon­
dents, the fact that the party did not become involved in the 
Stokes struggle was a fortunate development: 
The difference between the primary and the general was we didn't 
know how to relate to the party. In the primary they were clearly the 
enemy. In the general we didn't know where they would fit in. You 
see, we were anxious to see if they would come in and disrupt our 
organization, try to take over the organization, join and help the or­
ganization, or stay away and be aloof. As it turned out they didn't 
fit in at all. They stayed aloof, and I think that was a healthy thing 
because it would have been more disruptive to try and work with 
them than to continue to function as we were already doing. 
Although the local Democratic party organization did not fol­
low through on its pledge to support Stokes in the general elec­
tion (Stokes did receive considerable encouragement and some 
financial support from the national Democratic hierarchy), he did 
obtain some assistance from organized labor. The local AFL-CIO 
contributed a modest sum to his campaign chest, plus the local 
Teamsters conducted a telephone and mailing campaign, and they 
contributed money. Of the two labor organizations, the Teamsters 
were by far the more supportive and willing to engage in an earn­
est attempt to elect Stokes. 
For the most part, however, Stokes discovered that winning the 
Democratic primary did not increase significantly his access to 
the political organizations on the West Side. He still encountered 
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considerable difficulty in gaining admittance to ward club meet­
ings and other functions. In fact, some councilmen, rather than 
face the dilemma of informally barring Stokes, simply did not 
hold meetings during the campaign. Consequently, Stokes was 
once again compelled to rely heavily on church organizations, 
civic groups, sympathetic West Side residents willing to sponsor 
home meetings, and the mass media as avenues for delivering 
his campaign pitch to white voters. Winning the primary did in­
crease the number of invitations to appear on the West Side, and 
Stokes took advantage of as many as possible by appearing at 
several functions each day. In terms of emphasis, the great bulk 
of his campaign time (even more so than in the primary) was 
spent on the West Side, thus causing some grumbling within his 
organization that he was taking the black community for granted. 
This policy decision, however, was based on the judgement that 
the street-level organization was superbly equipped to turn out 
black voters with minimum involvement on the part of Stokes, 
whereas only his personal touch was capable of reaching and 
converting white voters. Assuming the validity of this propo­
sition and given the fact that white voters constituted approximate­
ly two-thirds of the electorate, it is understandable that Stokes 
allocated his time and energy as he did. 
Stokes's quest to garner white support was given a strong psy­
chological boost on 14 October. On that day the influential ethnic 
daily newspaper Szabadsag (which is Hungarian for "liberty") 
ran a front-page editorial endorsing Carl Stokes for mayor. The 
reasoning of the editorial was in concert with Stokes's desire to 
portray himself as the most recent example of ethnic acceptance 
and achievement in Cleveland. Noting that Cleveland was the 
first major city in which ethnic groups scored significant break­
throughs to high administrative and judicial posts, and the first 
city to elect a man of ethnic background, Frank J. Lausche, to 
the position of mayor, the editorial stressed that the citizens of 
Cleveland had an opportunity to elect a black man, Carl B. Stokes, 
mayor and thereby demonstrate to the free world that they had 
none of the very prejudices that forced them or their parents to 
emigrate to America. The editorial also analyzed Stokes's quali­
fications, and promising potential to supply the dynamic leader­
ship that Cleveland needed to regain its lost place in the front 
ranks of progressive American cities.6 The Stokes camp was so 
impressed by the editorial that they had it reprinted as a full­
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page ad in both the Press and the Plain Dealer, so that all Cleve­
landers, particularly those in the ethnic wards, would be exposed 
to its message. For a short time, then, a growing optimism began 
to circulate throughout the Stokes organization; perhaps securing 
the support of white ethnic voters was not as formidable as it ap­
peared. This brief encouragement, however, was dramatically 
shattered in less than a week's time. 
Throughout the primary Taft had repeatedly set forth chal­
lenges to debate the winner (he assumed it would be the lack­
luster Locher, not the polished debater Stokes). Shortly after his 
victory, against the wishes of some advisors who thought it was a 
mistake to provide Taft with exposure, Stokes agreed to two de­
bates plus the traditional City Club debate, which usually took 
place on the weekend before general election day. The ground rules 
stipulated that Taft could select an East Side location (he choose 
Alexander Hamilton Junior High School) and Stokes a West 
Side location (he selected John Marshall High School). The format 
included a twenty-minute period for each candidate to discuss 
the issues of his choice, a five-minute rebuttal period, and an 
open question period for the audience. Louis Seltzer, retired edi­
tor of the Cleveland Press, agreed to act as moderator for the 
programs, which were to be taped for a television showing later 
in the evening of each debate. 
The first debate was conducted on 17 October at Alexander 
Hamilton Junior High and in Taft's own words, it was a "disaster" 
for him. Stokes simply demolished him with barbs, witticisms, at­
tacks on his "carpetbagging," and his inexperience in dealing 
with city problems. The results dealt a near-death blow to the 
morale of the Taft people. "It was as if a funeral was taking 
place in our headquarters the next day," Taft remarked.7 If his 
election chances seemed to be an outside bet before the debate, 
it appeared that they were now reduced to near zero. 
This was the consensus in the Stokes headquarters also, which 
was of course elated by the outcome. Taft was even less effective 
than they had suspected. Indeed, Stokes had done so well against 
Taft that some of his supporters began to caution him about over­
powering his opponent. This counsel was based on the following 
reasoning as explained by one of Stokes's key workers. 
In the general election he had to fight off over-confidence. We
urged him to alter his campaign style because Carl Stokes's cam­
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paign style traditionally has been to show up his opponent, to ridi­
cule him—in a humorous way. And to establish his clear superiority 
in terms of facts and speaking style. But in the general election, all 
of a sudden he had to change this because it became apparent now 
that each time he appeared to be demonstratively better than his 
opponent someone would label him as an "uppity nigger." He almost 
had to carry his opponent, he couldn't appear to be too good, too 
superior. 
In the primary he had to show the voters how much better quali­
fied he was than Ralph Locher to be mayor and he would do it at 
every turn. But in the general he had to guard against over-kill be­
cause by this time the white voters knew he could beat a white man 
in a two-man race, and he had to be careful not to make Taft the 
beneficiary of the sympathy vote against an "uppity nigger." 
On the occasion of the second debate, held at John Marshall 
High School on 19 October, the worst fears of Stokes's supporters 
concerned about overkill and making Taft a sentimental underdog 
materialized. Taft led off the debate before an audience that was 
openly friendly toward him, but his talk was no more effective 
than the first one. In an effort to counter Stokes's accusation 
that he was a carpetbagger, Taft charged Stokes with bringing 
outside influence into the campaign through his attempt to raise 
money outside the city. He made specific reference to a Holly­
wood fund-raising party planned by Sammy Davis, Jr. (perhaps 
a subtle bit of implied racism, since it was well known that the 
black actor had a white wife). 
Stokes took the rostrum admist polite applause but a smatter­
ing of boos. He was also booed when he attacked Taft for living 
in a seven-bedroom mansion in Pepper Pike. Undeterred by the 
visible hostility of the crowd, Stokes then launched into a section 
of his prepared speech, which undoubtedly proved to be the turn­
ing point of the entire campaign. He said: 
I am going to be brutally frank with you—brutally frank with Seth 
Taft. The personal analysis of Seth Taft—and the analysis of all 
competent political experts—is that Seth Taft may win the November 
7th election for only one reason. That reason is that his skin happens 
to be white.8 
The school auditorium was instantly filled with boos and jeers 
that lasted for several minutes as Stokes attempted to continue 
and explain what he meant. He continued over the murmuring 
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by stating: "On this question, which I could have avoided so 
easily but brought out in the open for you to see, Seth Taft has 
pretended to bypass the so-called black-white issue. . . . But in 
practically every public utterance he has made during his cam­
paign, he so subtly points out that, and I quote, 'Carl Stokes has 
more experience at being a Negro, but Seth Taft has more ex­
perience at being a white man.' "9 
The level of noise increased and Stokes, in a flash of uncus­
tomary anger, snapped at the crowd: "Just be quiet for a mo­
ment." Once again he was drowned out by boos and catcalls to 
which he responded: "If you don't agree with me, that's what 
ballot boxes are for." In a final effort to recover, Stokes stated: 
"Seth Taft is not a racist; Seth Taft is not a bigot. But he does not 
believe that the people of Cleveland can rise above the issue. 
He believes that any white candidate could beat Carl Stokes in 
the election. How do I know this is true? Because Seth Taft told 
me." Stokes attempted to describe a private conversation he had 
with Taft but it was too late; the audience was in no mood for 
the explanation, and Stokes finally sat down. 
Taft had been alternately shaking his head in disbelief and re­
viewing a file that was prepared for him in the event that Stokes 
ever raised the race issue. He never thought he would get an 
opportunity to use the material; this was clearly the moment, and 
Taft played it perfectly. 
Well, well, well! It seems the race issue is with us. I was charged at
Carl Stokes's campaign opener of bringing up the race issue. It now
appears that if I say something on the subject, it is racism. If Carl
Stokes says something it is fair play. 
He held up a full-page newspaper ad and read from it. 
"Don't vote for a Negro: Vote for a Man!" he says in his ads. I agree
with that. After the primary, the theme changed to "Let's Do Cleve­
land Proud." What has Cleveland done that makes it so proud? 
Nominated a Negro for mayor. Now it is "Do something proud by 
electing one."
It is impossible to ignore this issue, but I have not brought it out
once in the debates. I had no intention of bringing it up. The reverse
is true. If Carl Stokes talks about it, nobody else can.10 
In less than an hour the entire character of the campaign had 
changed dramatically. The self-confident and sure-footed Stokes 
156 / Electing Black Mayors 
was for the first time visibly shaken. The promising momentum 
of what seemed to be a successful campaign was suddenly halted 
by Stokes himself, who apparently did what Taft was unable to 
accomplish—build a fire of enthusiasm under the white electorate. 
Almost instantaneously, Taft, who had been conducting a lethargic 
and defensive campaign, took the offensive against the stunned 
Stokes camp. 
The following day the Stokes headquarters was reminiscent of 
the Taft headquarters after the first debate. A feeling of disbelief 
and gloom permeated the entire atmosphere. According to one 
campaigner: "Practically everyone felt that he had blown the 
whole thing. We couldn't believe it, we just couldn't believe it. I 
just wanted to cry." Stokes called a meeting of the entire staff. 
He admitted that perhaps a mistake had been made but reminded 
his workers that they had experienced nothing but success in the 
campaign thus far and that what many considered a setback did 
not make or break a campaign. He argued that the manner in 
which they responded to the crisis would determine the outcome; 
if they became disheartened it would produce defeat, if it stimu­
lated them to work even harder, it would produce victory. 
The decision to raise the race issue was made by Stokes and 
his public relations manager, Ostrow; it was evidently based on 
two considerations. First, it was maintained that "Taft was taking 
both the high road and low road." Although he had publicly 
stated that he would not pursue a racist strategy (and most of the 
evidence suggest that this was a sincere pledge on Taft's part), 
the top decision-makers in the Stokes camp felt that he was con­
stantly making remarks with subtle but effective racial overtones. 
In addition, and perhaps without his knowledge, many of his 
campaign workers were using a racist pitch on their door-to-door 
campaigning and producing racist literature. It was felt that Taft 
might win the election with these tactics without the issue ever 
being explicitly raised. Consequently, it was decided that Stokes 
needed to point out that racism was the only factor that could 
defeat him. Indeed, Stokes had often and skillfully expounded 
this very view in scores of smaller meetings he attended on the 
West Side. At those meetings, however, he was speaking to es­
sentially friendly audiences, which was not the case in the John 
Marshall debate. There, the audience evidently interpreted Stokes 
as saying anyone who planned to vote for Taft, which included 
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many of them, was a racist. They did not take kindly to the ac­
cusation, nor in all likelihood did the bulk of the white television 
audience. 
It is clear that the John Marshall debate was the turning point 
of the general election and that it did not help Stokes's cause in 
the white community. However, the decision to raise the race 
issue was not based exclusively on the campaign in the white 
community; there was. another consideration related to develop­
ments among the black electorate. As we noted earlier, a lull 
beset the Stokes organization and the black community after the 
primary victory. Ostrow apparently decided that one way to com­
bat this complacency and remobilize people was to raise the 
specter that Stokes was in danger of losing because of the subtle 
and underground racist campaign being conducted against him. 
It was hoped that the exposure of this danger would sufficiently 
anger and regenerate the determination in the black community 
to do everything possible to elect Stokes. 
It is impossible to determine, on balance, whether the Stokes 
cause experienced a net gain or loss as a result of the John Mar­
shall debate, but it is obvious that the last fifteen days of the 
general election campaign were quite different than the preced­
ing days. After the debate, the Taft headquarters, for example, 
was flooded with inquiries from people seeking to help in the 
campaign. In assessing the impact of the debate on his campaign, 
Taft remarked: 
The next day everything was great and everybody went back to work 
a lot happier than they had been a couple of days before. And it 
clearly helped just in terms of morale, people were willing to go out 
and work a lot harder when it seemed suddenly that their man could 
take it. So it did make a tremendous difference. . . . By the end of 
the campaign we had 4,000 people out working and a significant 
number of them would not have been out working if we did not have 
the success of that debate. 
In Taft's estimation, the debate was a breakthrough success be­
cause it allowed him to point out how Stokes was utilizing the 
race issue while at the same time denying it to him. He believed 
that Stokes's basic technique in dealing with white voters was to 
"shame them into saying, 'If I don't vote for Stokes I am a bigot.' 
. .  . At the same time he was saying if Taft brings up race he is 
playing a racist campaign—so he had it going both ways. That 
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was the thrust of his 'Do Cleveland Proud' slogan which meant 
nothing more than saying you have done yourself proud by voting 
for a black man. . . . He was using two inconsistent arguments, 
and I finally had a chance to point out the inconsistency." 
Race, of course, had always been the fundamental, although 
perhaps submerged, question of the campaign; but once this 
inconsistency was publicly placed on the table, it dominated all 
other issues. Soon after the debate Taft, for example, allowed a 
letter to be sent to 45,000 members of various nationality groups. 
It encouraged the ethnic voters to "protect our way of life and to 
protect Cleveland, the citadel of nationalities in America." It 
maintained that "Taft and Taft alone can give Cleveland back to 
the law-abiding citizenry" and made reference to "false charges 
of police brutality." 
There is no question but that Taft picked up tremendous mo­
mentum on the West Side after the debate at John Marshall. 
In the words of one of the principal volunteers in Stokes's West 
Side office: "It was all Taft on the West Side for that last few 
weeks in the general. There were parades, spotlights, search­
lights, offices everywhere and the fanaticism of his workers." 
Asked what the Stokes workers did to counteract the growing 
strength of Taft, he responded: 
We tried to talk to people, reason with people, tried to make them
give the man a chance. We tried to remind them that they were
Democrats. . . . We did the best we could in talking to people, but
you can't talk to someone who is not there and the Stokes voters were
not there, they didn't want to be seen or heard because they were
afraid—it was real fear. 
When questioned why the West Side workers were unable to 
duplicate the block supervisor structure that was constructed on 
the East Side, this respondent explained: 
When you're downtown and on the East Side it is easy to say "you've
got to do this, you've got to get out there and do that." But when
you're over here and see what's happening, like a guy gets beaten
up and almost dies, things get thrown through the window, the place
almost gets burned down a couple of times, people threaten you
and slash your tires and no one will even talk to you, you wonder
where in hell you're going to get block supervisors. It just wasn't
possible. . . . There were only 40 of us actively involved in the Stokes
campaign, and we had to beg for help. The precinct committeemen 
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wouldn't even talk to us. We got most of our help from younger kids 
who got all kinds of hellfrom their parents who felt threatened by the 
whole thing. 
This same respondent felt that the West Side Stokes volunteers 
confronted considerably more harassment during the general 
campaign than they did in the primary. They also found it ex­
tremely difficult to combat the emergence of so-called indepen­
dent Democratic organizations and the unwillingness of council­
men to cooperate in pushing Stokes's candidacy. They discovered 
that white councilmen were giving lip service to supporting Stokes 
but in reality were doing nothing to actually promote his election. 
Most simply claimed that they had little or no influence over the 
voters in their wards. Whether the counciimen could have changed 
any minds if they had wanted to remains an open question, given 
the general outlook of white voters as described below. 
If you listen to the people talk like I did you would have to conclude 
that they just didn't understand Stokes's position at all. They saw his 
blackness and that's it. The thought that if he was going to be elected 
there was going to be a black police chief, a black safety director, all 
black members of the cabinet, and that they were going to take over 
city hall and keep it. . .  . You can't imagine how the people were 
threatened, really threatened. 
In essence, the West Side Stokes volunteers found that despite 
all of his assurances to the contrary, it was extremely difficult 
to dispel the widespread notion among white voters that Stokes 
would be a black mayor if he were elected instead of a mayor for 
all citizens. Thus, although Stokes fought vigorously to under­
mine such an image, in the minds of thousands of white voters 
he was the personification of black power. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that the following anonymous leaflet was widely dis­
tributed in some white neighborhoods just prior to election day. 
STOKES IS BLACK POWER

VOTE RIGHT—VOTE WHITE

You can rest assured that if Stokes is elected mayor of Cleveland you 
will get Negroes for neighbors and your children will have niggers 
for playmates. . . . 
Fellow white Americans—This is not an election between the Re­
publicans versus Democrats—this is a war between the niggers and 
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the whites. All of the niggers and nigger lovers are voting for Stokes.
Don't be a Judas to your own race. If the niggers win, it will be taken
as a signal in Washington by Johnson to raise your taxes and spend
more and more on the nigger and less and less on the white man and
his children. If the nigger Stokes wins, it won't be safe for your women 
and children to walk the streets. Don't let the kikes from Shaker 
Heights and Cleveland Heights and the niggers run your city. 
Get out and vote-vote-vote-for Taft!11 
THE GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS 
The debate at John Marshall and its aftermath had such a 
devastating effect on the Stokes campaign that he agreed to en­
gage in an extra debate with Taft. Billed as the great rubber 
match between the two candidates, it proved to be nothing more 
than a ritualistic performance in which Taft took the offensive 
by attacking Stokes with personal barbs; but Stokes ignored them 
and discussed his program for improving Cleveland in an ex­
tremely detailed fashion. According to an astute observer of the 
Cleveland political scene, the third debate "solved nothing, [it] 
gave neither candidate the edge and was, in fact, rather boring to 
sit through."12 However, this same observer did note a significant 
change in Stokes's strategy: "He was trying to appear more 
humble, trying to assume a quiet, defensive position in contrast 
to the bold, attacking manner he had exhibited in the earlier 
debates." 
The results of a Plain Dealer poll, released on 2 November, 
suggested that it may have been too late for Stokes to effectively 
alter his approach, for apparently the damage had already been 
accomplished. It showed that the substantial difference (16 per­
centage points) separating the two candidates in the middle of 
October had vanished. If the poll was accurate, the election had 
boiled down to a virtual dead heat, with Stokes receiving 50.1 
percent of the vote compared to 49.9 percent for Taft.13 In the 
final analysis, this slim difference resulted from the fact that 
Stokes was unable to prevent traditional white Democratic voters 
from crossing party lines to support and vote for his opponent. 
Testimony to this desertion is provided by a Stokes aide who was 
given the responsibility of visibly surveying the West Side on 
election day to see how things were going. He recalls: 
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I went out on election day to the West Side of town and except for
the area of the near West Side which has a Spanish population, you
didn't even see a Stokes poster. I can remember being outside the
polling places on election day. The precinct workers were out in front
and there were independents for Taft, Democrats for Taft, and sup­
porters of the incumbent councilmen but there was nobody passing
out Stokes literature—nobody. 
Further testimony to the widespread disaffection of Democrats 
into the Republican column was provided as the voting results 
began to emerge on election evening. During that night the at­
mosphere in the Stokes headquarters was much different than it 
had been on primary night. On the earlier occasion there had 
been a considerable amount of confidence and certainty among 
the Stokes workers: they had gotten the returns quickly and 
efficiently from their poll watchers; they analyzed the results, 
projected them, and were sure of victory. They were even bold 
enough to advise Stokes to announce victory when he was losing 
according to the calculations of all other commentators. This 
confidence and boldness was not characteristic of the general 
election evening. The polls closed at 6:30 P.M. and by 8 P.M. Taft 
had accumulated a 10,000-vote lead. Taft maintained a lead for 
the next six hours, during which time numerous misprojections, 
mistakes, and rumors had Stokes losing or conceding the elec­
tion. The same crew of Stokes workers who had so professionally 
and accurately projected the primary vote "were completely off 
base during the general—we had him losing all the way." By 2 
A.M. there was talk of making a victory statement in the Taft 
headquarters and talk of a recount among the Stokes people. At 
approximately 3 A.M., however, Stokes took a slim lead for the 
first time in the entire evening, and from that point on he re­
mained in front. By 4:45 A.M. it was of&cial Carl B. Stokes was 
elected mayor of Cleveland by a margin of 1,698 votes (see tables 
11 and 12—a recount reduced the margin to 1,679). 
SUMMARY 
When requested to explain why Stokes wi?s able to successfully 
mobilize the black community and thus become the first black 
mayor of Cleveland, one respondent paused for a considerable 
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time and then answered: "I'll give it to you in a nutshell. It was 
the right time, the right man, and the right kind of organization." 
Assessing the utility of this formulation requires, of course, 
additional comment. The Stokes campaign occurred at the right 
time in the sense that the black community in Cleveland had 
TABLE 11 
CLEVELAND MAYORALTY ELECTION, 1967 
Percentage 
Candidate Total vote of vote 
Stokes 129,396 50.3 
Taft 127,717 49.7 
SOURCE: Board of Election voting returns. 
TABLE 12 
CLEVELAND MAYORALTY ELECTION, 1967: BY RACE 
Black
wards
 White
 wards
 Mixed
 wards
 Total 
 wards 
Registered voters
Percentage turnout
 99,885
 79.7
 152,737
 78.5
 73,421
 66.9
 326,043 
 78.9 
Stokes vote
Percentage for Stokes
 75,586
 95.0
 23,158
 19.3
 30,872
 54.1
 129,616 
 50.5 
SOURCE: Computed from Special Census of 1965 and Board of Election voting returns. 
undergone a series of experiences that heightened group con­
sciousness, cohesion, and a sense of growing group power. The 
national civil rights movement obviously contributed to these 
developments, but local civil rights activity appears to have been 
even more significant. Not only did local actions encourage 
thousands of blacks to participate in demonstrations, marches, 
rallies, and boycotts, the actions exposed beyond question to 
the black community the racist nature of white officials, parti­
cularly Mayor Locher. As the blacks pushed harder and harder 
to achieve their civil rights goals, the Locher administration be­
came increasingly resistant and repressive. Instead of recognizing 
the legitimacy of black grievances and making at least symbolic 
efforts to alleviate them (thus undermining or coopting the 
movement), city hall took exactly the opposite tactic. It attributed 
the racial conflicts in Cleveland to a small number of trouble­
makers and responded to the problem with a get-tough program. 
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As a consequence, Mayor Locher, who had received overwhelm­
ing black support in the election of 1963, discovered that his 
standing in the black community plunged to near zero. Indeed, 
Locher and his administration became the common enemy that 
did much to build cohesion among blacks. Each attack on Martin 
Luther King, local black ministers, civil rights leaders, and black 
militants welded the black community closer and closer to­
gether. It became increasingly apparent to blacks that in order to 
protect themselves and improve their situation it was necessary 
to engage in united group action. There is no question that there 
continued to be numerous factions within the black community. 
However, for the first time in the history of Cleveland the black 
community began to display to itself and others that it was ca­
pable of achieving political unity. The 1964 school boycott, the 
vote on the school bond issue, the 1965 primary vote against 
Locher, and the 1965 general election vote for Stokes all provided 
examples that the black community was "getting itself together." 
It is conceivable, of course, that this new sense of group con­
sciousness and cohesion could have been directed toward sup­
porting another white politician for the mayorship, but for ob­
vious reasons it was not. The most obvious of these reasons was 
the pervasive notion among black citizens that blacks could as­
sume leadership posts comparable to individuals from other 
ethnic groups. Indeed, an editorial in the Call and Post made the 
solid point that black voters had been instrumental in electing 
an Irishman, a Slovenian, an Italian, and a Lithuanian to the 
mayorship, and thus could rightfully back a member of their own 
ethnic background.14 As the editorial went on to point out, this 
was particularly the case when the black candidate, Carl Stokes, 
was excellently qualified for the position. There could be little 
question that Stokes was highly qualified; he was intelligent, 
well informed, politically experienced, a witty and charismatic 
public speaker, and confident of his own ability to handle the 
job. He generated an enthusiasm that is difficult to capture with 
words. However, it is not an exaggeration to note that many 
blacks viewed him as a champion—indeed, a savior of the black 
struggle in Cleveland. As far as can be determined, no sizeable 
number of blacks expressed reservations concerning Stokes's 
commitment to the black community. The issues of sell-out to 
the white power structure and individual advancement at the 
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expense of group progress were simply never raised because 
rank-and-file blacks had every reason to trust Stokes. An index 
to this trust was the support Stokes received from the militant 
black nationalists who were highly skeptical of electoral politics 
in general. Thus, Stokes was the right man in the sense that the 
black community could trust him and feel proud of him because 
of his oustanding qualifications. He was a living example of the 
"black is beautiful" theme that was circulating throughout the 
black community, and, in fact, his campaign provided an op­
portunity to translate that slogan into practice. 
These characteristics were clearly instrumental in stimulating 
the development of Stokes's campaign organization. Without 
them it is doubtful that the organization would have been capable 
of attracting hundreds of volunteers who were willing to work 
long and grueling hours to help elect Stokes. But Stokes did 
possess the right characteristics and as a result his people not 
only worked those hours, they worked with a zeal, a creativity, 
and an enthusiasm that did take on the aura of a crusade. Con­
sequently, the entire black community became like a giant tidal 
wave that was intent on placing Stokes in the mayor's seat. The 
campaign organization was responsible for stimulating the tidal 
wave and at the same time direct its energy toward necessary 
organizational tasks. The level of success is reflected in the re­
sults; the black community went to the polls in unprecedented 
numbers, they voted for Stokes, and the votes were counted in 
an honest fashion—essentially as a result of organizational work. 
In short, then, Stokes was able to mobilize the black com­
munity behind his candidacy because of recent political de­
velopments in Cleveland, his own personal characteristics, and 
the hard work of his campaign organization. A similar set of 
circumstances resulted in the election of Richard Hatcher to the 
mayorship in Gary, Indiana. The details of that story are con­
tained in the following three chapters. 
1. Cleveland Plain Dealer, 4 October 1967, p. 1. 
2. This quotation and the following unattributed quotations are derived from 
interviews conducted in Cleveland by the authors. 
3. These polls were commissions by Taft and conducted by the Market Opinion 
Research Company of Cleveland, Ohio. The authors would like to thank Mr. 
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William Silverman, an associate of the Market Opinion Research Company, for 
making manuscript copies of these polls available to us. 
4. Ibid. There is considerable social science support for the notion that cross-
pressured voters will not vote. See Lester W. Milbrath, Political Participation 
(Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), p. 98. 
5. Cleveland Plain Dealer, 22 October 1967. 
6. Szabadsag, 14 October 1967. 
7. Quoted in James M. Naughton, "The Making of a Mayor," Cleveland Plain 
Dealer Sunday Magazine, 10 December 1967. Reprinted by permission. 
8. Quoted in ibid. 
9. Ibid. 
10. Ibid. 
11. Reprinted in Kenneth G. Winberg, Black Victory (Chicago: Quadrangle 
Books, 1968), p. 200. 
12. Naughton, "The Making of a Mayor," p. 51. 
13. This poll indicated that 92 percent of the 412 persons interviewed who had 
voted for Locher or Celeste in the primary were planning to vote for Taft. 
14. Call and Post, 16 September 1967. 
6 
Gary: The Economic,

Social, and Political Setting

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Compared with other major American cities Gary, Indiana, is 
relatively young. The town received its incorporation shortly after 
the turn of the twentieth century. Geographically situated in the 
northwest corner of Indiana within easy driving distance of Chi­
cago, Gary is an integral part of an enormous chain of industrial 
communities running along the southern shore of Lake Michigan 
across three states. 
In a very real sense the history of Gary is the history of the 
expansion of the United States Steel Corporation into the Calu­
met Region.1 The development of Gary grew out of the search by 
United States Steel officials for a site in the Calumet Region on 
which a large steel production facility could be established. 
Original plans called for the expansion of existing facilities in 
Chicago, but the lack of adequate space, rail facilities, and inex­
pensive land adjacent to Lake Michigan made such expansion 
infeasible. The Gary area appeared to be ideally suited to the 
company's needs. Located on the northwest border that sepa­
rates Illinois from Indiana, it was close enough to Chicago to 
allow the company to take advantage of Chicago's large supply 
of cheap labor. Land in the area was both plentiful and moderate 
in cost. The bulk of this section of the Calumet Region was still 
largely unsettled, with Miller, Tollerston, and Clark constituting 
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the only fully established towns.2 These features of the Gary 
environment presented the steel company with a golden oppor­
tunity to buy up large tracts of land at a modest price; these 
extensive land acquisitions assured the company of room for 
immediate as well as future development. Several other factors 
enhanced Gary's attractiveness as the home of a major steel 
complex in the Calumet Region. Although sparsely populated, 
railroads had already begun to move in and around this portion 
of Indiana, sharply reducing transportation problems endemic 
in the large-scale manufacture of steel. The site also bordered 
the southern edge of Lake Michigan. Consequently, it provided 
easy access to crucial electrical power and to the ore vessels 
plowing the waters of America from east to west. 
Recognizing the advantages this site held over possible al­
ternative locations, United States Steel officials decided around 
1905 to construct a new manufacturing complex in the Gary area. 
This decision gave birth to the idea of building a town around 
the mill site to service the needs of company employees and to 
attract new persons into the area. Thus, plans for the building of 
a new municipality were included in the steel company's original 
comprehensive design for the construction of the proposed steel 
manufacturing complex. Company officials exercised direct 
supervisory authority over the planning and development of the 
town. These officials viewed themselves as town fathers and 
guardians of the public interest, and in this capacity they sought 
to make Gary a model manufacturing community, not just an­
other company town. This paternalistic attitude toward the town 
was translated into efforts by company officials to guide the de­
velopment of the community. To accomplish this objective, the 
Gary Land Company was organized as an auxiliary agent of the 
steel company and given complete authority to coordinate the 
construction of the town by purchasing land adjacent to the pro­
posed mill site, to supervise the establishment of businesses and 
private dwellings and, as nearly as possible, to control land 
speculation. Gary's origin as a company town is underscored by 
the company officials' decision to name the new town in honor 
of Judge Elbert H. Gary, chairman of United States Steel's board 
of directors. 
Long after Gary had become a prosperous and vibrant com­
munity, steel company officials continued to exercise direct 
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supervision over its public affairs. The central place of steel 
company executives in the public life of Gary during the first 
three decades of its history constitutes one of the most important 
features of its early social, economic, and political development. 
Much of the influence wielded by company executives in Gary's 
public life derived from the company's tremendous impact on the 
city's economy. Between 1906 and 1930, Gary was essentially 
a one-industry city. During this period, only two companies not 
owned by United States Steel were established in Gary.3 The 
city's inability to develop a diverse manufacturing base over a 
period of nearly thirty years was due in large measure to calcu­
lated efforts by steel company officials to dissuade competing 
industrial concerns from moving into the area. An almost insuper­
able barrier to the establishment of competitive concerns was 
posed by the steel company's monopoly of municipal utilities. 
According to one respondent, although the steel company uni­
formly sold municipal services to the general public, it stub­
bornly refused to provide comparable services to potentially 
competitive industries. The company's desire to keep competitive 
enterprises out of the city was also supported by its ownership of 
the harbor and every foot of the city's frontage on Lake Michigan. 
Control of the harbor and the lake front, in effect, gave the com­
pany veto power over the launching of new manufacturing con­
cerns requiring access to Lake Michigan. As a result of these 
practices the company was able to establish a near monopoly of 
the city's working force. This tight control of the labor market 
enabled United States Steel to completely dominate the economy 
of the city; its enormous economic influence in turn gave it im­
portant leverage in other aspects of the city's life. 
Important, too, as a factor in Gary's early development was the 
influx into the city of large numbers of immigrants uprooted from 
their homes in Europe. The construction of Gary Works and its 
subsidiaries coincided with the period of the new immigration that 
brought to American shores millions of southern and eastern 
European immigrants. Animated by a consuming quest for eco­
nomic security and a better way of life, many of these immigrants 
were drawn to Gary, as in the case of Cleveland, by the lure of 
unskilled and semiskilled employment in the steel industry. Im­
petus to the natural flow of immigrants into Gary was added by 
a high-powered publicity campaign waged by United States Steel 
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extolling Gary as a model community and holding out the promise 
of exciting and profitable careers in a bustling industry. Adver­
tisements in papers circulated through the United States and 
Europe recounted the Gary story. Feature articles were printed 
billing Gary as a major steel-producing city offering unlimited 
opportunities for those who wished to participate in its develop­
ment.4 
The publicity campaign waged by steel company officials to 
attract European immigrants into Gary had its desired effect. Al­
though few ethnic types were among the original settlers in the 
city, by 1910 Gary had become a center of European immigration 
in the Midwest. At this time 49.1 percent of the city's total popu­
lation of 16,802 was of foreign-born extraction.5 Heavy represen­
tation of ethnics in Gary's population has remained a salient fea­
ture of the city's social structure. In 1946, Gary had one of the 
largest foreign-born populations per total population of any city in 
the United States. Since Gary was founded after the turn of the 
century when immigration to the United States from northern and 
western Europe had largely drawn to a close, the overwhelming 
proportion of white ethnics in Gary have come from countries 
in southern and eastern Europe. Among the most important nation­
ality groups represented in Gary's population are the Italians, 
Bulgarians, Serbians, Poles, Romanians, Hungarians, Germans, 
Czechs from Bohemia and Moravia, Scotsmen and Scandina­
vians.6 
Like foreign immigrants in Cleveland and other cities, European 
immigrants in Gary suffered from the handicaps of foreign lan­
guages and customs and low socioeconomic status. Their foreign 
backgrounds as well as their lack of economic resources pre­
vented them from integrating into the northside business and 
residential areas inhabited by the first citizens of the city, the 
White-Anglo-Saxon-Protestants. Instead the vast majority of these 
newcomers settled in a southside district known as the Patch. 
Within the boundaries of the Patch each ethnic group formed its 
own separate community. In nearly every case, serious efforts were 
made by the members of these groups to reconstitute their na­
tive traditions and institutions in their new community environ­
ments. Immigrant churches catering to the spiritual and social 
needs of community residents became prominent features of each 
sector of the Patch staked out by a nationality group. Similarly, 
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immigrant newspapers carrying news from back home and written 
in the native language of community residents enjoyed a consid­
erable measure of popularity and success in the Patch. On the 
social side, large numbers of clubs were founded that regularly 
sponsored dances, picnics, parades, and many other group-
oriented events. 
Feelings of attachment and interdependence remain very strong 
among the members of the multiplicity of ethnic groups repre­
sented in Gary's population. Consequently, although much else 
has changed since the first decades of the city's founding, the 
segmentation of its ethnic units continues to be an important 
feature of Gary's social system. As will be shown later, the preser­
vation of subgroups held together by common ethnic ties has had a 
considerable impact on the forms and substance of politics in 
Gary. 
OVERVIEW OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 
The first seven years of Gary's political history were charac­
terized by a struggle for power and influence between steel com­
pany officials and a strong Democratic faction led by Thomas 
Knotts, first president of the town board of trustees. Company 
officials began their drive for power by converting extensive 
cash gifts or land donations for the construction of public build­
ings, including the YMCA and the public library, into appoint­
ments as board members to a wide variety of community insti­
tutions. Next they attempted to consolidate their power in city 
politics by establishing an alliance with the Republican party 
and using their influence to elect to key positions Republican 
candidates respectful of steel-company interests and prerogatives. 
The electoral base for this Republican-steel company coalition 
was the eastern European immigrant community. In the eyes of 
steel company managers, immigrant voters were a compliant 
and manipulable source of political power. The vast majority of 
immigrants in the city were totally without prior political expe­
rience, economically insecure, and lacking a genuine interest in 
public affairs. Most importantly, they were absolutely dependent 
upon the steel mills for their livelihood. Exploiting to the fullest 
the immigrants' various social, economic, and political handicaps, 
steel company officials regularly sent plant managers into ethnic 
neighborhoods to drum up electoral support for Republican can­
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didates. Typically, plant managers made contact with representa­
tives of major ethnic groups, emphasizing in their conversations 
that the job security of community residents at the mill depended 
vitally on their solid support at the polls for candidates endorsed 
by steel company executives. Frequently, ethnic clergymen were 
induced through financial contributions and other means to en­
dorse from their pulpits steel-company-supported candidates. The 
blind faith and trust that many immigrants had in their clergymen 
made ethnic ministers especially effective liaison forces between 
the steel company and the ethnic community. 
The most important obstacle to the vigorous drive by steel 
company officials to establish their unchallenged hegemony over 
the city's political system was Thomas Knotts, one of the original 
founders of the city. Knotts, a Democrat, viewed the political as­
cendancy of the steel company as a threat to popular democracy 
and a detriment to the economic development of the city, since 
steel company officials staunchly opposed the creation of a diver­
sified industrial community. To thwart the consolidation of the 
company's power in the public arena, Knotts ran as a Democrat 
for mayor in the first community-wide election, held in 1909. 
He was opposed in the primary by William C. Crolius, a politi­
cian imported by steel company officials from Joliet, Illinois, to 
deny Knotts the Democratic nomination. Knotts and his support­
ers refused to participate in the regular Democratic primary with 
Crolius. They chose instead to hold a special nominating conven­
tion and then wage a battle in the courts for the right to display 
the party emblem and the title Democratic party on the general 
election ballot. A superior court in Hammond ruled in favor of 
Knotts. Shortly thereafter, Crolius threw his support behind 
Knotts's Republican opponent and returned to his home in Illinois. 
Knotts was challenged in the general election by John A. 
Brennan. The general campaign was very bitter, with the Knotts 
forces denouncing Brennan as a "stooge" of the steel company, 
and Brennan's supporters countering that Knotts's hostility to the 
steel corporation would stifle the growth potential of the city's 
economy. As election day approached, animosity between the 
rival election factions became so severe that the governor was 
prompted to declare a state of emergency and put the local militia 
on standby alert. 
Knotts won the election by a narrow margin of 71 votes, re­
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ceiving a total of 1,790 votes to Brennan's 1,719. The key to 
Knotts's victory was the success he enjoyed in attracting the elec­
toral support of southside ethnics. Apparently, Knotts was un­
usually popular in the Patch area and sought to take advantage 
of his ethnic appeal by helping as many immigrants as possible 
become eligible to vote. 
The rivalry between Knotts and steel company officials that 
had surfaced dramatically during the campaign continued to dom­
inate Gary politics after Knotts's election to the mayor's office. 
Informal control over the city council and major civic and social 
institutions by the managers of the steel mill served to substan­
tially weaken the ability of the mayor to implement his adminis­
trative program. Indeed, before Knotts's four-year term expired, 
every imaginable step was taken by steel company officials to 
hamper him in the performance of his mayoral duties and dis­
credit him in the eyes of his constituents. For example, steel 
company officials were the prime movers behind the mayor's ar­
rest on fourteen separate occasions over a two-year period.7 
Although not realizing their primary goal of removing Knotts 
from office before the expiration of his term, the persistent 
attacks by steel officials against the mayor did have the effect of 
so fragmentizing his electoral base that it was impossible for him 
to win a second term. When he began campaigning for reelection 
in 1913, Knotts found that his popularity in immigrant neighbor­
hoods had sharply declined. Further, he faced opposition not only 
from Republicans and steel company officials, but members of his 
own party who had supported his bid for election during the 
first campaign. These dissenting political forces came together 
in a loose coalition operating under the banner of the Citizen party. 
This new organization nominated Roswell O. Johnson, a Republi­
can, for mayor and slated two Democrats for seats on the city 
council. 
Every person nominated on the Citizen party ticket was elected 
to office. Johnson defeated Knotts by 1,516 votes, obtaining the 
support of an overwhelming majority of the voters in the south-
side ethnic districts that had gone solidly for Knotts in the elec­
tion of 1909. Although the election returns formally indicated a 
resounding victory for Johnson and his running mates, events 
following closely on the heels of the election made it clear that 
the real victors were the resident managers of the steel company. 
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Having finally removed their arch foe from public office, steel 
company officials began immediately taking over the reins of au­
thority in the Johnson administration. William P. Gleason, a 
company official, was appointed by the new mayor to the park 
board. Pontius Heintz, chief inspector of the Gary Land Company, 
was named police chief. Ralph E. Rowley, another company of­
ficial, was elected to the city council and became its president 
during his first term.. Operating behind the scenes as the "sha­
dow mayor" was Captain Norton, the man who for several years 
had been the steel company's chief political strategist. 
The election of Roswell O. Johnson as mayor in 1913 ushered 
in a twenty-year period of Republican dominance in Gary politics. 
Steel company officials refused to support Johnson for another 
term because of his alleged laxity in rooting out gambling and 
prostitution in the city. Instead, they threw their support behind 
William F. Hodges, former city attorney in the Johnson adminis­
tration, who had resigned in protest against the high incidence of 
vice in Gary. Hodges easily won the election and, as expected, 
showed great sympathy for the interests and desires of the steel 
company during his four years in office. Johnson was reelected 
mayor in 1921. His second term was cut short, however, by his 
conviction on federal charges of conspiring along with sixty-one 
other individuals to violate federal laws prohibiting the sale and 
use of intoxicating beverages. Johnson was sentenced to eighteen 
months in federal prison in Atlanta, Georgia, and fined $12,000. 
It is an interesting commentary on prevailing political ethics in 
Gary to note that Johnson's career in Gary politics did not end 
with his confinement in federal prison. Upon his release, John­
son ran again for mayor and was elected to office for a third term 
in 1929. 
Roswell O. Johnson's election in 1929 signaled the end of an 
era of Republican domination of city hall. Johnson was suc­
ceeded in 1933 by Lee B. Clayton, the first Democrat to be elected 
to the mayor's office since the turbulent reign of Thomas Knotts. 
Clayton's victory represented a pivotal breakthrough in Gary pol­
itics by the Democrats. Beginning with this election, the Demo­
cratic party gradually replaced the Republican party as the con­
trolling party organization in the city. Since 1933, Gary has had 
only one Republican mayor—Dr. Ernst L. Schiable—who served 
from 1938 to 1942. Dr. Schiable was defeated after one term in 
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office by Joseph E. Finerty, a Democrat. From 1942 to the pres­
ent the Democrats have been in continuous control of city hall. 
The emergence of Democratic control in Gary coincided with the 
arrival of the Democrats to power in Lake County generally. Re­
sounding victories by Democratic candidates in city and county 
contests have led to a near total collapse of the Republican party 
in Lake County. In deference to the awesome power of the Demo­
crats, Republicans have generally avoided competing in local po­
litical contests. Rather than using their limited resources to drum 
up support for party candidates running as sacrificial lambs, 
Gary Republicans have appeared to prefer to concentrate their 
political activities on securing patronage and other benefits 
from key state- and national-party officials. 
Much of the impetus for the change in party power and control 
in Gary occurring in the 1930s was derived from the devastat­
ing blow inflicted on the city by the depression. Gary's heavy 
dependence on steel production rendered it as vulnerable to the 
disastrous economic consequences of the depression as any city 
in the nation. Under the pressure of the depression, the love af­
fair between the resident managers of the steel company and 
working-class ethnics lost much of its fire. Roosevelt's welfare 
programs drew the bulk of Gary's ethnic population into a new 
majority coalition with blacks and labor—a coalition that was in 
many ways a microcosm of the national coalition underpinning 
the ascendancy of the Democrats in Congress and in the White 
House during these years. Capitalizing on their developing Demo­
cratic proclivities, Gary Democrats wooed intensively the vote of 
eastern European ethnics through patronage, favors, and recogni­
tion. Members of prominent ethnic groups began to receive the 
lion's share of welfare benefits distributed under the supervi­
sion of Democratic officials. Ethnic leaders were gradually, but 
systematically, absorbed into the formal structure of the local 
party, a process that resulted in the creation of direct links be­
tween various ethnic communities and the city organization. 
These measures helped to snap the final ties between ethnics 
and steel company bosses and facilitate the exodus en masse of 
ethnic voters in Gary from the Republican to the Democratic 
party. 
Paralleling the shift in party membership by eastern European 
ethnics in Gary was a significant crossover into the Democratic 
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ranks by Gary blacks. Blacks rallied behind the banner of the 
Democratic party for much the same reasons as their working-
class white counterparts. Constituting 17 percent of the popula­
tion in 1930, blacks were courted by local Democrats with assis­
tance and promises of assistance. Roosevelt's promises of expanded 
opportunities for blacks in the areas of employment, education, 
and housing eased considerably the task by local Democrats of 
moving the black population significantly into their ranks. As 
was true of blacks elsewhere, many blacks had remained loyal to 
the Republican party purely out of gratitude for Lincoln's freeing 
of American slaves. Roosevelt's appeal to blacks on concrete eco­
nomic grounds, however, substantially dimmed the importance of 
Lincoln's actions in the modern context. With the aid of persis­
tent prodding from local Democratic leaders, Roosevelt's national 
appeal operated in Gary's black community as a catalytic force, 
inducing many blacks to join hands with working-class whites in 
a decisive retreat from the Republican to the Democratic party. 
The developing strength of the Democratic party during the 
depression years of the 1930s was also a product of the strong 
political support given to Gary Democrats by organized labor. 
Intimate political ties between the Democratic party and labor in 
Gary grew mainly out of the antilabor posture of the Republicans 
during the struggle for unionization. Republican officials elected 
because of critical steel company support were compelled time 
and again during the 1920s to invoke measures to hamper the 
success of union activities. Having no other place to go, union 
forces naturally gravitated toward the Democratic camp. For their 
part, Democratic leaders welcomed the financial and electoral 
assistance they received from labor and showed their gratitude by 
integrating union members into the party's structure. Since the 
1930s the romance between labor and the Democrats has seen 
many peaks and few valleys. High-ranking labor leaders gener­
ally sit in on crucial meetings of the county Democratic organi­
zation in which key decisions regarding the distribution of re­
sources and the support for party candidates are made. Union 
leaders in turn have played vital roles in the mobilization of rank-
and-file voter support for Democratic candidates. 
The combination of ethnic, labor, and black political power all 
drawn into the same political camp laid the basis for more than 
thirty-five years of uninterrupted rule by the Democrats in Gary. 
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With these elements of the coalition that took shape during the era 
of the New Deal solidly unified, the power of the leadership 
corps that came to the fore in the Democratic party during these 
years was virtually invincible. By the same token, when the cohe­
sive quality of this coalition began to disintegrate, a parallel 
slippage in its ability to exert a commanding, stabilizing influence 
over the instruments of power in the city was no doubt also in­
evitable. 
POSTWAR CHANGES 
Among the most important social developments in Gary since 
World War II has been the phenomenal growth in size of the 
city's black population. The presence of Afro-Americans in Gary's 
population is not a factor of recent origin, for blacks were among 
the first arrivals in the city. One report notes the interesting fact 
that at least sixty-six blacks worked in the Gary steel mill during 
its first year of operation.8 It is true, however, that only a hand­
ful of blacks resided in the city prior to the close of World War I 
when blacks were brought in from the South by steel company 
managers as strike breakers. During subsequent years of the 
1920s successive upswings in the economy produced a significant 
influx of blacks into Gary seeking job opportunities in the steel 
industry. At the end of this decade 17,982 blacks lived in Gary; at 
this point they constituted 17.8 percent of the total population. 
The decade of the 1930s witnessed a sharp rise in the percentage 
of blacks as a proportion of Gary's total population. This fact 
was due mainly to two parallel developments: a steady increase 
(except for the bleakest years of the depression) in the number of 
blacks migrating into Gary from the South, and substantial white 
out-migration from the central city to surrounding suburbs. These 
trends had begun to significantly affect the racial composition 
of Gary as early as 1944. In that year the city had a total popula­
tion of 120,000 of which 24,000 or 20 percent were black. No 
other major northern city during this period contained a larger 
percentage of blacks in its population.9 Since the end of World 
War II the number of whites leaving Gary to settle in the suburbs 
has reached near epidemic proportions. The impact this phe­
nomenon has had on the social composition of Gary is vividly 
illuminated by statistics showing that from 1950 to 1960 the black 
population of Gary expanded nearly five times faster than the 
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white population.10 No fundamental break in this pattern has oc­
curred; to the contrary, all evidence suggests that, if anything, 
it has been given impetus by the growth of black power as a 
unifying force among blacks and the spread of urban racial con­
flict throughout northern communities. By 1967 the dual factors 
of expanded black influx and ever-increasing white out-migration 
had transformed a city that was once predominantly Eastern 
European into one that was more than 50 percent black. Unof­
ficial statistics in 1967 indicated that blacks were approximately 
55 percent of the population, making Gary, if these figures 
were accurate, one of only four American cities at the time with 
an absolute black numerical majority.11 
Blacks moving into Gary from the South were restricted by 
formal and informal housing policies to the oldest and most un­
desirable residential areas of the city. As the number of blacks 
in Gary increased after World War II, they gradually pushed 
working-class white residents from the central district, known as 
Midtown, to an area south of the Little Calumet River present­
ly known as Glen Park. Northeast of downtown lies the predomi­
nantly Jewish community of Miller. Noted locally for their liberal­
ism,. Miller residents are representative of the new monied class 
—individuals who have gained their wealth and social position since 
the depression as a result of the twin Jewish emphasis on edu­
cation and professionalism. 
Since 1960 the black district has significantly expanded into 
an area on the city's southwest side known as Tollerston. The 
bulk of Tollerston's new black residents have been middle-income 
blacks seeking residential space outside the central district ghetto. 
Because of the heavy movement of middle-income blacks into the 
area Tollerston has developed the highest degree of residential 
integration in the city. Until recent times, discriminatory housing 
policies served largely to lock black citizens out of Glen Park and 
Miller. 
Despite recent movement of blacks into a few formally all-
white areas, the majority of Gary's black population remains 
trapped in the central city ghetto. The prevalence of ghetto life 
among blacks in Gary is thrown into sharp relief by statistics 
comparing their socioeconomic status with that of whites in Glen 
Park and Miller. As in the case of Cleveland, housing in Gary's 
black community is disproportionately substandard. In 1950, 
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blacks lived in 62 percent of the city's substandard dwellings while 
occupying only 18 percent of the acceptable housing.12 Over the 
ten-year period between 1950 and 1960, the percentage of blacks 
living in substandard housing increased. In I960, blacks occupied 
approximately 68 percent of all substandard dwellings in Gary.13 
Comparatively speaking, while 11.1 percent of the white popula­
tion resided in substandard housing units, 28.1 percent of the 
black population occupied such dwellings.14 Black housing in 
Gary is not only inferior, but also in much shorter supply than 
is housing in the white community. Census data firmly documents 
the reality of congestion as a major social problem in the black 
community. For example, although blacks comprised over 40 per­
cent of the total city population in 1960, they occupied less than 
33 percent of the housing units.15 The population per household 
among blacks in 1960 was 4.08, as compared to 3.15 for whites.16 
In many respects the substandard physical environment of Gary 
blacks is a reflection of their inability to keep abreast of their 
white co-citizens in the areas of education, occupation, and in­
come. On the whole, blacks in Gary are much better educated 
than whites in other major cities in Lake County. But when com­
pared with the educational experience of whites in their city, 
blacks in Gary clearly fall in a lower position on this socioeconomic 
index. In this regard we can note that in 1960 the median num­
ber of years completed in school by whites twenty-five years of 
age or older was 10.9 years while the median for blacks was 9.1 
17 years.
The presence of the huge United States Steel industrial com­
plex in Gary has produced a higher level of economic prosperity 
than commonly found in northern cities of its. size and larger. 
Yet when comparisons are made between the economic position 
of Gary blacks and Gary whites, disparities analogous to those 
cited above in the area of education can clearly be discerned. A 
combination of discrimination and rural southern background has 
operated to produce twice the level of unemployment in the 
black community as exists in the white. Thus in 1960 unemploy­
ment for whites was 2.4 percent while unemployment for blacks 
was 5.9 percent.18 Moreover, far fewer blacks than whites were 
employed in white-collar, skilled job categories. The following 
statistics indicate the disparities between black and white employ­
ment in this segment of the labor market: 27.9 percent of the 
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white labor force held white-collar jobs while only 9.1 percent of 
the black labor force was so employed; 18.5 percent of employed 
blacks were craftsmen or skilled workers as compared to 89.6 
percent of employed whites; and 56.1 percent of the black labor 
force could be classified as semiskilled or unskilled, while 33.8 
percent of the whites could be placed in these categories.19 As 
could be expected, income figures for blacks and whites acutely 
mirror these occupational differences. In 1960 the median family 
income for blacks in Gary was over $2,000 less than the median 
family income for whites ($4,720 to $6,860). The rate of poverty 
among black families in Gary has consistently been more than 
twice as high as white families. Thus 22 percent of Gary's black 
population in 1960 had incomes below the poverty line of $3,000 
while only 9.5 percent of whites had incomes below this figure. 
Poverty is in fact such a serious problem in Gary's black com­
munity that Gary blacks make up the largest proportion of those 
receiving public assistance from the office of the Calumet Town­
ship trustee. Indeed, the demand by blacks for relief has been so 
heavy that most of the welfare money spent by Lake County in 
recent years has been earmarked for Gary recipients. 
Another important development in Gary in the postwar years 
has been the rise to power within the local Democratic party of 
an ethnic political machine. Since the early 1950s the Gary machine 
has been rivaled only by machines in nearby Chicago and in East 
Saint Louis in its ability to control the outcome of elections 
through the mobilization of the electorate. 
Gary's ethnic machine had its genesis in the election of Peter 
Mandich to the position of Calumet Township trustee in 1946. 
Mandich was the Gary-born son of Eastern European immigrant 
parents. His campaign for the trustee's office in 1946 constituted 
the first serious effort by Eastern European ethnics to wrest civic 
power from the old immigrants and WASPs then in firm control 
of the Democratic party. The political base of the campaign was 
Club SAR (Social, Athletic, Recreational) founded by Mandich's 
good friend, George Chacharis. Club SAR's membership was com­
posed mainly of Eastern European ethnics who shared common 
interests in sports and other forms of social recreation. Mandich 
was the club's star basketball player. When he decided to run 
for office he called upon other club members to work in his be­
half. Virtually the entire membership of the club responded to his 
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request and worked endless hours in his campaign. The Mandich 
campaign shifted the focus of Club SAR from sports to politics, 
creating in its wake a circle of ethnic leaders imbued with a life­
long commitment to active involvement in Democratic party poli­
tics. Reflecting on the politicizing effort of this initial venture, 
one Gary politician commented to a researcher in 1959: "We 
weren't much better than hoodlums and we might have ended 
up worse if Pete [Mandich] and George [Chacharis] didn't get 
successful and get us all careers in politics."20 
The process of machine-building began in earnest in 1951 when 
Peter Mandich successfully parlayed his position as township 
trustee and his electoral power base in the ethnic community 
into his election as the first Eastern European mayor of Gary. 
Mandich ran for a second term in 1955 and easily won reelec­
tion. During the third year of his second term, Mandich resigned 
from the mayor's of&ce to run for sheriff of Lake County in the 
1959 primary elections. Early retirement from the mayorship by 
Mandich paved the way for George Chacharis, who had served 
as city controller for most of Mandich's two terms in of&ce, to 
succeed to the top political of&ce in the city.21 Chacharis's suc­
cession to the mayorship was not surprising. Chacharis had been 
the driving force behind the rise to power by ethnics in Gary 
politics from its very inception. It was Chacharis who managed 
Mandich's first bid for public of&ce and who subsequently 
steered the course of his political career toward the mayor's of­
fice. As controller in the Mandich administration, Chacharis 
became the central source of power in city government, exercis­
ing in everything but name the authority of the mayor. 
George Chacharis was elected mayor in his own right in 1959. 
The Chacharis administration was marked by extensive centraliza­
tion of power in the hands of the mayor. Chacharis ruled the 
city with an iron fist, requiring that even the most trivial mat­
ters receive his personal approval before being acted upon by city 
personnel. As mayor, Chacharis also built for himself the reputa­
tion as the most generous philanthropist in the Midwest. He do­
nated huge sums of money to charity, and almost never turned 
down anyone who came to him personally for financial assistance. 
Chacharis's propensity to live beyond his means eventually led 
to his political downfall. In November 1962, one year before the 
expiration of his mayoral term, Chacharis, along with five other 
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Lake County political figures,22 were indicted by federal officials 
for tax fraud. Each defendant was charged with participating in 
the operation of a complex network of dummy and semidummy 
companies serving as receptacles for kickbacks exacted from in­
dividuals and corporations doing business with the city of Gary 
and other local agencies. Chacharis was charged specifically 
with requiring that subordinate city officials collect such payments 
and turn over a portion of this money to him. He was also ac­
cused of evading the payment of $226,686 in taxes on money de­
rived from his participation in kickback operations in Gary. 
During the long and controversial trial that ensued, Gary gained 
a national reputation as a city whose governance lay in the hands 
of an administration that was corrupt from top to bottom. When 
it was over, Chacharis had been found guilty of the charges 
against him and sentenced to federal prison in Milan, Michigan. 
Charges against all of the other defendants were dropped. 
By the time Mayor Chacharis was incarcerated in federal 
prison, the roots of Gary's ethnic political machine were firmly 
planted in the city's political system due to the planning of Man­
dich and Chacharis. Acting on Chacharis's advice, Mandich had 
begun the process of machine-building by filling the city bureau­
cracy with ethnic appointees. Top level positions went to mem­
bers of Club SAR who played prominent roles in the civic life 
of their ethnic communities. As coordinator of city-hall patron­
age, Chacharis made sure that the preponderance of lower-level 
jobs were also assigned to representatives of ethnic commu­
nities. Once control by Mandich and Chacharis in city govern­
ment was firmly established, they began to expand their orga­
nizational network into the bureaucratic strongholds of county 
government by electing members of their political family to key 
county positions. These county officials were expected to utilize 
county-level patronage resources to build up an ethnic-dominated 
bureaucratic structure paralleling the one established in the city. 
In this way, leaders of the Gary machine gradually consolidated 
their control over both city and county government. 
At the bottom of the ethnic machine's organizational structure 
was the Democratic precinct organization—a grass-roots electoral 
apparatus for mobilizing votes in city and county elections. The 
key figures in this organization were precinct committeemen 
who maintained close contact with voters on a continuing basis 
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and used their personal influence to turn out whopping majorities 
for machine candidates on election day. To fill precinct positions, 
machine leaders recruited persons who were immersed in the so­
cial life of their community, maintained a wide circle of friends, 
and enjoyed the respect of their neighbors. On election day, their 
effectiveness was measured by party leaders by the extent to which 
they were able to translate their community contacts into strong 
support by voters in their precinct for machine candidates. 
Prodigious work by precinct committeemen in ethnic and black 
neighborhoods created for the Mandich-Chacharis regime an in­
vincible electoral base. Control over the electoral process invested 
machine leaders with the ability to regulate the behavior of every 
politician of importance in the city. During the Mandich-Cha­
charis administrations, it was virtually impossible to get a nomi­
nation to a major public office without going through the city 
machine. A maverick who bucked the machine ran the risk of 
committing political suicide. Lacking a base within the precinct 
organization, he stood little chance of defeating a machine-
backed candidate. If he appeared to pose a serious threat, vigor­
ous attempts were made to buy him off, and, in all but the rarest 
instances, this was enough. If it was not, his defeat was assured 
by the entrance into the race of splinter candidates running spe­
cifically to dilute his potential base of support.23 
The heyday of machine power in Gary extended from 1955 to 
1959. Between 1960 and 1967 the organization witnessed a steady 
erosion of its ability to monopolize power and control elections. 
This decline in machine strength was due mainly to the collapse 
of its base of electoral power in the white community, and a 
number of factors contributed to this decline in influence. First, 
a significant rise in the socioeconomic status of whites freed a 
sizable proportion of the white population from dependence on 
the machine for critical economic resources. As whites became 
more economically affluent, the ability of precinct committeemen 
to trade favors and monetary rewards for votes in the white 
community substantially declined. Second, the onset of the black 
protest movement created enormous tension between the pre­
cinct organization and the white community. Demands by blacks 
for school desegregation, open housing, and other benefits were 
viewed by many whites as direct threats to their social and eco­
nomic statuses. Consequently, whites began to question the wis­
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dom Gf supporting machine candidates who consistently refused 
to promise that they would not give in to black demands. As 
this attitude spread significantly among white voters after 1960, 
it became extremely difficult for white precinct committeemen to 
work effectively in the white community. Most damaging of all to 
the influence of the machine in the white community was the 
Chacharis scandal of 1962. The revelation of rampant corruption 
in city hall gave Gary a black eye nationwide. White citizens felt 
a profound sense of betrayal since the public officials under indict­
ment were men that they had allowed to exercise unrestricted 
authority over the management of municipal affairs for ten years. 
Chacharis's convinction represented a profound blow to their civic 
pride and served to significantly weaken their emotional ties to 
the Lake County Democratic organization. 
Decreasing support for the machine by the white electorate in­
evitably lead to atrophy of the white precinct organization. To 
combat serious erosion of machine influence produced by a col­
lapse of its organizational structure in the white community, 
machine leaders decided to direct a larger share of their atten­
tion and resources to their most important remaining base of elec­
toral support—the black community. One leading figure in the 
regular Democratic organization candidly explained the consider­
ations entering into the decision to focus attention of the party 
apparatus largely on the black community. 
You depend on your solid vote, where you know the people are for
you. It's very foolish to waste all your time and effort in an area
where you know you're not going to get the vote no matter what you
do. So you rely on the area that's going to give you the votes. The
white community and the Negro community supported the party up
to the time the mayor and former mayor were involved in a scandal.
The white people felt like they had been betrayed and turned on the
party. Then you had to rely upon the heavy Democratic Negro pre­
cincts to carry the lead. It made sense. If you were going to break
even in the white areas, you had to concentrate in Negro areas to
get your majority.24 
That the black community remained a viable base of electoral 
strength for the Democratic machine at the same time that the 
machine's strength in the white community was waning is ex­
plained in part by the fact that blacks did not share in the eco­
nomic prosperity enjoyed by whites in the 1960s. The lack of 
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significant economic progress by members of the black electorate 
left them heavily dependent upon the socioeconomic amenities 
that the machine had to offer and generally traded in return for 
strong electoral support. Continuing black support for the ma­
chine was based most importantly on the superior political skills 
and commitment of machine workers in the black community. 
As in East Saint Louis, machine influence in Gary's black com­
munity had been channeled through a black organization re­
flective of, but clearly subordinate to, its white counterpart. The 
activities of this black machine enabled leaders of the regular 
Democratic organization to rob the black community of much of 
its ability to undertake independent political action. Leaders of 
the black machine were far more effective than their white 
counterparts in stifling the growth of antimachine voting pat­
terns among their black constitutents. Consequently, the base 
of power of the machine was more secure, stable, and enduring 
in the black community than in the white. Indeed, control of 
black political choices from the outside through the black sub­
machine was so thoroughgoing and continuous that the analogy 
with colonialism at the international level is practically un­
avoidable. Efforts to keep alive this relationship were intensified 
by machine leaders once it became clear that the black and white 
communities could not be kept in easy alliance in the same po­
litical camp. 
Key figures in the machine apparatus in the black community 
were black members of the Democratic precinct organization. 
Black precinct committeemen were key actors in the machine 
organization because they were far and away the most master­
ful grass-roots politicians in the city. Unlike white committee­
men for whom politics was a part-time endeavor, many black 
committeemen were full-time professional politicians. Black 
committeemen generally worked their precincts around the 
clock, responding to every possible need of their constituents. 
Exchanging favors for votes, they were able to strictly control 
the outcome of elections in their precincts. Indeed, their control 
over politics in their precincts was so extensive that they could 
forecast well in advance of elections the precise vote for each 
candidate. Black precinct committeemen, being practical busi­
nessmen, generally sold their political influence to the highest 
bidder. Since no other political force could match the wealth of 
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the city machine, this emphasis on monetary rewards invariably 
drew the black precinct organization into the political camp of 
the regular Democratic organization. In return for their support 
of machine candidates, black precinct committeemen could ex­
pect to receive patronage appointments in city hall as well as a 
host of other favors that promoted their economic interests. 
With greater amounts of machine largess flowing into the black 
community after 1962, black precinct committeemen were in­
spired to work even more assiduously to maintain their control 
over the political choices of their black constituents. 
The Democratic precinct organization was only one element 
of the black machine operative in the black community. Other 
black leaders, including black elected officials, civil rights ac­
tivists, and black ministers were also caught up in the web of 
machine influence and power. Aspiring black politicians were 
compelled to either become members of the machine or accept 
the inevitability of political defeat. Control by the machine over 
the black precinct organization completely ruled out the success­
ful mobilization of the black community by a black candidate for 
independent political action. 
The black community had a choice of people who were competent
and qualified and who ran for public office, who tried to change the
system. But each time these few men were discouraged by the fact
that they were defeated. They were always beaten down so the 
average man became discouraged to such an extent that he felt there
was no need to run for public office. Those who ran, ran with the 
understanding that I'm going to have to get on the team, otherwise
I'm going to lose. 
Similarly, efforts to organize the black community through pro­
test activity was thwarted by the co-optation of black com­
munity leadership by the machine. Leaders of organizations such 
as the NAACP and the Urban League were generally hand­
picked by white machine leaders and charged with the responsi­
bility of keeping the struggle for civil rights within acceptable 
limits. Black ministers were bought off through large financial 
contributions to their building programs, anniversary celebra­
tions, and other projects. In return for machine benevolence, 
they customarily turned their pulpits over to machine candidates 
and followed up their speeches with their own personal en­
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dorsements. Thus, although the white community was moving 
toward independence, the co-optive powers of the machine in the 
black community had the effect of intensifying the position of the 
black electorate as a manipulable source of machine power in 
Gary politics. 
The relative position of the black and white communities in the 
machine's electoral coalition is clearly illuminated in the outcome 
of the 1963 mayoral election. Selected to run as the machine 
candidate in the race was A. Martin Katz, a two-term city judge 
with an impeccable reputation for honesty and integrity. Katz 
was opposed in the race by four major white candidates, includ­
ing Emery Konrady, whose candidacy reflected the strong surge 
of reformist feelings in the white community in the wake of the 
Chacharis scandal. Konrady was president of a Gary oil firm 
and candidate for the Democratic state senatorial nomination in 
1960. Over the years he had established a reputation as a militant, 
articulate opponent of machine politics. Katz won the 1963 pri­
mary, but only by a razor-thin margin. Although more than 
55,000 votes were cast in the race, Katz managed to beat Konrady 
by a mere 3,095 votes (19,850 to 16,755). The crucial factor lying 
behind the closeness of the outcome was Katz's inability to com­
pete with Konrady for the white vote. Konrady out-polled Katz 
in every white precinct in the city. Indeed, Konrady carried two 
of the three white districts in the city. The first district, located 
in Miller, was carried by Glen Vantrease, former city controller; 
this district happened to lie within Vantrease's home area. But 
for the candidacy of Vantrease, Konrady would have almost 
certainly scored a smashing victory over Katz in Miller—a hotbed 
of Jewish liberalism.25 
In the final analysis, Katz received a modest 22 percent of 
the white vote. This comparatively poor showing in the white 
community was offset, however, by his exceptionally strong 
showing in the black community. Katz carried both the pre­
dominantly black fourth and fifth districts by polling more than 
55 percent of the vote in each. These were the only two districts 
carried by Katz in the election. Overall, Katz received 51 percent 
of the black vote. In addition, of the total vote cast for Katz, 67 
percent was black and 33 percent was white. These figures make 
it clear that the key to Katz's victory was the solid support he 
received from the black community. Essentially, Katz's black 
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vote put him in a position to take advantage of the divisive effect 
of Vantrease's candidacy in the white community. 
Thus as early as 1963, it was very clear to political strategists 
in Gary that the perpetuation of machine power in the city rested 
fundamentally on the continued political support of the black 
community. A significant erosion of the machine's electoral 
strength in the black community would mean a total collapse 
of the political dynasty founded by Mandich and Chacharis. The 
vulnerability of the machine engendered by its heavy reliance 
upon black support was not lost on leadership elements in the 
black community who had escaped the co-optive tenacles of the 
machine. Although in 1963 it was only barely recognizable, these 
men posed the most serious of all threats to the perpetuation of 
machine domination of Gary politics. 
THE BLACK MOVEMENT 
The critical importance of the black vote to the survival of 
machine power in 1963 obscured in large measure the growing 
discontent in the black community with the prevailing system of 
social, economic, and political colonialism. For many years black 
anger had been held in check by the conservative, legalistic ap­
proach to race relations practiced by the Gary NAACP. Racial 
tension had surfaced briefly in the 1940s over the question of 
school integration and the use of the lakefront public beach by 
blacks. But until the latter half of the 1950s racial flareups had 
been minimized by the commitment of black leaders to non-
disruptive tactics in the attainment of equal opportunities and 
equal justice for the black community. 
The struggle for black freedom in the South produced a marked 
shift in the character of race relations in Gary. A number of Gary 
blacks participated in the southern protest movement and re­
turned home to apply their experiences to racial problems in the 
local community. During the opening years of the 1960s the 
NAACP was toppled from its preeminent place among the civil 
rights organizations in Gary. Into the breach stepped several 
local organizations lead by a corps of young blacks committed 
to thoroughgoing social, economic, and political reform and the 
use of southern-style direct-action methods, including coercive 
public protests, to achieve the civil rights objectives of the black 
community. 
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The first protest-oriented civil rights organization to emerge in 
Gary was the Gary Fair Share Organization (FSO), founded by 
Hilbert Bradley, a young black attorney, in 1958. Although still 
formally a member of the NAACP, Bradley had become greatly 
disturbed by the unwillingness of the local chapter to embrace 
an activist program. Upon losing a bid to become a justice of the 
peace in 1958, Bradley decided to transform his campaign or­
ganization into a community organization that would fill the 
vacuum in leadership created by the NAACP's moderate ap­
proach to civil rights. 
In many ways the FSO was a precursor of Reverend Jesse 
Jackson's Operation Breadbasket movement in Chicago. The 
program of the organization centered around the picketing and 
boycotting of major commercial and industrial establishments 
in the city to secure for black people a "fair share" of available 
employment opportunities. During the height of its protest ac­
tivities, the FSO scored a number of important economic break­
throughs for Gary blacks. In the downtown area the organization 
concentrated its attack on the Gary National Bank and the Henry 
C. Lytton and Company clothing store. Under pressure from 
FSO picketers, both institutions agreed to institute policies of 
merit employment that would pave the way for black employ­
ment in all areas including top management. Following the lead 
of these commercial and financial giants, most major downtown 
establishments eventually dropped racial criteria for employ­
ment. Business institutions outside the downtown area were also 
targets of FSO protests, which also produced encouraging re­
sults. Largely through the work of FSO, blacks were placed in 
every store in the Village Shopping Center. Picketing action 
against A & P stores resulted in the hiring of the first black 
manager for an A & P store in the state of Indiana. After a pro­
tracted legal battle over its right to intervene in labor disputes, 
FSO was able to extract promises from Kroger company officials 
to hire at least one black store manager and several black cash­
iers. 
The notable exception in the FSO's history of successful pro­
test action was its seven-month battle to alter hiring practices 
toward blacks at the Anderson Company. Owned and operated 
by John Anderson, the Anderson Company produces and dis­
tributes nationwide "Anco" automobile windshield wiper blades. 
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The Anderson Company was especially vulnerable to the kind of 
protests staged by the FSO around the city. It maintained the 
poorest record of black employment of any manufacturing con­
cern in Gary. John Anderson had persistently voiced his opposi­
tion to externally induced policies that would compel him to 
increase the number of blacks working in his plants. Complaints 
against the company for its racially discriminatory hiring prac­
tices had been filed with the Gary Fair Employment Practices 
Commission (FEPC) as early as 1955. By 1961, the company still 
employed only 3 blacks out of a work force of 1,200 persons. 
Extended protests by the FSO against the Anderson Company 
and the FEPC for its cumbersome handling of the case resulted 
in promises by Anderson to accept applications for employment 
without discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, or 
nationality and to post conspicious notices when new applications 
for employment were being accepted. However, in a year-end 
address to company employees Anderson reassured his white 
work force that the company's policy toward the hiring of blacks 
had not been changed by the FSO demonstrations. He asserted 
that he refused to allow quarterbacking of management by the 
representatives of any race or nationality and vowed to protect 
them against malicious or other external political influences 
adverse to their interests and the interests of stockholders, cus­
tomers, suppliers, and moneylenders. 
The failure of the FSO to force the Anderson Company to adopt 
a policy of merit employment constituted the organization's first 
major defeat. In the wake of this episode, the organization began 
to suffer from internal dissension with charges and counter­
charges hurled by both leaders and rank-and-file members over 
strategies and tactics used in the Anderson protests. Internal 
disintegration of the FSO came to a climax when in May 1962 
Hilbert Bradley resigned as chairman of FSO. Bradley's resigna­
tion was followed by a substantial turnover in the leadership of 
the organization. 
Despite a strong recommendation by Bradley that the FSO 
dissolve because of waning community support, the organization 
continued its program of community protest. However, its ef­
fectiveness as an instrument of black protest was eventually de­
stroyed by several negative court decisions involving the right of 
FSO to intervene on the side of black workers in labor disputes. 
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In 1964 FSO was sued for damages totaling $15,000 by com­
mercial firms from East Chicago and Michigan City, Indiana, 
because of losses incurred as a result of FSO picketing. When 
the County Circuit Court and the State Supreme Court upheld 
the damage claims, FSO leaders decided to make a bold step and 
appeal the cases to the United States Supreme Court. The FSO 
appeal asked the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari opening 
up the rulings in the state courts for federal judicial review. FSO 
leaders argued in their petition to the court that the Indiana 
courts had gravely constrained their rights to free speech and 
association. The United States Supreme Court refused the re­
quests for certiorari, thus making final the awards of $15,000 to 
the East Chicago and Michigan city firms. 
The monetary damages placed by the courts against FSO ef­
fectively destroyed its ability to continue operating as a direct-
action organization. However, the new pattern in black protest 
that its activities had fostered was irreversible. As the power of 
the FSO as a direct-action group began to falter, the central con­
cern of the black movement in Gary shifted from equal employ­
ment opportunity to open housing. In line with this shift in direc­
tion, a new protest organization composed of liberal whites and 
militant blacks (many of whom had formally played key roles in 
FSO protests) was formed to lead the fight on the open-housing 
issue. The organization adopted the name Combined Citizens 
Committee on Open Occupancy (CCCOOO), and became com­
monly know as Triple C, Triple O. Under the direction of Triple 
C, Triple O, the struggle for open occupancy dominated the civil 
rights agenda of Gary from 1962 to 1963. 
The bulk of Triple C, Triple O's activities centered on pres­
suring the Gary city council to pass a measure securing the right 
of open occupancy for all citizens of the city. In July 1962 an 
open occupancy bill drafted by Triple C, Triple O's legislative 
committee was introduced in the city council. Key provisions of 
this measure proposed to make it illegal to refuse to rent, lease, 
or sell real estate solely on the basis of race, national origin, 
or ancestry, and called for the establishment of a fair housing 
board comprised of seven members to enforce the ordinance. To 
the surprise of few, Triple C, Triple O's housing bill ran almost 
immediately into the determined opposition of white council­
men. When the bill came up for a vote white councilmen voted 
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unanimously against it, defeating it on the first reading by a vote 
of six to three. Undaunted, Triple C, Triple O leaders campaigned 
for a reconsideration of the bill and succeeded in getting it placed 
before the council again for a vote in April 1963. This time the 
bill was defeated on the first reading by a slim one-vote margin. 
Councilman Paul Dudak, Glen Park representative, held the de­
ciding vote since the council was deadlocked on the issue four to 
four. Dudak chose to abstain, thus killing further consideration 
of the bill for lack of majority support during the preliminary bal­
loting. 
Having failed twice to get the city council to pass an open 
occupancy ordinance, the leaders of Triple C, Triple O decided 
to try another approach. This approach involved persuading 
Mayor Joseph Visclosky to assist in the fair housing effort by 
taking a public stand in favor of open occupancy. Visclosky met 
with Triple C, Triple O representatives and agreed to issue a 
public statement indicating his support for open occupancy and 
open-occupancy legislation. However, when—a week later—the 
Mayor issued his first major announcement on the fair housing 
question, he reneged on his promises to Triple C, Triple O. Instead 
of supporting open occupancy, Visclosky criticized the housing 
ordinance twice defeated by the city council on the grounds that 
it conflicted with the Fourteenth Amendment. He charged that 
under the ordinance, a widow with a room to rent would be de­
prived of her right to choose to whom she wanted to rent. 
Triple C, Triple O leaders publicly scored Visclosky for what 
they termed his "callous breach of good faith." Having failed 
again in their campaign for fair housing, it became clear to Triple 
C, Triple O leaders that the issue of open occupancy would begin 
to swiftly recede into the background and progress in this area 
would be stymied unless a new and dramatic protest tactic was 
employed. The kind of protest technique that might best capture 
the imagination of large numbers of citizens had been suggested 
several months earlier at the national level when thousands of 
citizens from across the country had assembled in Washington to 
march in support of civil rights. Following in the footsteps of 
the Washington march, Triple C, Triple O, in conjunction with 
the Gary Civil Rights Coordinating Committee, of which it was a 
part, announced plans for a march on Gary to protest the failure 
of the city council and the mayor to endorse the principle of open 
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occupancy and to take steps to eradicate prevailing discrimina­
tory housing practices. 
The march was scheduled to begin at 10 A.M., 14 September, 
south of Twenty-fifth Avenue, and to move along Broadway to city 
hall. A program featuring speeches by both national and local 
leaders, including Dick Gregory and Gloster Currant, director of 
branches of the NAACP, was to take place in the parking lots 
adjacent to city hall. 
By all standards, the march for open occupancy was the largest 
and most impressive civil rights demonstration in the history of 
the city. Caught up in the mood of the times, large numbers of 
blacks participated in this demonstration with an enthusiasm 
never before exhibited for a civil rights-oriented event. The 
march stimulated feelings of excitement and power that were— 
to say the least—frightening to whites who adhered to the myth 
of black apathy and docility. One respondent described the grow­
ing feelings of black political consciousness revealed by the 
1963 fair housing march in the following manner: 
We marched down Broadway to city hall singing "We Shall Over­
come." It was terrific. White people had been saying niggers can't 
get together. This was the first time we realized that if we can get
together and march we can do anything else. We began to see people
in Midtown join the march. It was quite orderly. For the white people
to stand on the side and see this many Negroes together was really
something—they were just amazed. This was really the beginning of
a black movement in Gary. 
The march on Gary was the climax of Triple C, Triple O's 
year-long struggle to secure the passage of fair housing legisla­
tion for blacks. Although it failed in its immediate objective, it 
gave invaluable assistance to other forces engaged in the dim-
cult task of arousing the black community to a sufficient level 
of consciousness to make possible the commencement of actions 
leading to its social, economic, and political liberation. The 
central spot in the black movement, abandoned by Triple C, 
Triple O after the 1963 fair housing march, was taken over al­
most immediately by the Gary Civil Rights Coordinating Com­
mittee (CRCC), an umbrella organization serving as a coordinat­
ing unit for a variety of Gary organizations concerned with civil 
rights.26 Leaders of this group represented both traditional civil 
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rights groups as well as newer ones. Emergence of this group to 
prominence on the local scene was the result in large measure of 
an attempt by old-line civil rights leaders, who had been shoved 
aside by younger, more militant leadership elements, to regain 
their power and status in the black community. 
In the wake of the eclipse of the fair housing issue as a focus 
for vigorous protest action, CRCC leaders made a tactical deci­
sion to push the housing question to the side for a time and open 
up the black movement on another front—de facto school segre­
gation. Racial segregation in Gary schools had long been a 
source of anger and anxiety among black citizens. The black 
community had begun to unite around this issue in 1962 when 
the Gary School Board broke its promise not to further advance 
school segregation by building a proposed new high school in­
side the Midtown area. This action by the board resulted in Bell 
v. The School City of Gary, one of the landmark Supreme Court 
cases dealing with de facto public school segregation in the 
North.27 CRCC broke new ground in this area when it announced 
in February 1964 plans to coordinate a citywide one-day boy­
cott to protest continuing racial segregation in the Gary public 
schools. In announcing the boycott, CRCC spokesmen strongly 
criticized the Gary School Board for its failure to take action to 
promote integration in the schools and noted that in view of the 
board's intransigence on the question, the organization believed 
the time had arrived to take direct action. CRCC spokesmen 
stressed that the boycott method was being used rather than 
some other form of direct action because it was an economic 
weapon resulting in the loss to Gary schools of $1.47 for each 
child that remained away from school. 
Despite efforts by Superintendent Lee Gilbert to head it off, 
the boycott took place as previously scheduled on 17 April. In 
terms of its immediate objectives, the boycott was a rousing 
success. Estimates of the number of black students who stayed 
away from school—out of a total of 25,000—ranged from 16,103 
made by the Post-Tribune to 19,000 made by the leaders of 
CRCC. A more revealing indication of the response to the boycott 
was a check of schools made by the Post-Tribune that showed 
white schools had nearly normal attendance, while classrooms 
at the all-black schools visited by reporters averaged two to four 
pupils. 
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The dramatic school boycott staged by CRCC signaled more 
clearly than ever before that the black community was swiftly 
becoming conscious of its power and unified around common 
social, economic, and political objectives. It demonstrated be­
yond a doubt that the black community could be mobilized on a 
broad scale to do more than march. The overwhelming response 
on the part of blacks to the boycott proposal was irrefutable 
evidence that blacks in Gary were not asleep but aroused, aware, 
and angry. Although the boycott lasted only one day, the excite­
ment and sense of accomplishment it generated were more than 
enough to convince black leaders interested in reversing the 
colonial posture of the black community to formulate concrete 
plans to bring about this result. 
By 1965 the most important dimension of the black movement 
in Gary was the focus on politics and power. Between 1963 and 
1965 blacks had become increasingly interested less in finding 
ways of making the machine responsive to their needs than in 
developing strategies for overthrowing the machine and insti­
tuting black control over the city political system. This transition 
from protest to politics was in large measure a product of the 
profound sense of political consciousness infused into the black 
community by its various experiences in social protest. By the 
same token, it was the result of strenuous efforts by a nucleus 
of committed black leaders aimed at consciously pushing the 
black community toward a position of political independence. 
These efforts, it should be noted, were taking place simultane­
ously with, but somewhat apart from, the array of protest ac­
tivities discussed above. 
The major vehicle through which these efforts at independent 
politics were pursued was an organization called Muigwithania. 
This organization grew out of plans formulated in 1960 by two 
black professional employees of the Lake County Criminal Court 
—Richard Hatcher and Huston Coleman—to bring together a 
group of young black men to work for the social, economic, and 
political advancement of the black community. The need for such 
an organization had become apparent in the course of extensive 
conversations between Hatcher and Coleman over a period of 
several months. Hatcher and Coleman were especially concerned 
about the low level of political influence exercised by the black 
community as a consequence of the strict control over the elec­
toral choices of blacks exercised by the Lake County Democratic 
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machine. They were eventually successful in persuading a num­
ber of other young professional blacks to join them in forming a 
black man's organization committed to community uplift. Aside 
from Hatcher, other original members of the organization were 
Dozier Allen, Tim Adams, Jon Evans, John Lawshe, and Jackie 
Shopshire. Once the organization was established each member 
was encouraged to contact at least one new person and invite 
him to weekly meetings. In this way the organization quickly ex­
panded its size to about twenty active members. One of the early 
members of the organization explained the common concerns 
that drew these young men together as a cohesive force. 
At that time the black community was not together; it was con­
trolled by the white power structure. We felt through this organiza­
tion we would enable the black community to have a stronger voice
in politics and the operation of the city than it had ever had before.
We felt that the black community was just being exploited and that
we couldn't rely upon the prevailing organizational structures to
address themselves to the needs of the black community. We knew
that we could not depend on the black people who then wielded
some power in the city to work effectively for the black community
because they were part and parcel of the white power structure. 
Members of the group met for several weeks without deciding 
on a formal name. The task of coming up with a name was given 
to John Lawshe who had been elected historian. Lawshe under­
took this responsibility with great diligence. His search for an 
appropriate name led him to an extensive examination of books 
on Africa. During the course of Lawshe's research, he became 
fascinated with the Mau Mau movement and stumbled upon the 
term "Muigwithania" in a book loaned to him by a sister-in­
law who lived in Africa. The term, he found, was actually the 
name of Jomo Kenyatta's liberation newspaper during his reign as 
leader of the Mau Mau movement in Kenya, and it meant in 
Kukuyu "to come together and go forward." He felt that this 
perfectly reflected what the organization wanted to do: To unite 
black people and move them forward down the path of self-rule. 
He brought the name back to the group and the other members 
accepted it immediately. One person present at this meeting re­
called of the group's reaction to Lawshe's suggestion of a name: 
We felt this name fitted us well. We were young, we were like a
new independent nation trying to secure freedom from the chains of 
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the previous establishment. We wanted the people to know these
chains could be broken if they would stick with us. 
Muigwithania initially sought to foster change for Gary blacks 
by delivering to them badly needed welfare benefits. However, 
as members of Muigwithania became more and more deeply in­
volved in community work, it became apparent that they could 
not deliver the social and economic goods to blacks they desired 
without becoming directly involved in organized political ac­
tivity. Consequently, after a time politics began to assume the 
major place on the organization's agenda, and it gradually began 
to transform itself from a civic club to an active political or­
ganization. 
Transformation of Muigwithania into an association concerned 
with promoting change through direct political involvement took 
place in several stages. At first it attempted to operate as an 
interest group, applying pressure on key political actors while 
attempting to remain out of the mainstream of the political arena. 
This approach, however, produced only limited payoffs, inspir­
ing the organization to switch its strategy and wade into the 
turbulent waters of Gary politics directly and with great abandon. 
Before moving too far in their political endeavors, however, mem­
bers of Muigwithania sought to educate themselves about the 
Gary political system. What impressed them the most after the 
decision to involve themselves in politics in an intensive way was 
how little most of them really knew about the nuts and bolts of 
Gary politics. All were political neophytes with no history of 
prior political experience beyond the routine task of voting. To 
fill in the serious gaps in their political knowledge, members 
of Muigwithania decided to begin a program of direct participa­
tion in the political campaigns of candidates for public office. 
It was felt that through these campaigns, members of the or­
ganization could gain some insight into the mechanics of con­
ducting a political campaign and pick up pointers on how one 
could become an effective campaigner. 
This program resulted in the quiet infiltration of Muigwi­
thania members into the campaign organizations of a number of 
Lake County politicians. With some initial campaign experience 
under their belts, members of Muigwithania decided to run their 
own candidates for minor political offices. The targets of this 
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initial foray of Muigwithania as an organized force into electoral 
politics were seats as delegates to the 1962 Democratic state 
convention. Six members of Muigwithania took the unusual step 
of challenging party regulars for seats in the Lake County delega­
tion.28 Muigwithania viewed these state-delegate contests pri­
marily as learning experiences with no real hopes of victory. 
They traveled from precinct to precinct knocking on doors ask­
ing for support of their candidates—and they found to their sur­
prise that people were responsive to the idea of having one of 
the neighborhood boys represent them at the state convention. 
When the election was over, the six Muigwithania candidates 
had defeated party regulars for state delegate positions. 
When the Muigwithania delegates arrived at the convention, 
they set about purposely to expand their political education. 
They did not participate formally in the convention's business 
but just observed, talked to as many people as possible, and took 
copious notes. When they returned, they gave detailed reports of 
their experiences to the members of the group. This information 
coupled with the knowledge and experience gained from previous 
ventures convinced them that they were now ready to run a mem­
ber of their group for a major city office. 
After considerable discussion, Muigwithania decided to sup­
port members of the group for three seats on the city council, 
one at-large and two district. For the two district seats the or­
ganization endorsed Cleo Wesson, an incumbent councilman and 
group member, and Louis Watts. The nod to run for the at-
large seat was given to Richard Hatcher, president and co­
founder of Muigwithania. Hatcher's choice to run for the at-large 
seat was especially noteworthy since he had only been in the 
Gary area for three years. Hatcher had been raised in Michigan 
City, Indiana, and had moved to East Chicago to join a promi­
nent black East Chicago law firm shortly after receiving his law 
degree from Valparaiso University in 1963. His association with 
Henry Walker, influential black Democrat and head of the law 
firm, had resulted in his appointment in 1960 as deputy Lake 
County prosecutor. Hatcher's selection to run as Muigwithania's 
candidate for the city council undoubtedly reflected the tre­
mendous respect members of the group had acquired for his 
abilities as a politician and social activist since he had arrived on 
the Gary scene. Almost from the day of his arrival, Hatcher had 
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immersed himself in the growing civil rights movement in the 
city. Eventually he became an active member of virtually every 
civil rights group in Gary. He became counselor for the Young 
Adults Branch of the NAACP; he worked actively in the Fair 
Share movement; he served as legal consultant for Triple C, 
Triple O and became a member of its advisory board; and he 
served on the executive committee of CRCC. Hatcher was rarely 
content to take a backseat in civil rights causes, but typically 
played a very prominent role. He was one of the lawyers in the 
famous 1962 Gary school desegregation case; he led a delegation 
of 120 persons from Gary to the march on Washington; he helped 
to organize the march on Gary and served as a platform orator; 
and he participated in the picketing of Methodist Hospital and 
served as a chief negotiator in the settlement of the dispute. 
Hatcher was encouraged in these civil rights endeavors by his 
Muigwithania brothers every step along the way. They had early 
taken note of his leadership abilities and made calculated efforts 
to groom him as a potential political candidate by building for 
him a favorable image among blacks in Gary, both through word 
of mouth and by pushing him out front at various affairs spon­
sored by the organization. Thus Hatcher was a natural choice for 
one of the positions on the city council eyed by the group. Conse­
quently when he stepped forward to announce that he was seri­
ously interested in running for an at-large seat, he encountered no 
difficulty obtaining the unanimous consent of the membership. 
Hatcher ran for the council in the 1963 Democratic primary with 
the full backing of Muigwithania. When the votes had been tabu­
lated, Hatcher had beaten all candidates in the at-large council­
manic race, pulling a surprising 12,779 votes. His closest oppo­
nent, an incumbent white councilman from Glen Park, trailed 
Hatcher by nearly 4,000 votes. That Hatcher ran so strongly in 
the councilmanic race his first time out was not due entirely to 
the indefatigable efforts of members of Muigwithania; for critical 
to his victory was the fact that he received extensive help in the race 
from the regular Democratic organization. Machine support for 
Hatcher stemmed mainly from the fact that the token incumbent 
black at-large councilman had been implicated in the Chacharis 
scandal. Wishing to whitewash its image, the machine bent over 
backward in 1963 to put forth a slate that was impeccably clean. 
Since Hatcher was a newcomer he seemed a safe choice for the 
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at-large seat earmarked for blacks. Hatcher's strongest black rival 
for the position was Hilbert Bradley, long-time civil rights activist 
with an unsavory reputation in the white community because of 
his role in the protest activities of the FSO. Although an activist 
in civil rights too, Hatcher had not been in the city long enough 
to create the host of enemies in the white community Bradley 
had accumulated over a number of years. Given a choice be­
tween Hatcher and Bradley, leaders of the machine chose to sup­
port Hatcher. One respondent put the matter more bluntly: 
The machine slated him. You know what slates are. They just put
him on the slate and said vote for a fellow named R. Gordon Hatcher. 
And when the Post-Tribune endorsed him there were no pictures of 
him. This meant itself 5,000 votes. It is the only white daily news­
paper. He got 3,500 more votes than the top white candidate who
was an incumbent and had been in office four years.29 
No doubt central to the thinking of machine leaders in support­
ing Hatcher in the primary race was the view that once elected 
Hatcher could be easily controlled in the same way other black 
councilmen had traditionally been brought into line. Upon taking 
his seat on the council, after an easy victory over his weak Repub­
lican opponent, Hatcher quickly showed himself, however, to be 
a maverick of the first order. Whereas other black councilmen 
had generally voted as they were told, Hatcher joined an economy 
bloc on the council and voted frequently to curtail unnecessary 
spending by city hall. Other black councilmen had often been con­
tent to remain mute during council proceedings, but Hatcher used 
the council as a rostrum from which he could focus the attention 
of the city on black problems. He often admonished his fellow 
councilmen that their insensitivity to black needs was a major 
source of unrest in the black community, which, if continued, 
would lead to considerable bloodshed in the city streets. 
These atypical actions led to Hatcher's total isolation in the 
council and the Democratic party. Leaders of the machine abrupt­
ly cut off his access to party patronage. Black and white council­
men joined hands in opposition to him. Despite these moves, 
Hatcher continued to wage one-man battles in the council in be­
half of the black community. 
Hatcher's councilmanic activities were not without their re­
wards. Whereas whites looked upon these activities with morti­
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fication, blacks looked upon them with jubilation. Hatcher's 
deviant behavior was vicariously enjoyed by a wide sector of the 
black community. Never before had there been a black politician 
willing to challenge so strongly the city's white power structure. 
As he persisted in his councilmanic efforts, a tight rapport de­
veloped between Hatcher and the black masses. There was forged 
a kind of dialectical relationship between his leadership and their 
following. They encouraged him and he led them forward. 
Blacks began to demonstrate in concrete ways that they be­
lieved they had found themselves a new leader. They defended 
Hatcher vociferously whenever he was attacked in the white 
press or on radio talk shows. Blacks crowded in the council to 
see him perform—to watch him fight against overwhelming odds— 
and encourage him to "keep on keeping on." Soon the growing 
feelings of black nationalism and pride stimulated by the black 
protest movement began to converge around the heroic actions 
of Gary's young, dynamic city councilman. The dimensions of this 
process are revealed in the comments of this respondent who be­
came over a period of months after his election to the council 
Hatcher's most stalwart supporter: 
We followed Mr. Hatcher in the course of his activities on the coun­
cil. All of us began attending council meetings. Whites had said
blacks weren't interested in problems because no blacks were in the
audience. This was not true. The situation in Gary was such that we 
thought there was no point. This is when we began to see there was
a point, and we should rally around the one person who did repre­
sent us and go forth from there. 
During his first two years on the council, Hatcher successfully 
built for himself a reputation as a selfless politician who would 
not sell his people short in his dealings with the power structure. 
In striking contrast to the stereotyped view that blacks generally 
had of black politicians in Gary, Hatcher's actions on the council 
showed him to be more interested in securing welfare benefits 
for the black masses than status and material benefits for him­
self. Hatcher fought tirelessly for legislation to improve the social 
and economic positions of the black community. Basic to his po­
litical style was a willingness to speak out on controversial racial 
issues, even at the risk of antagonizing powerful party leaders. 
Hatcher also cultivated a wide circle of friends in diverse seg­
ments of the black community. Although clearly middle class, he 
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appeared perfectly comfortable in the company of his low-income 
black constituents. Unlike other black politicians, he seemed in­
terested in doing more than what was absolutely necessary to as­
sure his reelection. He appeared genuinely committed to repre­
senting the interests of the black community in the most vital 
areas of power in the city. All of these factors helped to fashion 
for Hatcher an image as a totally different brand of black politi­
cian—one who contrasted sharply with the shallow, quiet, unimagi­
native, and uninspiring black political leaders who had served 
for years as the backbone of Gary's white-controlled political 
machine. The widespread belief that Hatcher was a "new breed" 
black politician operated to establish for him a solid power base 
in the black community. In 1964 this power base began to be ce­
mented in the wake of his central role in the resurgent struggle 
to secure passage of an open-occupancy ordinance. 
When Hatcher entered the council in 1963, the question of open 
occupancy was rapidly fading as a key issue in the Gary black 
movement. However, the issue suddenly came back to life in Sep­
tember 1964 when the housing committee of the council reported 
out a strong open-occupancy measure submitted by Mayor Katz 
and toughened by the chairman of the committee, Mrs. Jessie 
Mitchell, and committee member Richard Hatcher. Katz had em­
braced the open-occupancy bill as a symbolic jesture to his major 
electoral constituency—the black community—and had succeeded 
in rounding up considerable civic support for the measure. Oppo­
sition to the concept of open occupancy still cut very deeply, how­
ever, both in the general white community and in the chambers of 
the Gary city council. Consideration of the measure by the coun­
cil on the first reading produced a surprising five to four vote 
in favor of its scheduling for final passage. Approval of the bill 
on first reading triggered substantial white resistance. The white 
councilman who cast the final vote in favor of the bill received 
death threats before he left the council chambers and had to be 
escorted from the meeting by armed guards. Later in the week a 
group of Glen Park citizens organized the Society for the Preser­
vation of Every American's Right (SPEAR) to fight against final 
passage of the open-occupancy law. Leaders of the group claimed 
it had no membership dues and no membership meeting, but that 
it did have a headquarters located in the crack of the Liberty 
Bell. 
The meeting for consideration of final passage of the bill was 
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set for 13 November. Voting on the measure was preceded by a 
public hearing in which thirty-six persons were allowed to state 
their arguments for or against its passage. Before casting his 
vote, Hatcher urgently appealed for positive action on the open 
occupancy measure: 
The role of this council is clear. Everything fine and decent, every­
thing sensitive and humane, all of man's infinite compassion, cries
out for the passage of this ordinance. Let us not forsake our fellow­
man in his long history of travail. Let us dare to make a new begin­
ning. Let us build a new city and a new man to inhabit it. Let each
and everyone of us have the courage to do what we all know must
be done.30 
Hatcher's eloquence fell largely on deaf ears. The council defeated 
the measure by the same vote that it had passed it earlier. Hugh 
McLaughlin, the white councilman who had cast the deciding vote 
for preliminary passage, switched his vote on final passage thus 
assuring its defeat. 
The defeat of the open-occupancy measure by the council set 
off a chain reaction in the black community. An emergency meet­
ing was called by civil rights leaders, and a new organization was 
formed to wage the struggle to secure passage of the open-oc­
cupancy bill. This organization was named the Freedom Move­
ment Council (FMC). Following in the path carved out in earlier 
years by the FSO, the FMC committed itself to a program of direct 
action and called for mass picketing and boycotting of downtown 
merchants until the Gary council made fair housing a reality for 
black citizens. FMC began its protest activities with an attack on 
the downtown Gary National Bank building and two branch of­
fices of the bank. Gary National was singled out as a protest 
target because Paul Guist, a white councilman who had consistent­
ly voted against open occupancy, was manager of the Tollerston 
branch of the bank. FMC pickets requested that either Guist resign 
as manager of the bank, located in an area rapidly becoming pre­
dominantly black, or resign from the council. Guist stubbornly 
refused to do either; consequently the attack against the bank 
was escalated to a full-scale boycott. Black patrons of the bank 
were urged to withdraw their accounts and deposit them in the 
Bank of Indiana. In the face of this economic pressure against 
the bank, Guist resigned from the council. One person who was 
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extensively involved in this protest action explained how Guist's 
resignation was secured: 
We organized our people and had them drawing their money out of 
the Gary National Bank. After all that money started coming out of 
that bank, the board of directors became concerned. Banking is their 
business not politics. As a result, this member of the council re­
signed. . . . By protesting this bank we figured that the bank of­
ficial would do either one of two things: he would fall in line for the 
open occupancy bill or resign. So he resigned. One Saturday before 
he resigned black people drew $45,000 out of the bank and trans­
ferred it to another bank. Prior to that, every day some of the black 
people were drawing money out and moving it to another bank. This 
one Saturday, I guess, was all they could take. We moved them in 
cars and drew that $45,000 out in one day. So the following Tuesday 
he resigned from the council. 
During December 1964 and January 1965, the FMC broadened 
its attack to include a massive boycott of all Gary downtown busi­
nesses. Blacks were encouraged to shop at outlying shopping 
centers in East Chicago and Chicago. The boycott was particu­
larly effective during the Christmas shopping season. 
Merchants in Gary took a big beating. We caught them during the 
Christmas holidays. They had a lot of toys they had to put in the base­
ment for the next year so some of them started speaking out. 
Capitalizing on the mounting pressure from the black commu­
nity, Hatcher maneuvered a substitute fair-housing bill drafted 
by the Chamber of Commerce out of the housing committee to 
the floor. However, once reported out, no councilman—black or 
white—would move for passage. Seizing on the apparent division 
in the ranks of black councilmen, a white councilman who op­
posed open occupancy motioned that the measure be tabled. 
Hatcher was furious with the tabling action and lashed his col­
leagues for abdicating their responsibility to the black commu­
nity. He was, however, far from giving up the fight. Several 
months later, Hatcher again forced the pending omnibus civil 
rights bill out of the housing committee. In urging passage of the 
measure he warned that the bill constituted the last opportunity 
for the council to avoid wholesale bloodshed in the city. Once 
again the council ignored Hatcher's challenge and tabled a vote 
of the housing measure. In doing so, however, Hatcher's col­
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leagues underestimated his stubborn, determined character, es­
pecially when aroused in behalf of a program affecting large 
numbers of black citizens. On 4 May 1965, Hatcher maneuvered 
the fair-housing bill to the floor of the Gary city council for a third 
time. Chances of passage of the bill on this occasion appeared 
somewhat brighter since Mayor Katz had appointed a Mexican 
American named John Armenta to replace Paul Guist. It was 
widely rumored that before Armenta was appointed, Katz had ex­
tracted from him a promise to vote for the housing bill if it came 
up again for a vote. 
These views about the bill's chances proved to be correct. The 
Gary council voted to approve the fair-housing ordinance on pre­
liminary passage by a vote offive to three. As expected the critical 
vote was cast for the bill by Armenta. One white councilman, 
sensing passage of the measure, stormed from the council without 
voting. 
The final vote on the fair housing ordinance came on 18 May. 
Prior to the balloting, Hatcher led a successful effort to beat down 
four amendments proposed by councilmanic opponents of open 
occupancy designed to weaken the substance and impact of the 
fair-housing ordinance. Finally the balloting was held, and the 
fair-housing measure passed again by a vote of five to three. 
Formally designated as an omnibus civil rights bill, the ordinance 
in its final form created a fifteen-member human relations com­
mission with unrestricted subpoena power, provided for open oc­
cupancy, and incorporated into the work of the commission exist­
ing city provisions relating to fair employment practices. 
In retrospect, it is clear that the strong support given to the 
civil rights ordinance by Mayor Katz was the key element in its 
passage. Throughout the controversy Katz had gone to extraordi­
nary lengths to create a climate of opinion in the white com­
munity favorable to the passage and acceptance of an open-hous­
ing ordinance. His inside political maneuvering—especially his 
authorization of a special commission to draft a fair-housing 
ordinance and the appointment to the council of a man whom he 
knew would change the balance of power on the open-occupancy 
question—was absolutely critical to the final passage of the open-
housing measure by the council. However, among blacks the real 
hero of the hour was Richard Hatcher. They recalled his eighteen-
month struggle in the council, often in the face of overwhelming 
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odds, to get the fair-housing bill passed. They remembered his 
eloquent, often militant, defense of the rights of blacks to be free 
from the racial restrictions placed on their lives by prevailing 
programs and practices of the city administration. They remem­
bered his efforts at tricky parliamentary maneuver in order to 
keep the fair-housing ordinance alive before the council. But most 
of all they remembered he stood up; that he fought with a con­
trolled but intense passion; that he spoke in terms of their hopes, 
their fears, their aspirations. 
Richard Hatcher's successful leadership of the campaign for 
open-occupancy legislation represented a significant milestone in 
the black movement in Gary. The struggle waged to secure the 
passage of positive legislation by the Gary city council in this 
controversial area had two important consequences. First, it rein­
forced and intensified gains made through previous civil rights 
struggles in building a sense of ethnic identity and political con­
sciousness in the black community and moving it down the road to 
political independence. Second, it thrust Hatcher to the top of the 
leadership hierarchy in the black community and built for him a 
solid base of black political support. After the passage of the 1965 
fair-housing law, no politician in the city, including Mayor Katz, 
could compete with Hatcher for the support of the black masses. 
This fact placed Hatcher into live contention for the mayorship 
in 1967, since it was generally acknowledged that the black 
community held the key to the outcome of the 1967 race. The big 
question left outstanding was whether or not Hatcher could trans­
late his political charisma into a broad-scale mobilization of the 
black community, for the first time, for effective independent 
political action. Factors bearing on the question of black mobili­
zation in the 1967 mayoral campaign in Gary are considered in 
the next two chapters of this study. 
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Gary: The 1967 Primary Election 
THE DECISION TO RUN 
Richard Gordon Hatcher's campaign for mayor of Gary was 
launched approximately three years before he formally announced 
his candidacy for the office. Imbued with strong ambitions and a 
natural zest for political life, Hatcher began almost immediately 
upon taking his seat on the city council to build for himself a 
broad network of support in the black community. This process 
began with the inauguration of a weekly house-meeting program 
that brought Hatcher face to face with a wide segment of his black 
constituency. The unstated purpose of these meetings was to 
establish Hatcher's reputation as a politician concerned with the 
needs of the little people, who was always ready to use his in­
fluence to find workable and satisfactory solutions to their prob­
lems. According to several respondents, he did an outstanding job 
of promoting and realizing this objective. 
At that time we didn't have lights out here, so many of our neighbors
asked about street lights. A councilman was allotted so many lights.
And so he must have given us a lot of his allottment because we got
them on every corner within a short time. So this way he demon­
strated to the people his interest in them before coming to solicit
their vote. It was effective; it was a good plan. This was done three
years before he announced.1 
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The house-meeting program was accompanied by steps to re­
activate the RGH (Richard Gordon Hatcher) Club, a young people's 
group founded to assist in his councilmanic campaign. This group 
began holding meetings every Sunday. These meetings served both 
as social outlets and forums for the discussion of important politi­
cal topics. One frequent topic of conversation was the variety of 
steps that would have to be taken to mobilize the black com­
munity behind Richard Hatcher as a candidate for mayor. 
The RGH Club derives its central importance from the fact that 
many members of this group eventually formed the backbone of 
Hatcher's 1967 mayoral campaign organization. Through this 
group, Hatcher was able to attract a dedicated corps of young 
people into his political camp and to translate their youthful 
idealism into valuable political currency. The critical role played 
by the RGH Club is highlighted by the remarks of a strongly 
committed Hatcher supporter: 
I first became involved in the RGH Club through a friend while at­
tending Indiana University. I went to the first meeting and met Mr.
Hatcher. He spoke but I was not too impressed. He was just starting
in politics, did not have a gift for gab, and was very shy. I thought
he just wanted money. I went to another meeting and I saw the faces
of people I knew. This was a different kind of group and he was able
to relate to this group better than to the larger group. He was so
sincere that I said here was something for me to do rather than just
sit around and be a housewife. So I started working actively in his
campaign from then on. 
Hatcher's search for political support was not confined to the 
black community. He was very much aware that if he ran for 
mayor he would, for example, need substantial financial backing. 
Fully realizing that money of this magnitude was generally not 
available in the black community, Hatcher turned, during 1964, to 
a group of liberal-to-radical Jews in Miller, cynically dubbed by 
the local population as the "Miller Mafia" because of their 
history of left-wing political involvement. Hatcher made discrete 
inquiries to find out whether or not the members of this group 
would be interested in providing some financial support should 
he decide to seek the mayorship. The unambiguous message that 
he received was that the members of the Miller group were not 
interested in supporting his candidacy for mayor at that time. 
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Many indicated that they were not completely sure where Hatcher 
stood on a number of issues of importance to them, particularly 
the Vietnam War, and thus could not give him a blanket endorse­
ment or promise financial support until he formulated the planks 
in his platform. 
During the early months of 1966 Hatcher continued to carefully 
assess his chances of capturing the mayor's of&ce in 1967. To get 
as broad a perspective on this issue as possible, he consulted with 
blacks in Cleveland, Ohio, and Newark, New Jersey, who had 
participated in the political campaigns of black candidates run­
ning for mayor in those cities. The general message he received 
was that he ought to run—that the time was right for the election 
of black mayors across the country. 
By the fall of 1966 Hatcher had definitely made up his mind to 
run. Several factors strongly influenced this decision. One im­
portant factor was the mounting frustration he felt as a city council­
man with a voice and a vote but no power. Typically, the real 
power of all Gary councilmen was sharply circumscribed by the 
combined political muscle of a strong mayor and an entrenched 
political machine. Because Hatcher expressed points of view un­
satisfactory to the white establishment, he wielded even less in­
fluence than most councilmen. Intensely driven by deep-seated 
political ambitions and a genuine concern for the welfare of the 
black community, Hatcher sincerely believed that any steps he 
took short of seeking the mayor's of&ce in 1967 would be virtually 
meaningless. "The real power in Gary is in the mayor's of&ce 
and blacks were shut out. I wanted to try to be in a position to do 
something really significant."2 
Perhaps the most important factor governing Hatcher's decision 
to run, however, was the conclusion he reached in the fall of 1966 
that his chances of winning the 1967 mayoral contest were un­
usually good. This conclusion was based in part on his assess­
ment of the overall strength and viability of the Democratic 
political machine. An extensive scholarly examination of con­
temporary machine politics in Gary by Hatcher and several close 
associates suggested that the regular Democratic organization was 
so fraught with internal dissension that it was no longer capable 
of uniting and thus guaranteeing the defeat of a strong indepen­
dent candidate. 
Hatcher's conviction that he had a good chance of winning the 
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mayoral nomination was also based on his perception of the sup­
port he was likely to receive from the black community. He 
harbored no illusions about the intensity of antiblack feelings 
among whites in Gary. After all, George Wallace had carried 
Gary's white precincts in the 1964 presidential primaries. Hatcher 
was also aware that many whites were not just antiblack but par­
ticularly anti-Hatcher since he had played a leading role in the 
passage of the omnibus civil rights ordinance. These facts made 
it plain that the overwhelming preponderance of support in his 
bid for the mayorship would have to come from the black com­
munity. Hatcher had become convinced by the fall of 1966 that 
if he ran he could in fact get substantial black support. This belief 
was based to some extent on his understanding of the considerable 
growth of black nationalism in Gary as a result of local and na­
tional civil rights struggles. He sensed among Gary blacks a 
general restlessness that signaled a psychological readiness to 
vote black, and to bloc vote, if the appropriate opportunity pre­
sented itself. Most importantly, a careful examination of the voting 
behavior of blacks across several recent local elections firmly 
indicated that Gary blacks were ready to vote not only for black 
machine candidates, but also for black candidates running as 
political independents. 
Several contests involving bids by prominent black candidates 
for local offices were found by Hatcher to be particularly instruc­
tive on this point. One of these contests involved a bid by a black 
funeral director, Andrew Smith, for Calumet Township trustee in 
the 1962 Democratic primaries. Smith's chief opponents were 
Milton Bromich, running independent of the machine, and Ted 
Sikora, running as a machine candidate. Despite tremendous 
efforts by machine workers to hamper his campaign activities, 
Smith ran a remarkably strong race, coming in third in a field 
of eight candidates. An examination of the election results clearly 
shows that Smith was a serious candidate in the race only be­
cause he received unusually strong support in the black com­
munity. Concentrating his campaign almost exclusively in black 
precincts, Smith beat his major white rivals in all three of the 
predominantly black electoral districts. Professional politicians 
registered surprise at Smith's strong showing in the black com­
munity against formidable machine opposition. Some individuals 
who worked actively in the Smith campaign interpreted Smith's 
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performance as a critical breakthrough for blacks, because it 
enabled them to realize that if they voted together they could put 
a black candidate into a major political office. Even George 
Chacharis was prompted to predict, in light of Smith's showing, 
that someday Gary would have a "Negro Mayor." 
The race by Vivian Carter, black businesswoman and former 
radio personality, for city clerk in 1963 illustrated further the 
ability of an independent black candidate to receive black sup­
port.3 Mrs. Carter's chief opponent was Betty Malinka, a member 
of the state legislature and a powerful figure in the regular 
Democratic organization. Although Miss Malinka was expected to 
coast to an easy victory because of her party connections, she 
won the election by a razor-thin margin of 1,579 votes (19,638 
to 18,059). Significantly, although Mrs. Carter lost the citywide 
contest, she soundly defeated Miss Malinka in the black com­
munity, obtaining an impressive 74 percent of the black votes to 
Miss Malinka's 16 percent. 
The impressive performance of Mrs. Carter in the black com­
munity served to affirm the significance of the movement toward 
black electoral independence established a year earlier in the 
Smith contest. Even more decisive confirmation of developing 
black electoral independence was provided, however, in the race 
by Dozier Allen, a black service-station operator, for the office of 
Calumet Township assessor in 1966. Allen's performance in this 
race was the final determining factor in Hatcher's decision to run 
for mayor. 
Allen was one of the original members of Muigwithania and 
was persuaded to run for the assessor's office by members of the 
organization. He had previously run for the state legislature in 
1964 and had narrowly missed election to one of Lake County's 
ten representative seats. Hatcher played a key role in Allen's 1966 
campaign, working behind the scenes as his unofficial political 
advisor. Indeed, Hatcher's involvement in the campaign ultimately 
became so extensive that many persons, including members of the 
local press corps, began viewing Allen's candidacy as a dry run 
to test Hatcher's mayoral possibilities. 
The field of candidates in the 1966 assessor's primary race was 
quite impressive. Besides Allen, major candidates included 
incumbent assessor Thomas Fadell, city clerk Betty Malinka run­
ning with strong support from city hall, and former Gary mayor 
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Joseph Visclosky. Few political observers gave Allen much of a 
chance of winning against such a formidable field of contenders. 
However, to the astonishment of practically everyone, Allen 
came in first in Gary and second in the overall township bal­
loting.4 The township race was won by the incumbent candidate 
Fadell; Miss Malinka ran third and Visclosky a weak fourth. Final 
election returns showed Fadell with 11,634, Allen 10,019, Malinka 
9,202, and Visclosky 7,552 votes. 
Allen's strong showing in Gary was totally unexpected and was 
due almost exclusively to the substantial victory he registered 
against the machine in the black community. Miss Malinka re­
ceived only 22 percent of the black vote despite the expenditure 
of sizable sums of money in her behalf by the regular Democratic 
organization. In contrast, Allen received 60 percent of the black 
vote (4 other minor black candidates received a combined total of 
9 percent). Of the total vote gathered by Allen, 96.8 percent was 
cast in black precincts and only 3.2 percent in white precincts. 
Thus, with three major white candidates in the race, Allen ob­
tained nearly enough votes from the black community alone to 
carry the election in Gary. The Gary total was Allen 10,011, 
Fadell 9,690, Malinka 8,413, and Visclosky 6,777 votes. In gen­
eral, the Allen race represented a tremendous outpouring of black 
support for a black candidate running against strong machine 
opposition. 
The Allen election had a considerable impact on the political 
game plans of both Mayor Katz and Hatcher. Katz interpreted 
the election as establishing a new trend in voting that would have 
to be taken into account by every serious future candidate for 
public office in Gary. He noted in a prepared statement that the 
Allen race demonstrated conclusively that the black vote was a 
much stronger force in Gary politics than it had ever been before. 
Hatcher interpreted the election as a breakthrough event that 
illustrated the weakening ties of the black community to the 
political machine. He believed that the Allen race proved incon­
trovertibly that a black candidate with a decent reputation who 
made a strong appeal for the black vote could get substantial 
black support. The Allen race removed any lingering doubt in the 
minds of Hatcher and his supporters that the time was right for a 
major black candidate to run for the mayor's office. As one prom­
inent member of Muigwithania put it: 
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We felt that if we could take a man from our group with only six years 
experience as an organization and shake the whole Lake County
Democratic party structure, and each time we shook it we got a little
bit closer, which meant that we were shaking it a bit harder, then
the time had definitely arrived for us to go for the mayor's race. 
Having firmly established in his mind that he was going to run 
for mayor, Hatcher began to weld together a coalition composed 
of various community groups with whom he had been interacting 
politically over a period of several years. As an initial step in this 
direction he called together a black political brain trust to discuss 
the feasibility of his running, his chances for victory, and possible 
electoral strategies. In attendance at this meeting were Hatcher, 
Quentin Smith, James T. Jones, James Hendrick, Jesse Bell, 
James Holland, Henry Coleman, Robert Brown, and Fred Ford. 
Although expressing grave doubts about his chances of winning 
against the powerful Lake County machine, members of this group 
nonetheless encouraged Hatcher to run because they believed his 
candidacy would effectuate the building up of a strong opposition 
bloc in the black community to the continued control of the black 
vote by the political machine. 
Hatcher consulted next with members of Muigwithania to line 
up the solid support of this key group. He initially received 
heated resistence from some Muigwithania members who be­
lieved that Dozier Allen should run for mayor since he had done 
such an outstanding job in the assessor's race. Resistance from 
this quarter faded, however, as it became clear that Hatcher 
rather than Allen would be the stronger, more effective, black 
mayoral candidate. 
Once the support of Muigwithania was fully secured, Hatcher 
began concentrating his organizing efforts on the whites in Miller 
with whom he had touched base earlier. This time he was warmly 
received by the Miller group. The Allen race had convinced them 
that he had a good chance of winning, so they encouraged him 
to run. A formal meeting of this group, along with a few inter­
ested blacks, was held at the home of Andrew Smith, and a 
formal decision was made to endorse Hatcher and work with him 
in his campaign. 
While informally working assiduously to firm up support for 
his candidacy, Hatcher attempted to convey the outward appear­
ance of a reluctant candidate responding to a popular draft. Be­
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lieving that he might not run, a number of opinion surveys were 
taken by various groups of black citizens to convince Hatcher that 
he was the "people's choice." Two black men, John Grigsby and 
Larry Turner, both of whom later played important roles in 
Hatcher's campaign, collected between them five thousand names 
on a petition encouraging Hatcher to run for mayor. Similar 
surveys were taken by milkmen and insurance men working in black 
neighborhoods. Louis Comer, a prominent black trade-union of­
ficial, led a delegation of black union men to Hatcher's home to 
encourage him to run for mayor with their unswerving support. 
Initially, Hatcher's standard reply to requests that he file for the 
mayor's office was that he was giving the matter serious consid­
eration. Finally, after having thoroughly established himself as the 
people's candidate, Hatcher made it generally known that he in­
tended to run for mayor and was in the process of recruiting 
persons to work in his campaign organization. 
THE CAMPAIGN ORGANIZATION 
By the time Hatcher announced his candidacy for mayor in 
January 1967, his campaign organization had been functioning for 
about six months. The initial recruitment of persons into the orga­
nization was handled mainly by Hatcher and a close friend, Jesse 
Bell. Hatcher made numerous phone calls and personal visits 
around the city to individuals he felt would be willing and able to 
serve as chairmen of campaign committees. At the same time, 
Bell went about the task of recruiting workers from a cross sec­
tion of the black community to perform the thousand and one 
small duties essential to the mounting of an effective campaign 
effort. After initial contacts were made with key people, member­
ship in the Hatcher organization increased in snowball fashion, 
with each new recruit in turn drawing in other persons. 
The campaign organization that resulted was one composed 
of a nucleus of sixty extremely active workers. Approximately 85 
percent of these persons were black and 15 percent white. With 
very few exceptions everyone who participated in the Hatcher 
campaign did so on a volunteer basis: thus the significance of the 
name of the group "Volunteers for Hatcher." Everyone entered 
into the Hatcher organization with the clear understanding that 
no one would be paid and that no other commitments would be 
made in return for his political support. This philosophy of volun­
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teer service underpinned the entire spirit and form of operation 
of the primary campaign organization. 
The volunteer spirit pervading the Hatcher primary effort is 
also illustrated by the fact that many persons worked for Hatcher 
at considerable financial sacrifice. Some of the most active 
Hatcher supporters took off from their jobs for as long as six 
months (one individual took off a year and a half) in order to 
work full time as a Hatcher volunteer. Several took out second 
mortgages on their homes to get the campaign off the ground 
financially. One Hatcher worker drove his truck to Chicago and 
back for sixty days straight at his own expense to pick up cam­
paign material. Virtually everyone paid for his own transportation 
and lunches while at the same time contributing out of his pocket 
to the campaign treasury. In some cases, sizable amounts were 
donated by Hatcher volunteers, no doubt the most generous con­
tribution coming from one volunteer who gave a thousand dollars 
during the primary and another thousand during the general elec­
tion. This aspect of the Hatcher organization was best summa­
rized by one respondent who observed: "The only way you work 
for Hatcher is that it cost you money. If you wanted to work for 
Hatcher then you were always shelling out at every meeting. 
And there were people who pulled away because there was no 
money. We were happy to get rid of them. But if you wanted to 
work in the Hatcher campaign, you put out, put out of your pocket. 
You weren't on the take, you were on the give." 
The people drawn into the Hatcher campaign organization on 
the volunteer basis described above were—with very few excep­
tions—political amateurs. Blacks participating in the organization 
were representative of two distinct segments of the black commu­
nity. At least half of the blacks very active in the organization 
were low-income, grass-roots individuals with virtually no prior 
history of political involvement. That this sector of the black com­
munity was well represented in the organization was not for­
tuitous but deliberate. Hatcher campaign coordinators made a 
vigorous effort to identify and attract into the organization grass-
roots community opinion leaders from varied walks of life— 
persons whom it was believed could best communicate with rank-
and-file black voters. The success of the coordinators in recruit­
ing these individuals into active campaign work was due in no 
small measure to Hatcher's efforts over the years to establish a 
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close identification with the black masses through his actions as 
a councilman and his involvement in the civil rights movement. 
Every effort was made not to just give the grass-roots component 
of the organization symbolic status, but to make it an integral 
part of the organization and to encourage its involvement in 
every phase of campaign work. And it is central to our under­
standing of the 1967 mayoral primary in Gary to grasp the signif­
icant point that these representatives of the grass-roots black 
population were among the most dedicated, energetic, and ef­
fective of all Hatcher volunteers. 
The balance of the black persons playing very active roles in 
the Hatcher campaign organization were middle- to low-income 
blacks whose previous political experience had been confined 
to local civil rights protests and the amateur political activities 
of Muigwithania and the RGH Club. These were, for the most part, 
Hatcher's long-time comrades in arms or young adult admirers, 
some of whom had been associated with him in various public 
endeavors since 1960 and had been instrumental in helping him to 
shape both the character and the direction of his political career. 
Noticeably unrepresented (or underrepresented) in the Hatcher 
coalition were the various social groups that made up the black 
establishment, that is, black professional politicians, black busi­
nessmen, and other black professionals (with the noteable excep­
tion of teachers), old-line black civil rights spokesmen, and black 
ministers. Generally speaking, members of the black establish­
ment believed that blacks were not prepared to support a black 
man for the top position in the city. Thus they disapproved of 
Hatcher's candidacy because they believed his campaign efforts 
would be futile and in the long run counterproductive. Operating 
on these assumptions, a group of black professional politicians, 
dubbing themselves the Committee of 100, sought unsuccessfully 
to persuade Hatcher not to run for mayor but to file for reelec­
tion to the city council. 
The white component of the Hatcher organization, unlike the 
black, was a very homogeneous group. Whites who worked for 
Hatcher generally ran in the same social circles and they were 
drawn into the organization through the urgings of three key 
Hatcher political advisors belonging to this intimate social group. 
An examination of the socioeconomic characteristics of white 
Hatcher workers brings into sharp focus the homogeneous nature 
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of this group.. Their most salient common characteristics were 
their ethnic affiliation and economic class standing. All but one of 
these persons were Jewish. They were on the whole members of 
the upper-income bracket with a median annual income of about 
$25,000. All but one of them lived in Miller; the one exception 
lived in a community adjacent to Miller known as Aetna.5 
Although most of these white Hatcher workers had had expe­
rience in politics, this experience did not include deep involve­
ment in electoral politics but politics as it related to a broad 
range of social and political issues—a range that covered the spec­
trum from peace to civil rights. Their political experience then 
was obtained mainly through social activism. Except to campaign 
for a Jewish candidate for the city council—Milton Roth—in 1955 
and 1959, these whites had purposely steered clear of involve­
ment in Gary electoral politics because they believed it to be too 
corrupt and utterly incapable of reform. Consequently, in terms of 
their experience with the multifaceted, beguiling, mind-bending 
aspects of practical Gary politics, they too were political ama­
teurs. True, they were not nearly as inexperienced in social or­
ganization and political movements as their black colleagues; but 
when pitted against an organization that had been winning elec­
tions for twenty years, their experience in these areas would 
mean very little. 
Hatcher's primary organization then—much the same as the 
Stokes organization in Cleveland—was made up of amateurs with 
only nominal, if any, experience in traditional electoral politics. 
The motivations of the people who joined the organization and re­
mained to play very active roles were complexed and varied. 
Some overarching motivational forces do distinctly emerge, how­
ever, from their interviews. Undoubtedly the most important stim­
ulus for their involvement was the magnetic quality of Hatcher 
as a personality and a political force. Respondents cited most fre­
quently as their reasons for joining the Hatcher organization 
Hatcher's personal attributes of honesty, integrity, and compe­
tence, as demonstrated by his work on the city council. The factor 
of honesty was particularly central to the involvement of black 
respondents. Many had come to view black leadership with pro­
found cynicism and distrust and repeated time and again that they 
would not have worked for Hatcher—or any other black politician 
—unless they believed he was a man of impeccable honesty. 
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That they should approach political activity with a good deal of 
apprehension and cynicism was only natural given the history of 
betrayal that blacks in Gary had experienced, as the following re­
spondent explained: 
When you take a community of people that has been bought 
and sold just like merchandise on a shelf, they've had their hopes
built high on a member of their community and then later on they
find out that he's put them on the auction block, then this kind of
gives them a skeptical feeling. And they come to ask themselves
the question, is there anybody that we can trust? And it only stands
to reason because black people in this city have been used as a politi­
cal football, tossed around by the power structure, used as they 
pleased. 
Hatcher's integrity, demonstrated by his principled stand on 
issues arising in the city council, was critical to the decision by 
black workers to join his campaign organization. In this context 
one black Hatcher worker observed: 
A lot of people paid close attention to the way this man conducted
himself in those council meetings and how he really fought for the
issues he believed in. Not necessarily the way we thought it should
have gone, but the man stuck to his convictions. A lot of time maybe
I wouldn't agree that this was the way it should have been done, but
what impressed me and a lot of people was that the man if he felt
that he was right he stuck to it. If you take a man that's swayed by all
kinds of public opinion you're not going to have a man that's worth
his salt. . . . Mr. Hatcher would stand alone and fight for the things
people needed in this city. I never will forget one council meeting
when the people of Brunswick told him in no uncertain terms not
to even run for dog catcher again in this town because he wouldn't
be elected. But Mr. Hatcher still fought for open occupancy while
all other Negro councilmen backed down. He was a man who stood
on honesty and integrity. 
Responses obtained from black Hatcher supporters—such as 
those quoted above—who had never participated in politics be­
fore, compels a careful reexamination of the common notion that 
low-income blacks do not participate in politics because they are 
uninterested in political affairs and have little knowledge of the 
political world around them. A number of Gary's black respon­
dents asserted that they did not participate in city politics be­
cause their knowledge and understanding of the local political 
system convinced them that they had no reason to participate. 
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Prior to becoming Hatcher volunteers these respondents had ex­
hibited considerable interest in local politics. They watched from 
a distance as Hatcher emerged as a dynamic force on the city 
council, and they admired him for the daring battles he waged as 
a member of that body. They admired him for his out of council 
activities as well. 
We protest inarched at a bank out here in Tollerston because the 
manager of the bank was a councilman and he voted against open
occupancy. Mr. Hatcher didn't sit behind a desk or something and
say you should do this, he was out there. He was a councilman but
he was out there. We walked all the way from Broadway West clean
over to Grant Street, knocking on doors, passing out handbills, and
he was with us and it was five below zero. That was impressive so
far as I was concerned. He was a dedicated man; he was sincere. 
Hatcher projected an image that these black citizens had never 
before seen in their political leaders. He was young, intelligent, 
a reputable lawyer, and a capable city councilman. Most impor­
tantly, he was down to earth: 
I think the key to his success is that he is a plain, ordinary Joe. The 
average fellow feels comfortable around him because he acts just
like any ordinary fellow. You wouldn't know he was a lawyer unless
somebody else told you. He'll sit and talk, and never mention it. 
We've been accustomed, you know how some of us are, we're a little
more fortunate than others, and we want to soon project that. But
he's not that kind of fellow. And that's the key to his success. He's
the type of fellow that people will get out for because they have con­
fidence in him. You can always talk to him. He's never in too big a
hurry. 
Hatcher's social and political activities thus convinced these blacks 
that he was honest, capable, and possessed an unusual amount of 
personal integrity. They came to believe that in Richard Hatcher 
they had finally found a reason to participate in politics—and they 
surged into action when it became clear that he was contemplat­
ing a run for the mayor's office. 
Motives for white participation in the Hatcher organization sub­
stantially coincided with those of black participants. However, at 
some point black and white motivations sharply diverged. Where­
as blacks were involved in the organization almost exclusively out 
of admiration for Hatcher, whites were involved for reasons that 
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related more directly to the issue of social and political reform. 
Many whites joined the organization chiefly out of a desire to 
beat the machine, and they believed Hatcher's candidacy provided 
an excellent opportunity for doing so. Others were motivated 
chiefly by ideological concerns. These persons were primarily 
interested in achieving black political power that matched the 
numerical strength and enormous needs of the black community, 
and they viewed Hatcher's campaign as a vehicle through which 
this objective could be realized. Witness, in this context, the fol­
lowing exchange between one of the authors and a white Hatcher 
worker: 
Q.	 What factors most strongly influenced your decision to 
become a member of the Hatcher campaign organization? 
A.	 That's a rather difficult question to answer. I can say I 
thought America was a land of disenchanted promise. And 
I thought it was important for dissatisfied sectors of the 
country to move, that includes black people, poor whites, 
and campus kids. And so far as I was concerned, Hatcher's 
election was all about black power. I as a white man sub­
scribe to black power. And when I say black power I don't 
just mean putting black men in office. I mean putting 
militant black men in office. I'm not talking about all kinds 
of other guys in this city who might want to run for mayor. 
Q.	 Is this how you viewed Mr. Hatcher? 
A.	 Yes, as a militant black cat. 
Q.	 And is that why you supported him? 
A.	 That's right. 
Q.	 Any other reasons why you supported him? 
A.	 Because I was a Jew and because six million Jews died in 
crematoriums. Though I will never know what it means to 
be black, I know a little more about what it means to be 
black than a non-Jew knows. Black people have had it for 
three hundred years and Jews have had it for three thousand 
years. And I dig that a little bit. I dig what it means to be 
burned and lynched. Not like the black man digs it, but I 
dig it a little bit.6 
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It was essentially this mixture of motives, some idealistic, 
some ideological, some pragmatic, which inspired and stimulated 
the various elements of the black and white communities that 
came together to elect Richard Hatcher as the first black mayor 
of Gary. 
Structure and Function 
Although members of the Hatcher organization often pro­
claimed they were practicing a form of new politics, numerous 
aspects of their political work were cast in the mold of traditional 
approaches to electoral activity. The structure and operation of 
the Hatcher campaign organization provides the best example of 
its adherence to common political norms. As in the case of prac­
tically all campaign organizations—including the Stokes organiza­
tion in Cleveland—the Hatcher organization was broken down into 
a variety of committees assigned to carry out functions essential 
to the effective promotion of a political candidate for public 
office. Specifically, the Hatcher campaign organization was 
separated into fourteen committees, each having its own duties 
and responsibilities. These duties and responsibilities were 
spelled out in concise, unambiguous language in a campaign 
guideline authored by Jesse Bell and distributed to every Hatcher 
volunteer. Among the most important of these committees was the 
finance committee, chaired by Dr. Kessler Truelove and co­
chaired by Mr. Lemuel Carter. This committee began functioning 
several months before the formal campaign organization was 
drawn together. The job of this committee was central to the suc­
cess of the campaign, since a minimum level of fund-raising was 
absolutely necessary if the many other tasks to be performed by 
other components of the total organization were to be accom­
plished. Another key committee was the voter-registration com­
mittee. The campaign guideline succinctly emphasized the critical 
nature of this committee's responsibility: "without registered 
voters to pull the levers for our candidate he cannot win." Can­
vassing and registration functions were placed in the hands of 
John Grigsby and Larry Turner. Two other committees with over­
lapping responsibilities operated as fundamental components of 
the primary organization: the research committee and the speech-
writing committee. Hatcher was quite fortunate in attracting a 
group of talented and dedicated scholars to serve on these com­
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mittees. Research activities were supervised mainly by Charles 
Ross and Fred Stern, while speech-writing functions were per­
formed by Burton Wechsler, Arthur Daronasty, and James Yeary. 
Although their duties were formidable, these men brought to their 
work intellect, skill, and determination more than equal to the 
challenge. Additional campaign committees, all of which played 
important roles in the overall effort were those of: transportation, 
headquarters, telephone, special assignment, signs and billboard, 
literature distribution, publicity and advertising, meetings, ab­
sentee ballot, new breed, labor, and celebrity and name contact. 
At the apex of the campaign organization was the candidate, the 
campaign manager, the campaign coordinator, and the assistant 
campaign coordinator. Serving as campaign manager was Henry 
Coleman. Mr. Coleman was the only seasoned politician in the 
entire Hatcher camp. A veteran of thirty years in Gary politics, 
Mr. Coleman had managed the campaigns of numerous black 
candidates and was responsible for educating a whole generation 
of independent-minded, politically active blacks in the art of prac­
tical politics in the Gary context. His forte was anticipating the 
moves of the opposition and making strategical adjustments in 
campaign operation having the effect of confounding the most 
well thought-out battle plans of campaign rivals. In recent times, 
Mr. Coleman has become somewhat of a professional campaign 
manager and is an acknowledged expert in this field. 
Serving as campaign coordinator was Jesse Bell. Mr. Bell, a 
Gary school teacher, had been a friend of Hatcher's since their 
association together as activists in the NAACP in the early 1960s. 
Possessing great respect for Bell's organizational ability, Hatcher 
tapped him to build the volunteer component of the campaign 
organization and map out its formal structure. As campaign 
coordinator, Bell was charged with the responsibility of handling 
organizational and operational problems and coordinating the 
activities of all working committees. Information from commit­
tees to the campaign manager and candidate was to be funneled 
primarily through Bell and his assistant, Claude Mayberry. 
Hatcher, Coleman, and Bell operated as a kind of decisional 
triumvirate. From the outset it was made clear that key political 
decisions—for example, decisions that said whether or not the 
organization would strike out in one direction as opposed to an­
other, or against one group of individuals rather than another— 
224 / Electing Black Mayors 
were to be made strictly by these three men and could not be 
argued. In practice, however, such decisions were not always made 
by these persons alone. Instead of a fixed group of decision-
makers establishing policy on key issues, in actuality, according 
to the circumstance and the issue, there was a rotating group of 
decision-makers—with Hatcher as the axis—who hammered out 
major policy decisions. From time to time Charles Ross, or Julian 
Allen (Hatcher's law partner) or Burton Wechsler, or Fred Stern, 
or Arthur Daronasty, or Larry Turner, in addition to and some­
times in the place of Coleman and Bell, had a hand in the formula­
tion of key decisions. 
The central core of the campaign organization was the execu­
tive board. All members of the executive board were appointed 
by the candidate and served at his pleasure. It consisted of the 
chairman and cochairman of all standing committees, plus several 
other persons appointed to serve by the candidate because of their 
expertise in certain fields. Overall, approximately thirty-six 
persons served on the executive board during the primary cam­
paign. 
The executive board made decisions on day-to-day, routine mat­
ters of the campaign. An elaborate system of reporting was set 
up whereby members of committees would report to committee 
chairmen, who would in turn report to the executive board. Prob­
lems of each committee were considered by the executive board 
in plenary sessions. Discussions of these matters took the form 
of wide-open debates, and "knock-down, drag-out" disputes 
among board members were a common occurrence. Eventually 
the board would agree upon certain courses of action and would 
then make recommendations to the candidate. We should under­
score at this point the advisory nature of the executive board's 
function. Decisions made by the executive board did not have 
compulsory force but were subject to the approval of the candidate. 
Hatcher made it clear from the beginning—although there is 
evidence that some members of the executive board did not fully 
comprehend the implications of this—that he would retain veto 
power over everything the executive board did. This rule of opera­
tion was strictly enforced; on several occasions Hatcher over­
turned policy, operational, and procedural decisions arrived at 
through exhaustive actions by members of the executive board. 
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CAMPAIGN STRATEGY 
The strategy worked out by Hatcher and his chief advisors to 
achieve his mayoral nomination in the 1967 primary election was 
influenced by a number of demographic and political considera­
tions. Central to Hatcher's calculations for victory was the fact 
that he was a black man running in a city highly polarized along 
racial lines. Even a cursory examination of voting returns in pri­
mary elections left no doubt that white people did not vote for 
black people running as independent candidates for major public 
offices in Gary. Given this fact, it became obvious that if he was to 
be a serious candidate for mayor, the overwhelming proportion 
of his campaign effort must be directed toward the black com­
munity. Consequently, the crux of the Hatcher campaign strategy 
was that of mobilizing enough black electoral support to win. 
The central objective of this mobilization effort would be to induce 
every eligible black voter to register to vote and to cast his ballot 
on election day for Hatcher, an independent black mayoral candi­
date. 
Another key factor entering into Hatcher's primary campaign 
strategy was data that showed that there were more eligible white 
voters in Gary than eligible black voters. As of November 1966 
white registration was officially put at 52.3 percent, whereas 
black registration was 47.7 percent.7 Thus though blacks consti­
tuted a majority of the total population, they were not a majority 
of the citizens eligible to vote in the primary election. This meant 
that even if Hatcher received 100 percent support in the black 
community—and he viewed this as a virtual impossibility—he 
would still need a substantial amount of white support in order 
to win. Yet every indication was that nothing more than nominal 
support for his candidacy would be forthcoming from white vot­
ers. Hatcher believed that his unpopularity among the white elec­
torate could be realistically offset in only one way: if two or more 
major white candidates entered the mayoral race and split the 
white vote. Some key Hatcher supporters were initially extremely 
pessimistic about his chances for victory, because they were posi­
tive that given the threat of a black candidate in the race, the 
machine would unify around one candidate and use every means 
necessary to prevent a splinter white candidate from filing. How­
ever, this pessimism began to swiftly erode when developments 
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within the regular Democratic organization indicated that unity 
might be lacking. The most important of these developments 
was the entrance into the mayor's race of three strong white 
candidates. First among the major white candidates to file for 
the mayor's office was the incumbent mayor A. Martin Katz. The 
announcement by Katz was not surprising since he had publi­
cized his intention to run for a second term as early as April 1966. 
Katz's announcement was followed shortly afterward by the 
entrance into the mayor's race of the Lake County treasurer, Leslie 
O. Pruitt, a key figure in the Lake County Democratic organiza­
tion. Pruitt's candidacy for mayor was the product of a growing 
conviction on the part of county party officials that Katz was so 
unpopular in Gary's white community that he could not win re­
election. These county officials argued that in contrast to Katz, 
Pruitt enjoyed immense personal popularity in the white com­
munity and would therefore be the party's strongest contender in 
a head-to-head confrontation with Hatcher. 
The third major white candidate to enter the mayor's race was 
Bernard Konrady, Gary businessman and brother of Emery Kon­
rady who ran unsuccessfully for mayor in 1963. In announcing his 
candidacy, Konrady said that he was following in the footsteps of 
his brother who died on the evening of his bid for reelection to 
the Indiana state senate. Konrady observed, "Save for his un­
timely death, my brother would be making this announcement in 
my stead."8 He emphasized, however, that he was not campaign­
ing on his brother's record or running in his shadow, but be­
cause surveys that he conducted indicated he had a good chance 
of winning. 
The announcement by Konrady was welcomed news for the 
Hatcher camp. Hatcher had filed for mayor immediately after 
Pruitt entered the contest. Although the evidence of division in 
the ranks of the machine reflected in Pruitt's candidacy had given 
Hatcher some encouragement, he was still not confident that party 
pressure would not eventually force either Katz or Pruitt to with­
draw. However, with Konrady also in the race, withdrawal by 
Katz or Pruitt would not be a major blow to Hatcher's election 
possibilities since there would remain two white candidates to 
split the white vote. The only other outstanding danger was 
the possible withdrawal by Konrady. However, this danger 
swiftly eroded as Konrady made it absolutely clear that he would 
Gary: 1967 Primary Election / 227 
not yield to strenuous efforts by machine officials to buy him out 
of the race.9 
With assurances that at least two major white candidates would 
be competing for the white vote, Hatcher and his supporters rea­
soned that his success in the mayoral race hinged almost exclu­
sively on their ability to turn out and deliver a large, cohesive 
black vote. In making this assessment, they harbored few illu­
sions about the magnitude of the challenge. They knew, based on 
the previous reaction of the black community to black candidates, 
that one of the most intractable obstacles they would face in their 
mobilizing efforts was black self-doubt. They were very much 
aware that their conviction that Hatcher could win the mayorship 
was not shared by the black community as a whole. They were 
constantly reminded that a group of rank amateurs did not stand 
a chance of beating a well-oiled political machine with pratically 
an inexhaustible supply of political resources. These were not 
just superficial impressions but attitudes that had become deep­
ly rooted in the ethos of the black community over a period of 
about twenty years. For Hatcher workers this suggested an in­
disputable fact: their biggest job would be selling to a multitude 
of black doubters the proposition that Hatcher could win. Until 
and unless this was done, the hopes of stimulating a massive black 
revolt of the dimensions requisite for Hatcher's election would be 
a lovely dream. In this context one central figure in the Hatcher 
organization observed: "People like to be on the winner's side, 
and if they don't think you can win, they don't want to waste 
their vote or to waste the $10.00 they might have gotten other­
wise." 
Intense opposition to Hatcher's candidacy from within the black 
community constituted another difficult hurdle that somehow had 
to be surmounted. Members of the black establishment had made 
it clear that they not only would not support Hatcher, but would 
work actively against him. Thus Hatcher would not only have to 
fight a hostile white political power structure but an unfriendly 
black political power structure as well. He was faced with the 
likelihood that at the same time his supporters were trying to sell 
the proposition that he could win, black ministers, black profes­
sional politicians, old-line civil rights leaders, and others would 
loudly proclaim that he could not win and should not win. Hatcher 
supporters were certain that many of these persons were deeply 
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in debt to the machine and that every pressure would be brought 
to mobilize them against Hatcher and in the service of Katz. Given 
the inevitable opposition of this powerful segment of the black 
community, some means had to be devised to neutralize their 
strength, and obliterate their effectiveness as instruments of ma­
chine power. 
Even more menacing was the almost certain opposition of the 
black precinct organization. As pointed out in chapter six, this 
organization was the pivotal source of control by the machine 
in the black community. Hatcher knew that he could not begin 
to compete with the machine for the political support of black 
precinct committeemen. These men had made it plain that they 
were not committed to black power but black capitalism and that 
they intended to sell their services to the highest bidder. On this 
basis, Hatcher had no choice but to write black committeemen 
off as inaccessible political resources, because it was inconceiv­
able that he could pay them the sums they could command from 
the opposition. Some Hatcher supporters dismissed the inevitable 
opposition of the black precinct organization as relatively unimpor­
tant. For example, one Hatcher worker stated: 
We learned in 1966 that the precinct organization did not command 
the kind of magic they claimed they did—that people could form opin­
ions, could vote, and would vote. . . . Fred Egan, when he was run­
ning for judge in 1966, proved this. They demanded of him $3,000 
per district to carry him. He said I'm not going to give you anything, 
and won by a landslide. They've been doing this to everybody. Yeah, 
we'll carry you (hand out gesture). They could always give you a fair­
ly respectable snowing by voting the ineligible names. 
But this was definitely a minority opinion. Most Hatcher work­
ers were extremely despondent over the unambiguous impressions 
they received in the early days of the campaign that the black 
precinct organization would work to bolster the power of the 
machine by supporting the renomination of the incumbent mayor. 
Many [black precinct committeemen] said they could not support 
Mr. Hatcher because as precinct committeemen they were honor 
bound to serve the people in power in the party at that time. But the 
real reason was that they owed their lives and their jobs to Katz. 
And also they wanted extra money. They also knew that once Mr. 
Hatcher won they would lose their jobs as precinct committeemen. 
Their refusal to work with us really shook us up because they had 
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quite a bit of control. We thought the black precinct committeemen 
were our worst enemies. 
Underpinning all of the obstacles mentioned above was the im­
portant fact that the Hatcher forces were fighting a machine ap­
paratus that not only operated in the city but whose tenacles 
reached far into the county as well. This broad, overarching net­
work of power allowed the machine not only to control money, 
workers, and organizations but also to exercise tyrannical control 
over the mechanics of the electoral process. Some Hatcher peo­
ple had learned from their experience in the Dozier Allen campaign 
that tremendous difficulties could be placed in their way by the 
power of county officials to alter at will the rules of the electoral 
game. These were the people who validated registered voters, as­
signed registrars and election day workers, counted the votes and 
controlled official public records and the dissemination of public 
information regarding elections. The importance of these factors 
to the mobilization process is suggested by the observations of 
this Hatcher volunteer: 
The people in the county were in charge of all records and could
put all kinds of pressure on people because they had the knowledge
we did not have. They would change the records indiscriminately.
You might go out there to see how many black people were registered
and they might tell you 57 black people and 67 whites were regis­
tered, whereas in reality only 38 black people were registered. You
believe this and you feel you have only a very narrow gap to cover.
But if you don't believe it then you know you have to go out and get
this many more. You know the records we keep many times are not
the records that actually are. 
To overcome these obstacles and others that would surely 
emerge as the campaign progressed, Hatcher and his advisors de­
veloped two strategic approaches to the black community. One in­
volved the running of a high-pitched emotional campaign de­
signed to stimulate an intense level of group consciousness and 
arouse the black masses to independent political action. This as­
pect of the campaign would stress over and over again the point 
that 1967 was not 1963 and that the time had arrived for blacks 
to break the control of the political machine over the black com­
munity through cohesive electoral action. The second approach in­
volved the launching of a grass-roots effort that would take the 
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campaign directly into the home of every black person in the city. 
The substantive dimensions of these campaign strategies and 
their relation to the mobilization process in the black community 
will be closely examined below. 
In summary, the Hatcher primary campaign strategy was based 
on the central thesis that his prospects for victory hinged pivotal­
ly on the ability of his campaign organization to turn the black 
community on—to create the kind of excitement among black vot­
ers that would produce a massive outpouring of political support. 
This did not mean that the white vote was not also to be reached 
for when possible; but it did mean that workers should never 
lose sight of the fact that major possibilities for generating signif­
icant payoffs at the polls rested in the black rather than the white 
community. Consequently, the mobilization effort in the black 
community could not afford to be diluted or distracted by the 
quest for white votes. Hatcher believed that his chances of receiv­
ing strong support in the black community were good because 
he had established for himself a favorable image and because the 
climate of the times created a restlessness in the black community 
that lent itself to the mounting of independent political action. 
But he was very much aware that these factors would not auto­
matically translate themselves into effective black political power. 
He fully realized that only through a well-organized and well-
executed campaign effort could the critical conversion of resources 
to power be made. 
MOBILIZING THE BLACK COMMUNITY 
The campaign for black votes by the Hatcher organization was 
conducted on two distinct levels. At one level a general black com­
munity appeal was made by the candidate himself with the assis­
tance of his campaign advisors. The central objective of this as­
pect of the campaign was to project and enhance Hatcher's 
image as a militant, articulate, committed, trustworthy politician 
who was eminently qualified to be mayor, and who, if elected, 
would work with diligence and skill to dramatically reverse the 
economic, social and political status of the black community. 
This objective was promoted through a perpetual round of house 
meetings and campaign rallies involving blacks from every walk 
of life. These meetings presented Hatcher with the opportunity 
to engage in a hardheaded discussion of the critical issues fac­
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ing the black community, to outline his program for turning Gary 
around by taking its governance out of the hands of a corrupt 
machine and putting it into the hands of the "people," and to re­
mind his black brothers and sisters of his record of devotion and 
sacrifice as a councilman and as a leader in the civil rights move­
ment to the cause of black liberation. 
Hatcher was given invaluable assistance in his campaign efforts 
by the members of the research committee. Considering the fact 
that they were all political amateurs, the members of this commit­
tee did a remarkable job of preparing background material for the 
campaign. Much of their success was engendered through sheer 
resourcefulness. They compiled a wealth of information on urban 
problems by simply nosing around the city and picking the brains 
of persons who were experts in various fields. They consulted 
with people on the smoke abatement board, members of the 
League of Women Voters, and professors and graduate students 
in Chicago doing books and doctoral dissertations on a variety 
of subjects relating to the urban scene. This information was pulled 
together in a thirteen-point platform that many said was one on 
which a candidate for national office could comfortably run. In 
this regard one member of the committee remarked, "I think we 
were trying to overcompensate for any notions of inferiority." 
This campaign document pulled no punches. It talked in very 
angry terms about poverty, discrimination, poor housing, disease, 
poor education, crime, and political corruption. "We saw these 
as priority concerns. These are the things a mayor ought to ad­
dress himself to, not necessarily neglecting streets, water and air 
pollution—we did include air pollution and things of that kind. 
But these were the major social problems." Points from the plat­
form were used as the basis for Hatcher's public presentations. 
At the same time he was hammering away in his major speeches 
at themes emphasizing his commitment to improving the social 
and economic status of the black community, Hatcher was also 
attempting to convince black voters that he was a serious candi­
date—that he could indeed win provided he received sufficient 
black support. To give factual substance to this claim, a docu­
ment prepared by the research committee called Tell It like It Is 
—Hatcher Can Win, was released for general distribution. This 
was probably the most important piece of material to come from 
the Hatcher camp during the primary. In many ways it set the 
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tone for the entire mobilization effort. Using data worked up by 
Burton Wechsler on recent city, township, and county elections, 
this document purported to show conclusively that Katz's popu­
larity in both the black and white communities was at such a low 
ebb and his position in the regular Democratic organization so 
tenuous, that he could not possibly win the Democratic primary 
for mayor. On the other hand, it cited the Dozier Allen and Vivian 
Carter races as evidence that Hatcher could win. The pamphlet 
asserted that if Hatcher received the 74 percent of the black vote 
received by Carter, this would give him 21,272 votes, and re­
minded blacks that Katz won the 1963 primary with only 19,853 
votes. These figures, it was stressed, did not even take into ac­
count the white vote Hatcher was likely to receive and the pro­
jected increase in black registration for the 1967 primary. The 
central message this document communicated to black doubters 
was that they, by themselves, acting in concert, could elect their 
own black mayor—that they had the votes, all that was lacking 
was black unity around a candidate who would bring dignity to 
the mayoral office, and pride to every black person in America. 
Although it is difficult to accurately gauge the effect of this docu­
ment, there is good reason to believe that it helped to push many 
confused, reluctant, doubting black voters firmly into the Hatcher 
camp. 
That pamphlet sort of launched it for us. It was given city wide pub­
licity. The newspapers got it, people got it, and I think it really was
a stimulant. After he announced, there were people saying, how can
he win, why should I beat my brains out with another loser. So this 
pamphlet—Tell It like It Is—was very important. 
Complementing the general community campaign waged by the 
candidate and top organization officials was a street-level cam­
paign coordinated at the top and carried out by an army of vol­
unteer workers. This second campaign centered around the 
implementation of a grass-roots strategy aimed at bypassing 
normal channels for gaining political support and carrying the 
campaign directly to the people. The objective of the strategy was 
to ignore the precinct organization, traditional civil rights organi­
zations, and other components of the black submachine, and to 
use volunteer workers to perform the arduous task of solidifying 
rank-and-file black voters behind Hatcher's candidacy. One 
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Hatcher worker described the design and intent of the strategy 
in the following manner: 
This approach was worked out by Hatcher and [Henry] Coleman 
together. Ignore me as the big time preacher and go to my members. 
Ignore me as the ward healer and go to the man in the ward. And 
when the ward healer found out, the man in the ward was telling him 
I hear this is going on, and he found that there was something afoot 
that he couldn't stop. That idea came from Coleman. Ignore those 
guys, they're the property of the machine. There's no need of trying 
to buy what's Rockefeller's, you don't have that kind of money. He 
owns it. But if you talk to the people that don't belong to Rockefeller 
you'll get them. So go out into the hedges and the byways and shake 
them from the bushes because the bushes was where the people 
were hiding. That was altogether new too—that was a new approach. 
Because the system went to the big time preacher and the big time 
ward healer, all the political prostitutes. They were the leaders. 
They would pad their pockets and then go to their parishioners, 
woof, woof, woof, this is the man. But now the approach was so dif­
ferent they didn't know how to cope with that. 
In short, the Hatcher people felt that the only way that they could 
beat the machine in the black community was by stealing the 
black vote away from all those persons who had helped maintain 
a vibrant, healthy submachine in the Midtown district. 
Implementation of this strategy required a certain kind of po­
litical machinery. Specifically, it required the building of a vol­
unteer organization, which operated parallel to the regular Demo­
cratic party structure, capable of placing persons committed to 
Hatcher in every political jurisdiction in the black community 
from the district all the way down to the block. Responsibility 
for building this street-level machinery rested primarily with 
Claude Mayberry, assistant campaign coordinator. Mayberry 
began by selecting four persons to serve as district leaders in 
the second, third, fourth, and fifth districts. Each district leader 
was obligated in turn to select area leaders who would have super-
visional authority over five precincts. Within their areas, district 
leaders were to find persons to serve as precinct captains and 
block workers. The ultimate goal was to have ten persons on 
each block who were willing to go door to door convincing their 
neighbors that they should register to vote, and cast their vote for 
Hatcher on election day. 
This organizational structure was knitted together by a set of 
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rules and procedures denning the responsibility and authority of 
each Hatcher volunteer. District coordinators, for example, were 
expected not just to give orders, but to become actively involved 
in the mobilization process through the organizing of speakers 
bureaus, sponsoring public meetings, working along with the 
transportation and literature distribution committees to make 
sure that workers and materials were always at the right place 
at the right time, and so forth. Similarly, area leaders were ex­
pected to be working field supervisors, leading not watching their 
troops go off to battle. These persons promoted the street-level 
effort through various fund raising activities such as dinners and 
drawings, holding weekly planning sessions with precinct captains 
and block workers, coordinating voter registration activities, and 
in many other ways.10 Workers at the block and precinct levels 
had perhaps the most important assignment of all: going door to 
door, using every technique imaginable to stimulate their friends 
and neighbors to disregard the advice of their party committee­
men and vote for Hatcher as mayor. Each worker was supposed 
to report to his campaign supervisor relative to the status of his 
work and the problems he encountered. These reports were col­
lected by Mayberry, who in turn presented them to Jesse Bell, 
who summarized them and presented this summary to the execu­
tive board for its consideration. 
Because they were political amateurs, members of the street-
level organization were not wedded to ancient formulas for polit­
ical campaigning, so they experimented with new as well as old 
techniques for performing the duties of their job. For example, 
in order to get Hatcher campaign literature on the breakfast table 
of every black family, Hatcher workers placed his literature un­
der door-to-door milk deliveries. When the cool air hit the milk 
bottle, moisture would develop, pasting the literature to the bot­
tle's bottom. A Hatcher respondent described what usually hap­
pened next: 
The housewife picks the bottle up with this piece of paper or card
sticking to the bottom. Now the milk will be placed on the table or
in the refrigerator, but eventually the card will fall off the bottom
when the family is in the kitchen. The card will fall off on the break­
fast table, and there's the picture of your candidate with his name on
it and they wonder how it got in the house. But the fact is the children 
are there and they pass the card around, let me see, let me see Mr.
Hatcher. All around, and that is what you want. 
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Other highly successful gimmicks used to accomplish the same 
purpose were the passing out of balloons to youngsters who took 
them home and therefore familiarized their parents with Hatcher's 
name, and reliance upon insurance men or cleaning establish­
ments to slip promotional cards in their customer's merchandise. 
If the people that he gives these cards to are not for Mr. Hatcher,
then the cleaning man is going to risk losing business. But if he's
pushing somebody that he thinks the people in this community are
for, he's not going to lose business, he's going to gain business. Be­
cause that'll make them think that the cleaning man is a little closer
to the mayor than I thought he was. 
But no promotional gimmick could supplant face-to-face discus­
sions by the volunteers of political issues and the attributes of 
their candidate with rank-and-file voters. The effort to sell black­
ness, to convince blacks that the time was right for black control 
of city government, and to convince them both that Hatcher could 
win and cope with the challenges of the mayor's office had per­
force to be the major campaign technique of street-level volun­
teers. Time and again they encountered stubborn resistance to 
both the proposition that Hatcher could win, and that blacks were 
ready to govern. Note these observations by a Hatcher grass-
roots campaigner: 
I remember knocking on a door and the lady telling me she didn't
have anything against Richard Hatcher, that in fact she thought he 
was afine young man, but she couldn't vote for him because she knew 
once one of us got into office that things would be ruined. She felt
that right now she could go down and she could talk to Mayor Katz
and he would do something about her problems. She just didn't feel
that once one of us got into the office this was the way it was going
to be. She said she wasn't going to vote for Mr. Hatcher not because 
she had anything against him but because of the fact that she just
didn't want a Negro in office. 
To overcome these negative images of black leadership, Hatcher 
workers repeated over and over again his record on the council 
and argued that it was impossible for him to be any worse than 
previous mayors. 
Significantly, grass-roots campaign workers found that many 
blacks were reluctant to cast their votes for Hatcher not because 
he was black, or they did not think he could win, or because they 
did not trust him, but because they had become accustomed to 
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receiving cash rewards, gifts, groceries, and other benefits from 
their precinct committeemen for voting for machine candidates, 
and they feared these would be cut off if they voted for anyone 
else. Apparently, many black voters genuinely believed that ma­
chine politicians had accurate information about how each person 
voted and would use this information to punish those who did 
not vote as they were told. To counteract these beliefs, Hatcher 
volunteers initiated a whispering campaign in the black commu­
nity designed to convince black voters of the confidentiality of 
their vote. The originator of this idea described how it operated. 
I worked with the citizens in Nashville in 1960-1961. We were able 
to get the black people to realize that the time has come when you 
can't sell your vote for a drink. Then we saw there was opposition to 
that so we took another approach. If [X] comes to you with ten dollars 
for your vote, take it, because when you close the curtain nobody 
knows what you're going to do. We convinced the people that there 
was no way under God's sun that they would know how they voted. I 
proved it on machines to people. So if I gave you ten dollars, go 
ahead and vote for me. "Thank you, I'll do that." Take that ten dol­
lars, go buy your child some shoes and then vote him out too. 
This strategy enjoyed tremendous success, a fact that is heavily 
underscored by a personal experience the respondent quoted 
above had with one of his employees: 
I had a lady working for me. She had been working for me for four 
years. I had been talking to her; she had been victimized for all these 
years. She had the belief that if she told a person she would vote for 
him, he could find out whether she did or didn't. That night—to show 
you how people were getting the message—in her precinct the pre­
cinct committeewoman came by passing out two dozen eggs for 
everyone who would vote her ticket. So Mrs. [X] took the two dozen 
eggs. She came to our house the next morning. She said "Mr. [X]. 
You know one thing. It's just recently I've gotten to the place where 
I can follow what you say." She said "you know this lady brought to 
my house these two dozen eggs and said vote my ticket." She said "I 
took those eggs, I had some for dinner last night and had some for 
breakfast this morning. But you know what? I'm not going to vote for 
her but I'm going to eat all her eggs." I said eat her eggs. That wave 
began to move over the community. Prior to that they had been fear­
ful of doublecrossing the system. You don't doublecross the system, 
the system will get you. One area they came out passing five-dollar 
grocery certificates to shop at certain stores. They took those certif­
icates. I said take them. Feed your family. Deceive that bastard like 
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he's been deceiving you. Play his same game—he taught us. And we
learned from him. He's been deceiving us since 1619. Deceive him
—play his same game. Take everything he has to give you. Then go
behind the machine and vote him out of there. They did it—and it
was beautiful. Judge Kaplan said the people in Midtown were un­
grateful. Took whatever there was to be given and voted against the
people too. . .  . I was really elated to hear that lady say that I took
those eggs, ate some this morning, ate some last night. And she felt
good that she was deceiving this guy who all these years had been
deceiving her. A small retaliation, but it was a feeling she had never
experienced before. 
Hatcher volunteers were able to win over some black doubters 
by using a bit of homespun psychology. Essentially what they 
did was agree with these persons that Hatcher couldn't win. 
Then they went on to argue that what they really wanted to do 
this time was make a good showing so that even if Hatcher lost 
the power structure would have to recognize the effort. They told 
these blacks that they had everything to gain and nothing to lose 
by supporting Hatcher because they weren't getting anything un­
der the incumbent administration but "crumbs from the table" 
anyway. The real purpose of this campaign, they were told, was 
to shake up the power structure by demonstrating the potential 
might of the black community thereby putting it on notice that if 
it did not become more responsive to black needs, it would be 
turned out when the next election period rolled around. As re­
called by one respondent, the argument was phrased somewhat in 
these terms: 
We don't think we can beat them this time. But at least we've got a
spokesman in our community that the power structure's got to reck­
on with. So all we're saying is let's get out and give them a big show­
ing. Let's get out and give them a big vote. 
The objective of this strategy, of course, was to get black doubters 
to shift their attitudes from "he can't win, so I won't throw my 
vote away," to "he can't win but I'm going to support him just 
the same." Hatcher supporters knew that when they got black 
voters taking the latter position, his chances of actually winning 
would improve. 
Wefigured if we got enough people saying that they didn't think he
was going to win but they were going to vote for him, there wasn't 
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any doubt in our mind, you know, that he would come out a winner.
That's the way we did it. 
If Hatcher was in fact going to win the mayoral primary, it 
was necessary not only that blacks already registered vote for him, 
but that a substantial number of additional black voters be added 
to the registration rolls. Voter registration therefore became one 
of the most critical functions of the street-level organization.11 
Before the registration of black voters could begin, the black com­
munity had to be thoroughly canvassed. For canvassing purposes 
leaders of the registration committee formulated a system that 
they hoped would allow them to locate every unregistered voter in 
the black community. Nightly instructions were given until every 
worker participating in registration knew every step in this pro­
cedure by heart. The procedure worked in the following manner. 
First a poll book was secured from the board of elections and 
canvassing cards made up for each name in the book. Block work­
ers were then sent out into black precincts to canvass the areas 
according to the addresses on the cards. When a person included 
on the canvass card was located, his registration was verified 
and a record made of this fact on a note pad. Before leaving, this 
person would be asked to identify other persons in the building 
who did not live there during the last registration period or whom 
he knew not to be registered voters. If possible, these persons 
were contacted before the canvass worker left the building. In 
any case, a record was made of the persons identified. The worker 
would then move to the next house. If someone lived there other 
than the person listed on the canvass card, this meant that the 
person had moved in since the last registration. This person's 
name, registration status, and former place of residence were re­
corded on the pad. If the person who used to live there had died, 
the new occupant would probably know and a record was made 
of this fact. If he had not, an effort was made to find out where 
he had moved. 
When a check had been made of all the addresses included on 
his canvass cards, the worker would have a complete record of 
how many people formerly lived in the area of the precinct he 
covered, how many people were still there, how many persons 
had moved to some other part of the city, how many persons 
were deceased, and how many possible ghost voters were in the 
area. Information collected by each worker was put on file in 
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the central headquarters. When all of the canvassing information 
was fully analyzed it would then be possible to locate all living 
voters—both those who remained in their original precincts and 
those who had moved from say the tenth to the fifteenth pre­
cinct. Since the names of the dead were often voted in elections, 
it was also necessary to have accurate information on the identity 
and number of deceased persons. To validate data compiled by 
canvass workers of persons deceased, cards containing these 
names would be compared to records at the board of health. 
This comparison provided a fairly accurate estimate of the num­
ber and identity of deceased persons. If board of health records 
said 150 persons had passed away since the last election, then 
the central headquarters expected to have on file 150 cards say­
ing deceased. This canvassing procedure allowed the registration 
committee to identify and locate practically every unregistered 
black voter, living or dead. 
Identifying and locating unregistered black voters is one thing, 
registering them is quite another. Hatcher workers found when 
the formal registration period began that many black citizens 
were reluctant to admit that they were not registered to vote. 
Many were ashamed of the fact that they had been in the city all 
of their lives and had never registered to vote. This meant that 
Hatcher workers had to "figure out a way of getting them to regis­
ter without insulting them." The solution they came up with 
was one in which the worker helped the unregistered voter to get 
around his embarrassment by putting himself in his place. In doing 
this he would make a statement similar to the following: "You 
know it's a funny thing, but I was [X] number of years old be­
fore I registered to vote. And when it came to my mind that I 
wasn't registered, I was so ashamed that I pretended for a long 
time that I was a voter." This would make the person loosen up 
and he would begin to talk. At this point the worker would ask 
the following question: "Say now, if the election was today (do 
you know the candidates running?—Yes) what choice would you 
pick for mayor?" If the person hesitated and said, "Well, I'd like 
to see Mr. Hatcher win," the worker knew he had someone that 
could be persuaded to register and vote for his candidate. He 
would then reply that the person could help Hatcher win if he fol­
lowed his example and became prepared to help. "The only way 
you can help him is by being a registered voter. We've got trans­
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portation downstairs to take you to the registration station, will 
you come on down and register?" In most cases, the person agreed 
to come. One worker recalled that he used this technique to per­
suade one elderly black citizen who had been living in the city for 
forty-nine years to register to vote for the first time. 
If an unregistered voter was not at home when a registration 
worker called, that card was brought back to the office to be put 
in a special file. Another attempt would be made a few days 
later to contact this person at his home. If this effort was success­
ful and the person registered, the card would be taken out of the 
unregistered file and put in the registered file. If it was not, a 
worker would find out where he worked and what time he got 
off. It would then be his responsibility to be at the job site when 
this person got off, and to find someone to point out the un­
registered voter to him when he came out. Upon locating the un­
registered voter the Hatcher worker would identify himself and say 
"look, according to this information you live at this place or that 
place and you're not registered." If he agreed, he would be taken 
to register and then given a free ride home, or wherever else he 
wanted to go. 
The door-to-door registration campaign was eventually broad­
ened to include every nook and cranny of the black community. 
Some Hatcher workers spent hours in pool rooms and bars at­
tempting to pick up additional registrants. Blacks in supermarkets, 
department stores, movie theatres, churches, virtually all public 
places received the same stock inquiry from Hatcher workers: 
"Are you registered to vote? No? Then come go with me." Black 
steel workers were met at mill gates and told, "You've got to go 
register." Thousands of handbills were distributed informing black 
citizens that transportation to and from registration stations was 
available for those who needed it. 
In general, a tremendous registration campaign was waged by 
Hatcher volunteers in the primary; and it enjoyed notable success. 
Between November 1966 and May 1967, 2,200 additional black 
voters were added to the registration rolls. These voters were 
registered, it should be noted, in spite of the concerted opposition 
of the Lake County Democratic machine. Machine officials used 
practically every possible means to discourage and hamper regis­
tration in the black community. For example, plans by the Hatcher 
organization to launch a roving caravan to register black voters 
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at their homes, jobs, or on the street were sabotaged by County 
Clerk John Krupa who ruled that the door-to-door registration 
law did not permit precinct committeemen to register individuals 
who lived outside their precincts.12 Additionally, Krupa denied 
a request by the Hatcher organization for the appointment of 
deputy registrars to work in black areas. Hatcher supporters force­
fully argued that the need for deputy registrars in the black com­
munity was critical because of the stubborn refusal of precinct 
committeemen to register voters in areas where Hatcher support­
ers lived, but they achieved no success. 
Calculated moves to obstruct registration were made by ma­
chine officials in other ways. For example, it had been customary 
for registration boards to be set up well in advance of the election. 
Threatened with possible defeat by the massive registration drive, 
the county organization refused to set up the boards until thirty 
days before the day of the election. When the boards were finally 
set up, their hours of operation were curtailed from what they 
had been in the past. In Crown Point, a slow-down procedure 
was instituted to discourage voters from remaining long enough to 
complete the registration process. Also, during the early canvass­
ing period, efforts were made to deny Hatcher workers access 
to poll books to check against precinct canvasses. These obstruc­
tive methods were easily implemented since all of the people 
working as registrars were appointees of county Democratic of­
ficials. 
At the grass-roots level, precinct committeemen intimidated 
welfare mothers with threats of having child support payments 
cut off if they registered to vote for Hatcher. Anyone having 
Hatcher literature in his home was subject to receive an ominous 
warning from his precinct committeemen. 
My precinct committeeman told me I couldn't work on the election 
board because my house was splattered with pictures of Mr. Hatcher. 
I told him just scratch my name because I would not remove his pic­
tures out of my windows. 
Hatcher volunteers surmounted these obstacles mainly through 
exuberance and determination. They simply refused to allow diffi­
culties placed in their way by the machine to permanently im­
pair their efforts to carry their campaign to the voters. Each new 
obstacle was thoroughly studied and strategies devised for going 
242 / Electing Black Mayors 
over or around it. As a result of the resourcefulness and determi­
nation of Hatcher workers, black voters who had never before 
participated in politics were reached and their voting strength reg­
istered in the primary election. 
While some Hatcher workers were grappling with the black pre­
cinct organization over registration, others were contributing to 
the mobilization process by competing with members of the black 
establishment for the allegiance of rank-and-file black voters. 
The objective of this aspect of the campaign was to identify 
members of the black establishment actively involved in the Katz 
campaign as "Uncle Toms" who were selling out their race. One 
respondent explained how this was done: 
The mayor [Hatcher] never would have approved of this, but some of 
us would ride at night. And we knew where these guys would hang
out. So we stationed certain ones at this spot, that spot, that spot,
and that spot. When they came in, we'd challenge them. We pointed
them out everywhere we met them. We challenged them everywhere,
in crowds, in meetings, and other places we met them. We'd brand
them as "Uncle Toms" who were detrimental to their own people. 
These public challenges were designed to put black Katz support­
ers on the spot and needle them into taking actions that would 
diminish the luster of their image in the black community. "We 
got people to thinking and watching them. When we put them on 
the defense they started making irresponsible statements." In 
this way, Hatcher supporters were able to neutralize the obstruc­
tive potential of that prominent segment of the black community 
playing profoundly anti-Hatcher roles in the primary campaign. 
This same component of the Hatcher organization also engaged 
in sporadic psychological and physical warfare with the entire 
machine appartus. It attempted to keep the opposition off balance 
by faking as if it was going to move in one direction and moving 
in another. These Hatcher workers tormented the Katz forces by 
reproducing literature distributed in the white community and 
circulating it in the black community to let blacks know how 
"Mayor Katz really felt about them." They blocked the distribu­
tion of Katz newspapers among blacks by picking the distributors 
up when they entered the black community and tailing them in 
cars until they left. "They knew we were from the Hatcher camp 
and they wouldn't dare let us catch them putting them out. So 
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they couldn't do anything but ride." These tactics communicated 
to machine leaders that they would not be able to run roughshod 
over fearful black citizens in the same way they had done in the 
past. 
We instilled such fear into the machine that they were afraid to 
bother too many of us. I'll say this. We didn't fear any mother's 
daughter or son. We knew we were not dealing with timid people.
And an organization that sees it's losing is like a hungry man grab­
bing a loaf of bread. And we knew that. But we were not saints either. 
Mr. Hatcher didn't know that. I honestly believe he didn't know we
weren't saints. We would have resorted to anything that they played;
we would have played their same game. I think they knew that. They
knew that this was a new black movement—that we were black and 
that we were not going to be cheated. They knew that we were going
to resort to anything. The black man no longer fears death. Death is
something the white man used to whip us with. "We'll kill you!" So
what? I'm going to die here or Vietnam or some place. And that was
the philosophy by which we went about our work. And I think the
message was received. 
In sum, Hatcher supporters believed that the machine—faced 
with a powerful threat from a militant black candidate—was 
willing to use any means necessary to win and that they should 
be prepared to counter provocative machine action with pro­
vocative action of their own. They also believed that in the rough 
and tumble world of Gary politics, this position was neither ir­
rational nor irresponsible. 
A major worry throughout the entire primary campaign was 
the securing of sufficient funds to support the myriad demands of 
effective campaigning. Successful black mobilization requires 
money for media space and time, literature distribution, trans­
portation, and a thousand other small and large endeavors. 
Normal problems involved in raising campaign funds were com­
pounded in Hatcher's case by his insistence that he would not 
make promises or commitments to anyone in return for campaign 
contributions. This policy, clearly set forth in campaign guide­
lines, severely handcuffed the finance committee in its efforts 
to obtain large pledges of financial support. A key member of 
this committee explained why this was so: 
Large contributions so often depend upon promises. For a city to
suddenly be asked to give without promises, a city where the average 
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voter is not asked for money because the organizations don't need it,
for the big businesses to be giving money without promises, this was
a complete about-face for both the average person and for the people
who had lots of money. 
With large contributors unwilling to support the campaign effort, 
other approaches to fund raising had to be found. Since the cam­
paign was to be one with a central grass-roots focus, an appeal 
was made to the community as a whole to support the campaign 
so that Hatcher could enter into office financially unencum­
bered. The idea behind this approach was a good one, but it 
met with limited success. "We found out that you can't get money 
to run a campaign by asking people to contribute nickels and 
dimes." The only other avenue open was that of sponsoring a 
variety of fund-raising affairs. Social groups such as Muigwith­
ania were encouraged to sponsor dances and donate the proceeds 
to the Hatcher campaign. A group called Teachers for Enlight­
ened Leadership, which was formed to assist in Hatcher's election, 
sponsored several cocktail parties to raise campaign funds. Other 
projects were sponsored by the campaign organization itself, 
including cocktail parties, and a testimonial dinner featuring 
Georgia State Representative Julian Bond. 
Despite these efforts, campaign funds continued to fall far 
below what was needed to operate effectively. Toward the end 
of March the situation became desperate as workers in the field 
began to run out of bumper stickers, money for signs, and other 
campaign materials. An emergency meeting was called of the 
finance committee to consider possible strategies for raising 
additional funds. On the advice of Mrs. Doris Finkle, a decision 
was made to sponsor another cocktail party and to try to get 
Harry Belafonte to attend as guest of honor. Many originally 
thought the idea of trying to get Belafonte to come was out­
landish because he was "too busy" and knew nothing about 
Hatcher and his campaign for mayor. Mrs. Finkle informed the 
group, however, that her youngest daughter attended a private 
school in Massachusetts with Belafonte's daughter and that she 
might be able to get his private telephone number from the 
school's headmaster. Obtaining the number from the school 
official, Mrs. Finkle succeeded in reaching Belafonte at his home 
and explained her purpose in calling. Belafonte was quite angry 
at first that his private number had been released; his anger 
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soon subsided, however, and he informed Mrs. Finkle that he 
could not give her a definite answer to her request until he 
"checked" Hatcher out. Three days later Belafonte returned 
Mrs. Finkle's call informing her that he would not only come for 
the cocktail party, but would be happy to give a benefit concert 
afterwards. 
Belafonte came, despite a trip to New York by machine repre­
sentatives to encourage him not to become involved in the Gary 
campaign. The cocktail party was a tremendous success. Bela­
fonte's pitch for campaign money was so strong that some per­
sons who had intended to give $100 gave $200; almost everyone 
gave more than they had anticipated. More successful still was 
the evening concert. A sell-out crowd of four thousand persons 
packed Memorial Auditorium. Belafonte gave an inspired per­
formance that lasted an hour and a half. A surprise guest of the 
night was heavyweight champion Muhammed Ali, who told the 
audience he came because he had heard that his good friend 
Harry Belafonte was there and because he heard that one of his 
black brothers was running for mayor. "So I had to come over 
to see what was happening." Entertainers Oscar Brown, Jr., and 
Jean Pace also performed during the evening. 
The Belafonte concert was—from the perspective of the Hatcher 
movement—a pivotal turning point in the campaign. Enthusiasm 
by blacks for Hatcher's candidacy reached an all-time high during 
the Belafonte affair. Belafonte warmed the audience up with an 
appeal for black unity. When Hatcher walked on stage blacks 
shook the rafters. They cheered wildly as Belafonte assured them 
"he's working for your cause." Hatcher told the audience that 
his campaign was a people's movement, and predicted that 
primary election day would be remembered as the day planta­
tion politics died in Gary, Indiana. 
No longer shall we be stampeded to the polls like a bunch of cattle 
by a cynical, corrupt, bigoted political machine. Plantation politics 
is dead. The day the machine can come to us with a satchel full of 
stolen and extorted money and buy our vote is, thank God, over and 
13 gone.
The enthusiasm stirred by the Belafonte concert continued to 
swell as Hatcher volunteers persisted in their grass-roots mobil­
izing work. A bandwagon effect began to set in as a wave of black 
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nationalism swept across the city, centering around the man 
striving to become the first black mayor of a major northern 
city. Hatcher supporters were able to visibly observe large seg­
ments of the black community literally become politically alive for 
the first time, as masses of blacks, noting the enthusiasm of 
their brothers, began to finally realize that Hatcher did indeed 
have a superb chance of winning. One Hatcher worker vividly 
described the substantive dimensions of this transformation of 
the black community: 
People for the first time really began to see how important a vote 
was, that they could control a way of life, and that they could make
or break a machine, and that they could actually control what they
wanted in their own city. They could demand certain things them­
selves as people. I think that people never before realized this. They
accepted the fact that voting time came, some people were elected,
and they let it go at that. Some people had power. I think they felt
there were those politicians in the area and they could go to them
when problems came along and ask them to do things for their chil­
dren. I think for the first time people realized if given the op­
portunity they didn't have to go to somebody to live as human beings,
they could do it for themselves if they could possibly get an op­
portunity to live like everybody else. 
The surge of black support for Hatcher became infectious, 
reaching into every quarter of the black community. Signs of a 
bandwagon effect were present everywhere. Pictures of Hatcher 
studded the windows and walls of black homes. Threats made by 
committeemen to have them removed began to backfire as 
blacks began to ask themselves: "Well, why is it they don't want 
me to put this man's picture in the window? Can he really do 
something for me? Is he really a threat?" People approached 
Hatcher volunteers begging to be registered and offering their 
services in his campaign. Indeed, so many people began to volun­
teer to work that this in itself became an organizational problem. 
Having nothing to do for many of the people who were standing 
around headquarters under foot, key Hatcher workers began to 
offer a pat reply to the question what can I do to help: "Go 
spread the gospel brother, go spread the gospel." And spread 
it they did. Katz supporters found themselves no longer able to 
get a hearing in the black community. Ministers who endorsed 
Katz from the pulpit were threatened with immediate dismissal. 
A person who inadvertently made a disparaging remark about 
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Hatcher in a bar ran the danger of getting cracked in the head 
with a bottle. Black political consciousness had developed full-
blown in Gary, Indiana. The mood of the hour is sharply captured 
in these observations by a black politician who was himself run­
ning for public office at the time: 
The fever was in the air. You could feel it. If I walked from here to 
the alley even the average wino would ask me "where do you stand
so far as Mr. Hatcher is concerned?" And I would say, I'm with 
Mr. Hatcher. "All right, I'll vote for you." You were either with Mr.
Hatcher or against him. There was no in between. You couldn't say
anything against Mr. Hatcher. If you went into an audience and 
made a speech for a white candidate, the audience would walk out
on you. The incumbent mayor had very few people with guts enough to
go into places and make a speech for him. The average black person
could identify with Mr. Hatcher. The billboards all around you had
pictures of Mr. Hatcher. Even the kids were taking balloons home,
taking pencils home. Even my son asked me, "Dad, who do you
think is going to be mayor?" I tried to out fox him. He was at the
time eight years old. I said I don't know. Who do you think is going
to be mayor and he said "I don't know but I hope Mr. Hatcher is."
He could identify himself with the black man running for mayor.
And if this was demonstrated in my household, I dare say in the
household of every black man in the city of Gary, the teenagers, the
minor kids were talking about voting for Mr. Hatcher, and so this
had an indelible impression—it had to have had—on the parents. If
they went out and voted for anyone else they would be a traitor to
their race. 
In summary, the Belafonte concert not only saved the Hatcher 
campaign financially, but gave it a tremendous psychological 
lift. It produced a show of solidarity and enthusiasm of such 
impressive proportions that even the most pessimistic blacks who 
wished Hatcher well became captivated by what they perceived 
as his greater prospects for victory. The Belafonte concert set 
off a wave of emotion that soared to higher and higher levels 
of intensity until it reached its dramatic climax on primary elec­
tion day. Thus, in some sense, this event can be viewed as a 
triggering device setting into motion the final phases of a process 
of group emergence spanning over approximately a ten-year 
period. 
Before leaving the city, Belafonte offered to give a follow-up 
concert for Hatcher during the general election. Hatcher wasted 
no time accepting his offer. 
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CAMPAIGN EFFORTS IN THE WHITE COMMUNITY 
In striking contrast to the massive campaign effort mounted 
in the black community, only limited and superficial attempts 
were made to garner votes for Hatcher in the white community. 
This was due mainly to the feeling on the part of Hatcher stra­
tegists that a vigorous campaign to rally white votes in Hatcher's 
behalf would be a waste of time, because whites on the whole 
simply would not vote for a black candidate running on a strong 
black power platform. The statistical analysis of past elections 
prepared for the primary campaign by Hatcher researchers es­
tablished to their satisfaction that every hour spent in the black 
community would yield much more rewarding results than an 
hour spent in the white community. Consequently, practically 
every aspect of the primary campaign was devoted to turning 
out the black vote because the black vote would unquestionably 
be the key to Hatcher's success in the campaign. With two white 
candidates in the race, it became highly probable that they 
would chop each other up sufficiently in the white community 
to nullify the possibility of either winning the election, provided 
the black community was mobilized sufficiently to produce a 
sizable and cohesive black vote behind Hatcher's candidacy. 
This is not by any means to suggest that the white com­
munity was completely neglected. In fact, the Hatcher organiza­
tion broke precedent with the campaign practices of black can­
didates running for major offices in previous elections by 
establishing a campaign headquarters in the first district. This 
facility operated under the general supervision of Arthur Lebo, a 
Miller resident and active member of the white group associated 
with the Hatcher campaign. The Miller headquarters was run 
almost as an independent agency in the campaign. It was es­
tablished primarily as a symbolic sign to whites that Hatcher was 
interested in support from the total community, not just the black 
community and, if elected, would be not just a black mayor but 
a mayor for all the people. Since it was completely unreasonable 
to think Hatcher would get any votes at all out of Glen Park, no 
parallel facility was established in the sixth district. 
The appeal for votes in the white community was directed al­
most exclusively by white members of the Hatcher campaign 
organization. Several house meetings for Hatcher were ar­
ranged by these persons, which allowed him to speak to from 
six to sixty residents of the Miller area. Literature was dis­
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tributed in white neighborhoods by white campaign members 
with the assistance of students from the Gary branch of Indiana 
University. Various fund-raising drives among white citizens in 
Hatcher's behalf were also initiated by white Hatcher campaign 
workers. Three white members of the Hatcher organization put 
together a long and impressive campaign document entitled 
Hatcher and the Progressive White Voter, which, in addition to 
discussing general issues such as war, the need for federal funds, 
and the patronage system, offered a comparison of Katz's record 
as mayor with the reform platform on which Hatcher was run­
ning. The document concluded that Katz had been the best 
mayor in fifteen years but that his best was not enough. It 
argued that Hatcher on the other hand was honest, capable, sup­
ported by outstanding black citizens, and offered hopes for a 
new day to all Gary citizens. 
These activities in the white community by white Hatcher sup­
porters had only limited impact. In part this was due to their 
narrow range of effective influence in the white community. 
Much of their time was spent con vicing their friends, many of 
whom had political views that would have inclined them to 
vote for Hatcher anyway, that Hatcher was the best of the avail­
able candidates. Virtually no efforts were made to do systematic 
grass-roots organizing in the white community because the 
motivation for such efforts was totally lacking. The impact of 
the electoral activities of white Hatcher supporters in the white 
community was also gravely blunted by intense white hostility. 
Scurrilous leaflets were circulated through the white community, 
which identified leading whites in the Hatcher campaign and 
labeled them communists. These whites were generally harassed 
with threatening phone calls, damage to their homes and other 
public property, hate mail, and so forth. Their children were also 
taunted by other children at school who often repeated remarks 
they had heard expressed by their parents. Similarly, students 
distributing literature for Hatcher in white areas were severely 
beaten on several occasions. The Hatcher headquarters in Miller 
was the target of frequent vandalism with windows being 
damaged by bricks and gun shots. If at one point in the campaign 
it became dangerous to make anti-Hatcher remarks in the black 
community, it was also equally dangerous to make favorable re­
marks about him in the white community. 
Except for the Indiana Civil Liberties Union, no predominately 
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white organization lent public support to Hatcher's campaign in the 
primary. Organized labor endorsed Katz and virtually all the trade 
union members active in the campaign—except for a small 
contingent of black union members—were active in Katz's behalf. 
A union committee headed by Louis Comer in the Hatcher or­
ganization made a concerted attempt to neutralize organized 
labor in the campaign but failed. The reaction of the Post-Tribune 
to Hatcher's candidacy ranged from hostility to camouflaged 
neutrality. Hatcher supporters complained of articles submitted 
to the paper being omitted or edited beyond recognition. They 
generally perceived coverage by the Post-Tribune of the cam­
paign to be slanted, playing up violent incidents attributed to 
them but giving scant attention to those that could be placed at 
the door step of the supporters of other candidates. 
Thus few inroads were made into the white community during 
the primary campaign. Hatcher was given only modest exposure 
in white neighborhoods, only a small number of general level 
appeals were made for the white vote, and literally no grass-
roots action was mounted to rally the white electorate behind 
Hatcher's candidacy. There were some members of the Hatcher 
campaign organization who disagreed with this approach to the 
white community. They felt that at least a small percentage of 
the white vote would be needed in order to elect Hatcher and 
that it was not at all a certainty that Hatcher would get this white 
vote unless he actively campaigned for it. Some campaign work­
ers suggested that a forceful campaign be directed toward 
younger whites who tended to be open-minded on racial ques­
tions and could be used to influence the voting behavior of their 
parents. But these views were given little consideration in light 
of the desperate need to channel all available campaign re­
sources toward the mobilization of the black community. 
Part of the Hatcher organization's strategic approach to the 
white community in the primary related to the establishment of 
a coalition between blacks and Latin Americans. It was felt that 
such a coalition would not only be important for the 1967 elec­
tion but would be crucial for future elections since the Latin 
population was rapidly becoming a significant numerical pro­
portion of the city's overall population. Consequently, the deci­
sion was made to make a conscious appeal for the Latin vote in 
the primary. The basic appeal was made by the candidate who 
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attempted to present himself as sympathetic to the problems of 
all oppressed people in Gary. He made particular reference to 
the low socioeconomic position of Latins and contended on 
several occasions that they were just as much victims of eco­
nomic and social discrimination as blacks. Hatcher promised 
when elected to provide channels of communication through 
which the concerns of Latins could be directly transmitted to 
major city officials and departments. 
At the street level, Latins were encouraged to join in the door-
to-door, grass-roots campaign, especially in the second and third 
districts where most Latins resided. The Hatcher campaign was 
taken directly to the Latin people through volunteer work. One 
enterprising volunteer rented a video tape recorder, a monitor 
and a camera, recruited Spanish-speaking people to perform 
as actors, and made a film demonstrating procedures for using 
voting machines. This film was then shown in about seven loca­
tions in the Latin community. 
The campaign to stimulate Latin support for Hatcher in the 
primary was, by and large, a failure. Some Latins were recruited 
into the campaign organization, and they were able to make 
inroads into the Latin community that could not have been made 
by other volunteers. But generally speaking, Hatcher people 
were unable to establish a viable coalition between blacks and 
Latin Americans during the primary campaign. Several factors 
were probably responsible for this. First, work in the Latin com­
munity by Hatcher volunteers was greatly encumbered by the 
low visibility of independent Latin leadership. Latins with a city­
wide reputation for community involvement were, for the most 
part, tied in with the machine. Hatcher people were told that an 
independent Latin leadership corps was emerging, but they had 
no way of reaching it. One effort was made to cut through to this 
leadership corps, which took the form of a series of meetings 
with Latin trade union leaders, but it was basically unproduc­
tive. Second, Hatcher workers discovered during the campaign 
that the Latin community was badly divided between Mexicans 
and Puerto Ricans. Tension between these two groups arose 
from close residential proximity, competition for blue-collar jobs, 
and differences in traditions and culture. These tensions pre­
cluded the consolidation of the Latin community behind Hatch­
er's candidacy. Third, many Latins refused to work in the cam­
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paign on a volunteer basis. A few who demanded money were 
paid; but most were not because the organization could not afford 
to do so and because some volunteers objected to bringing Latins 
into the organization on a basis different from all other workers. 
Finally, the appeal to the Latin community was diluted by the 
crisis in identity faced by many Latins. This crisis stems from the 
fact that Latins are technically classified as Caucasians, but are 
treated as such only when machine politicians are interested in 
obtaining their vote. "During election time the power structure 
would go to them and stress the point that they were white. 
And a lot of them believed it. But after they gave them their vote 
and they started acting white, the power structure would call 
their attention to it and say, what are you doing, you must 
think you're white?" Latins driven by a desire to be white, but 
frustrated because this was impossible to accomplish in fact, 
generally ignored Hatcher's appeal to their sense of group identity 
and his attempt to demonstrate a close parallel between their 
social situation and that of blacks. 
The inability of the Hatcher organization to establish a coali­
tion between blacks and Latin Americans was—from the point 
of view of Hatcher supporters—one of the most disappointing 
aspects of the primary campaign. 
THE KATZ AND KONRADY CAMPAIGNS

Incumbent Mayor A. Martin Katz entered the 1967 primary 
race extremely optimistic about his chances for winning because 
he had expected to be involved in a one-on-one battle with 
Richard Hatcher. Katz figured to pick up strong support in the 
white community, because he would be the only rational al­
ternative for white voters, as well as solid support in the black 
community, because of his reputation as a liberal on racial issues. 
The early announcement by Pruitt that he intended to run was 
the cause for initial alarm but Katz later became convinced that 
strong enough pressure could be brought to bear to force Pruitt's 
withdrawal in the interest of the party unity. Concern about his 
chances for winning did not emerge full-blown until Bernard 
Konrady filed for mayor and rebuffed all attempts to persuade 
him to withdraw. With Konrady and Hatcher in the race, Katz 
strategists calculated that he would need to poll 30 percent of 
the white vote and 40 percent of the black vote in order to win. 
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Katz anticipated that he would have difficulty obtaining a sig­
nificant percentage of the white vote. Two factors laid behind 
this evaluation. First, he had alienated large segments of the 
white community by his liberal stand on issues affecting the black 
community. Whites were particularly distressed by Katz's strong 
support of the 1965 omnibus civil rights bill. Second, Bernard 
Konrady's brother, Emery, had run well in the white com­
munity in 1963, and it was quite likely that the same voters who 
voted for Emery would vote for Bernard. Further, Konrady pro­
vided disgruntled white voters dismayed by the machine's poor 
performance over the past four years an acceptable alternative 
to Katz in the mayor's race. The conclusion reached by Katz and 
his advisors was that they had a terrific job of rebuilding to do 
in the white community if they were going to get the percentage 
of white votes he needed to win. 
On the other hand, Katz firmly believed that he would do well 
in the black community and identified the vote in Midtown as 
the central target of his campaign appeal. He believed that the 
very thing that made him unpopular in the white community— 
his record on civil rights—would garner for him from 40 to 50 
percent of the black vote. Some persons interested in his elec­
tion warned Katz that he should not underestimate Hatcher's 
tremendous popular appeal among black voters caught up in 
the rising tide of black nationalism across the country. One re­
spondent recalled admonishing Katz in this regard in the follow­
ing manner: "I said to him Marty, a new black man is going to 
be behind that voting booth, and when they are faced with the 
choice of supporting their own young, black, militant, aggressive 
leader, against a white machine politician, in view of rising anti-
Semitism among blacks, who in the hell do you think they're 
going to vote for?" But Katz dismissed such warnings as un­
realistic. He continued to insist that he would do well in the black 
community because he was entitled to black support. His pat 
response to contrary opinions, according to the respondent cited 
above, was "how can they [blacks] vote against me? After all, 
we passed the fair housing ordinance." 
Katz's firm convictions that he would receive strong black 
support were reinforced by assurances he received from black 
precinct committeemen that their control over the black vote was 
as tight as ever, and that they would produce solid majorities 
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for him all over the black community. They reminded Katz that 
they were professionals with a long history of success and sug­
gested that it was inconceivable that a bunch of rag-tag amateurs 
could steal the votes of their constituents from under their noses. 
Similar assurances were offered by Katz's chief political advisor 
in the election, George Chacharis. Although many Katz sup­
porters resented the prominent role Chacharis played in the cam­
paign, because they felt that he was dishing out the "same old 
baloney" used to win elections in the past, Katz relied on Cha­
charis very heavily throughout the campaign. Katz considered 
Chacharis to be an asset in his campaign for three basic reasons: 
(1) he respected his political wisdom and judgment; (2) Katz 
controlled by himself only 40 percent of the precinct organiza­
tions, but with Chacharis behind him his control increased to 75 
percent; and (3) Chacharis still wielded considerable influence 
with Lake County party leaders, including Leslie Pruitt, whose 
open support would add substantially to Katz's appeal in the 
white community.14 But Chacharis was still committed to old-
style machine politics and did not fully comprehend the changes 
that had taken place in the black community from the time he 
went to jail to the time he returned to the city. He advised Katz 
that if everything else failed, the black vote could surely be de­
livered by a huge expenditure of money in the black community 
during the week before the primary election. 
Despite a strong personal appeal to black voters centering on 
his liberal civil rights record, and the full-fledged support of the 
black precinct organization, Katz's campaign never really got off 
the ground in the black community. Some blacks wavered be­
tween Katz and Hatcher during the early days of the campaign, 
but as the Hatcher movement began catching fire, support for 
Katz rapidly diminished. As the campaign in the black com­
munity wore on, it became more and more necessary for anyone 
attempting to sell Katz to black voters to proceed with extreme 
caution. Black committeemen found that when they visited black 
residences they had to go to considerable lengths to feel out the 
political persuasion of their constituents before mentioning 
Katz's name. A more direct approach only guaranteed that they 
would have a lot of doors slammed in their faces. Commenting 
on the attitude of black voters, a respondent very active in the 
Katz campaign remarked: "You just couldn't talk to them. 'Don't 
you remember he [Katz] was fighting for civil rights? He has a 
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long history of being tolerant of the Negro.' It didn't work. 
Nothing worked. They were determined that one of their own 
would be mayor and you couldn't talk them out of it." Indeed, 
opposition to Katz became so intense in the black community 
that some black committeemen themselves took to passing out 
literature for Hatcher while carrying literature folders bearing 
the slogan "Keep Katz." 
To compensate for Katz's deteriorating political position in the 
black community, the machine initiated a massive effort to buy 
the black vote. An incredible amount of money was pumped into 
the black community during the last few weeks of the campaign. 
Some respondents contended that during the last two weeks alone 
the machine dropped nearly $100,000 in the black community. 
This money was spent in various ways. Representatives of the 
machine invaded taverns and restaurants in the black district 
spreading large sums around—$500 to $1,000—imploring indi­
viduals to throw parties for Katz or undertake other kinds of 
political activity in his behalf. During the last five days of the 
campaign five women in every precinct were paid $60 apiece 
to make phone calls encouraging blacks to "Keep Katz." On 
election day black committeemen were authorized to hire twenty 
persons per precinct at $2 per hour to go door to door pulling 
out black voters and encouraging them to vote for Katz. To the 
amazement of top machine officials, in this election the black 
community took the money and still voted against Katz. One 
important county official who opposed plans to spend huge sums 
in the black community to get Katz elected commented bit­
terly: 
They [Katz and Chacharis] overestimated the power of their money.
They thought they could buy the votes in the Negro district. They
couldn't. They took the money. But they took it from them the year
before when they voted for Allen. He [Katz] did nothing to punish
them. If they got away with it one time, they figured, well, we can
do it again. They were relying on the money to do the job down there
it had done in the past, but it couldn't be done because Hatcher was
smart enough to know that he could raise the racial question down
there and overcome the money. He [Katz] was influenced to follow
this course by Chacharis who argued that you don't change some­
thing that's successful. 
If Katz's political position in the black community was dis­
couraging, it was downright dismal in the white community. 
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Katz originally intended to rely exclusively upon the white pre­
cinct organization to deliver the white community for him. How­
ever, a sizable proportion of that organization was committed 
to Pruitt in the primary. When Pruitt pulled out of the race, 
many of these committeemen decided to sit the primary out. 
Those who worked for Katz found themselves extremely handi­
capped by his unsavory reputation among white voters. White 
committeemen attempted to project the image of Katz as an 
honest, hard-working administrator who had improved the effi­
ciency of essential city services, made impressive capital im­
provements, revitalized the various commercial centers around 
the city, and kept the lid on social tensions in the city. But white 
voters simply were not buying Katz on these terms. Many white 
residents refused to talk to committeemen campaigning for Katz. 
"You could go in peoples' homes and they would tell you get out, 
don't bother coming to talk to me." It was very difficult to get 
whites to come out to a Katz meeting. Indeed, many white voters 
appeared so incensed and confused that it was difficult to get 
them to participate in any capacity in the election. More and 
more Katz workers began to receive clear indications from white 
voters that they did not even intend to cast ballots in the primary. 
In this regard one Katz supporter observed: 
They [the white voters] were still angry with Katz. It was just a
general feeling. When you asked them why they were angry no one
could come up with any specific answer. . .  . It got to the point
that you knew they weren't going to come out. It wasn't the organiza­
tion's fault because they worked. But you knew going through the
precincts talking to people. You'd walk out and you'd say well that
one is not going to vote. You just couldn't put your finger on the
problem. "I'm just not going to vote." "Why?" "I just don't want 
to." 
In the beginning when Katz workers came back with reports of 
white-voter hostility and apathy, they were instructed simply to 
go back and try harder. Once it became clear that no matter how 
hard they tried using the good government approach white voters 
could not be induced to vote for Katz, a new strategy for generat­
ing white support for Katz was employed. This strategy was 
designed to play upon the racial fears of whites by suggesting 
to them that a vote for Konrady would do no more than con­
tribute to the election of Hatcher. Busloads of Katz workers 
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during the final three weeks in the campaign scattered through­
out the white community selling the proposition to white voters 
that a vote for Konrady was a wasted vote, so that if they 
wanted a white mayor they had no choice but to vote for Katz. 
They argued that Katz would receive a substantial number of 
black votes because of his civil rights record. Thus if white 
voters lined up solidly behind Katz they could assure them­
selves a white mayor for the next four years. The door-to-door 
Katz drive in the white community was supplemented by a tele­
phone and mailing program. Ladies hired to handle the telephone 
operation were instructed to concentrate on the new campaign 
theme: a vote for Konrady is a vote for Hatcher. Small cards 
were mailed to practically every white home in the city. These 
cards cut right to the core of the new Katz appeal. They read, 
"Think, A vote for Konrady is a vote for Hatcher." These last 
minute maneuvers began to produce notable results. The white 
community began to come alive and to unify around Katz. Large 
numbers of white voters who formerly had been committed to 
Konrady shifted over to Katz during approximately the last ten 
days of the campaign when the main appeal of the Katz cam­
paign was at its highest. But these efforts came too late to pull 
the election out of the fire for Katz. Some Katz supporters 
estimate that if the primary campaign had run just one week 
longer Katz could have drained enough of Konrady's white sup­
port off to win the election. Katz had been counting, however, 
on the black community to come through for him. By the time 
he realized that it was not going to do so and that he would 
need more white support than he originally anticipated, too 
much of the campaign period had elapsed for him to completely 
unify the white vote behind his candidacy. 
Bernard Konrady entered the primary race (and remained in 
it) for two reasons. First, and foremost, he entered because he 
believed that he could win. This conviction was based on the 
premise that the major appeal of both Katz and Hatcher was in 
the black rather than the white community. This fact suggested 
that Katz and Hatcher would split the black vote, and each 
would run so poorly in the white community that he (Konrady) 
would have an excellent chance of polling enough of the white 
vote to win the election. Second, barring that outcome, Konrady 
believed that he could at least poll enough white votes to deny 
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the election to. Katz—this would be a secondary victory, since he 
was absolutely convinced that the machine had stolen the 
mayoral election from his brother in 1963. 
Konrady based his campaign in the white community on a 
strong reform platform. One component of this platform involved 
a ringing indictment of corruption in city government and con­
trol of Gary politics by a cynical political machine. The platform 
also included an attack on Katz's record of performance as 
mayor. He accused Katz of shackling the police, thus allowing 
the rate of crime to soar, failing to build one public facility, 
increasing the tax rate while allowing city services to deteriorate, 
and proposing to build public housing in Glen Park and Miller 
for his own financial gain and that of his associates.15 Konrady 
also stressed Katz's tie up with the machine, charging him with 
bringing into his political family "the most outrageous plunderers 
of public property including Gary's own Billy Sol Estes [Chacharis], 
who is masterminding the mayor's campaign of vice and crime 
and who hopes to regain the seat of trust which he so disgraced."16 
In his various campaign speeches Konrady outlined a program of 
reform that he contended would clean up the city physically, rid 
the city of ghost payrollers, check the rise in the tax rate, improve 
city services, halt the wasteful expenditure of city funds on proj­
ects of limited value to the city's progress and safety, and crack 
down on all forms of crime and vice in the city. 
Konrady viewed Katz as vulnerable on all of these issues, and 
directed his campaign to those white voters who were most con­
cerned about high taxes and political corruption in city govern­
ment. One Konrady supporter underscored this assessment of 
Katz's political posture in the white community: 
I couldn't possibly see any white voters, voting for Katz. This was sin 
city; vice was running rampant, mothers were getting aggravated;
crime was coming in all over. Anything could be bought. The police
could be bought. I just couldn't see how Katz could get anywhere
near the white vote he got. 
Throughout most of the campaign, Konrady was clearly the 
frontrunner in the white community. However, Katz effectively 
cut the ground from under Konrady's campaign in the white 
community with his profoundly racial appeal for white support 
in the final weeks of the primary race. To Konrady's credit, he re­
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fused to counter Katz's racial appeal with one of his own. Some 
of his supporters advised him to accuse Katz of "trying to make 
Gary into a black town," but he resisted, asserting that he was 
confident he could maintain white support without playing that 
kind of racial game. 
THE HATCHER CAMPAIGN ORGANIZATION ON ELECTION DAY 
Election day activities of the Hatcher campaign organization 
centered around the production of a large voter turnout in the 
black community and protection of the Hatcher vote. Both of these 
goals were considered to be pivotal to Hatcher's primary victory. 
It went without saying that Hatcher could not win if a substan­
tial percentage of the eligible black electorate did not turn out to 
vote. The task of turning out a heavy black vote was assigned pri­
marily to the same street-level organization that had operated so 
effectively during the registration drive. It was given a powerful 
assist by Indiana University students and members of the Inde­
pendent Voters League of Illinois. Block workers fanned out across 
the black community going from door to door encouraging people 
to vote. Transportation was provided to and from the polls, and 
babysitting services were made available upon request. This 
phase of the campaign reached near massive proportions with as 
many as two thousand people tagged with buttons and cards 
that clearly identified them as Hatcher workers beating the 
bushes of the black community—including pool halls and bars— 
and pulling out every possible black voter registered to participate 
in the election. 
At the same time this army of volunteers was working to pro­
duce a heavy black turnout, other Hatcher people were involved 
in efforts to minimize the incidence of fraudulent voting. Protec­
tion of the vote on election day had become a major preoccupa­
tion of the Hatcher organization during the final weeks of the 
campaign as persistent rumors filtered into campaign headquar­
ters regarding a bold attempt by the machine to steal the election. 
The credibility of those reports was supported by canvass statis­
tics compiled by the Hatcher organization, which showed that 
in black precincts the registration poll books listed the names of 
5,200 persons who were no longer precinct residents. This meant 
that if repeaters were paid to vote these ineligible names, Hatcher 
would begin the election 8,000 to 9,000 votes behind. Hatcher 
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campaign officials, based on this information, and their experi­
ences in the Dozier Allen campaign, were determined not to leave 
any bases uncovered in their effort to assure a reasonably honest 
vote in the primary election. 
One of the crucial lessons learned by members of Muigwithania 
during their several forays in electoral politics was that a black 
independent candidate could not get a fair count on election day 
unless he recruited and trained an effective group of election-
day poll watchers. Accordingly, two months before the primary, a 
program was begun to train some Hatcher volunteers to be poll 
watchers on election day. Responsibility for this poll-watching 
operation was placed in the capable hands of Mr. L. T. Allison 
who developed an in-service training program for persons volun­
teering to serve in this capacity. These poll-watcher trainees 
were given instructions in what to look for at polling stations, 
how they should proceed if they witnessed illegal voting activity, 
and how to circumvent pitfalls that would be placed in their way 
by the machine. With respect to the latter, they were given de­
tailed instructions on the formal and informal rules of the politi­
cal game. 
What does the law say you can do? Then what does the system say 
you can do? These are two different things. So we had to prepare them 
for what the law said they could and could not do, and what the sys­
tem said they could and could not do. The most detrimental of them 
all is the system. 
In addition to the poll-watching program, several other pro­
grams were instituted to safeguard the vote in black precincts. 
For example, some Hatcher workers were trained as voting-ma­
chine mechanics. The organization was able to get the Hatcher 
volunteers approved by the county as official election mechanics. 
Anticipating trouble, Hatcher workers surveyed the situation in 
black precincts the night before the election and isolated the pre­
cincts likely to have machines that would break down "automati­
cally." Early the next morning machine mechanics working for 
Hatcher visited these precincts without being called in order to be 
on hand before the emergency occurred. Nevertheless, Hatcher 
headquarters still received a barrage of phone calls from angry 
black voters saying that they had gotten up at 6:00 A.M. to vote, 
had been standing in line for two hours, were running late for 
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work, but still had not voted because the machines in their pre­
cincts were "out of order." 
In order to discourage as much vote juggling by precinct com­
mitteemen as possible, a rumor was spread by some members of 
the Hatcher camp that the FBI would be keeping close watch 
over voting activities in black neighborhoods. On election day a 
group of Hatcher people rented several large black cars, dressed 
up in dark suits and large hats pulled down over their foreheads, 
and went from one precinct to the next in black areas standing 
completely silent, jotting down comments in note pads. They never 
identified themselves as law officers, but many election officials 
jumped to the immediate conclusion that they were. One person 
who participated in these activities recalled, "I could hear whis­
pers of FBI, FBI, as we went along. They didn't know whether to 
throw us out or what. We felt that maybe this kind of thing may 
have stopped a few people from doing what they were going to do. 
And we tried to hit as many precincts as possible; we just went 
round and round all day long until the whole thing was over, then 
dragged ourselves to headquarters to find out what happened." 
An effective lawyer's organization was also formed to assist in 
election day activities. Some of these lawyers concerned them­
selves with mapping out plans for legal action in case the machine 
succeeded in stealing the election. Others operated out of central 
headquarters and were on call to investigate complaints by poll 
watchers of illegal voting practices. Communications equip­
ment was installed in private automobiles so that top campaign 
leaders or lawyers could ride by precincts and inquire about the 
status of things from workers on duty inside. Poll watchers had 
strict instructions to contact these roving vehicles, headquarters, 
a local radio station, and the Post-Tribune if they witnessed irreg­
ularities or were subjected to intimidation. A few poll watchers 
reported during the day being told that they could not work in­
side the polling place, and of being jostled around by precinct 
officials; but most encountered little difficulty because the Hatcher 
camp had made it understood well in advance of the election that 
it did not intend to be cheated out of this election. The nature of 
this understanding was best described by this respondent: 
The word had gotten around, you're not going to come in my pre­
cinct and steal. No you weren't going to do that. Now you steal over 
my dead body. All they had to do was get fifty votes in each area 
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and we were dead. You're just going to go in there and do that, and
I'm going to stand there like I used to do—we weren't doing that. And
we were going to resort to anything to prevent it—and we did. 
One of the most important responsibilities of persons serving 
as poll watchers on election day was that of keeping track of the 
vote and periodically phoning the vote on their precinct machines 
in to campaign headquarters. At the end of the day they were 
instructed to remain inside the polling place until the machines 
were locked up and to make absolutely sure that they had a record 
of the final tally on each machine. They were then to call that 
tally in, before bringing it in. These precautions were considered 
essential because it was believed that in the past the machine 
had made it standard practice to tamper with machine tallies af­
ter precinct polling stations had officially closed. 
We wanted to have an accurate tally so that if the machine had a
certain amount of votes on it when it closed, and was locked up, if it
leaves here and goes to California and back, it's supposed to have the 
same number of votes on it. This is what we learned in the township
assessor's race: we didn't have the count on every machine. 
The surveillance of the primary vote by Hatcher workers did 
not end with the collection of final machine tallies. Hatcher of­
ficials had been informed by a man who had taught the opposition 
how to steal votes that often drastic changes in the final vote 
were made in city hall before figures were taken to the tally room 
for processing. He told them that this was customarily done in one 
of two ways. One way was for the election inspector to drive into 
the city hall garage and exchange tally sheets with another per­
son before taking the final count to the tally room. The other 
method involved taking the city hall elevator to the fourth floor, 
exchanging tally sheets with someone waiting there, and then rid­
ing back down to turn in a false sheet on the second floor. In the 
light of this information, the decision was made to station a 
Hatcher worker at every possible point where a change of tally 
sheets could be made. Security forces from the Hatcher camp were 
ready to roll the moment the voting inspector received his call to 
come to city hall. They trailed him all the way to the downtown 
destination. Other Hatcher workers were waiting to follow him 
into city hall and to stay with him until he deposited the tally 
with downtown election officials. One Hatcher worker assessed 
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the effectiveness of this strategy for protecting the vote: "It 
worked in the sense that they had to find another way of steal­
ing, they couldn't use that one on us." 
Respondents who worked actively for Hatcher in the primary 
were absolutely convinced that despite their extraordinary pre­
cautionary measures, some of the votes cast for Hatcher were 
still stolen. They quickly pointed out, however, that these measures 
were effective enough to prevent the machine from stealing the 
number of votes that it needed to win. 
That was our main goal. If we can keep them from stealing enough 
then we can win. It was just enough with the right type of enforce­
ment to keep them from taking it. A man can steal, but if he steals 
too much you're going to notice it as soon as you walk in the house. 
So you can make everything so tight that they can't steal as much as 
they want without going to the penitentiary. And this was all a part 
of the strategy that was worked on. 
THE PRIMARY RESULTS 
On the day of the primary election the mayoral race was con­
sidered by most knowledgeable observers to be a toss up, with the 
three major candidates running within 1,000 votes of each other. 
This analysis during the early stages of the balloting appeared to be 
at least partially correct. Although Konrady failed to run as 
strongly as predicted, Hatcher and Katz traded the lead up to 
about halfway in the vote count. At that point Hatcher pulled 
ahead and maintained a steadily growing margin. Final election re­
turns officially confirmed a narrow victory for Hatcher with 39 
percent of the vote. Katz ran second with 35 percent, and Kon­
rady third with 26 percent. The results of the primary election 
by districts are presented in table 13. 
TABLE 13 
GARY DEMOCRATIC MAYORAL PRIMARY ELECTION, 1967 
District Hatcher Konrady Katz 
First
Second
Third
Fourth
Fifth
Sixth
 446 
 1,260 
 6,988 
 5,496 
 5,817 
 265 
3,176
2,847 
1,114
294 
245 
5,455 
3,946
2,809 
2,194
2,554 
2,008 
4,399 
Total 20,272 13,133 17,910 
SOURCE: Board of Election voting returns. 
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An examination of primary election returns suggests that sev­
eral factors were chiefly responsible for Hatcher's primary vic­
tory. One factor was the almost equal division of the white vote 
between Katz and Konrady. This division of the white vote 
virtually destroyed Konrady's chances of winning. Konrady had 
pinned his election on the polling of approximately 80 percent 
of the white vote; however, he fell short of reaching this objec­
tive in both the predominately white districts. He carried the 
sixth district, Glen Park, where white antagonism to Katz was 
the highest, but did so by receiving only 62 percent of the vote. 
In the first district, the Miller area, Konrady was defeated by 
Katz who polled 52 percent of the vote to his 42 percent. Overall, 
Konrady received 46 percent of the white vote while Katz re­
ceived 47 percent. 
That Katz would more than break even with Konrady in the 
white community was not predicted by even the most seasoned 
observers of Gary politics. Respondents commenting on this 
subject agreed that Katz picked up the bulk of his support in the 
white community during the last ten days of the primary campaign. 
This was the period when George Chacharis began to furiously 
pull strings in Glen Park in order to divert votes in that area 
from Konrady to Katz. More importantly, it was the period in 
which Katz sought with success to convince white voters that 
Konrady was a splinter candidate whose presence in the race 
would possibly deny them a white mayor. 
A second variable greatly influencing the outcome of the 
primary race was Katz's inability to prevent a substantial propor­
tion of the black community from defecting to the Hatcher camp. 
As we have seen, a very forceful effort was made by Katz and 
his machine backers to perpetuate their powerful control over 
the black vote. They realized too late, however, that it could not 
be done. That this was so is not at all surprising, because the 
fundamental continuous pattern coloring Katz's relationship with 
the black community was the tendency on the part of his ad­
ministration to offer blacks too little, too late. Katz's most out­
standing failing was his inability to recognize that blacks in 
Gary had come to the point that they would no longer be satisfied 
with anything less than substantial, meaningful change. He 
continued to harbor the mistaken notion that token appointments 
and the passage of symbolic social legislation would be enough 
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to keep blacks from voting solidly for city-hall candidates. His 
big handicap was not that he did not try to respond to the urgent 
needs of the black community, but that he came too late with 
each of his offers. Katz began his administration by calling on 
blacks for advice; at that point blacks were already beyond the 
advice-giving stage and were seeking to share in the decision-
making process. By the time Katz was ready to allow them to join 
in decision-making, blacks did not want that anymore, they wanted 
to make the total decision. Each time black aspirations and white 
leadership were miles apart. Consequently, although he did not 
realize it, Katz started the campaign behind in the black com­
munity because black aspirations had far outstripped what he 
was personally willing to concede at the time. Running against 
only white opponents, or a black opponent that did not symbolize 
black aspirations, as did Hatcher, there is no question but that 
Katz would have been unbeatable in the black community. Faced 
with a choice of electing one of their own, or a white incumbent 
who symbolized the continuance of white power and white control 
in a city having a black majority, many black citizens ultimately 
decided in favor of the former rather than the latter. Hoping to 
receive a minimum of 40 percent of the black vote, Katz, relying 
on the entire stock of machine resources including money and 
the ability to manipulate the rules of the electoral process, was 
able to poll only 24 percent of the black vote. Because of his 
weak political influence in other segments of the electorate, this 
relatively poor performance in the black community made Katz's 
defeat a foregone conclusion. 
Katz thus emerged in the 1967 primary as a man caught in the 
middle between the quest by blacks for real power, and the pro­
found resistance of whites to black social, economic, and political 
aspirations. The critical fact of the matter was that by 1967 racial 
polarization in Gary had become too severe to be adequately 
managed by a mayor committed to a middle course. 
Most important of all in determining the outcome of the 1967 
primary election was the very capable job of making the black 
community aware of its political potential and mobilizing it for 
effective political action that had been performed by the Hatcher 
campaign organization. Much of the success achieved by the 
Hatcher campaign organization in the primary is attributable to 
the fact that, despite its amateur and volunteer character, its 
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electoral work was well coordinated and organized. As we have 
seen, committees were established to carry out the multiplicity of 
tasks necessary for the mounting of a successful campaign. Co­
ordination of the work of committees was directed through the 
executive board, the campaign coordinator, and the assistant 
campaign coordinator. This coordination was carried out through 
general guidelines establishing a chain of command each worker 
was supposed to follow, and an elaborate system of reporting was 
instituted that provided top decision-makers with up-to-date 
information about the general success—or lack of it—of the cam­
paign apparatus in achieving its objectives during each stage 
of the campaign. 
Many problems of coordination were eliminated by the tre­
mendous cooperative spirit of the volunteer workers. Esprit de 
corps among Hatcher workers was stimulated mainly by the deep 
commitment each volunteer brought to the cause of electing 
Hatcher as Gary's first black mayor. The vision of Hatcher's 
reign over the city's elaborate governmental structure operated 
to weld the primary organization into a tightly knit group and 
contributed to the success it enjoyed in performing the functions 
necessary for the political arousal of the black community. 
The faulty impression should not be left, however, that the 
Hatcher organization at all times operated smoothly and effi­
ciently. Members of the organization were amateurs, and they 
made all the mistakes of amateurs; or as one respondent put it: 
"Let's say we were neophytes. We made all the mistakes a suc­
cessful team can make." Problems of confused scheduling, im­
proper use of personnel, failure to check up on their assigned 
specific duties all wrought havoc with consistent and smooth 
operation. As in the case of the Stokes organization, the Hatcher 
organization encountered difficulties and disagreements over 
policies. One major dispute involving disagreements over policy 
and a basic clash between two key personalities nearly ripped the 
organization apart. 
It is important to stress, however, that none of the host of or­
ganizational problems experienced substantially hampered, ex­
cept for brief periods of time, the efforts by Hatcher supporters 
to mobilize the black community. The constant realization that 
they were participating in an historic event, coupled with their 
strong belief in the merits of their candidate, imbued Hatcher 
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volunteers with dedication and enthusiasm that more than 
compensated for the mistakes and internal conflicts that arose. 
As one Hatcher worker succinctly put it: "The lack of smoothness 
was made up for by the enthusiasm of the volunteer workers, the 
widespread popular appeal of the candidate, and the fun of being 
black." No better indication of the dedication of Hatcher's volun­
teer group can be found than the personal statement of these 
workers that they spent an average of eight hours a day, aside 
from their regular employment, working in his campaign. A sig­
nificant number claimed to have worked as many as eighteen 
hours a day. Most indicated that they relinquished all other out­
side activity to work in the campaign. Many also neglected their 
families, some their jobs, and a few even their health in their 
untiring efforts to elect Hatcher to the mayorship. The almost 
unbelievable enthusiasm and dedication that Hatcher's candidacy 
generated was described in very graphic terms by a Hatcher dis­
trict leader: 
That headquarters got to be another home. People just came out
and stayed. From 9 to 11, 8 to 11. Whenever this man would enter
the headquarters it was just something that people felt. To me he
gathers a type of feeling that can be compared to the Kennedys.
You know there is a thing that goes with them. I don't know what it
is, it is a thing that people built up so far as they were concerned.
And to me it seems that Hatcher gathers this same type of feeling.
It was just something to see. Men would work all day. They would
come to headquarters to get their materials to go out and put up
posters all over the city. It made no difference whether it rained. 
They'd stay up to 11, 12, 1, 2 o'clock in the morning, go home and go
to work, and come back the next day and do the same thing. There
wasn't any question of you do it, I don't want to do it; it was just
something that people automatically did. 
Herein lies the key to Hatcher's primary victory: his success 
in drawing around him a host of volunteer workers interested only 
in his election. These were the people who, although faced with 
what sometimes seemed insurmountable obstacles, continued to 
work endless hours, in everyway they knew how, to sell their can­
didate and his program to thousands of black voters. Without these 
devoted, industrious volunteers, Hatcher could not have been a 
serious candidate. 
The tremendous success enjoyed by the mobilization effort in 
the black community is reflected both in the size and cohesive­
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ness of the black vote in the primary election. Black turnout in 
the primary was an all time high. Approximately 61 percent of the 
eligible black electorate participated in this election. The Hatcher 
campaign organization was so successful in stimulating black 
turnout, in fact, that although white registration was higher 
than black registration, in excess of 3,000 more black voters cast 
ballots in the election than white voters. Only about 50 percent 
of the eligible white electorate participated in the primary elec­
tion. 
Blacks not only voted in heavy numbers, but they voted over­
whelmingly for Hatcher. The Hatcher campaign organization beat 
the machine impressively in all three of the predominately black 
districts. Although he did not come close to carrying the mixed 
second district, Hatcher received an overwhelming majority of 
the votes in the four black precincts located in that district. In 
total, Hatcher received approximately 70 percent of the black 
vote. Given the very firm control over the black vote exercised 
by the machine in past mayoral primaries, the delivery of this 
cohesive black vote in support of Hatcher's candidacy can be 
properly viewed only as an incredible display of political mobiliz­
ing ability by Hatcher and his dedicated group of amateur volun­
teers. 
1. This quotation and following unattributed quotations are derived from inter­
views conducted in Gary, Indiana, by the authors. 
2. Interview with Richard G. Hatcher, 7 January 1969. 
3. The authors wish to express their deep appreciation to Mr. Burton Wechsler, 
former professor of law at Valparaiso University, for making available the data 
on background elections discussed in this chapter. 
4. The total area of the election included not only Gary but eleven white 
precincts in Griffith Township. As expected, few votes cast in Griffith Township 
were cast for Allen. 
5. It is significant to note that these whites were not only homogeneous in 
their socioeconomic background, but also in their political and ideological lean­
ings. When they voted, they almost always voted Democratic. However, none of 
them considered themselves as strong Democratic party identifiers. Rather, they 
viewed themselves at best as independent Democrats; some considered them­
selves to be radicals with no affiliation or identification with traditional political 
institutions. Indeed, a few had histories of radicalism dating back to the labor 
movement in the 1930s and the Wallace progressive movement in the late 1940s. 
One of them had served as the Lake County director of the Wallace campaign 
in 1948. During the 1960s, they were actively involved in the peace movement 
and draft counseling. 
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6. On the subject of black power as a motivation for white participation in 
the Hatcher campaign, another white Hatcher worker observed: "I think that 
Hatcher represents a form of (though not necessarily the only form) black power 
that is important. It seems to me that black power is an essential stage in the 
development of a decent America. It seems to me that the nation has not had a 
greater problem in its history than its relationship with the black community. No 
matter whatever else one may say about the democratic promise and the demo­
cratic process, it has always been compromised by the fact of slavery and segrega­
tion. . .  . It seems to me incumbent on white Americans who are concerned with 
restructuring America to support black power movements whenever reasonable 
and feasible because I think it is such an important and necessary phase. And it 
seems to me that the Hatcher movement, less so than Hatcher himself, is one 
aspect of the stage—and a very important one. In a city like Gary with a majority 
black population, it seems not only right but absolutely necessary that when 
black leadership arises, as Richard certainly is> it ought to take the helm and give 
the black community a sense of pride and ability to govern." 
7. These figures on registration are from Wechsler. 
8. Gary Post-Tribune, 2 February 1967. 
9. Evidence of machine efforts to buy Konrady out of the mayor's contest first 
came to light in a statement by Konrady to the Post-Tribune on 19 March 1967. In 
view of Konrady's intransigence, party leaders decided that Pruitt's candidacy 
would only serve to split the white vote and assure Hatcher a free ride in the 
black community. Consequently, they persuaded Pruitt to retire from the race in 
favor of Katz who stood a better chance of competing with Hatcher for the black 
vote. 
10. For example, one area leader conducted a telephone survey, calling twenty-
five people a day and asking them to support Hatcher's campaign to become 
mayor of Gary. 
11. In Gary, any citizen 21 years old or older who meets state and precinct 
residence requirements (one year and three months, respectively) was eligible to 
register to vote in 1967. The central location for registration in the Gary area is the 
Lake County Board of Elections in Crown Point, about fifteen miles from down­
town Gary. To reduce the inconvenience entailed in a trip to Crown Point for 
registration purposes, several centrally located registration stations are typically 
established within the corporate boundaries of the city. 
12. This ruling by Krupa prevailed despite the fact that one Hatcher worker 
investigated the law and found that it contained no such limitation. 
13. Gary Post-Tribune, 17 April 1967. 
14. Chacharis was ultimately successful in persuading Pruitt to openly endorse 
Katz in the primary. However, Pruitt did not work actively for Katz. 
15. See, for example, Gary Post-Tribune, 13 March 1967. 
16. Ibid. 
8 
Gary: The 1967 General Election 
CAMPAIGN STRATEGY 
The primary election was followed by a two-month hiatus in the 
work of the Hatcher campaign organization. During the summer 
most of those who had been key Hatcher workers in the spring 
found it extremely difficult to become psychologically aroused 
about the general election campaign. At this point practically 
everyone in the Hatcher camp was of the opinion that his elec­
tion in the fall would be a shoo-in. Foremost in their minds was 
the fact that Gary was a Democratic stronghold. It had been over 
twenty-five years since a Republican had seriously competed in 
the general election for mayor. The major battle had, for as long 
as most could remember, been fought in the Democratic primary. 
When the Democratic primary decided the party's mayoral candi­
date, Lake County Democrats had invariably come together to 
administer a thorough shellacking to the sacrificial candidate nom­
inated by a moribund local Republican party. 
Expectations by Hatcher workers that he would coast to an easy 
victory in the fall were enhanced by their assessment of the po­
litical stature of his Republican opponent. The Republicans had 
nominated in the May primary Joseph Radigan, a forty-seven­
year-old Gary furniture dealer. Radigan was in every sense of the 
word a political dilettante, having had no prior experience in elec­
toral politics. Hatcher supporters believed that Radigan had 
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neither the organizational support nor the flair for political cam­
paigning capable of allowing him to seriously challenge their can­
didate for the mayorship. Radigan had shown himself in the pri­
mary to be a dull, and lifeless political personality. His speeches 
were dry, he appeared uncomfortable in large crowds, and he en­
countered great difficulty speaking extemporaneously. Radigan's 
advisors attempted to protect him from his faults as a political 
campaigner by holding as few large rallies as possible and by 
limiting his press conferences largely to prepared statements 
with little time for question and answers. Generally, Radigan pre­
sented an image that contrasted sharply with the charisma and 
dynamism projected by Hatcher. Further, although he came from 
a distinguished family, in political circles he was an unknown per­
sonality. One could only judge Radigan's fitness for mayorship 
on the basis of his reputation as a businessman, and his business 
experience could not be easily transferred to the qualities needed 
to run a multimillion-dollar city governmental operation. Hatcher 
had proven himself as a politician and governmental official 
while serving on the city council. For all of these reasons, Hatcher 
supporters found it irrational to imagine that Radigan, laden with 
all of these disadvantages, could break the three decades of unin­
terrupted control by the Democratic party over city government. 
On the whole, an aura of confidence pervaded the Hatcher camp. 
This confidence was reflected in the modest and relatively un­
complicated campaign strategy worked out for the general elec­
tion during the summer lull. Hatcher strategists were impressed 
with the solid support shown by the black community in the pri­
mary. They felt that because Hatcher was black, because he was a 
Democrat, and because he had proven he could win, with a mod­
erate amount of work on the part of the volunteers, the political 
base in the black community could be firmly maintained. But 
with only one white candidate in the race, and black registration 
falling below white registration, 100 percent support from the 
black community would not be enough to win the election. Thus 
much of the work in the general campaign had to be directed to­
ward making substantial inroads into the white community. It 
was believed that several approaches to the white community 
had to be taken. First, whites working in the campaign organiza­
tion would use their influence to deliver a large proportion of the 
white vote for Hatcher in the fall. Second, Hatcher would devote 
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a much greater share of his own campaign energies to the task of 
personally selling himself to whites fearful that a black mayor 
would not be sensitive to their needs and aspirations. Third, as 
the chief Democratic standard bearer, Hatcher would call upon 
the regular Democratic organization to bury animosities spawned 
during the primary and join with his volunteers in attempting to 
prevent a massive crossover of white voters to the Republican 
candidate. Token help from the regular Democratic organization 
in holding the white vote would be sufficient to guarantee that 
Hatcher would receive at the very least 30 percent of that vote, 
which would be more than enough for victory, assuming near 
unanimous support for him in the black community. 
In short, expansion of Hatcher's support among white voters 
was viewed by Hatcher advisors as a pivotal key to his success 
in the general election. The shaping of the general campaign along 
these lines began almost immediately after the primary election. 
For example, in his first press conference following his mayoral 
nomination, Hatcher directed practically the whole of his remarks 
to a not too subtle appeal for the white vote. Hatcher informed the 
assembled newsmen that in the fall he intended to carry his cam­
paign to every part of the city. He expressed confidence that 
Gary was made up of a preponderant number of decent citizens 
who would vote for the person they thought was best qualified 
to face the problems confronting the city not on the basis of race. 
Speaking exclusively for the benefit of suspicious whites, Hatcher 
made a special point to note that his administration, when as­
sembled, would be both multiracial and multireligious.1 Indica­
tive, too, of the necessity of an effective appeal to the white com­
munity was the change of the campaign theme from "Progress 
Today, Not Promises Tomorrow," to "Let's Get Ourselves To­
gether." The latter theme signified the need for blacks and whites 
to join together on a number of fronts, including politics, to build 
a better city. 
The calm, self-assured character of the Hatcher campaign orga­
nization began to dissipate when it became apparent during the 
month of August that this time the political battle in the general 
campaign would be as rigorous as the primary in the spring. What 
made this general campaign significantly different from those in 
the recent past was the refusal on the part of the regular Demo­
cratic organization to back the Democratic mayoral nominee. 
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Not only was there mounting evidence that Hatcher would not 
receive the support of the regular organization, but it was also 
becoming crystal clear that a significant proportion of the regular 
organization was preparing to line up behind the white Republi­
can candidate. These maneuvers meant that the worst fears of 
the most cynical of Hatcher's supporters were now being realized: 
the general election was being transformed from an interparty 
fight to an intraparty fight with the salient issue around which 
the intraparty battle would be waged being race. In other words, 
the regular organization was mobilizing to stir up a white back­
lash vote in order to defeat the party's black mayoral nominee. 
This development constituted, from the perspective of the 
Hatcher camp, a totally unexpected turn in the campaign. When 
Hatcher first won the primary, party leaders gave strong indica­
tions they intended to support Hatcher in the same way they had 
mayoral nominees in the past. For example, on 4 May, County 
Chairman John Krupa scotched rumors that the regular organi­
zation would field an independent ticket in the fall election. 
Rather he said that he intended to get together with Hatcher to 
work out arrangements for the support and assistance of the party 
central committee in his fall campaign.2 The political picture did 
not begin to change until several months later when Hatcher and 
Krupa failed to come to terms on the conditions under which reg­
ular organization support would be offered and accepted. As 
closely as it can be reconstructed, what happened at the meeting 
between Hatcher and Krupa was this. Hatcher asked Krupa to 
pledge party funds and political support to him, unincumbered 
by promises of regular organization influence in his administra­
tion. Krupa replied that he could only commit party funds and 
political instruments to Hatcher if he agreed to allow the county 
organization to have a hand in the selection of his major cabinet 
appointments and patronage workers in the city bureaucracy. 
Hatcher refused, saying that he would rather lose than have the 
members of his administration picked primarily by the county 
organization. "Too many people have worked too hard in this. 
I'm not going to abdicate my responsibilities or sell them out."3 
Hatcher's firm rebuff of Krupa's request for guarantees of reg­
ular organization influence in his administration precipitated a 
groundswell of opposition to his candidacy by the leaders of the 
organization, and it spread in concentric fashion until it reached 
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into every white Democratic precinct organization in Lake County. 
White members of the regular organization began openly ex­
pressing strong reservations about Hatcher's party loyalty. The 
most commonly heard opinion was that he was too independent 
—that he felt he did not need the party and refused to abide by 
well-established party policies. Others went further to suggest 
that his real intention was to destroy the party and turn Gary 
into a bastion of black power. The floodtide of party opposition 
to Hatcher was formally opened when County Chairman Krupa 
blasted Hatcher's nomination in the press as a disaster for the 
party and for Gary as a city because he was the captive of radi­
cal left-wingers who had worked actively in his campaign orga­
nization in the spring. Krupa hinted that these left-wingers 
espoused views and supported causes that were blatantly un-
American. He said that in any case that he could not, as party 
chairman, make available to Hatcher the resources of the regular 
Democratic organization until he disavowed the superliberals 
associated with him. 
Shaken by the position taken by the regular organization, 
Hatcher went before a meeting of Lake County Democratic party 
officials to plead for party help in his campaign. In his speech, 
he vehemently denied that anyone who supported him in the pri­
mary harbored un-American attitudes or was guilty of engaging 
in un-American acts. He called upon the organization to support 
him in the same way it would have supported Katz or Konrady 
if either of them had been victorious in the primary. He reiter­
ated specifically his request for the organization's financial help, 
and for its political support, and warned that if these were not 
forthcoming everyone would know the reason would be because 
he was black. 
This campaign needs the political support of the regular Democratic
organization, just as every other campaign has needed that support.
If the support is not forthcoming everybody will know the reason for
the letdown no matter what public statements are made.4 
Hatcher concluded his speech with a plea for party unity, assert­
ing that he was desirous of finding ways of working with the 
regular Democratic organization so that a joint effort involving 
all sincere Democrats could be undertaken to bring a better way 
of life for all citizens of Lake County. 
It was a good performance, but totally fruitless. The die had 
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already been cast; party officials had no intention of helping to 
elect a man who threatened to topple their political and financial 
empires. Hatcher's election would mean not only the loss of the 
machine's political base in the black community, but also control 
over the various key positions in the city administration that af­
fected the flow of millions of dollars into the party's warchest. 
Hatcher's race was only of secondary importance to the regular 
organization's opposition. Although party leaders would have 
preferred to see a white man as mayor, they would have accepted 
a black man willing to bargain with them for control over the 
power resources of the city. Hatcher was black; but more impor­
tantly he was a political independent running on an avowedly 
reform platform. Undoubtedly the latter factor was the one that in 
the final analysis rendered Hatcher personna non grata to party 
bosses. Most of the respondents interviewed, including the candi­
date himself, testified to the validity of the above interpretation 
of regular organization officials' motives in denying Hatcher the 
party's financial and political support. 
There is no reason why my party should not have supported me after I 
won the primary. They claimed that I refused to talk to them and
that's why they didn't support me. The real reason why they didn't
support me was that I was black. But most of them could have even­
tually accommodated themselves to that fact. In the final analysis,
I was not the right kind of "Negro." In me they knew they were get­
ting not just a black man but one they couldn't control.5 
Having made the irrevocable decision to work for Hatcher's de­
feat, party bosses went about the business of mobilizing Demo­
cratic support for the Republican candidate by pandering to the 
endemic racism of the white community. The strategy used in 
this regard was twofold. First, an attempt was made to paint 
Hatcher as a black power advocate and a left-wing extremist. 
The substantive content of this strategy was revealed within 
hours after Hatcher's speech before party officials. In reply to 
Hatcher's appeal for party support, County Chairman Krupa is­
sued an ultimatum that Hatcher denounce by name alleged black 
power extremists Stokely Carmichael and H. Rap Brown. Hatcher 
refused, calling Krupa's demand irrelevant and an obvious politi­
cal dodge to justify the withholding of party support. He did go 
on record, however, as opposing the use of violence in general 
to achieve social, economic, and political objectives. 
Second, the machine began selling Radigan to white voters as 
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a "white hope"—the only rational alternative to the control of city 
government for the next four years by a black man who was an 
advocate of black militancy and consorted with left-wing extrem­
ists. Fulfillment of this objective required the cooperation of the 
Republican and Democratic bosses. Radigan's advisors constantly 
reminded him that if he wanted to win he had to run as a white 
man, not as a Republican who happened to be white. According­
ly, at Radigan rallies in white areas, no mention was ever made of 
his party. Similarly, Radigan literature omitted any reference to 
the fact that he was running on the Republican ticket. Another 
essential requirement was that he remain silent most of the time. 
His press announcements and other matters related to communi­
cation were to be handled through his top campaign assistants. 
Most importantly, he was to avoid at all costs entering into a de­
bate on the issues with Hatcher. In short, the design, as one news­
paper analysis put it, prescribed that Radigan "say little and be 
white," while the regular Democratic organization did everything 
in its power to prevent Hatcher from getting the percentage of 
the white vote he needed to win. 
The unvarnished opposition of the regular Democratic organi­
zation had two predominant impacts on the thinking of the people 
active in the Hatcher campaign. First, it destroyed what little 
faith they continued to have in the ethical character of the Amer­
ican political system in so far as questions of race were concerned. 
The comments by the following respondent are illustrative of 
this phenomenon: 
It [regular organization opposition] made me take a deep long 
thought about politics among the white people. Parties to them 
don't mean a thing. But most black people are loyal to the party. 
Had we lost, we would have supported the nominee of the Dem­
ocratic party. They were using the party for their own personal 
benefits. Parties only mean something when the black man is not
challenging the power structure. When he's challenging the power
structure and defeats it, they don't mean a thing. I think that was
educational to all black people in the city because it taught us one
thing: the white people can have their differences of opinion but 
when the chips are down they're all together.6 
Secondly, it made compulsory, if the election was not to be lost, 
a substantial revamping of the general campaign strategy. 
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We thought the hard part was over, but it was only the beginning. We
began to see plays at the line, audibles being called, and we didn't
expect these audibles. The formation that some of these players took
when the audibles were called were disturbing because no one had
ever seen it done that way before. Complete shifts were made. Swings
across party lines became a popular thing—it became popular to say,
"I'm not going to vote a Democratic ticket, this is the first time in
my life I'm not going to vote a Democratic ticket." It became a thing
of acceptance among the forces that were against us. We hadn't 
thought of that so we had to regroup. 
The shift in strategy that occurred was more in scope than 
direction. That is, machine opposition required that the dimen­
sions of the strategy be broadened far beyond what was originally 
anticipated. The ingredients of the strategy, however, remained 
basically the same. For example, Hatcher advisors still considered 
the black vote a critical factor in his mayoral election. However, 
it would no longer be sufficient to hold the line in the black com­
munity. Rather, the quest for black votes had to be redoubled 
through grass-roots workers that reached the six thousand black 
voters who voted for Katz in the primary and the thousands of 
blacks who were still unregistered. To accomplish this objective 
new campaign techniques for mobilizing the black community 
would have to be devised, a step that would possibly require the 
broadening of the campaign structure to include professional as 
well as amateur help. Similarly, more rigorous measures now had 
to be employed to counteract the mobilization of the white com­
munity by the regular Democratic organization. Inroads into 
Glen Park and Miller would have to be made now almost ex­
clusively by Hatcher. It became absolutely necessary to get him as 
much exposure as possible in the white community of a kind 
permitting face-to-face discussions of issues important to the 
white electorate. House parties would have to be the prime vehicle 
for this; under the intimate circumstances of these informal gath­
erings, Hatcher would be able to bring his considerable verbal 
skills and personal charm to the task of convincing white voters 
that he was not an extremist, and would, as mayor, secure tangible 
benefits for all of Gary's citizens. One sector of the white popula­
tion that could not afford to be neglected was the Latin American 
community. More resourceful means than those used in the pri­
mary would have to be created to identify Latin leadership so 
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that an effective coalition between blacks and Latin Americans 
could finally be realized. The Latin community would have to 
be canvassed, and Latin citizens encouraged to register to vote. 
This meant that something more than token representation would 
have to be given to Latins within the campaign organization. 
Latins would have to be placed on campaign bodies from the 
executive board to the grass-roots block committees if any 
semblance of an effective campaign was to be mounted in the 
Latin community. 
To combat the opposition of the regular Democratic organiza­
tion, the general campaign would have to be elevated to a level 
of national importance. Democrats from all over the country 
would be encouraged to rally to the defense of a black Demo­
cratic candidate struggling against political obstacles placed in 
his way by the selfish acts of members of his own party. Political 
and financial help must not only be vigorously sought in Chicago 
and Indianapolis but also in Washington, D.C. 
Perhaps the most important new requirement of all would be to 
construct ways and means of preventing the election from being 
stolen. Hatcher people interpreted the all out support of the Re­
publican candidate by leaders of the regular Democratic organiza­
tion as an act of desperation. And machine bosses had shown on 
several occasions that under desperate circumstances they were 
willing to use every resource at their command to accomplish 
their political objectives. Whether this would be true in this case 
remained to be seen. In the meantime, every precaution had to be 
taken, including the training of additional poll watchers and a 
meticulous study of election laws, to make sure that if political 
chicanery by the opposition did arise, they would be prepared to 
bring to it an appropriate response. 
In sum, opposition to Hatcher by the regular organization in­
jected an unforeseen dimension into the general election requiring 
a revision of original general campaign plans in a number of 
respects. 
THE CAMPAIGN ORGANIZATION: EXPANSION AND CONFLICT 
Hatcher campaign officials were of the opinion that execution 
of the revised general election strategy required that the base of 
the campaign organization be broadened. Proposals were formu­
lated to broaden the campaign base in two major ways. One of 
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these involved reaching out and pulling in those elements of the 
electoral machinery of the regular Democratic organization willing 
to work with them. This action was rationalized on the grounds 
that Hatcher was now head of the fall ticket with responsibility 
for the political success of all city Democratic candidates. Elec­
tion of the entire ticket required that an olive branch be extended 
to Democratic workers and officials who had opposed Hatcher in 
the intraparty contest but who were now willing to work alongside 
the Hatcher volunteers in pursuit of a common objective. Thus a 
formal role was carved out in the campaign structure for the Demo­
cratic precinct organization. Campaign guidelines stressed that the 
volunteer organization used in the primary was not meant to "re­
place or infringe upon the propriety of any properly functioning 
precinct organization," but rather its sole purpose was that of 
supplementing precinct organizations "in terms of skill, hands, 
feet, and amateur enthusiasm." 
These steps to broaden the base substantially altered the 
operational norms of the Hatcher campaign organization that had 
prevailed during the primary. Thus whereas relations among 
workers in the primary were generally cooperative and harmoni­
ous, relations in the general organization were strained at times 
almost to the breaking point. Much of the conflict in the general 
organization stemmed from the existence of irreconcilable differ­
ences between the precinct organization and the volunteers. Their 
debts paid to Katz in the primary, some members of the black 
precinct organization accepted Hatcher's invitation to become 
functional members of the general campaign organization. Not 
accustomed to serving in subordinate political capacities, many 
of these committeemen demanded, and were given, prominent 
positions on campaign standing committees and other organiza­
tional bodies. Many Hatcher volunteers resented the entrance of 
these committeemen—most of whom had fought them bitterly in 
the primary—into important positions in the general organization. 
They believed that they were now being pushed aside by people 
who were just simply jumping on the bandwagon in order to ad­
vance their own selfish political interests. Some volunteers were 
also absolutely convinced that many of the new faces now popping 
up in key positions were nothing more than spies paid by the 
opposition to infiltrate and sabotage the general campaign effort. 
Distrust of black precinct committeemen working in the general 
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organization by the volunteers ran so deep that many volunteers 
refused to divulge their campaign plans to anyone who was not 
actively involved in the primary campaign organization. 
It was very difficult to work in the fall because by that time we were
infiltrated by a lot of other people. There was a time when you would
meet, discuss your needs, map out strategy, and you knew that was
as far as it would go. But speaking for myself and the opinion of
quite a few others, I believe that people were sent to join us. We had 
three or four people who were making some peculiar moves. It was
quite evident that a little money was being bounced around. So it 
made it difficult to go back in a huddle to call a play, expecting that
the play would be radioed across the lines. We had spies, no doubt
about it. 
These guys were just brought in and thrust down our throat. "As
of now John Doe will be a member of this committee." What, when 
we knew John Doe was out there killing us and I'm going to bring
him into our committee? He's going to sit there and make decisions
and carry it back to the same guy he's been prostituting for all these
years? I can't tolerate that. 
Campaign officials were very much aware of the resentment and 
suspicions harbored by the volunteers toward black precinct 
committeemen, but they believed that this was the price they had 
to pay for getting some aspects of the organization's work done 
that could only be accomplished through the cooperation of 
precinct committeemen. One of these officials observed in this 
context: 
You can have a million volunteers, but when you get ready to register
people you can't put their name on that form. So during the registra­
tion period we had to deal with those people who could register 
people. And to this extent they [volunteers] felt we were pushing 
them aside and it was true. 
Feuding between the volunteers and the precinct organization 
continued throughout the campaign. This rife substantially af­
fected the internal functioning of the general organization. Some 
of the most active and dedicated volunteer workers became dis­
enchanted with the movement and either greatly curtailed their 
work, or dropped out of the campaign organization all together. 
People stopped attending meetings. They just had no purpose. Why
talk to the devil when you know the devil will strike at you. It be­
came meaningless. So it got to the point where there was no need to 
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participate. Myself, I stopped going to a lot of meetings. Prior to that
I wouldn't miss a meeting, not only my meeting but anyone else's
meeting I thought I could give some aid to. 
Hatcher was careful not to be drawn into the conflict raging 
between these two opposing camps. Rather, he sparred with 
both of them, obtaining whatever support he could from one, then 
the other. Relying on political savvy gained through six full years 
of experience, Hatcher expertly hung loose from both the precinct 
organization and the volunteers, bouncing like a rubber ball over 
the controversy surrounding their ill-fated relationship. 
As the campaign rolled along, other developments arose that 
greatly disturbed the volunteers and helped to dampen the en­
thusiasm they brought to their work. Some objected strongly to 
the official policy that everyone was expected to work not just 
for Hatcher but the entire Democratic ticket. These volunteers 
believed some of the Democratic nominees to be not only racists 
but traitors to the Democratic party because they were openly 
working with the regular organization to bring about Hatcher's 
defeat. Yet they were being asked to sell these men to the black 
community; some refused to do so; others did sell them, but with 
great reluctance. 
Most serious was the deterioration of the power of the executive 
board in the general campaign. As we have seen, in the primary 
the board played an important role in the coordination of com­
mittee work, the thrashing out of campaign problems, and the 
making of recommendations to the candidate for his considera­
tion. In the general campaign, membership on the board was 
expanded to include representatives of various ethnic groups 
(especially Latin Americans), Democratic politicians defeated in 
the primary, community groups, and the black precinct organiza­
tion. This membership expansion made the board quite unwieldy as 
a decision-making body. Consequently, top officials—responding to 
the exigencies of the campaign and the need to make quick de­
cisions—more frequently bypassed the board when key campaign 
decisions were made. Members of the board who had served 
during the primary became distressed over the failure of the 
decisional triumvirate to even bring issues before the body before 
they were resolved and policies made in accordance with the 
manner of their resolution. They contended that this left the board 
in the position of serving as a kind of glorified debating society, 
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going through the motion of doing something meaningful while 
being denied the information needed for rational decision-making. 
Particularly distressing and disheartening to members of the 
executive board was the habitual absence of the candidate at 
board meetings. Hatcher's schedule in the fall was so demanding 
that it became impossible for him to attend board meetings more 
than a few times. Board members, especially those who had been 
active during the primary, interpreted his absence as a sign that 
he no longer appreciated the exhaustive volunteer service they 
were performing in his behalf. Additionally, his absence sub­
stantially undermined effective decision-making by the board, 
because many board members were afraid that Hatcher would 
veto proposals formulated without his direct involvement. The 
upshot was an erosion of the power of the executive board, and 
the making of major campaign decisions on a unilateral basis by 
Hatcher and his inner circle of political advisors. In this regard 
one board member observed: 
The whole board was symbolic at that point. The actual campaign was
run out of an office at Sixteenth and Broadway. Most people didn't
even know where it was. It was across the hall from Richard's law 
office with no name on the door. In fact it was empty. There was a
regular secretarial staff in there and this is where the meetings 
were held. 
In the light of these developments, the close rapport and un­
limited enthusiasm characterizing the functioning of the primary 
organization were substantially diminished during the general 
election. They were replaced with a high degree of suspicion and 
conflict. By the same token, much of the volunteer ethos that 
had characterized the attitudinal disposition of primary campaign 
workers began to change. Workers began questioning each other's 
motives and thinking oi where they would be in terms of their 
relationship to the Hatcher administration when the ballgame 
was over. These organizational and attitudinal changes are 
brought into focus by the comments of this Hatcher volunteer: 
The old philosophy of the volunteer thing changed. "I'm now seeking
something because." That attitude was the result of this infiltration
[by outsiders]. Questions were now being asked among the group,
"What is John Doe after, what does Tom, Dick, and Harry want,
what does he want, what does she want?" That wasn't asked in the 
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primary. At that point there were not too many successes we could
put on the Scoreboard but it was obvious it was changing to self. 
I will still say had there not been this influx of political parasites
that immediately jumped off the losing wagon and jumped on this
wagon and started singing real loudly—had they not come in with
definite goals—I don't think that we would have had our breakdown
in the whole idea of being a volunteer thing. I know people who
worked (and when I say worked, I'm a hard man to work for be­
cause I demand a performance) like they were working for their 
livelihood, for their bread and water. And worked for nothing as 
though they were getting an enormous pay, who really had the 
volunteer spirit, they began to change. There was just not the harmony
in the general election as we came nearer and nearer to the finish line.
In the primary the closer we came to the finish line, the tighter it 
seems to me we got. 
These statements are supported by numerous other respondents 
who stressed that the general campaign was not the same kind 
of crusade as the primary, and who noted a tapering off of the 
zeal and selfless spirit of the volunteer organization well before 
general election day. The point should be emphasized, however, 
that despite considerable internal dissension within the general 
campaign organization, it remained sufficiently cohesive to mount 
an effective mobilizing effort in the black community. 
REMOBILIZING THE BLACK COMMUNITY 
When the grass-roots electoral work began in the fall, there were 
a number of significant signs that the task of black mobilization 
would be considerably less difficult than in the spring. Street-
level workers no longer encountered widespread self-doubt among 
the black masses. Blacks firmly believed that Hatcher would win 
because he was a Democrat—few of them remembered the Demo­
crats ever losing in a general election. Indecision in the minds 
of blacks as to what candidate they ought to support—a black in­
dependent or a white incumbent machine candidate—had also 
substantially dissipated. Every political indicator suggested 
without equivocation that Radigan could expect to receive very 
little support in the black community—blacks were loyal Demo­
crats, and they fully intended on election day to vote a straight 
Democratic ticket. These things notwithstanding, Hatcher workers 
knew that it would be a mistake to take the black vote for granted. 
There was always the possibility of a psychological letdown after 
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becoming so highly aroused and turning out in such unprecedented 
numbers in the primary. The ability of the Hatcher organization 
to remobilize the black community for the general election would, 
perforce, be a key determining factor in the outcome of the 
general mayoral contest. 
Street-level workers basically refined the techniques they had 
used in the primary to unite the black community and reapplied 
them in the general. Again they found that their most potent cam­
paign technique was the door-to-door selling of Hatcher as a qual­
ified, committed black candidate whose election would bring dignity 
to blacks across the country and good government for the first 
time to city hall. These workers particularly emphasized the im­
portance of Hatcher's record on the council as an indication that 
he was a politician who truly believed in people and believed in 
change; they argued that if given an opportunity, Hatcher would 
make more profound changes in their daily lives than they could 
ever expect to occur under a white mayor. Finally, Hatcher work­
ers repeated over and over again that this election provided 
blacks with a golden opportunity to elect Hatcher as the first 
black mayor of Gary. In the words of one worker, blacks were 
told: 
We have never had one [a black mayor]; we've never had an oppor­
tunity like we have now, and if we don't take the opportunity now
they may annex the city before the next election comes along. It will
set us back twenty to twenty-five years, and we won't be able to get
a black mayor. 
Workers attempting to mobilize the black community for the 
general election received powerful assistance from an unexpected 
source: County Chairman John Krupa. Respondents who worked 
for Hatcher in the general campaign consistently referred to 
Krupa as their best campaign worker in the black community. 
Krupa infuriated the black masses with his unsupported personal 
attacks against a black man whom they thought was decent, hon­
est, qualified, a credit to his race, and who ought to be mayor. 
As the general campaign reached mid-course, Krupa's charges 
against Hatcher, from the perspective of the black community, 
became completely outlandish. He contended, for example, that 
the only difference between Hatcher and H. Rap Brown and 
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Stokely Carmichael was that Hatcher was quiet and "smooth" 
while Brown and Carmichael shouted and yelled.7 Krupa claimed 
that Hatcher was using the "big lie" technique in charging that 
the county organization would not give him money because he 
was black. According to Krupa, the county organization had 
never given money to mayoral nominees. He said that Hatcher 
knew this and was claiming he was being victimized for the sole 
purpose of drumming up sympathy. "All America has bought 
Hatcher's line that he's a poor self-made man once removed from 
slavery and is being denied funds."8 
Krupa coupled his charges of black power extremism with thin­
ly veiled suggestions that Hatcher was also disloyal—maybe even 
a communist. Copies of the 16 September issue of the Black Muslim 
newspaper, Muhammad Speaks, were widely circulated in the 
white community in which Hatcher was quoted as saying that 
American pilots captured in North Vietnam should be tried as war 
criminals. However, a front-page retraction of this article a few 
weeks later was conveniently overlooked. At party functions 
throughout Lake County, Krupa questioned Hatcher's patriotism, 
saying that Hatcher had failed to satisfy him as to what loyalties 
he held dearest. He said that it was his job as county chairman to 
elect "red-white-and-blue Democrats" not men who would "risk 
our way of life for some other ism" and who thought that being 
an American was "nasty, old fashioned, and corny."9 Krupa 
said his record of support for black candidates in the past proved 
he was not a racist.10 "The only color I am against is red."11 
Hatcher generally adopted the strategy of not dignifying 
Krupa's charges with an answer. However, after a time it became 
impossible for him to avoid responding to some of Krupa's more 
scurrilous comments. Hatcher's replies to Krupa were heavy with 
ridicule, dubbing Krupa as the modern-day version of Johnny 
One Note who ran the very serious risk of boring voters to death 
with his repetition of baseless allegations: 
I have already said that I deplore violence and that I am opposed to
extremists of both the left and the right. If the County Chairman or
any other person has any real evidence concerning individuals as­
sociated with me, I call upon him to bring this evidence to me and I
will take the necessary steps. This has been my position in the past
and will continue to be my position.12 
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Krupa's indefensible blasts against Hatcher generated reactions 
from both state and national party officials. State party chairman 
Gordon St. Angelo, worried about the effect of the rife in Gary on 
the party's fate in state and national elections, journeyed to Gary 
to persuade Krupa to support Hatcher. Krupa flatly refused to do 
so. St. Angelo than charged Krupa and other Lake County party 
leaders with practicing "McCarthyism" in denouncing Hatcher 
on the grounds that he was associated with left-wing leaders and 
refused to disavow them.13 He called upon Krupa to immediately 
make peace with Hatcher or resign. A similar request was made 
by Indiana Governor Roger Branigin. Senator Birch Bayh also 
rallied to Hatcher's defense. Answering one of Krupa's charges, 
Bayh revealed that Hatcher was not appointed Assistant U.S. At­
torney in 1962 because of his lack of experience.14 This infor­
mation was confirmed by Senator Robert Kennedy who stated 
that Hatcher's records in the Justice Department in Washington 
indicated that he was an American of the finest tradition.15 
Kennedy expressed puzzlement at Krupa's opposition and called 
upon party leaders to support Hatcher as they had other Demo­
crats in the past. Hatcher received an equally strong endorse­
ment from Vice-President Hubert Humphrey. Humphrey charged 
that county officials were opposed to Hatcher for superficial rea­
sons. He stated that it was the duty of Democratic party leaders 
and workers to back their mayoral candidate, particularly since 
he was well-qualified and was the first of his race to be nomi­
nated for the mayorship of a large American city. 
Krupa's crusade against Hatcher was unaffected by these ac­
tions of state and national officials. The only visible change in 
his approach was a broadening of his attack to encompass state 
and national officials whom he charged lacked the courage to 
challenge treasonable utterances and wanton acts of disrespect 
for law and order. 
Krupa's unbridled attacks against Hatcher gave the black com­
munity whatever solidarity it needed to produce a massive vote 
for Hatcher on election day. Blacks generally interpreted Krupa's 
charges as an insult to the black community and a demonstra­
tion of gross unappreciation of the loyal support blacks had given 
white Democrats running for public office throughout the years. 
It is likely that Krupa vastly underestimated how strongly blacks 
felt about the racial issues he raised in the campaign. As one re­
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spondent put it: "I don't think the white population has any idea 
what men like Rap Brown, Stokely Carmichael, and Malcolm X 
mean to the black community." In any event, there is no question 
but that Krupa's attacks helped to make Hatcher in the eyes of 
the black masses a struggling underdog, carrying the burden of 
the entire race on his shoulders. Consequently, blacks who might 
have otherwise been apathetic rallied to protect Hatcher against 
the onslaughts of an insensitive white opposition. Black outrage 
at the unmitigated attacks by Krupa on Hatcher was expressed in 
a number of ways. One black minister, Dr. L. K. Jackson, pastor 
of Saint Paul Baptist Church, preached a sermon on Krupa in 
which he called his charges against Hatcher, "irresponsible," 
and out of line with "normality, sanity, logic, consistency, righ­
teousness and the mainstream of American Democracy."16 Joseph 
(Duke) Hill, a black precinct committeeman, fired off a telegram 
to Krupa insisting that he resign. A number of black organiza­
tions, including the Northern Indiana Political Alliance and the 
Midtown Voters League, denounced Krupa as a racist and pledged 
to defeat him for whatever future political office he sought. 
Hatcher volunteers were in the forefront of the backlash reaction 
against Krupa in the black community. Essentially, Hatcher 
workers encouraged Krupa in his personal attacks, while at the 
same time using them to make his name and everything he repre­
sented poison in the black community The following respondent 
described the work of the Hatcher organization in this regard: 
We found out in the general that we had a live issue. The issue we had 
was John Krupa, the county chairman. And we used him. We 
nettled him and made him say what we wanted him to say. He would 
say something and we would project it to the people. So what we 
did, we made him public enemy number one to the black people. 
We used him for our own purposes. 
In short, Krupa served as an outside threat with which the black 
community could identify and gather the motivation it needed to 
come together as a cohesive unit in support of the black man who 
was the target of his offensive statements. 
Hatcher workers in the black community were quite fortunate 
that County Chairman Krupa was relieving them of much of the 
responsibility for building black unity because, with the war 
chest of the regular Democratic organization closed to them, and 
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the development of the general election into a much more serious 
contest than anyone imagined, a good deal of their energies had 
to be directed toward fund-raising. The central vehicle for fund-
raising in the fall was a new campaign entitled "Dollars for De­
cency." Jazz Trumpeter Clark Terry came to the city to help kick 
off the campaign. This new fund-raising venture grew directly 
from Hatcher's difficulties with the regular organization. It was 
based on the premise that Hatcher's campaign should be funded 
by the community at large so that when he was elected to office 
he would be responsible only to the people. As Hatcher expressed 
it: "The cry from the people is we don't want Dick to have to give 
in one thing that he stands for because of the lack of finances 
for his campaign."17 All Gary citizens interested in seeing a 
"decent," uncontrolled administration in city hall for the first 
time were therefore encouraged to give a dollar or more. Dr. 
Alfonso Holiday and Dr. Manuel Vargus were named cochair­
men of the dollars-for-decency campaign. 
The citizens' fund-raising effort was much better coordinated 
and executed than the one launched during the primary. Street-
level workers canvassed the entire black community, going door 
to door collecting dollars for decency. Oatmeal boxes with rubber 
bands around them were placed in various businesses. Collection 
groups went around periodically to pick up these boxes and turn 
them in to the finance committee or to Charlotte Johnson at 
campaign headquarters.18 Campaign donors were given certifi­
cates with Hatcher's picture printed in the background. These 
certificates were issued in different colors according to the amount 
contributed. Letters were sent out to churches, social and civic 
organizations, and unions, asking them to give whatever they 
could to the dollars-for-decency drive. 
Response to this fund-raising drive was extremely gratifying. 
A multitude of black civic and social organizations used this 
fund-raising venture as a means of getting on the Hatcher band­
wagon. Among the most outstanding contributors were the Third 
District Women's Auxiliary, the Shocktroops, and Unique 
Bronzettes (all ladies social clubs), and the Democratic Women 
for Better Government. Some special groups, such as the West-
side Ladies for Hatcher, and Teachers for Hatcher, were formed 
for the sole purpose of making membership, and community 
door-to-door solicitations for campaign funds. The success of 
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the Hatcher organization in generating campaign contributions 
from rank-and-file black citizens, as well as myriad black social, 
civic and religious organizations, provides a good barometer of 
the extent to which a traditionally fragmentized black community 
united solidly behind his candidacy in the general election. 
Other sources were also tapped for campaign funds. A Hatcher 
testimonial dinner attended by more than fifteen-hundred per­
sons at the Gary Armory raised a considerable amount. This 
affair was followed by a $100-a-plate dinner sponsored by the 
All American Alliance for Hatcher at the Sherman House in Chi­
cago. Chief promoter of this event was Hatcher's long-time politi­
cal mentor and former law partner Henry Walker of East Chicago. 
More than three-hundred persons attended the affair, including 
Hatcher's father, Mr. Carleton Hatcher, who stole the show with 
a lengthy dissertation on the Hatcher family. Prominent among 
the many guests was U.S. Steelworkers District Director Joseph 
Germano. Acting in behalf of his organization, Germano made a 
campaign contribution of $2,000. Benefit concerts were given 
for Hatcher by nationally known black entertainers, including 
the Staple Singers, a family gospel group, and Harry Belafonte. 
The second Belafonte concert was not nearly as successful as the 
first, the latter attracting only about two thousand two hundred 
people. It did, however, provide Hatcher with an opportunity to 
take a final swipe at the machine before the election. Hatcher 
identified his real opposition as George Chacharis, Dr. J. J. 
Forszt, Peter Mandich, and John Krupa. He labeled this group 
as the unholy quartet and asserted that Radigan was just their 
stooge, their puppet, their "Charlie McCarthy."19 
One of the most outstanding achievements of the general or­
ganization was its success in tapping outside sources of political 
funds. Hatcher and his advisors believed reliance on outside 
funds to be critical; because despite the good intentions of local 
citizens, there was just not enough uncontrolled local money to 
allow him to run the kind of campaign necessary to defeat the 
formidable opposition he faced. Thus as his troubles with the 
local organization mounted, Hatcher turned to the state and to 
the nation as a whole for campaign funds. He received consider­
able help at the state level, including a $2,500 donation from the 
Indiana Democratic Club, which Krupa attempted to block, 
charging that this donation violated state statutes relating to 
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contributions by private corporations. Trips were made to South 
Bend and Chicago to secure campaign funds from sympathetic 
outsiders. These trips resulted in a $2,000 contribution by twenty-
two professors at Notre Dame and a $500 contribution by the 
greater Chicago Area Citizens Committee of the United Auto 
Workers. 
At the national level a spectacular fund-raising affair was 
hosted for Hatcher by Vice-President Hubert Humphrey, Sena­
tors Edward and Robert Kennedy, former Senator Paul Douglas, 
Representative Charles Diggs, and Indiana Senators Birch Bayh 
and Vance Hartke. This affair was a smashing success, with 
several hundred persons representative of a cross section of 
business, economic, religious, and political establishments in 
Washington in attendance. Hatcher received the full endorse­
ment of party leaders, including Vice-President Humphrey and 
President Johnson. 
Far and away the most successful of all fund-raising strategies 
employed during the general campaign, however, was an ad run 
by the Hatcher camp simultaneously in the Post-Tribune and 
the New York Times. The ad was entitled "For God's Sake Let's 
Get Ourselves Together" and showed a white cop beating a black 
demonstrator over the head with a billy club. It asked Americans 
who said that they were for peace and unity to "put your money 
where your mouth is." The ad described Hatcher as a man who 
believed in peace and despised bigotry and ignorance and it 
suggested that he was running for his political life in Gary. It 
ended with an urgent appeal for contributions from all Ameri­
cans who could afford to give any amount. 
Contradicting initial reservations by some members of the 
executive board about the wisdom of this strategical move, the 
decision to run the Times ad turned out to be a masterstroke. 
Campaign contributions poured into Hatcher headquarters from 
all over the world. Letters containing money were received from 
as far away as Hong Kong. Some of the letter writers identified 
themselves as white Republicans who were angry at the position 
the local Democratic party had taken toward Hatcher. Most of 
these persons expressed the view that since he won the primary 
fair and square, his party should have supported him in the 
general. Several respondents contended that donations were still 
coming in a week after the general election was over. The size 
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of the contributions varied from a thousand dollars to fifty cents 
sent by a poverty family in Brooklyn who expressed the wish 
that "they could do more."20 
The New York Times ad had the effect of not only solving the 
campaign organization's financial worries, but of making Hatcher 
a national figure. After the Times ad, attention from around the 
world was spotlighted on Gary and the position the county or­
ganization was taking toward the Democratic mayoral nominee. 
This national publicity put the national Democratic party on the 
spot and resulted in tremendous pressure from Washington on 
the county organization to settle its differences with the Hatcher 
camp. In addition, the ad generated for Hatcher invaluable media 
exposure. He received newspaper and television coverage that 
he did not have the money to buy. Nationwide reaction to the ad 
was a source of considerable heartache to the county organiza­
tion. Krupa denounced Hatcher's elevation of the campaign to a 
national controversy and accused him of injecting the race issue 
in the campaign by including the picture of the police officer 
and the protestor in the ad. 
Aside from fund-raising, the major task of the street-level 
organization during the general campaign was voter registration 
in the black community. Two factors made a massive black-
registration drive in the general campaign critical to Hatcher's 
mayoral victory: (1) the likelihood that large numbers of white 
voters would split their tickets, dropping Hatcher and picking up 
the Republican candidate; and (2) clear evidence that a vigorous 
campaign was going to be mounted in the white community to 
increase the number of eligible white voters. Given the fact that 
the number of registered white voters already surpassed that of 
black voters, it would be necessary to dramatically expand the 
number of registered blacks just to maintain the ratio of regis­
tered black to white voters existing during the primary election. 
The registration campaign in the general differed from the one 
mounted in the primary in one key respect: the Hatcher organiza­
tion now had the cooperation of about one-third of the black pre­
cinct organization. Involvement of the black precinct organization 
facilitated the establishment of the traveling registration boards 
proposed, but never employed, in the primary. Initially, campaign 
leaders were again thwarted in their efforts to establish such 
boards by County Clerk Krupa's ruling that committeemen could 
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not register individuals who lived outside their precincts. How­
ever, this time campaign coordinator Bell asked for a ruling by 
state party chairman Gordon St. Angelo on this subject. St. 
Angelo informed Bell that Gary precinct committeemen could 
register people anywhere in the corporate bounds of the city. 
This ruling by St. Angelo made possible the establishment of 
traveling boards using precinct committeemen to register people 
on the spot. Eventually, this program of on-the-spot registration 
was expanded into a full-blown registration effort involving the 
entire campaign apparatus. This new registration drive was 
dubbed by campaign leaders as "Operation Saturation." 
Essentially operation saturation involved the collapsing of 
all committee workers into the registration committee. With the 
help of thirteen precinct committeemen, virtually the entire cam­
paign organization would invade a precinct, knocking on doors 
and bringing people out to the back of a truck or out to the side­
walk where the cooperating precinct committeemen were waiting 
to register them. On weekends, tables were set up on corners. 
Campaign workers would blanket the target neighborhood going 
from house to house, pulling out people and signing them up. In 
each district members of the indigenous population were en­
couraged to join in the registration effort. For example, the fourth 
district contained Gary's famous redlight area, where gambling 
and prostitution flourished. Hatcher people approached leading 
prostitutes and stick-up artists in the area and encouraged them 
to help them mobilize the people in this area. They were able to 
convince them to join in and play an active role by telling them 
they were not going to make moral judgments about their work, 
all they were interested in was their help in getting Hatcher 
elected. One Hatcher worker described precisely how they were 
able to get these people involved in electoral work: 
We told them if you're a prositute, a stick-up man, whatever you are, 
if you feel yourself morally that you're right in what you're doing, 
then your conscience is as clear as mine. We invited them to come in 
our organization and play an active part. Some of them were a little 
reluctant because you figure here's a young lady that's been branded 
a prostitute, then she's coming in here to rub shoulders with people 
who are dead against it. You've got quite an inferiority mixup there. 
What we did finally, we got her to come in. We brought her in and 
made her feel important, like she was somebody. We put her on a 
committee. She worked, she was treated just like any other of our 
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female volunteers. Our concern was political not moral. As a result, 
we took this one and put her to work in that particular area. When 
we got down there, all of the people there would see one of their 
colleagues calling the shots. That worked on the other ones' minds 
who were peeping from behind the curtains. So as a result of that 
another one came, and another. So we moved into the male segment 
of it. And the same thing happened. We had in a sense a head­
quarters set up down there in a poolroom. And they would meet in 
there and get their instructions. They ran the whole show down there. 
The people who lived in there were the people who called the shots 
in there. Then the prostitutes starting saying, "I know Mr. Hatcher 
is going to cut this out, but I'm going to support him." The hustlers 
started saying, "well I know there'll be no more crap games, but 
I'm going to support him." We got them in the same frame of mind 
as the person who said I know he doesn't have a chance but I'm 
going to vote for him. But that's about what it amounts to. 
A different tactic was used to reach black voters in the fifth 
district. This district contained an unusually large number of older 
black citizens. Hatcher workers found a reluctance on the part of 
these voters to support Hatcher, because they thought he was too 
young. To overcome this obstacle, teenagers were organized in 
the district into a young people's booster club known as the "New 
Breed." This group had existed during the primary but did not 
begin to actively function until the general campaign when its 
leadership and supervision were placed in the hands of Mrs. Bertha 
Jones, a Gary high school counselor. The idea was to reach parents 
in the fifth district through their children. Committees paral­
leling the larger campaign organization's committees were set 
up composed of New Breed members. They received instructions 
at the campaign headquarters from Mrs. Jones and her assistant, 
a white college senior, John Blood. When the class was over, these 
youngsters were experts on subjects such as registration laws, 
poll-watching, absentee-balloting procedure, and others. Once 
the teenage group was thoroughly organized and trained, the 
organization moved down to politically orient younger adoles­
cents. This respondent explained the function this infant group 
served in the campaign: 
We wanted them to tell their mothers and fathers one thing: 2d,
remember 2d—that was Hatcher's number on the machine. You could 
hear 3 and 4 year olds, "What's Hatcher's number," they'd say "2d." 
We had a truck with kids riding on the back of it going through town 
yelling "2d, election day, 2d." Now we had little buttons and we'd 
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tell the kids, pass this to mama. Tell mama, 2d, election day, 2d.
And anywhere you'd go you'd hear little kids holering "2d, 2d." 
These mobilizing activities elicited from their black targets the 
intended response. One Hatcher worker contends that on the first 
Saturday that operation saturation was employed, the organiza­
tion registered some 960 people off the streets. Precinct com­
mitteemen were assigned to poll rooms to do nothing but register 
voters. Precinct committeemen operating out of one pool room on 
Seventeenth Avenue registered from that establishment alone 
approximately 540 people. Indeed, this operation at one point was 
so successful that, according to one newspaper account, 50 black 
people were being registered for every new white registrant. 
Officials in Crown Point did not want to believe that the Hatcher 
organization was registering that many legitimate voters. County 
officials charged that Hatcher people were padding the voting 
roster by registering vacant lots. Hatcher workers denied this 
allegation. "Our instructions were strictly that you register human 
beings. And that's what we did. Any registration that was ques­
tionable, we sent somebody to check it out before it was sub­
mitted." Overall during the fall, the Hatcher organization regis­
tered approximately 5,000 voters. 
The general campaign organization received invaluable as­
sistance in its electoral work from a number of organizations 
that had quietly sat out the primary election. The NAACP and 
the Gary League of Women Voters supplemented the Hatcher 
registration drive with a registration campaign of their own. 
During the middle of August, voter registration offices were 
opened by these groups, with the cooperation of Muigwithania, 
at 1624 Broadway. An NAACP spokesman announced in con­
junction with this project that the sponsoring organizations in­
tended to request additional voter registrars from County Demo­
cratic Chairman John Krupa. The United Viscounts, a black man's 
social service organization, endeavored strenuously, but without 
success, to arrange a debate between Radigan and Hatcher. Re­
jection of the idea by the Radigan camp prompted the Viscounts to 
ask Radigan to withdraw from the race because he was receiving 
his basic support from forces associated with the Democratic 
party and it was illegal in Indiana for two Democrats to run for 
the same office in a general election. Considerable help with 
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grass-roots organizing was provided by the Gary Aid for De­
pendent Children (AFDC) mothers group and the Chicago chapter 
of the Independent Voters League of Illinois. 
Hatcher volunteers continued to receive formidable resistance 
to their electoral work from the political machine. The pre­
ponderance of the black precinct organization refused to cooperate 
with the Hatcher organization in any way. A few black com­
mitteemen worked actively with the regular Democratic organiza­
tion in its campaign to defeat Hatcher, joining with County 
Chairman Krupa in denouncing Hatcher as a black power ex­
tremist and accusing Hatcher workers of using "gestapo tactics" 
to coerce black voters into voting for their candidate. Most of 
them simply sat out the campaign, not lifting a finger to help 
either Hatcher or Radigan. 
The major source of resistance, however, was the county or­
ganization. John Krupa continued to turn down the Hatcher 
organization's request for deputy registrars in the black com­
munity. In the light of Krupa's persistent denial of the Hatcher 
request, the Young Adults Council of the NAACP staged a march 
on Krupa's home to dramatize the urgency of the need for more 
registrars in black areas. Krupa reaffirmed his position that there 
was no need for more registrars in Gary. He said that he would 
not be swayed by demonstrations and deplored the use of young 
marchers by Hatcher to gain a political advantage. Krupa referred 
to the marchers as dupes of a left-wing plot to take over Gary. 
And he left no doubt whom he thought was the key figure in 
the plot. 
It would be the greatest thing for the city of Gary to elect a Negro
mayor. But it must be a man who denounces Black Power advocates.
And it must not be someone who is going to force housing integra­
tion on people. The people of Gary had better wake up. If these people
are able to capture city hall, they also gain control of the police and
fire departments, leaving the steel mill and industrial complex at 
their mercy. The leaders in Moscow and Havana must be rubbing their 
hands in glee over this situation.21 
To slow down the tremendous rate of black registration, Krupa cut 
back on the number of affadavits for registration going to the 
Hatcher camp while, according to one respondent, "giving the 
Republicans all the affadavits they wanted." County officials 
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initially allocated only twenty affadavits at a time to precinct com­
mitteemen working with Hatcher. These would have to be ex­
hausted before additional registration forms could be obtained. 
This procedure imposed severe constraints on the registration 
process. A committeeman having forty people waiting in line to 
be registered could only register half; he would have to then re­
quest that the additional persons remain while he returned to 
Crown Point to pick up twenty more affadavits. The number of 
affadavits were raised to twenty-five and finally thirty, after a 
few precinct committeemen—on the urging of Hatcher volunteers 
—banded together to protest the limitations placed on their ability 
to register black voters by the prevailing policy relative to affa­
davit allocation. But even thirty affadavits were still far fewer 
than were generally required to expedite registration in the black 
community. 
These attempts at obstruction by the county organization failed 
to substantially hamper the mobilization process in the black com­
munity. Blacks would stand in line for hours to register to vote. 
The entire black community was jumping on the Hatcher band­
wagon, even elements of the black establishment that had bitterly 
opposed him in the spring. No one doubted, even county of&cials, 
that Hatcher's support in the black community would surpass the 
unprecedented vote he received in black precincts in the primary. 
Symptomatic of the prevailing black mood was the response 
Hatcher received during a campaign swing through one of the 
roughest, most depressed, traditionally most politically apathetic 
sectors of the black community. This event was described by a 
Hatcher worker in the following manner: 
We didn't take him [Hatcher] in there until the clientele was just
right—we'd been working on it. So he went down there about 3 o'clock 
with the intention of shaking hands. He started around Sixteenth.
By 5:30 he had made two blocks. That's as far as he could get, be­
cause he had other meetings and things that he had to start going to
around 6 o'clock. And you would have thought that it was some big
celebrity coming to town, I mean the way people were down there.
People were coming out of houses, women were coming around the
corner with their babies in their arms. Everybody was trying to shake
hands with him. It was a tremendous turnout. From Sixteenth to 
Thirteenth all the cars had to be turned around, they couldn't get
through. People were all out in the street everywhere. 
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With the black community thoroughly remobilized, Hatcher work­
ers were confident that if the white community produced at even 
a tiny fraction of its potential, Hatcher could not lose—unless, 
of course, the election was stolen. As we will see, this latter factor 
became the final, and most difficult challenge the Hatcher or­
ganization faced in its year-long quest to make Richard Hatcher 
the first black mayor of Gary, Indiana. 
THE GENERAL CAMPAIGN IN THE WHITE COMMUNITY 
Hatcher and his advisors believed that they could not afford 
to concede the white community to the opposition; thus a large 
share of the candidate's time was spent competing for the white 
vote. As a sign of the Hatcher organization's intention to vigor­
ously woo the white electorate, a campaign headquarters was 
established in conservative Glen Park. Attempts were made to 
also reopen the headquarters in Miller, but the owner of the build­
ing refused to rent it to Hatcher representatives. The building 
remained vacant for a time, but a portion of it was eventually 
opened up as a "Radigan for Mayor" command post in the Miller 
area. 
Hatcher was from time to time sharply criticized by volunteers 
for concentrating so much of his campaign time in the white 
community that it appeared he was taking the black vote for 
granted. These rebukes had little effect. Hatcher reasoned that 
it would do him no good to run extraordinarily well in the black 
community if he could not also poll enough white votes to win. 
He was relatively confident that the approximately two thousand 
white voters who voted for him in the primary would do so again 
in the general, even if he did not campaign in white areas. But 
with only one white candidate in the race, these votes would not 
be enough to guarantee his victory. Rather, his success in the 
general hinged pivotally on his ability to improve on the vote he 
received in the white community in the primary. 
Most of the exposure Hatcher received in the white community 
in the general was provided by white campaign workers and their 
friends. This aspect of the campaign was again headed by Mr. 
Arthur Lebo. The approach to the white community at the per­
sonal level was much more systematically organized in the fall 
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than in the primary. This time, Lebo put together a house-
meetings committee composed largely of whites from Miller, 
with a couple of persons from the Westside, and a couple from 
Glen Park. Lebo's committee constructed a form that persons 
willing to hold house parties had to fill out, providing informa­
tion relative to the time and place of the meeting and how many 
persons were expected to attend. A meetings schedule was set 
up based on the premise that Hatcher would not move from 
house to house, but would limit himself to two meetings a night. 
The standard format involved a short statement by Hatcher, in 
which he expressed his intention to provide the city with honest 
government and to use city resources to tap federal money that 
could be used to improve the lives of all citizens, followed by a 
lengthy question and answer session. This house-meetings pro­
gram enjoyed outstanding success. Whites attending these meet­
ings were favorably impressed with Hatcher's sincerity and his 
ability to provide articulate, well thought-out answers to their 
questions. Hatcher performed best in these situations; his will­
ingness to enter into frank face-to-face discussions with persons 
in attendance at these meetings helped him to pick up some 
wavering white support. Through this meetings program Hatcher 
was able to score several breakthroughs. For example, although 
most of his house meetings were held in Miller, several well-
attended house parties were also given for him in Glen Park. This 
was a first for a major independent black candidate. Hatcher 
people were pleasantly surprised by the reactions of citizens at­
tending the meetings in Glen Park. 
In addition to house meetings, Hatcher attempted to make in­
roads into the white community through a weekly radio broad­
cast and door-to-door campaign work by students from the Gary 
campus of Indiana University. Hatcher received help in the white 
community from two sources not available to him in the spring. 
A strong Teachers for Hatcher group was formed under the codi­
rectorship of John Friel and Charles Brown. Black membership 
in this group overlapped a good deal with the Teachers for En­
lightened Leadership group that had formed to help Hatcher in 
the spring. The Teachers for Hatcher group was much broader, 
however, because it contained a substantial white component. 
This group financed through its own resources an ad in the Post-
Tribune containing the names of about eight hundred persons. 
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All of the signatures for the ad were collected outside of school 
because leaders of the group did not want to open themselves up 
to charges of participating in electioneering activities on school 
time.22 Teachers for Hatcher also played an important role in 
providing exposure for Hatcher in the white community through 
the sponsoring of cocktail and house parties. In addition, some 
members of the teachers group served as an unofficial speakers 
bureau, substituting for Hatcher on occasions when he was not 
able to fulfill his commitments. The involvement of teachers in 
the Hatcher campaign was a significant accomplishment, because 
in the past teachers had constituted an untapped political poten­
tial. As one member of the Teachers for Hatcher group noted: 
"The role of the teacher in past years had been so refined, they 
tend to be such timid souls, that it is hard to convince them 
that they have not only the right but the responsibility to become 
active." 
Another source of support in the general not available in the 
primary was the leadership of organized labor. Hatcher received 
a strong endorsement from United States Steel workers District 31 
Director Joseph A. Germano. At a rally for Hatcher held on 16 
September, Germano vowed to seek support for Hatcher from 
"all those who have enjoyed the support of the United Steel­
workers of America in the past."23 He observed that it would be 
bad if steel mill workers did not support the Democratic mayoral 
nominee. It is important to point out, however, that Germano's 
strong endorsement was not sufficient to prevent his rank-and­
file white constituents from crossing over in droves to vote for 
Hatcher's Republican opponent. The failure of union leaders to 
deliver for Hatcher the votes of their blue-collar constituents is an 
enlightening commentary on both the weak nature of union leader­
ship in Gary, and the depth of racism among union members in 
general. Reflecting on his years of involvement in the Gary trade-
union movement, one Hatcher supporter incisively summed up 
the crucial factors hampering the exercise of effective leadership 
by union leaders on racial questions. 
On matters of race the trade-union movement in Gary has been
pretty well corrupt. There is a willingness to pay lip service—every
union is quite willing to have a black vice-president, but not willing
to go beyond that. Even those leaders who have their hearts in the
right place feel that they can't take their people with them. They're 
300 / Electing Black Mayors 
just afraid they can't carry on. They are fat and soft and don't really 
have a philosophy anymore except for a sort of tragic economism. 
"Let's get the best we can for the boys in the shop" is all it amounts 
to. 
A significant new dimension in Hatcher's general campaign 
was the substantial inroads made into the Latin American com­
munity. Hatcher was much more successful in getting Latins to 
identify with his campaign for mayor in the general than in the 
primary. Several Latins held key positions on the executive board 
and other bodies within the general campaign organization. With 
the help of Latin campaign members, grass-roots electoral activ­
ity was energetically pursued in the Latin community. A number 
of house parties were also held in Latin areas in an effort to at­
tract and hold the Latin vote. Each of these affairs was well at­
tended. 
Hatcher was warmly embraced by several highly influentical 
Latin community leaders. Perhaps the most important Latin 
community endorsement came from Jack Azcona, president of the 
Mexican-American Democratic Organization. In a published state­
ment circulated widely through the Latin community Azcona re­
minded Latins that the Democratic party was their traditional 
home, and that they had made progress under the Democrats 
whereas the Republicans when in power denied citizenship to 
them. He stated further that Latins had supported the nominees 
of the Democratic party in the past and nobody mentioned their 
nationality, race, or color. 
Latin American enthusiasm for Hatcher was pushed to its high­
est point by the endorsement of Congressman Henry B. Gonzalez 
of Texas. In October Gonzalez was the featured speaker at the 
Gary Urban League's annual banquet. He came to Gary a day 
before his scheduled speech specifically to stump for Hatcher in 
the Latin community. During his visit, Gonzalez toured the Tri­
city Plaza Democratic headquarters, spending several hours there 
talking to Latins and encouraging them to remain true Democrat­
ics by supporting Hatcher. He pointedly endorsed Hatcher in both 
Spanish and English. Before boarding his plane at the airport, 
Gonzalez issued a final appeal for Latin unity behind Hatcher, 
reminding Gary's Latin citizens that in the past they had been 
victimized by the tactic of divide and conquer. 
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Despite the strenuous campaign for the white vote waged by 
the Hatcher organization it became increasingly evident as the 
campaign progressed that large segments of the white commu­
nity were planning to cross over to support the white Republican 
candidate. The intensity of feeling against Hatcher in the white 
community was so great that it became difficult to work for him 
openly in white areas without getting verbally abused or physi­
cally attacked. One white respondent observed that in his com­
munity "every racist in the area, and by this I mean those who 
are usually somewhat on the fringe, were out in the open, up and 
down the street." Full-scale countermobilization emerged in the 
white community as whites became aware of the tremendous mo­
bilization campaign being waged in the black community in 
Hatcher's behalf. 
Countermobilization in the white community was spurred by 
the electoral work of the regular Democratic organization. In 
fact, what Hatcher faced in the white community was the united 
opposition of the entire Lake County machine. A majority of Dem­
ocratic white precinct committeemen worked full-time for Radi­
gan, distributing his literature and giving white voters instruc­
tions on how to split Hatcher out. Those who did not actively 
campaign for Radigan made only feeble efforts to discourage 
their white constituents from splitting their ballots in the mayor's 
race. The few white precinct committeemen who expressed an 
interest in working for Hatcher were told by party bosses this 
would not only be foolish but possibly suicidal. Witness, for ex­
ample, these comments by a leading figure in the regular Demo­
cratic organization: 
Most party workers didn't work hard for Hatcher. I told some of 
them, you have to be a hypocrite or a liar if you think you can go in­
to Miller and sell Mr. Hatcher. I said he's going to get a percentage 
of those votes. Some of them will be accidental, some of them will be 
on purpose. But they couldn't guarantee they could go in there and 
get X amount of votes. 
With few exceptions, white Lake County politicians lined up 
solidly in support of the Republican candidate. Hugh McLaughlin 
was the only white Democratic politician at the city level to ac­
tively campaign for Hatcher's election in the general. Confining 
his campaign activities primarily to Glen Park, his council dis­
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trict, McLaughlin publicly charged Krupa with being a captive 
of a "strange combine" consisting of "the corrupt political ma­
chine that includes George Chacharis, Peter Mandich, the present 
accused robber of the poor Milton Bromich and now the GOP."24 
Hatcher received weak endorsements and no active support from 
either Mayor Katz or city Democratic chairman Louis Karras. 
Katz was in fact suspected of taking actions behind the scenes 
to help Radigan. For example, city-hall employees were report­
edly instructed by the mayor to vote Republican in the November 
election.25 One city employee (a street inspector) active in the 
Hatcher campaign was dismissed and told by City Sanitation Di­
rector Stanley Piet, after being sent to his office by Mayor Katz, 
that he would be rehired when "Radigan was elected."26 City 
hall officials including Stanley Piet and Anthony Laterzo openly 
campaigned for Radigan without being reprimanded by Katz.27 
In what was perhaps the most glaring example of city-hall sup­
port, during fire-prevention week, Radigan himself was allowed 
to campaign riding a fire truck through white communities.28 
All three white Democratic nominees to the city council cam­
paigned independently of Hatcher in their districts. One of them, 
Theodore Nabhan running in the first district, worked actively 
to defeat him in the white community. Speaking at a first-district 
rally of 150 persons, Nabhan went out of his way to commend 
John Krupa for opposing the mayoral nominee of the Democratic 
party in Gary. He assured his first district constituents that he 
also opposed Hatcher. "I have sat on the Council for four years 
with him, and he is no good for Gary or any other city in the 
United States. He is for one man, and that is himself, and not for 
Gary."29 Before the rally ended, instructions were given on a 
sample machine supplied by County Chairman Krupa on proce­
dures for cutting Nabhan in while splitting Hatcher out. 
Lake County Auditor Bartel Zandstra, Lake County Juvenile 
Court Judge Joseph Meszar, and Lake County Coroner Alexander 
Williams were the only county officials to pledge strong support 
for Hatcher in the general election. Two prominent county offi­
cials, County Clerk John Krupa and County Treasurer Leslie 
Pruitt, campaigned widely for Radigan in the white community. 
At one Glen Park Democratic rally, for example, Radigan was in­
troduced from the stage by Pruitt. The keynote address of the 
night was delivered by Krupa; his speech centered on a round­
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house attack on national Democratic leaders for supporting 
Hatcher. Krupa told the audience of five hundred, "We cannot 
follow the pattern of our leaders in Washington—they lack leader­
ship and courage. So to hell with Washington."30 As he spoke 
Radigan milled through the standing patrons, shaking hands and 
calling for support in the November city election. 
While his Democratic allies worked to destroy Hatcher's may­
oral chances, Radigan campaigned throughout the white com­
munity promoting a good government, white-oriented platform. 
One Radigan advisor summarized the Republican campaign 
strategy in the following manner: "We pushed the name Joe 
Radigan. Very little of our literature had Republican on it; this 
was a part of the strategy. We wanted to lure as many Demo­
crats as we could. . . . Almost everything was beamed at the 
white Democratic vote. Do you want a good honest man or do you 
want Hatcher?" In keeping with this strategy, Radigan prom­
ised white Democrats that his administration would oppose the 
bussing of school children to achieve integration and would re­
move constraints on the power of the police to apprehend thugs 
who preyed on "God-fearing citizens." 
THE VOTE FRAUD PLOT 
Throughout most of the general campaign Hatcher advisors 
worried about a possible attempt on the part of the political ma­
chine to steal the election. Beginning in late September persis­
tent rumors floated into headquarters of various schemes, hatched 
out of county offices in Crown Point, to rob Hatcher of a general 
election victory, but no one appeared to have hard evidence to 
support these charges. Thus all Hatcher supporters could do was 
nervously scrutinize the activities of the county organization and 
pray that if a fraudulent vote plot materialized they would get 
wind of it in time enough to combat it. 
We had heard rumors of the registration of nonexistent people—that 
registration was being carried out wholesale in some of the white 
areas. But there was nothing specific, just rumors. We spent hours 
thinking of what legal remedies we had. Were there any injunctive 
things? Were there any mandamus kinds of actions? What could we 
do? We thought about maybe going to a state court or a county court, 
which we felt was kind of not a very hopeful gesture with all the 
damned political involvements. But we were preparing legal actions 
of one sort or another. 
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This nail-biting period was brought to a dramatic halt, however, 
when, during the second week in October, two reporters from 
Life magazine, Bob Bradford and Declan Hahn, brought to Hatcher 
workers incontrovertible evidence that an elaborate plot was 
afoot to defeat Hatcher through massive fraudulent voting in 
the white community. On assignment for Life to cover the Gary 
election, Bradford and Hahn managed to strike up working rela­
tionships with key workers in both the Hatcher and Radigan 
camps. During one of their numerous trips to Glen Park, they were 
contacted by a white precinct committeewoman named Mrs. 
Marion Tokarski. To their amazement, Mrs. Tokarski told Brad­
ford and Hahn of her participation in a plot emanating from 
Crown Point to cast 20,000 ghost votes for Radigan in the gen­
eral election. Bradford and Hahn immediately turned this infor­
mation over to one of their Hatcher contacts, and a meeting was 
arranged for Mrs. Tokarski to tell her entire story to Hatcher. 
Mrs. Tokarski's revelations were too much for Hatcher to be­
lieve. "When I told him they were going to steal 15,000 to 20,000 
votes, he kept saying 'That's fantastic, that's fantastic' "31 
Hatcher's advisors urged him to use Mrs. Tokarski's information 
as a basis for filing a law suit charging Democratic party offi­
cials with encouraging fraudulent voting practices and asking for 
a postponement of the election. Hatcher balked at the sugges­
tion. "He did not want to implicate precinct committeemen who 
might work for him. I told him 'Dick, if you don't go to court, 
you're going to lose—you're going to blow your campaign.' " 
While the hassle was still brewing over what to do with the Tokar­
ski information, additional hard evidence came to light of efforts 
being taken by the county organization to steal the election. Eye­
witnesses brought to Hatcher officials information that clerks in 
the county courthouse were tampering with absentee ballots. Ac­
cording to these reports, persons applying for absentee ballots 
were being urged to split Hatcher out and cast a vote for his 
opponent. To make sure these voters did not accidentally vote 
for Hatcher, they were requested not to seal their ballots before 
returning them to the county courthouse. Before any response 
could be discussed regarding these latest charges, an even more 
ominous development occurred: the Lake County Board of Elec­
tions, in an unprecedented move, summarily dropped over five 
thousand black registrants from the rolls, although Indiana law 
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did not allow for the purge of voters until the January following 
a presidential election. 
This audacious action by the county organization had its genesis 
in a series of articles by Hilbert Bradley published in Info relating 
to ghost voting in the black community. Entitled "Election Fraud 
—Gary Style," this series was based on several months of personal 
investigation by Bradley following the May primary. The pur­
pose of the Bradley articles was to explain why Hatcher ran so 
poorly in some black precincts in the primary by showing how 
the political machine typically stole votes in the black community. 
Written in a humorous vein, Bradley's articles revealed that a 
large number of persons who voted in the May primary did so 
under assumed names registered from phony addresses—vacant 
lots, store fronts, taverns, and the like. Bradley had collected 
enough evidence of ghost voting by July to file a request for a 
hearing with the county board of elections. This request was 
completely ignored by county officials for four months. Then, with­
out warning, Bradley received a letter from the election board on 
14 October informing him that his request for a hearing had been 
approved and that the hearing date had been set for 25 October. 
Bradley's testimony was favorably received, and the board prom­
ised a full-scale investigation of voting irregularities in black pre­
cincts. At the very moment Bradley was testifying before the 
board, Republican workers were busy canvassing black precincts 
in search of ghost voters. On 26 October, Republican city chair­
man Robert Rooda, a member of the Lake County Election Board, 
presented the board with a list of 5,286 names of persons turned 
up in the Republican canvass as fraudulent registrants. Over 
5,000 of the persons included on the list were black. John Krupa, 
Secretary to the Election Board, proceeded immediately to send 
out letters to all 5,286 persons on the Republican list challenging 
their registrations. Individuals receiving these letters were re­
quired to respond in person or by registered mail by 3 November 
or their names would be dropped from the registration rolls. 
This was unquestionably the gloomiest period in the general 
campaign for the Hatcher camp. When the five thousand letters 
challenging black registrations came down from the county chair­
man, most Hatcher workers were absolutely certain that the ball-
game was over—that the machine had succeeded in stealing the 
election from them. 
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They sent everybody and his uncle those letters. Some people had
been living at the same address for 12 or 13 years and owned their
own homes and were sent these letters. Many of them said they were
not going to send this letter back because they would have to send
it by registered mail which involved money. If they sent it, then they
would have to come out to Crown Point and appear before the elec­
tion board. So when they did this we knew we had lost. The Republi­
cans had put on a drive for their own ghost voters. With the ghost
voters they had, and the voters they took away from us, we knew
we had lost at that time. 
Campaign officials, however, were far from ready to throw in the 
towel; they had fought too hard over the past eleven months 
to let the whole thing slip away at the very end. But what could 
they do? Hatcher continued to rule out court action. An appeal 
to state and local officials would be fruitless. This left only one 
other avenue for help: the federal government. Accordingly, on 
the day Krupa announced his decision to nullify the registration 
of a large number of voters in the black community, an urgent 
telegram was sent to United States Attorney General Ramsey 
Clark. This telegram requested federal protection to insure an hon­
est election in Gary on 7 November. The Hatcher organization 
informed Clark that it had indisputable proof that certain promi­
nent Lake County election officials were engaged in massive fraud­
ulent registrations in white areas in order to steal the election. 
It charged that Democratic and Republican members of the elec­
tion board were in a conspiracy against Hatcher—a conspiracy 
that would allow more than 200 persons to go from precinct to 
precinct in white areas voting under assumed names. The tele­
gram concluded that without immediate federal intervention, a 
fair election could not be held and the people of Gary would be 
robbed of their inherent constitutional rights.32 
Hatcher people waited on a reply from the Justice Department. 
After several days telephone inquiries were made. The word they 
received back was " 'If you're going to do something you'd better 
do it yourself, don't count on the Justice Department for a thing.' " 
This response left the Hatcher organization no choice but to turn 
to the courts. The possibility of filing a suit in the state courts 
was kicked around and dismissed because it might take two or 
three years to get a judgment at that level and by that time the 
whole question would be moot. Black state senator Pat Chavis 
who had been sent to assist in the campaign by the state central 
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committee suggested that they file immediately in the federal 
courts and that they try to get attorney William R. Ming of Chi­
cago, the leading black constitutional lawyer in the Midwest, to 
handle the case. Ming agreed to handle the case, and the state 
central committee pledged to finance court costs incurred by the 
action. At that point, the legal strategy included going all the way 
to the Supreme Court. The suit was filed in the district court; it 
called for the convening of a three-judge panel to hear arguments 
and render a decision. A negative judgment by the panel would 
be immediately appealable to the United States Supreme Court. 
Lawyers working on the suit were undecided whether they 
should go for establishing a legal basis for setting aside a fraudu­
lent election or a postponement of the election. It was finally 
agreed to ask the court to do whatever was necessary to guarantee 
Richard Hatcher and other classes of complaintants, including all 
registered Democrats who had voted in the primary, and registered 
Democrats specifically whose registration had been nullified by 
the Krupa letter, a fair election. Second, the Hatcher petition 
asked that if the first request was not possible to grant, that the 
court set the election over. The Hatcher complaint alleged that 
defendants in the suit were involved in a scheme designed to 
deliberately disenfranchise large numbers of black voters, vote 
large numbers of nonexistent white persons allegedly registered, 
and defeat the candidacy of the chief complaintant Richard 
Hatcher. It accused Krupa of boasting to use every means to de­
feat Hatcher, including the disqualification of black voters, and, 
if necessary, willful negligence in the counting of votes cast for 
him in the mayoral race.33 Named as defendants were John 
Krupa, Walter C. Zurbriggen, Jerome J. Reppa, Robert H. Rooda, 
Anthony Dobis, Jr., Louis G. Karras, Marian Evanseck, Helen 
Ann Repya, Bessie Manoski, Elease P. Wilson, Edward Robinson, 
Erma McBride, Roby Bartolomei, Meaky Metcalf, Frank Perry, 
Andrew Atkins, Marguerite Graves, Ortomease G. Gandeau, 
Issac Davis, Steven Mojanovich, Mary A. Dzacky, Martha Pruitt, 
John Bokash, Joseph S. Bejgrowiiz, and Dorothy Wackowski. 
Joining Ming as attorneys in the case were Walter K. Black 
(Chicago), Julian B. Allen (Gary) and Patrick E. Chavis (Indianap­
olis). Ming had warned his co-attorneys that the court would 
probably not set the election over. He said that in fact they had 
to be careful that the whole thing was not swept under the rug; 
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but it was his judgement that the suit was still worth the effort, 
because at the very least it would provide a basis for setting 
the election aside if Hatcher lost. The suit was presented to U.S. 
District Judge George N. Beamer who took it under advisement 
and shortly therafter announced the convening of a three-man 
federal panel to conduct a hearing on the suit on Monday 6 No­
vember one day before the scheduled general election. 
Two important developments closely followed the filing of 
the Hatcher suit. The first was an announcement by John Krupa 
that he was restoring the names of the 5,286 voters removed from 
the registration roles. Krupa said that he was taking this step in 
light of advice he received from county attorneys that his action 
in removing the names would probably be declared illegal by the 
federal courts. Second was the announcement by the Justice De­
partment—in a reversal of its previous position—that it was filing 
a companion suit to the Hatcher suit charging Lake County of­
ficials with inflating the number of white registrants while di­
minishing the number of legally registered black voters. This 
action constituted the first time the federal government had in­
tervened in a local election to protect the voting rights of blacks 
in the North. 
Despite appearances, the decision on the part of the Justice 
Department to enter the Gary controversy was not a precipitous 
move. Unknown to practically anyone was the fact that the FBI 
had been investigating charges of voting irregularities in Gary for 
six months. These FBI activities were supplemented by the work 
of a special team of twenty-two lawyers from the civil rights 
division of the Justice Department immediately after the Hatcher 
suit was filed in the court. When representatives of the Justice 
Department arrived, they found that the FBI had already meticu­
lously photographed and sent to Washington for examination, all 
new registration cards and applications from the period May 
through October 1967. Using information supplied them by the 
FBI, Justice Department lawyers fanned out through white 
neighborhoods checking the accuracy of white registrations. Be­
tween Wednesday 1 November and Friday 3 November, when the 
federal suit was filed, Justice Department and FBI agents veri­
fied the existence of 300 false white registrations. They uncov­
ered 700 additional fake names on registration rolls in white areas 
between Friday and Sunday. This information provided the basis 
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for a wealth of data to support the case the federal government 
intended to present to the federal panel on Monday. The data 
included, according to one respondent, "charts and other docu­
ments." Although not inexperienced in such matters, this respon­
dent was astounded by the ability of the federal government to 
amass such an assortment of information over a period of a few 
days. He described the investigatory capability of the Justice 
Department as "awesome." "I've never seen such a collection 
of data, such a compilation of material, which required fantastic 
physical effort and expertise. I would hate to have the federal 
government come after me the way it came in that case. It was 
just an absolutely incredible display of logistical ability." 
On the morning of the hearing, the federal courthouse in Ham­
mond—site of the proceedings—was jammed with press representa­
tives and an overflow crowd of spectators. Presiding were Judges 
George Beamer of the Hammond Federal Court, Jesse Eschbach 
of the Northern District Court of Fort Wayne, and Walter Cum­
mings of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Chicago. Be­
fore hearing testimony, the federal panel—over the strenuous 
objection of defense attorneys—consolidated the Hatcher and 
Justice Department cases. 
The hearing began with the testimony of three witnesses called 
by the Justice Department to substantiate its allegations of 
fraudulent registration activities in white areas. The first witness, 
Mrs. Charles Luck, testified that none of the eighteen persons 
shown on poll books as being tenants in her apartments were 
living there as of 1 November, nor had they been living there 
for the past three months. Arthur Illyes, a second government 
witness, owner of lots from 4121 through 4141 on Georgia Street, 
which contained a used car lot but no residences, denied that a 
William Henderson registered at 4125 Georgia Street lived there. 
Mrs. Marg Fejo issued a similar denial that two persons listed 
as registered from her home actually lived there. 
Donald H. Lotz, senior resident agent for the Gary FBI, also 
testified as a government witness. Lotz told the court that FBI 
agents had discovered 1,100 registrations in white neighborhoods 
that could not be verified. He said all of these false registra­
tions had been added since Hatcher's defeat of Mayor Katz in 
the May primary. On cross-examination, Lotz admitted that black 
precincts were not as extensively canvassed as white. However, 
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he said a thorough check had been run in the 57 predominantly 
black precincts and that no fictitious names were discovered on 
the poll books there. 
John L. Howard, a black steelworker, took the stand to testify 
that he had received a letter from the county chairman's office 
challenging his registration although he had been a registered 
voter in Gary since 1936 and had never missed voting in a city 
election since that time. He said he called Anthony Dobis to com­
plain when he received the letter, and Dobis assured him that his 
registration card would be put back. 
Hatcher attorney William Ming called Krupa to the stand. Krupa 
denied that the county organization attempted to purge black vot­
ers from the rolls. He did admit, however, that he sent out letters 
challenging the registration of the 5,000 black voters in question, 
although there were no specific procedures or regulations autho­
rizing him to take such action. 
The most dramatic point in the hearing came when Mrs. Marion 
Tokarski took the stand to testify to widespread fraudulent regis­
tration in white areas. A description of the atmosphere of the 
courtroom during the time of Mrs. Tokarski offered her spectacu­
lar relevations was provided by the following respondent: 
Everything built up to Marion Tokarski. It was a packed court room.
And boy when that white woman started dropping those names,
everytime she dropped one there would be an audible gasp from the
spectators. The tension was so thick you could cut it with a knife. 
Prefacing her remarks with the declaration "I am incriminating 
myself in this case," Mrs. Tokarski told of her participation in the 
registration of fraudulent voters. She claimed to have first-hand 
knowledge of 107 names of persons who were either dead or had 
moved away who were registered to vote in her precinct in the 
general election. Mrs. Tokarski also testified to receiving a 
phone call from a Democratic district captain asking her to pro­
vide five names to be purged so her precinct could be included in 
a citywide purge of voters. 
At the close of their arguments in the case, Hatcher attorneys 
asked the federal panel to put a court representative or Hatcher 
representative on the staff of election officials supervising voting 
activities in Gary's 132 precinct-polling places. They contended 
that this action was necessary because Hatcher could not be fairly 
represented by persons appointed by county chairman Krupa to 
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serve as election judges. The only persons really committed to 
safeguarding the Hatcher vote, they argued, were unofficial ob­
servers who did not have the power to challenge voters or to see 
that proper procedures were followed. 
When closing arguments had been presented, the three-judge 
panel recessed the court and deliberated for one and a quarter 
hours before returning with its decision. The court ruled in favor 
of the plaintiffs. In their opinion, the three judges unanimously 
agreed to deny the Hatcher petition to postpone the Gary election, 
but instead to issue a preliminary injunction against actions by 
the defendants that would impair the holding of a fair and non­
discriminatory election. Election officials were ordered specifi­
cally not to allow the 1,100 ghost voters turned up by the FBI and 
Justice Department to participate in the election. County clerk 
Krupa and his subordinates were also ordered not to prohibit the 
5,286 voters on his letter list from voting. Written records relating 
to the challenge of any voter in the 7 November election were 
to be maintained by election officials and made available to fed­
eral officials for inspection. The court noted that it was retaining 
jurisdiction in the case until after the election "for such further 
proceedings as justice may require."34 United States marshals 
were ordered to post the court order along with lists of alleged 
fraudulent voters at all polling places, and to serve copies of the 
documents on all election-day workers. The three-judge panel 
turned down Hatcher's request that he be allowed to place his 
representatives at each polling place, observing that the hour was 
too late to change election officials and that such a step would 
constitute a violation of Indiana election laws.35 
Hatcher labeled the court decision a victory. Krupa commented 
that the court action provided for what the county organization 
wanted all along—a fair election. Radigan, who had previously 
referred to the Hatcher suit as reckless and irresponsible said 
that he was confident the court decision would guarantee a fair 
election but would still like to see federal marshals stationed at 
each polling place to provide extra protection against vote steal­
ing in black as well as white areas. 
ELECTION DAY 
In the wake of the multitude of charges and countercharges of 
vote fraud, rumors of possible racial turmoil on election day 
spread throughout the city during the final week of the campaign. 
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Taking these rumors seriously, national, state, and local officials 
made elaborate precautionary arrangements to firmly quash 
any outbreak of racial violence that might arise. Approximately 
five thousand national guard troops were assembled at armories 
in Valparaiso, Michigan City, and Hammond with orders to move 
into Gary the moment trouble developed. One contingent of na­
tional guard troops were ordered into South Gary near Gilroy 
Stadium before dawn on election day by Major General John S. 
Anderson of the Indiana National Guard. They were accompanied 
by armored personnel carriers and other riot equipment. A tem­
porary headquarters for the state police was set up at a Valparaiso 
motel. Reporters counted as many as 240 state patrol cars outside 
the motel at one point in the day. Included among the state 
law officers on alert at the motel were four platoons of patrol­
men specially trained in riot control. "With replacements and 
officers they constituted virtually the entire state police force."36 
Hundreds of state policemen joined with Gary's entire force of 
248 policemen in patrolling precincts throughout the day. Fed­
eral help was provided by FBI agents and 25 United States mar­
shals sent to Gary from several other cities. City police from near­
by communities prepared to seal off Gary if rioting broke out so 
that "Chicago hoodlums" could not rush over to join in the vio­
lence. A central command post for law-enforcement agencies was 
established in Gary police headquarters. Radio transmitters were 
installed, putting the command post in immediate contact with 
police squad cars and police and national guard headquarters 
outside the city. 
The situation in both black and white precincts on election 
day in Gary was extremely tense. Hatcher workers were not ap­
pointed as official precinct-observers by Krupa, but many did 
serve as unofficial poll-watchers, the same capacity they had held 
in the spring. Again an elaborate two-way communication system 
was set up enabling poll-watchers to immediately contact a team 
of lawyers operating out of central headquarters, who served as 
election day troubleshooters. Phones at Hatcher headquarters 
were ringing continuously all day. Most of the calls were from 
persons complaining that they were not being allowed to vote by 
election officials because their names were not in poll books or 
supplementary binders issued by the county clerk's office. One 
especially troublesome problem resulted from the registration of 
some voters in Midtown by a Mrs. Freeman who identified her­
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self as a vice-committeewoman in the 124th precinct. However, 
Mrs. Freeman was never sworn in as a deputy registrar and ap­
parently never turned in the sign-ups she recorded. Thus the 
names of persons she registered were all missing from poll books. 
A frantic search for Mrs. Freeman ensued, but nobody seemed to 
know anything about where she could have possibly disappeared. 
Hatcher headquarters also received a rash of complaints about 
voting machine breakdowns in midtown precincts. Mayor Katz 
denied that these breakdowns were deliberate but attributed the 
trouble to "new equipment and, in some cases, new election work­
ers unfamiliar with the machines."37 A few reports were received 
of ghost voting. William Barden, for example, told Hatcher offi­
cials that he had been informed by poll officials when he tried 
to vote that someone using his name had already cast his vote. 
He said polling officials ignored his objections and turned him 
away. In general, however, the incidence of vote-stealing was 
sharply curtailed by the close supervision by federal agents of 
election-day activities. This fact is underscored by the reflection 
of this Hatcher worker on his experiences as a poll-watcher in 
an all-white precinct: 
I poll watched in the [X] precinct on the Eastside. The precinct com­
mitteewoman was [Y], who was named in the federal suit along with
Marion Tokarski as one of the instigators of the movement to steal
the election. The Democratic Sheriff was her mother. The polling 
place was in her garage. The Republican precinct committeeman
was under her thumb. The only honest person of all the election of­
ficials both Democratic and Republican was the Republican sheriff, 
who was an old time Republican. He was honest, but Republican
through and through. They were frightened. She [Y] was frightened 
especially. Around 8:00 A.M. the federal marshal came and handed 
everyone the injunction enjoining them from interfering with the 
voting procedure or attempting to steal the election. They also 
tacked the injunction on the door of the garage. After these docu­
ments were handed out and the marshal left, [Y] went to the polling
book and crossed out another thirty or forty names which she knew
about that the federal government didn't know about. It was quite
obvious she was very frightened about getting caught in this. She
was doing all in her power to assure Radigan's election. But she 
didn't want to get caught up in this suit of false people voting under
someone else's name. She pointed out to me and several others that
if any of these other people came in they were to be challenged. 
This respondent noted that despite the cautious attitude of the 
Democratic precinct committeewoman, some flagrant violations 
314 / Electing Black Mayors 
did occur. The precinct inspector and Democratic judge, for ex­
ample, were going behind the curtain showing people how to split 
Hatcher out until he called this activity to the attention of the 
Republican sheriff who immediately brought it to a halt. He also 
asserted that the police had to be called to the precinct several 
times because iron workers persisted in intimidating people com­
ing in and out of the polling station. One student from Notre 
Dame standing around pretending to take pictures with an un­
loaded camera was beaten up by this group. 
Not surprisingly, one of the most harassed persons in Gary on 
election day was Mrs. Marion Tokarski. She reported to news­
men that she had been receiving threatening telephone calls. One 
male caller told her "If Hatcher is elected, you'll never see him 
mayor."38 When she went to vote in her precinct she was ac­
costed outside by a man who said that she had "sold her soul 
for 30 pieces of silver."39 
On balance, despite all of the rumors of racial violence, gen­
eral election day was one of the calmest in recent times. There 
were no reports of extremely severe incidents. Again much of 
the prevailing peace can be attributed to the presence of federal 
forces, as this Hatcher supporter candidly explained: 
We were reinforced by some federal fear that was thrown around
the last few days of the campaign. This was very effective. Had it
not been for that the confrontation would have developed. Because
they were going to steal, they've been doing it for the last twenty
years so why stop now. That was going to go on. And we were deter­
mined not to allow it to go on. So the forces would have met and it
would have been quite a meeting. 
Election day also witnessed the heaviest turnout of voters in the 
city's history. At 5:00 P.M. two hours before the polls closed Mayor 
Katz forecast a record 80 percent turnout. Heaviest turnout was 
achieved in predominantly black districts. By noon more than 60 
percent of the eligible black electorate had voted while about 50 
percent of the white voters had turned out. At the bottom of this 
tremendous black turnout was the Hatcher organization. The 
ranks of Hatcher workers participating in the effort to turnout 
the black vote in the primary were swollen in the general by col­
lege students from throughout the country. A contingent of stu­
dents from Notre Dame and Purdue were brought to Gary by 
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George Neagu, director of the South Bend Human Relations Com­
mission. Students also came over from Northwestern, Roosevelt, 
University of Chicago, and other nearby schools. One delegation 
of one hundred students came from Illinois, Connecticut, Michi­
gan, Ohio, New Jersey, and California. They made it clear to re­
porters that they were not outsiders but "mostly the children of 
Gary parents who have gone to school in other states."40 Three 
out-of-town students indicated that they came "in response to 
the need for an honest election in your city."41 Also participating 
in the get-out-the-vote effort were black members of a packing­
house union in Chicago, and Chicago-based black politicians 
State Senator Richard Newhouse, State Representative Harold 
Washington, Alderman William Cousins, Jr., former Alderman 
Robert H. Miller, and State Senator Charles Chew. Robert Lucas, 
director of the Chicago chapter of the Congress of Racial 
Equality was an additional out-of-towner on hand to lend his sup­
port to Hatcher's success in the general election. Generally, 
more than three thousand persons were involved in the total elec­
tion-day effort to protect the vote and generate a massive turnout 
in the black community. 
Hatcher and Radigan ran neck and neck throughout the elec­
tion day balloting. At one point only 37 votes separated the two 
candidates. By 7 P.M. when the polls closed, both Hatcher and 
Radigan were declaring victory in the mayoral race. Hatcher's 
statement, however, conveyed an undertone of uncertainty that 
belied the outward image of confidence he attempted to project. 
He told his supporters gathered at headquarters: "I am confi­
dent we are going to be victorious tonight. This has been a cam­
paign to try to create a different kind of city—a new Gary. I am 
certain right always wins over evil. I am certain we are going to 
win tonight."42 In contrast to Hatcher's cautious optimism, Radi­
gan assumed the role of a candidate who had already been de­
clared mayor-elect. He strutted around his headquarters flashing 
a victory sign and declaring to his jubilant followers: "This was 
a hard-fought but good clean campaign. After the election I will 
sit down with my opposition to discuss the good of all Gary."43 
At this point preliminary returns showed Radigan polling huge 
majorities in Glen Park and Miller. As the night wore on, how­
ever, ecstasy turned to agony in the Radigan camp. A 10 P.M. 
check of the vote showed Radigan leading by 4,900 votes. Twenty 
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minutes later, as returns from Midtown began to pour in, this 
lead was whittled down to 770 votes. At about this precise mo­
ment Hatcher headquarters began coming alive. By 11:00 the out­
come of the election was no longer in doubt. Hatcher was lead­
ing by 2,000 votes with only 3 more precincts to be recorded. 
Black precincts had given Hatcher such lopsided majorities as 
4 to 434, 16 to 522, and 1 to 291. The deciding vote was cast 
by Hatcher's home precinct, the 111th; this precinct gave Radi­
gan 14 votes to Hatcher's 1,003. Hatcher headquarters broke out in 
wild rejoicing. Shouts of "Oh, no!" went up in Radigan head­
quarters. An organ struck up a chorus of "When Irish Eyes are 
Smiling," but few in Radigan headquarters were in the mood for 
singing. 
When final totals were computed, Hatcher had won the elec­
tion by the narrow margin of 1,389 votes, receiving 39,812 to 
Radigan's 37,947.44 A breakdown of the vote by districts and the 
percentages of the vote by districts are shown in table 14. In 
TABLE 14 
GARY MAYORALTY ELECTION, 1967 
Percent Percent 
District Hatcher Radigan Hatcher Radigan 
First
Second
Third
Fourth
Fifth
Sixth
 2,012
 3,379
 11,171
 10,848
 10,530
 1,371
 11,636
 7,790
 2,367
 540
 366
 15,039
 11.7
 23.7
 82.5
 95.5
 97.5
 8.3
 88.3 
 76.3 
 17.5 
 4.5 
 2.5 
 91.7 
Total 39,812 37,947 50.9 49.1 
SOURCE: Board of Election voting returns. 
an exclusive postelection interview with the Chicago Daily News, 
Hatcher contended that his actual margin of victory was much 
higher, but that the machine managed to successfully steal be­
tween 5,000 and 7,000 votes. Asked if any fraudulent votes were 
cast for him, Hatcher answered, "No. I'll tell you why. The 
people who opposed us had control of the entire election ma­
chinery. We had control over nothing. We didn't want to do any­
thing wrong, and even if we did we weren't in a position to do it. 
If any fraud went on, it went on in behalf of my opponent."45 
An analysis of the vote indicates that several factors were most 
crucially responsible for the outcome of the election. First, a 
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cursory examination of voting patterns in the election clearly 
shows race to be the dominant factor influencing the voting de­
cisions of the Gary electorate. This was no doubt a natural prod­
uct of the overtly racial nature of the general campaign. Both 
Hatcher and Radigan made valiant efforts to rise above the race 
issue to talk about plans for reconstructing city government and 
providing for the citizens of Gary a better way of life. Rational 
discourse on good government issues was impossible, however, in a 
campaign where one candidate was constantly called upon to 
defend himself against charges of black power advocacy and 
the other of being a dupe of a corrupt political machine at­
tempting to hold on to power by any means necessary. Race 
inevitably overshadowed all other issues; its impact in the elec­
tion was so strong that it shattered patterns of voting behavior 
in the white community that held sway over a period of thirty 
years. Leaders of the regular Democratic organization appealed 
to the racism endemic in Gary's white community for their own 
political purposes; and they succeeded in stimulating a massive 
defection of white voters to the Republican camp. This fact 
produced the single most important attribute of the 1967 mayoral 
election: the division of the vote along racial lines. Table 14 
shows that the predominantly black third, fourth, and fifth dis­
tricts went solidly for Hatcher while Miller, Glen Park, and Up­
town gave overwhelming support to Radigan. 
When one probes beneath the racial factor, however, one 
finds that a pivotal key to Hatcher's victory was his success in 
polling a higher percentage of the white vote than Radigan did 
the black vote. Given the intensity of the racial assaults leveled 
against him, Hatcher ran surprisingly well in the white com­
munity. He received 5,322 or about 14 percent of the white vote. 
Hatcher ran poorest in Eastern European precincts in Glen Park; 
his vote in Glen Park ranged from 4 percent in precinct 102 to 
12 percent in precinct 100. Overall, he managed to capture 8.3 
percent of the Glen Park vote. As could be expected, Hatcher ran 
much better in Miller. He received about 15 percent of the Miller 
vote. However, support for Hatcher significantly surpassed this 
average figure in wealthier Miller precincts. He polled, for ex­
ample, an impressive 24 percent of the vote in the economically 
affluent first precinct in Miller. Hatcher made his greatest in­
roads in the white community among Latin American voters. 
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Analysis of the vote in the heavily Latin second and third dis­
tricts reveals that he received approximately 60 percent of the 
Latin American vote. 
In contrast, Radigan fell down badly in the black community. 
For example, in the fifth district he received a miniscule 2.5 
percent of the vote. He improved on this slightly in the fourth 
district where he received 4.5 percent of the vote. His best per­
formance was in the third district; there he received 17.5 percent 
of the vote. Most of Radigan's support in the third district came 
not from black precincts but from the all white thirty-fifth, 
thirty-sixth, and thirty-seventh precincts that have traditionally 
voted Republican. 
Hatcher's support in the white community—though not ex­
traordinarily large—was large enough to assure his victory. Radi­
gan's support in the black community was too weak to offset 
the amount of support picked up by Hatcher in the white com­
munity. What accounts for Hatcher's white vote in an election 
fought mainly along racial lines? It is probable that a good per­
centage of the white vote Hatcher received in Glen Park came 
from habitual Democrats who could not bring themselves to vote 
for a Republican. These were persons who remembered that it 
was Roosevelt not Eisenhower who brought them through the 
depression; they had always voted straight Democratic tickets in 
the past, and out of habit and a sense of party loyalty continued 
to do so in the 1967 Gary mayoral election. Another closely re­
lated component of the Hatcher white vote was that element of 
the white community that initially felt cross-pressured but was 
inspired by Hatcher's campaign appeal to maintain their support 
for the entire Democratic ticket. A substantial proportion of this 
vote came from the Latin community. With the invaluable as­
sistance of Latin leaders, including Congressman Gonzalez, 
Hatcher successfully appealed to a majority of the Latin elec­
torate's sense of party loyalty and attachment to the group's 
heritage. Although persons who worked in the Hatcher cam­
paign tended to downgrade the significance of the Latin vote, 
it is clear that the Latin community played the pivotal swing role 
in this election that the black community played in an earlier 
point in the city's history. Whites in Miller were more willing to 
judge the candidates on their merits rather than their race; this 
fact accounts in part for the white support Hatcher received in 
that area. A number of Miller residents had supported Hatcher 
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all along even in the primary; some supported him openly, but 
even more kept their preference for Hatcher within the confines 
of their family and friendship circles. The latter point was stressed 
by Hatcher's campaign manager Henry Coleman in a post­
election newspaper interview. Coleman contended in this article 
that many white voters felt compelled to support Hatcher pri­
vately because "they were afraid of their neighbors."46 There is 
some evidence to support the conclusion that at least a small 
proportion of Hatcher's white vote came from whites who ob­
jected to the overtly racial campaign tactics employed by Hatch­
er's Democratic opponents. These comments by a white re­
spondent helps to establish the basis for this conclusion: 
Defeating a Democratic nominee in this town is not easy. And the 
only way they [leaders of the regular Democratic organization] could
defeat him was by making an overt racial appeal. But in some cases
this strategy backfired. For instance in our precinct here, the fifth 
precinct, which consists of a large number of people up from Ten­
nessee and Kentucky, I think the mayor [Hatcher] got about 17 
votes in the primary whereas in November he got somewhere about 
70 to 80 votes. Well, somebody around here who didn't want that 
man mayor in the primary just couldn't stomach the fact that a vote 
for Radigan was a purely racial vote. And I would be hard pressed 
to find the people. I couldn't name them, but obviously they were 
here. 
We may note also that Hatcher's voting percentage in the white 
community was enhanced by the large number of ballots spoiled 
by whites in the attempt to vote for other Democratic candidates 
while splitting Hatcher out. In Glen Park and Miller 3,700 more 
votes were cast for councilman than for mayor. In the racially 
mixed second district 288 persons voting in councilmanic races 
did not cast a vote in the mayor's race. It is reasonable to pre­
sume that these differences were due in large measure to errors 
made by whites inexperienced in the practice of split-ticket vot­
ing. No such problem plagued black voters. Thus, for example, 
whereas large differences in the number of votes cast for Demo­
cratic council candidate Eugene Carrabine and Hatcher existed 
in the second district (2,406), in black precincts in this district 
both candidates received approximately the same number of 
votes. Black voters generally just went to the polls and voted a 
straight Democratic ticket. 
Complementing Hatcher's moderate success in the white 
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community was the tremendous success he enjoyed in the black 
community. In the final analysis the extraordinarily high mobi­
lization of the black vote by Hatcher's campaign organization 
was the most important factor contributing to his general elec­
tion victory. The Hatcher organization turned out a record 76 
percent of the black vote; this compared to a turnout of 72 per­
cent of the registered white electorate. Blacks voted in bloc 
fashion as they had done in previous general elections, but this time 
they did so over the opposition of Democratic party leaders. 
Hatcher received 96 percent of the black vote cast in the election. 
This combination of high turnout and cohesion by black voters— 
which could have only been accomplished through a mobiliza­
tion effort of extensive dimensions—provided the pivotal founda­
tion upon which the electoral coalition that catapulted a black 
man into the mayor's office in Gary, Indiana, in 1967 was built. 
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A Summary View of Political Mobilization 
INTRODUCTION 
Throughout the post-World War II period, millions of black 
Americans migrated into large northern cities, and millions of 
whites moved from the central cities to surrounding suburbs. 
These simultaneous migratory patterns created (and are still 
creating) a demographic context that substantially increased 
the possibility that blacks would attempt to elect members of 
their own ethnic group to the mayorship of cities because of its 
symbolic and substantive importance. In the preceding chap­
ters we have attempted to demonstrate that such an accom­
plishment is by no means an automatic process. We have argued 
that a large numerical concentration of blacks within a govern­
mental jurisdiction is at best only a potential political resource 
in the quest for electoral black power. Numerical concentration 
is a resource that must be supplemented by other political re­
sources, including a heightened political consciousness, inde­
pendent leadership, organization, and group cohesion, if black 
electoral success is to be achieved. In this chapter our objective 
is to review and summarize the factors that contribute to politi­
cal mobilization in black communities and the additional factors 
that influence whether or not a black candidate will be elected 
mayor of a large city. 
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THE INGREDIENTS OF POLITICAL MOBILIZATION 
The early stirrings of the mobilization process in both Cleve­
land and Gary began with the emergence of the civil rights move­
ment in the early 1960s. Civil rights action on the national level 
was, of course, an important stimulant in this process, but local 
civil rights activities were even more significant. Numerous 
demonstrations and other activities performed the double func­
tion of involving in direct political action thousands of blacks 
who had previously been politically inactive and exposing the 
stubborn racism of the white establishment. The combination 
of these two factors contributed to several developments: it 
encouraged a growing number of blacks to engage in politics; 
it shattered the notion that blacks were experiencing normal 
progress and thus were satisfied with their lot; it reinforced the 
idea that blacks had to act in unison, not as individuals, if they 
wanted to improve their socioeconomic-political condition; it 
provided blacks with a growing sense of group consciousness 
and cohesion; and it identified the incumbent white adminis­
tration as the common enemy of virtually all black people. In a 
word, the civil rights movement served to mobilize black resis­
tance to the prevailing system of domestic colonialism. 
Out of this process of political awakening and growing group 
solidarity emerged a new set of black leaders distinguished by 
their identification with the aspirations of the black masses. 
Both Hatcher and Stokes and the people surrounding them pro­
vided ample evidence to the black community that they were not 
sell-out risks to the white establishment. Unlike numerous tradi­
tional black leaders, these new leaders projected the image of 
selfless people whose major concern was not the promotion of 
their own personal interest but the overall interest of the black 
community. This factor, for example, contributed more than 
anything else to Hatcher's widespread popularity in Gary. First 
as a civil rights activist and later as a member of the Gary city 
council, Hatcher had demonstrated to the black masses that he 
was dedicated to the advancement of the total black community 
and could not be induced to sell out black interests through 
promises of money or threats of political or physical retaliation. 
In this respect he presented a public image that contrasted 
markedly with that of traditional black leaders who had on in­
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numerable occasions compromised the interests of the black 
community for personal rewards. This ability to overcome the 
distrust the black masses had of orthodox leadership can be 
viewed as a pivotal ingredient of the political mobilization pro­
cess. Testimony to the critical nature of trust and confidence 
in the mobilization process was provided by a number of re­
spondents. Witness, for instance, these words of advice offered 
by one black respondent to blacks in other cities wishing to 
follow in the footpath of Gary blacks. 
I hope if we didn't do but one thing, our movement here will inspire 
black people in other places to look around in their community and 
find a candidate. I am willing to go and help some other people 
look around in their community and find a candidate. I don't want 
to pick one of those cities with just a sprinkling few whites. I want 
to pick one of those cities like Chicago. It would be a pleasure for 
me to go into Chicago, help those people find a candidate and prove 
to them that the Daley machine can be beat. But here's the thing. 
Now you're not going to do this with one of those stiff collars. The 
people are not going to buy him. He's got to be identified with the 
grass-roots people, the ordinary John Doe, as a man who stood up, 
stood alone, spoke out for what he thought was wrong regardless 
of the consequences. That is the kind of man it's going to take in 
Chicago to bust Daley. Whenever I find that the people have chosen 
themselves a candidate who can identify with the grass roots, whether 
it be Chicago or some place else, I will be more than willing to offer 
my services for free.1 
Emergence in the black community of a leadership corps and 
a candidate enjoying the trust and confidence of the black mass­
es made possible the formation of a grass-roots campaign or­
ganization composed of volunteer workers.2 The formation and 
development of such a campaign structure is critical to the 
mobilization of the black electorate for several reasons. First, 
given the unlikely possibility that any black mayoral candidate 
around whom the mobilization process would focus will have at 
his disposal a sizeable campaign war chest, the creation of such 
an organization serves to substitute volunteer citizen activity 
for extensive economic resources. This fact takes on immense im­
portance in circumstances such as those faced by Hatcher and 
Stokes who had to confront powerful and entrenched Democratic 
organizations and wealthy Republican organizations. Second, 
members of the organization provide an indispensable link 
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between the candidate and the black electorate. Both Stokes and 
Hatcher found that the individuals in the best position to sell 
them to rank-and-file black voters and thus compete with pro­
fessional black politicians for the loyalty of the black masses 
were the volunteer representatives of the grass-roots black com­
munity. In effect, the campaign volunteers became parallel 
precinct committee people and successfuly challenged the tra­
ditional precinct workers. With hundreds of volunteer workers 
—many of whom were grass-roots individuals with no previous 
experience in political campaigning—using every possible means 
to deliver the vote of every eligible black voter on their behalf, 
Stokes and Hatcher were able to bypass the traditional political 
structures that had historically delivered the black vote to white 
mayoralty candidates. Third, such a campaign organization 
created a band-wagon effect within the black community, which 
made it very difficult for any segment of the community to with­
hold support. A crusade-like atmosphere, charged with high 
emotionalism, prevailed and encouraged blacks from varied 
walks of life to participate in a historic event. 
Thus one of the keys to black electoral mobilization is the in­
volvement of large numbers of citizens at the grass-roots level 
who are emotionally involved in the struggle to elect a committed 
black politician to a major elective office and who in fact view 
the battle that must be waged to accomplish this objective as a 
crusade. It should be stressed, however, that this emotional zeal 
and the political energy it produces must be channeled by effec­
tive organization and capable leadership. Without a substantial 
degree of organization and leadership support, the grass-roots 
movement in the election will collapse in the midst of chaos and 
confusion. Certain elemental things must be done if the galva­
nizing of massive black participation and intense cohesion in the 
election is to be realized. Among the more important tasks that 
must be accomplished by those serving in the upper ranks of the 
campaign organization is fund-raising and research. A mul­
tiplicity of ways must be tested for raising necessary monies to 
operate the campaign. Except in unusual circumstances, such as 
those which lead to the New York Times advertisement placed 
by the Hatcher organization and the contributions of some 
wealthy individuals to the Stokes effort, the most effective 
method for raising funds will generally center around small 
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contributions by rank-and-file citizens and moderate contribu­
tions from liberal whites and established black organizations. 
Funds from regular party organizations and labor union sources 
are most likely to be cut off from an independent black candi­
date. It is also unlikely that donations will emanate from busi­
ness sources that are open to retaliation from regulatory city hall 
departments. Consequently, the bulk of campaign funds are 
most likely to be derived from rank-and-file sources within the 
black community, although white liberals and special events, 
such as the Harry Belafonte concert in Gary, will also be im­
portant. 
In addition to fund-raising, the upper echelons of the cam­
paign organization must expend considerable energy in conduct­
ing research on the social, economic, and governmental issues 
of the city so that the literature distributed to the public and the 
major policy statements made by the candidate are well docu­
mented and carefully prepared. This requires the combined ef­
forts of an effective team of volunteer researchers and literature 
writers who can collect and prepare a multitude of information 
for dissemination. Such an accomplishment provides the candi­
date with an opportunity to demonstrate to voters that he is 
exceptionally well informed and prepared to assume the mayor­
ship, and that he is a candidate that black people can be proud of. 
Fund-raising and research are obviously important; however, 
central to the mobilization effort is the work performed by the 
street-level organization. As previously indicated, the members 
of this organization are assigned the critical task of selling the 
candidate to their friends and neighbors. In doing so they must 
overcome the obstacles of black self-doubt—the feeling that 
blacks cannot elect a member of their race to a major public 
office—and the myth of black inferiority—the belief that a black 
man is not as capable of performing effectively in a key public 
office as a white man. To sell their candidate to the black masses 
in the light of these obstacles, street-level campaign workers 
must use personal-contact techniques with rank-and-file voters 
to convince them that the candidate is eminently qualified to 
hold high public office, that he has a very good chance of win­
ning if the black community unites behind him, and that if he 
is elected he will fulfill the goals of the civil rights movement 
by opening up to blacks expanded opportunities for social, eco­
nomic, and political mobility. 
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If the campaigns run by both the upper-level campaign mem­
bers and street-level campaign members are successful, the re­
sults will be, as noted earlier, a bandwagon effect generating a 
massive outpouring of public support for the candidate. The 
emergence of this bandwagon effect denotes the epitome of 
group cohesion and electoral political consciousness, which 
culminates on election day with unprecedented mobilization in 
the black community. During this period, grass-roots campaign 
activity is intensified, with thousands of workers pounding the 
streets seeking to reach every eligible black voter and perform­
ing other specific tasks. On election day the focus of the grass-
roots as well as the high-level campaign organizations centers 
on the performance of three critical tasks: (1) organizing a last 
minute canvass of every black neighborhood; (2) making sure that 
every black voter gets to the polls and votes for the candidate; 
and (3) devising mechanisms to protect the candidate from mas­
sive vote stealing by the opposition. Around the performance of 
each task carefully planned grass-roots organization must be 
developed. Persons active in the street-level organization must 
join forces with other interested parties such as college students, 
members of good-government groups and experienced civil 
rights workers, in a door-to-door drive to insure that every eligi­
ble black voter gets to the polls. These workers plus others sta­
tioned at polling places should supply all voters with sample 
ballots and other materials that will help them cast a legitimate 
vote for the candidate. 
While these segments of the organization concentrate on turn­
ing out black voters, other segments must center their atten­
tion on making sure that each vote cast in the election is fairly 
counted. The key to this effort is to have persons trained as 
election day poll-watchers. These persons act as the eyes and 
ears of the campaign organization inside the precinct polling 
place, and they should be instructed to immediately report to 
central headquarters any activities that appear to violate city or 
state election laws. Calls concerning illegal efforts to tamper 
with the vote or interfere with the electoral process should be 
relayed to teams of lawyers working out of central headquarters, 
who investigate such complaints and decide upon appropriate 
responses to them. 
The culmination of the mobilization process is indicated by an 
unprecedented black voter turnout and cohesive vote in the 
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election. Both the high turnout and the high cohesion are the 
necessary requirements for the establishment of a solid base of 
black support for the candidate. This base of support is indis­
pensable to the election of an independent black candidate to 
the mayorship of a major American city. Whether or not this 
base is sufficient for electoral victory is dependent on additional 
factors, which are discussed below. 
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR SUCCESS 
We want to underscore the fact that black mobilization does 
not necessarily mean black victory. Only where blacks are 51 
percent or more of the voting electorate would successful mobi­
lization of the black vote be sufficient for victory. In most cases, 
however, the black electoral base for black mayoral candidates 
will not be so extensive. Consequently, black candidates must 
include the white as well as the black community in their strategy 
for victory.3 
Several factors have a crucial bearing on the extent to which 
a black mayoral candidate running on solid black support will be 
able to garner enough white votes to win. One factor relates to 
the strength and cohesiveness of the dominant white political 
organization. If the dominant white organization in the city is 
both strong and highly cohesive, it will be extraordinarily diffi­
cult for the black candidate to obtain significant electoral sup­
port in the white community. Under such circumstances the 
dominant white organization can in all probability hold the 
white community together by settling on one white candidate 
to run in a head-to-head contest with the black candidate, such 
as was the case in East Saint Louis. Given the choice of a white 
or black candidate, the overwhelming majority of whites will 
unquestionably cast their votes for the candidate of their own 
race. On the other hand, if the white-dominated organization is 
weak or divided, it might not be in a position to prevent several 
major white candidates from getting in the race. This situation 
tends to favor the black candidate because with a splintering of 
the white vote among two or more candidates, the number of 
white votes he needs to win the election is measurably reduced. 
As we have seen in previous chapters, it was precisely such 
fragmentation within the white organizations in Cleveland and 
Gary that facilitated the election of Stokes and Hatcher. 
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A second factor affecting the ability of a black mayoral can­
didate to obtain the necessary votes for victory in the white 
community is the socioeconomic characteristics of the white 
electorate. The presence in the white electorate of a large num­
ber of middle- and upper-income Jewish voters may provide a 
black candidate with a sympathetic base of support in the white 
community due to the tendency toward liberalism evidenced in 
Jewish voting behavior. If Jewish citizens are not eligible to 
vote in the election because of their residence in the suburbs 
(as was the case in Cleveland), some are likely to provide 
financial or organizational assistance. On the other hand, if the 
electorate is disproportionately composed of blue-collar ethnics 
with a history of competition with blacks for jobs, schools, 
homes, and many other city facilities and resources, the chances 
of receiving more than a modicum of support from the white 
community will be slim. 
As a rule of thumb, we can say that the larger the degree of 
white support a black mayoral candidate will need to win and 
the smaller the number of whites sympathetic to his mayoral 
aspirations, the more he will find it necessary to stress the no­
tion that he intends to be mayor for all the people of the city.4 
In addition, he must project the image that he is sincerely com­
mitted to being both progressive and honest. This commit­
ment will have to embrace a program of institutional reform and 
an aggressive attack on the social and economic problems of 
the community. In either case, the most effective vehicle for 
selling himself to white voters will be small house parties, 
which provide opportunities for interpersonal contact and 
meticulous appraisal of his personality as well as his programs 
by inquisitive and curious white citizens. These house parties 
must be arranged primarily by whites active in the campaign 
organization, although other white organizations mobilized dur­
ing the campaign—such as teachers groups—might prove useful 
in this respect. 
In all but very unusual circumstances, elections involving a bid 
by an independent black candidate running with solid black 
support to become mayor of a large American city will be de­
cided by a small number of votes. Given this fact, it will be 
necessary for black mayors, in addition to appealing to the 
general white community, to seek viable coalitions with other 
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Third World groups. Indeed, as another rule of thumb, we can 
say that the closer the possible outcome of the election, the 
greater the need for the black candidate to make an effective 
appeal for the votes of other nonblack minorities. This proposi­
tion is supported by our analysis of the 1967 Gary mayoral 
election. In the primary when the white vote was split and it 
seemed reasonable that if Hatcher received solid support from 
the black community he could win, only modest steps were taken 
to involve Latins in an effective way in the campaign. How­
ever, in the general election when virtually the entire white 
community was threatening to cross over to the Republican 
camp, extensive efforts were made by Hatcher workers to draw 
Latins into the campaign organizations and to encourage them 
to play key roles in the mobilization of the Latin vote. 
In sum, successful mobilization of the black community alone 
will probably not be enough in the immediate future to elect a 
black candidate to the mayorship of major American cities. 
Supplementing the primary base of support in the black com­
munity must be a major effort to penetrate the walls of the white 
community and the seeking of alliances among other nonwhite 
minorities. 
CONCLUSION 
In this study we have attempted to demonstrate that the post-
World War II substantial increase in the percentage of blacks 
as a proportion of the central-city population will not auto­
matically produce black control of city government. Rather, 
if blacks are to translate the potential resources of numbers and 
concentration into actual political power, they must overcome 
the historical constraints that have stifled the development of 
independent black political action, and engage in a successful 
process of political mobilization. Such mobilization does not 
occur overnight but is a multistaged process beginning with 
black involvement in civil rights protest activity and culminat­
ing in the election of a black candidate to the top public office 
of the city. The key to this mobilization process is the develop­
ment of a high degree of political consciousness among the black 
masses, and the utilization of the factor of race as a unifying 
force that arouses the political interest of every sector of the 
black community and creates incentives for black solidarity in 
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the electoral arena. Central to the success of the mobilization 
strategy is leadership and organization. Low-income blacks 
whose socioeconomic conditions have constituted formidable 
barriers to their effective involvement in politics must be con­
vinced that black political leaders and candidates will not sell 
out once invested with powers and responsibilities of public 
office but will in fact deliver meaningful benefits. Black politi­
cal leadership of this sort will enhance the political efficacy 
of low-income blacks by instilling within them a sense of trust, 
and making available to them channels of decision-making 
unprecedented in the history of black America. In doing so they 
will help to lay the crucial psychological framework for black 
rebellion against domestic colonialism through the political 
process. Ties forged between black political leaders and the 
black masses must be reinforced through organization. Effec­
tive black organizations serve as the crucial institutional link 
that holds the black community together as an effective politi­
cal force on a continuous basis. They also perform administra­
tive functions essential to the transformation of black political 
consciousness into unified political activity in the electoral 
process. 
In recent years, political mobilization efforts by blacks in the 
cities have mainly been directed toward the election of black 
mayors. The extent to which winning the mayorship of a city 
eventuates in a substantive improvement of the quality of life 
among rank-and-file blacks is the question we turn to in part 
three. As we shall see, a black mayor encounters numerous 
obstacles in pursuing the objectives of his program and black 
liberation in general. 
1. This unattributed quotation is derived from interviews conducted by the 
authors in Gary, Indiana. 
2. It is important to note that this new political energy must be focused on 
one black candidate. If the new momentum is dissipated by the involvement of 
several completing black candidates, it will be impossible to build unity in the 
black community, and the result is most likely to be the continuation of a white-
controlled city hall. 
3. The significance of this point is underscored in a recent study published 
by the Joint Center for Political Studies, which shows that most medium- and 
large-size cities with black mayors do not have a majority black voting-age 
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population. Indeed, in half of the cities studied, the black voting age popula­
tion was less than 30 percent of the total. See Herrington J. Bryce, "Black Mayors 
of Medium and Large Cities: How Much Statutory Power Do They Have?" Focus, 
vol. 2, no. 10, August 1974. The point should also be stressed that even if the black 
base was 51 percent or more, the inclination to run campaigns exclusively in the 
black community must be tempered by the realization that a black mayor would 
still have to govern a city in which whites were a sizable and influential seg­
ment of the population. 
4. Thus, this kind of political stance was more crucial to the election of 
Thomas Bradley as mayor of Los Angeles, California, where blacks are 17 per­
cent of the population than of Kenneth Gibson as mayor of Newark, New Jersey, 
where blacks are 54 percent of the population. 
PART III
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Black Mayors: The Dilemmas of Power 
CONSTRAINTS ON BLACK MAYORAL LEADERSHIP 
What difference has the election of a black mayor made in the 
lives of citizens in your city? This is one of the key questions 
asked of respondents in Cleveland and Gary in our research on 
the performance of the Stokes and Hatcher administrations. 
Inquiries regarding the performance of black mayors take 
on enormous importance in view of the frequently voiced claim 
that political empowerment of the black community can best be 
achieved through the ballot box.1 Relying on the process of 
mobilization, blacks can, according to this analysis, gain control 
over instruments of power in cities and use these instruments to 
deliver crucial benefits to masses of black citizens. The election 
of Stokes and Hatcher in 1967 provided the first opportunity to 
test this theory of black political empowerment. 
Implicit in the emphasis on electoral politics as a solution to 
the multifaceted problems of urban blacks is the assumption that 
blacks will enjoy as much success as earlier ethnics in translat­
ing their control over cities into important instrumental benefits. 
Our data from Cleveland and Gary, however, do not support this 
assumption. To the contrary, they suggest firmly that black may­
oral administrations will face much more severe constraints than 
those encountered by other ethnic administrations on their ability 
to respond effectively to the pressing needs of the black commu­
nity. 
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It is important to note that these limits on black mayoral power 
will exist irrespective of the quality of leadership exhibited by the 
individual mayor. Social, economic, and political constraints that 
limit his ability to deliver meaningful benefits are rooted into 
the environment in which he operates. These constraints inevita­
bly produce for the black mayor dilemmas of power that place 
the goal of thoroughgoing urban reform far beyond the compe­
tence of his administration. 
Black mayors share with white mayors a range of problems 
that sharply restrict their ability to engage in effective policy-
making. Few contemporary mayors have sufficient power to ef­
fectively manipulate the forces of their environments. Rather, the 
hard reality of the situation is that due to the accumulation of 
urban problems over many years, the task of running a major 
American city has become a nearly impossible one. Indeed, these 
problems have become so immense that often the best a mayor 
can hope to do is hold the line against urban decay and social 
conflict. As Ford Foundation urbanist Paul Ylvisaker has ob­
served, "Under present rules of the game, no mayor of any cen­
tral city can win."2 Among the most vexing problems adversely 
affecting the leadership capabilities of big city mayors are the fol­
lowing: (1) a declining tax base spawned by reliance on the prop­
erty tax and the dispersal of large sectors of the white community 
—both citizen and business—into surrounding suburbs; (2) the in­
flux into central cities of high-cost citizens—especially poor blacks 
—in desperate need of governmental assistance for survival; (3) 
racial conflict generated by competition between blacks and whites 
for dwindling job opportunities and access to decent schools, 
homes, and recreational facilities in the central cities; (4) the 
emergence of a city bureaucracy protected by civil service, "which 
has become increasingly autonomous and has taken on an increas­
ingly large role in the governing of the city";3 (5) decentraliza­
tion of power from strong party organizations over which the 
mayor exercised control, to a plethora of governmental agencies 
and competing interest groups over which he has little effective 
control; (6) the impact on the social, economic, and political life 
of cities of policies made by corporate elites in private sanctuaries 
beyond the effective scrutiny and influence of any public official, 
including mayors; and (7) insensitivity to central city needs by 
important state and national officials. 
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The problems delienated above are accentuated in the case of 
black mayors by the additional factor of race. If the political and 
economic resource base needed to adequately cope with expand­
ing urban problems is weak for white mayors, it is even weaker 
for black mayors. The special demographic and political condi­
tions in a major city that contribute to the election of a black 
man as mayor also create numerous constraints on his effective 
action and therefore more rigidly constrict his capacity to govern. 
What this means is that the black mayor—more so than the white 
mayor—is likely to be powerless (or power poor) under circum­
stances that demand that he command and sagaciously exercise 
enormous power. Lacking sufficient power, his programs of urban 
reform will not produce the instrumental benefits so passionately 
desired and urgently needed by his black constituents. This gap 
between needs and performance vividly illuminates the crucial 
dilemmas that the absence of power produces for black mayors. 
Before proceeding further, it is necessary that we spell out the 
unique constraints that impose such extraordinary limits on the ef­
fective political power of black mayors. First, it is undoubtedly 
true that in the foreseeable future most black mayors will be 
elected in dead or dying cities whose accumulated maladies are 
swiftly moving toward the point of no return. These cities will 
bear only a modest resemblance to the financially secure govern­
mental structures captured by white ethnics. The election of black 
mayors signals instead the onset of black takeover of bankrupt 
cities consumed by social conflict, physical decay, and enormous 
financial problems. Black majorities in cities reflect the salient 
trend of white exodus to the suburbs and the concomitant build­
up of high-cost black citizens in the central cities. White settle­
ment in the suburbs places the most valuable taxable assets in 
the metropolitan area beyond the jurisdiction of central-city of­
ficials. However, increased demands for services coupled with 
years of neglect make the fiscal needs of central cities more 
pressing than ever before. When a black man is elected mayor, 
these trends are accelerated as middle-class whites, engulfed by 
racial fears, flee in unprecedented numbers to suburbia, and pov­
erty-stricken blacks, fired with visions of unlimited opportu­
nities, settle in large numbers in the central city. In sum, black 
mayors will inherit monumental problems but will lack the basic 
fiscal resources to adequately cope with these problems. Conse­
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quently, unless extraordinary remedies are found for the declining 
income base of central cities, black city administrations will 
operate under circumstances that offer little hope for success. 
Second, given the weak fiscal resources of central cities, 
black mayors will have no choice but to seek supplementary rev­
enue from outside sources. One such possible source is the state 
government. But black mayors are likely to find that state offi­
cials will not be very responsive to their pleas for fiscal assis­
tance. Suspicion and tension between local and state of&cials 
are deep-seated and long-standing. The election of a black man 
to the top political position in the city will most assuredly not 
mend the fractured relationship between city government and 
state government. In a period when state governments are hard 
pressed to marshal sufficient resources to adequately meet the 
needs of politically active and influential white citizens, it is un­
likely that state of&cials will respond in a serious way to the re­
quest by black mayors for greater shares of state fiscal re­
sources.4 To the contrary, given the present complexion of state 
politics—often involving an alliance between suburbs and rural 
areas against central cities—it is quite probable that state offi­
cials will continue to place the interests of affluent suburbanites 
over the interests of disadvantaged central city residents when de­
cisions concerning the allocation of state funds are made. Thus, 
at the crucial point when black city administrations will be strug­
gling for fiscal survival, state governments are more likely to be 
a part of the problem than a solution to it. 
More hopeful as a source of external funding for black mayoral 
administrations is the federal government. As a consequence pri­
marily of important political linkages between local and federal 
of&cials, the federal government has tended to be fairly sensitive 
to the fiscal problems of city governments. However, for black 
mayors federal funds are both a bane and a blessing. Although 
these funds have been crucial in helping city governments satisfy 
citizen demands, they have also served to tighten federal control 
over city decision-making. In many instances federal intrusion 
in local affairs of this sort is highly undesirable.5 Recent decisions 
by the Nixon and Ford administrations to sharply cutback funds 
for urban poverty programs further illuminates the excruciating 
dilemmas surrounding the role of contemporary black mayors. 
Compelled to pin their hopes for funds on outside help, they are 
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constantly threatened with being abandoned at sea by changes in 
political winds completely beyond their control. Under such cir­
cumstances, it is easy to understand why even the most able 
black mayor will often watch helplessly as his plans for urban 
reconstruction are mutilated by a host of inimical political forces. 
Third, black mayors must cope with the opposition they will 
face from other actors in the power structure of city government 
who will be hostile to their programs of social and economic im­
provement for low-income citizens and black political empower­
ment. In this regard, it can be noted that black mayors will in­
herit entrenched city bureaucracies staffed by white workers 
with maintenance needs and incentive systems that clash markedly 
with their own. Many of these persons will be the mayor's nat­
ural political enemies, having opposed him vigorously in the 
campaign, and will engage in overt and covert forms of political 
sabotage at every opportunity. However, because they are pro­
tected by civil service, he will have no choice but to accept their 
insubordination as an administrative handicap that cannot be 
easily corrected. 
Defiance and opposition from the city bureaucracy will likely 
be matched by open resistance to the mayor's program by other 
white-dominated city agencies such as the council and the police 
department. Operating in most instances with an inexperienced 
staff, the black mayor will be in no position to compete with the 
leaders of these agencies for support from the local press, the 
business community, labor, and other crucial political interests. 
His difficulties in this respect will be magnified by his position 
as an outcast in the local party structure. Elected over the intense 
opposition of regular party leaders, the black mayor can expect 
little assistance from the local party in his continuing struggle to 
amass sufficient power to govern the city. More likely, local party 
officials will be among his most aggrevating political adversaries. 
Of all the political forces arrayed against the black mayor, party 
politicians will assume they have the most to lose if his adminis­
tration succeeds. Consequently, on programmatic as well as racial 
grounds they must usually wage a continuous campaign of oppo­
sition, isolation, and sabotage. 
Finally, the election of a black man as mayor of a major Amer­
ican city builds up extraordinarily high expectations from his 
black constituents that cannot be satisfied. As we have seen, the 
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waging of emotionally stimulating campaigns is a key ingredient 
in the mobilization effort in the black community that must 
be made to elect a black man to the mayorship. However, one 
of the unintended consequences of this mobilization process is 
the generation in the minds of black constitutents of exaggerated 
notions of the mayor's power to dramatically reverse the priorities 
of local government. Many black citizens are unaware of the 
myriad constraints that limit the leadership potentials of black 
mayors. The price the mayor must usually pay for overestimations 
of his real power is widespread citizen disappointment in his per­
formance. Consequently, many black citizens who staunchly 
supported the black mayor in the election will become disillu­
sioned and withdraw their political support from his administra­
tion. 
In light of the dilemmas of power discussed above, the job of 
big city mayor—especially when the position is held by a reform-
oriented black politician—emerges as one of the toughest and 
most challenging public offices in America. The remaining sec­
tions of this chapter examine the success and failures of Stokes 
and Hatcher in meeting the challenges of the mayor's office, 
and assess the meaning of the Cleveland and Gary experiences 
for the future of black politics in America. 
CONFRONTING THE CITY BUREAUCRACY 
Carl Stokes and Richard Hatcher entered the mayor's offices 
of Cleveland and Gary deeply committed to fulfilling the social 
and economic aspirations of their black constituents. They 
were not in office very long, however, before they discovered 
that the political environment of city government substantially 
mitigated against a shift of policy priorities in the direction of 
the black community. One of the most important impediments 
they faced in this respect was intense and persistent opposition 
from the city bureaucracy. 
Hatcher's problems with the city bureaucracy in Gary were 
multidimensional. Although he was generally expected to trans­
form the Gary city government into a marvel of efficiency and 
productivity, Hatcher found that he was saddled with a city 
bureaucracy that was, in terms of its organizational structure, 
patently obsolete. Even a cursory examination of the structure 
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of city government revealed a city bureaucracy with no clearly 
established lines of authority for departments and no well-
established chain of command—nor was there very much coordi­
nation of functions and responsibilities. Each department 
operated in effect as a separate entity; the only common link 
between them was the requirement that each of thirty depart­
ment heads report directly to the mayor. Few rules governing 
the conduct of employees were set forth; those that did exist 
were generally ignored. Under such circumstances, bureaucratic 
efficiency was an irrational expectation. 
The city bureaucracy was not only inefficient but entrenched. 
It was virtually impossible to fire experienced city employees 
—even those not covered by civil service—without creating the 
kind of political difficulties Hatcher wanted most to avoid. 
Consequently, whereas implementation of the administration's 
program required competency and honesty, the bureaucracy con­
tinued to be incompetent and corrupt. This defect was com­
pounded by the stubborn defiance of the mayor's orders by hold­
overs from the previous administration. These individuals did 
not attempt to hide their dislike both for the mayor and the social, 
economic, and political priorities of his administration. Several 
publicly proclaimed that their allegiance was not to Hatcher 
but to the county organization—and they boldly challenged 
Hatcher to fire them because of their attitudes and their politi­
cal loyalties. 
The first five months of the Hatcher administration were 
characterized by continuous conflict between Hatcher and mem­
bers of the city-hall work force, including several members of 
his cabinet who charged the mayor with failing to sufficiently 
delegate authority.6 In June 1968 Hatcher finally began taking 
steps to gain control over the city bureaucracy. The first of these 
steps involved seeking outside help. Major universities in the 
Gary area were called upon to make available to Hatcher urban 
specialists to advise him on administrative matters. Private re­
search and philanthropic agencies such as the Ford Foundation, 
the Potomac Institute, and the Urban Coalition were also ap­
proached for funds and technical assistance. Through these 
sources a corps of expert talent was assembled to evaluate 
priorities and suggest possible avenues of administrative reform. 
In addition to these part-time consultants, the Ford Foundation 
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awarded Hatcher a grant to hire three full-time special assistants 
(or super executives) to work in critical areas of his adminis­
tration. With this money, Hatcher established the posts of special 
assistant for personnel and finance, special assistant for hous­
ing and community development, and special assistant for public 
safety. 
Hatcher's next step was the convening of a three-day con­
ference involving fourteen members of his cabinet for the pur­
pose of engaging in wide-ranging, straight-forward discussions 
on administrative reform. Out of this conference came a series 
of proposals for wholesale administrative reform of the munici­
pal bureaucracy. The most important recommendation put forth 
by the conference was one proposing a substantial decentraliza­
tion of administrative authority. A chain of command was 
established within departments, and department and division 
heads were delegated considerable authority to run their opera­
tions without constantly checking with the mayor. Conference 
participants also agreed that Hatcher would have to get tough 
with those elements of the city bureaucracy who persisted in 
flaunting his authority. 
Stokes also faced considerable hostility from members of the 
city bureaucracy in Cleveland. Like city workers in Gary, mem­
bers of the Cleveland bureaucracy were—for the most part— 
protected by civil service and therefore beyond the effective 
administrative control of the mayor. Stokes attempted to solve 
the problem of bureaucratic resistance by promising pay raises 
and better working conditions to city workers.7 Although these 
incentives helped to reduce tension between city workers and 
the mayor's office, they did not totally erase the hostility Cleve­
land's predominantly white municipal work force felt toward a 
city administration headed by a black man.8 
Stokes's administrative problems were compounded by con­
flicts between the mayor and members of his executive staff. 
These conflicts centered primarily around disputes between 
Stokes and his major administrative appointees over the extent 
to which decision-making authority should be centralized in the 
mayor's office. Sharp disagreements on this issue and a range of 
specific policy matters resulted in a rash of resignations and 
dismissals among key members of the Stokes administration. 
The first major city officials to leave the Stokes administra­
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tion were Paul D. White, law director, and Dr. Kenneth Clement, 
special consultant to the mayor. White was a prominent black 
lawyer and former municipal-court judge. As law director, he 
served as acting mayor in Stokes's absence and was first in 
line of succession if the office of mayor became vacant. White 
resigned after only four months in office. His resignation was 
prompted by what he viewed as Stokes's unwillingness to con­
sult with him on important matters falling within his area of 
responsibility.9 White was succeeded in the position of law 
director by black Cleveland attorney, Clarence James. 
Dr. Clement, who served as Stokes's campaign manager in 
1967, took the position as special consultant to the mayor at an 
annual salary of $1.00. In addition to advising the mayor on a 
range of subjects, Clement was given the responsibility of co­
ordinating city-hall patronage. Clement terminated his position 
with city hall after five months. During his brief affiliation 
with the Stokes administration, Clement had been embroiled in 
frequent policy and personality conflicts with the mayor. His 
ultimate departure from the Stokes administration was sparked by 
what he described as Stokes's insufferably low tolerance for 
honest criticism. 
Turmoil and conflict within the Stokes administration led to 
the resignation or removal of other city officials. In September 
1968 Stokes fired Police Prosecutor James S. Carnes because 
Carnes publicly criticized a committee to investigate police 
procedure established by law director James. For several months 
prior to his dismissal, Carnes had been feuding with the mayor 
over the issue of salary increases for assistant city prosecutors. 
In October 1968 Stokes fired Police Chief Michael J. (Iron Mike) 
Blackwell because he refused to obey the orders of the safety 
director and resisted efforts by Stokes to reform the police de­
partment. Blackwell was replaced by Deputy Inspector Patrick L. 
Gerity. Gerity's career as police chief was just as tumultuous as 
Blackwell's. The new chief took over the reigns of the police 
department in the midst of heated attacks by the council on the 
Stokes administration for failing to halt a sharp upturn in crime 
and a parallel dispute between the police department and the 
mayor's office. Gerity was the proverbial man in the middle. 
He was lashed by the city council for failing to put enough men 
on the streets to insure citizen safety. Council President Stanton 
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called for the resignation of both Gerity and Safety Director 
Joseph McManamon, charging them with failing to provide 
leadership. "The Police Department has never been worse. It 
lacks leadership. There is need for revision."10 
Gerity was also the object of attacks from the Cleveland Police 
Patrolman's Association, which repeatedly accused him of at­
tempting to defend the mayor's office against legitimate police 
complaints by harrassing and intimidating its members. In 
September 1969 the association filed suit in U.S. District Court 
asking for a permanent restraining order barring Gerity from 
interrogating patrolmen concerning their membership in the 
association, and threatening or suggesting disciplinary action 
against patrolmen who were association members.11 Finally, 
Gerity began openly feuding with Mayor Stokes and Safety 
Director McManamon. The most serious incident was Gerity's 
criticism of the administration's decision to appoint 60 police­
men to the force over his objection that department evaluation 
of the men had found them to be unqualified for police work. 
Gerity boycotted swearing-in ceremonies for 209 new police­
men because of his objection to the appointment of 60 of them. 
Stokes was bitterly stung by Gerity's criticisms and began im­
mediately looking around for a new police chief. When word 
spread that Stokes was considering several outsiders as his re­
placement, Gerity called his men together for a pep talk to ask 
them to stick together and vigorously oppose an outside choice. 
On 26 January 1970, Stokes announced the appointment of 
his third police chief in two years. The man chosen by Stokes to 
succeed Gerity as chief was William P. Ellenburg, a twenty-six­
year veteran of the Detroit police force. Ellenburg was greeted 
with a cool reception by Cleveland police, who resented the 
appointment of an out-of-towner. Ellenburg left no doubt, how­
ever, that he intended to be a strong chief and began immediately 
to shape the Cleveland force in his own image. William Ellen-
burg's career as Cleveland police chief turned out to be one of 
the shortest, and most controversial, in the city's history. One 
week after his appointment, Cleveland was jarred by charges 
made by Lawrence A. Burns, former Mafia attorney and fixer, 
that he had made monthly payments to Ellenburg to protect an 
abortion racket in Detroit from 1959 to 1963. Ellenburg vehe­
mently denied the charges, and Stokes went on Cleveland tele­
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vision to ask citizens not to leap to conclusions until the chiefs 
guilt or innocence had been firmly established. The seriousness 
of the charges against Ellenburg was heightened by the fact that 
Burns had submitted to a lie detector test in Detroit and passed 
with flying colors. Ellenburg, on the other hand, flatly refused 
to take a lie detector test. Stokes's image was so impaired by the 
Ellenburg affair that he personally lead a team of investigators to 
Detroit to look into the charges. Arriving in Detroit, Stokes told 
newsmen: 
This is important to me. Maybe you don't understand how important
it is to me. The problem of a police chief is the biggest problem I
have as mayor. It is the biggest problem any mayor can have today.
I picked my man and I am responsible for picking him. Certain
charges have been leveled against him and I have decided to come
to Detroit—to the source—and investigate those charges. No one else
could investigate them as I can. And when I am through, I will go
back to the people of Cleveland and report what I have found.12 
The investigation conducted by Stokes in Detroit neither con­
firmed nor denied the charges leveled against Ellenburg. Seeing 
no apparent relief from the cloud of suspicion the charges against 
him had established, Ellenburg voluntarily submitted his resigna­
tion as chief to Stokes after only ten days in office. Stokes im­
mediately appointed veteran Cleveland police inspector Lewis 
W. Coffey as the new chief. 
The shock of the Ellenburg resignation was eclipsed in im­
pact six months later by the resignation of Benjamin O. Davis, 
Jr., as Cleveland safety director. Davis had been appointed safety 
director after Stokes's first safety director Joseph McManamon 
resigned in December 1969. McManamon was generally despised 
by rank-and-file police. He had been at the center of numerous 
disputes between the Stokes administration and the police, and 
was viewed by officers in the ranks as Stokes's hatchet man. 
Cleveland policemen were especially disturbed by the way Mc-
Manamon handled the 1968 Glenville uprising in which three 
policemen were killed by black nationalists.13 Davis's appoint­
ment as a replacement for McManamon was enthusiastically 
applauded by Cleveland police. They were most impressed by 
his military credentials and his reputation as a sound adminis­
trator. At the time of his retirement, Davis was the top-ranking 
black person in the United States military, holding the rank of 
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lieutenant general. In 1954 he became the first black person to be 
named a general in the Air Force. 
During his service as safety director, Davis was an invaluable 
asset to the Stokes administration in the white community. Com­
plaints by whites about Cleveland's high crime rate sharply 
diminished as Davis quickly established his reputation as a strong 
advocate of law and order. Under Davis's command, relations 
between the Stokes administration and the police department 
markedly improved. Cleveland police believed that Davis was on 
their side and would back them up in their frequent clashes with 
nationalist groups in the black community. 
The favorable opinion of Davis held by whites was not shared by 
blacks. A number of incidents occurring over a period of several 
months convinced many blacks that Davis was the wrong man for 
the job of Cleveland safety director. Blacks accused Davis of dis­
criminatory law enforcement, taking a hard line against black 
nationalists (such as the Black Panthers) but failing to aggres­
sively pursue whites who regularly attacked blacks in white neigh­
borhoods. Davis's reputation declined to such a low ebb in the 
black community that he was subjected to blistering attacks by 
the Call and Post, a black newspaper that had been uniformly 
supportive of policies of the Stokes administration. 
Davis's resignation was prompted by conflicts between the 
mayor and the safety director over police policies toward the black 
community. Friction between Stokes and Davis first developed in 
April 1970 when Stokes turned down a Davis requisition for dum­
dum bullets (soft-core bullets that expand on impact) for Cleve­
land police. The split between Stokes and Davis widened when 
Stokes refused to take action against persons in the black com­
munity who criticized Davis's approach to law enforcement. 
Davis identified these persons as his enemies and therefore the 
enemies of law enforcement. Stokes disagreed, saying he could not 
take action against these individuals as long as they had not vio­
lated any specific laws. 
In his letter of resignation Davis cited two reasons for his de­
cision to leave the Stokes administration: (1) that he was not re­
ceiving from Stokes the support his programs required; and (2) 
the continued support and comfort Stokes gave to the enemies of 
law enforcement. Upon receiving Davis's letter, Stokes insisted 
that he name the specific enemies of law enforcement he had in 
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mind; when Davis refused to do so, Stokes released the names of 
seven individuals and institutions that the general had labeled in 
previous conversations as his enemies.14 Stokes told newsmen 
that Davis wanted him to silence each of these persons and orga­
nizations by cutting off city money and firing them from city 
jobs. 
The charges contained in Davis's letter constituted the worst 
political blow visited upon the Stokes administration since his 
election in 1967. Commenting on the impact of the Davis resigna­
tion, one close Stokes associate stated: "If all the deepest think­
ers in a 50 mile radius had gotten together to decide how they 
could most hurt the mayor, they could not have decided upon any­
thing more damaging than this."15 For three years Stokes had 
been valiantly struggling to reverse the widespread notion in the 
white community that he was soft on black criminality. Davis's 
charges had the effect of undoing much of what had been done in 
establishing the credibility of the Stokes administration on the 
sensitive issue of law and order. 
Periodic scandals in the Stokes administration also resulted in 
the resignation or dismissal of a number of other key city offi­
cials. In the early months of his administration Stokes fired 
one of his top black assistants—Geraldine Williams—after a Cleve­
land newspaper published a story accusing her of being part 
owner of a cheat spot—a liquor establishment selling liquor on 
Sunday and after hours in violation of city codes. Another Stokes 
assistant—William Stein—was fired after being shot in the home of 
one of his married female clients. Stokes was forced to ask for 
the resignation of his public relations assistant, William Silver­
man, in the wake of revelations that Silverman's services were 
being financed by a $72,000 grant from the Greater Cleveland 
Associated Foundation, a tax-exempt institution. Undoubtedly, 
the most damaging scandal of all, however, was the civil service 
scandal resulting in the resignation of two Stokes's appointees 
—Charles L. Butts, and Jay B. White—from the Civil Service Com­
mission. Butts and White were later convicted of destroying 940 
answer sheets and 940 identification sheets of a 1968 promo­
tional examination administered to members of the police de­
partment. Charges that both men had committed perjury in testi­
mony before the county grand jury investigation of the police 
scandal were dropped. 
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The above discussion embraces only a partial list of key individ­
uals who left the Stokes administration at various points. Overall, 
between December 1967 and July 1970, more than twenty major 
officials resigned or were fired from the Stokes administration.16 
Indeed, departures from Cleveland city government under Stokes 
took place at such a devastating pace that it appeared at times 
the administration was entrapped in a perpetual game of musi­
cal chairs. 
The problems of mayors Stokes and Hatcher with the city 
bureaucracy were not limited to the work force in city hall. Like 
other big city mayors, they were called upon to respond to de­
mands for high salaries and other prerequisites by aggressive and 
politically conscious organized groups of city workers. The tactic 
most frequently employed by the organized city bureaucracy in 
Cleveland and Gary has been the strike. On several occasions, 
strikes by city workers during the Stokes and Hatcher adminis­
trations produced crises of major proportions. A strike by Gary 
firemen in 1967 for higher wages, for example, sparked a serious 
confrontation between the Hatcher administration and the fire 
department. On the first night of the strike, a four-alarm fire 
broke out at the Broadway Lumber Company. Only three mem­
bers of the Gary Fire Department actively fought the blaze—Fire 
Chief Alonzo Holiday and two assistant fire chiefs. Assistance 
from Civil Defense volunteers and firemen from surrounding 
towns was impeded by striking firemen who threw bricks, cut 
water hoses, and engaged in other acts of sabotage. Fire trucks 
from Hammond and East Chicago were turned back at the scene 
of the blaze by Gary firemen who jumped on trucks and pulled 
out hoses. In the midst of the confusion, the Broadway Lumber 
Company burned to the ground. Damages were estimated to range 
in the millions of dollars. Before the firefighters dispute was 
settled, 59 firemen were suspended and contempt of court pro­
ceedings were initiated by the city against the firefighter's 
union. 
In Cleveland a transit strike in 1970 brought public transporta­
tion to a halt, and created massive traffic jams in the downtown 
area. The strike also had a catastrophic impact on downtown 
business, with some major department stores reporting an initial 
drop in sales of as much as 30 percent. Before significant head­
way could be made on a settlement of the transit strike, Cleve­
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land was hit by a garbage strike. With strikes by two major ser­
vice units occurring simultaneously, the city of Cleveland was 
practically paralyzed; garbage piled up on the streets, and health 
and safety problems mounted in the absence of dependable public 
transportation. City officials attempted to ease the garbage prob­
lem by instituting a system of "do-it-yourself pickups, but the 
plan fizzled out after being in effect less than an hour. 
Stokes was able to bring the 1970 service crisis to a halt only 
by agreeing to wage demands that would cost city taxpayers over 
twenty million dollars in excess of original budgetary projections. 
To meet these added expenses, Stokes had to violate his promise 
not to ask for a tax increase. In doing so he created a storm of 
political protest from city councilmen and rank-and-file taxpayers. 
Thus, the political revolt of Cleveland's organized bureaucracy 
in 1970 placed Stokes in a no-win position. Whatever decision he 
made regarding the demands of the city's labor force would pro­
duce more political liabilities than assets. 
The most difficult problems Stokes and Hatcher faced relative 
to the organized city bureaucracy centered around their relation­
ship with the police. White policemen tend to naturally resent the 
election of a black mayor and frequently attempt to use every 
means possible to defy his authority. Friction between Hatcher 
and the police surfaced within weeks of his election when more 
than a third of the force walked off the job in protest over low 
wages. Although an early settlement of the strike was reached, a 
sizable dissident element of the department never fully accom­
modated itself to the reality that a black man was in command of 
the mayor's office. When Hatcher ordered policemen to remove 
American flag shoulder patches from their uniforms because 
blacks considered them symbols of white racism, smoldering re­
sentments by white police rushed emotionally to the surface. 
Gary policemen protested the order, claiming that the flag was 
a symbol of American patriotism and insinuating that the mayor's 
attitudes raised serious questions concerning his status as a loyal 
American. In the wake of stubborn police defiance of his order, 
Hatcher capitulated, defusing for a time tension between his ad­
ministration and rank-and-file white policemen. 
Stokes's problems with the police were far more serious. Con­
flict between Stokes and the police stemmed in part from his in­
sistance on sweeping reforms in the police system. Stokes's re­
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form program was aimed at making the police department not 
only more efficient but also more responsive to the black com­
munity. Cleveland policemen fought the mayor on the issue of 
reform at every turn; they regarded the mayor's plans as too 
radical, and resented mayoral interference in the internal affairs 
of the department. The most fundamental factor underlying fric­
tion between Stokes and the police, however, was Stokes's 
handling of the 1968 Glenville rebellion. This incident involved 
three nights and two days of violence in Cleveland that left ten 
people dead, including three policemen, scores of injuries, and 
millions of dollars in property damage. The wave of violence was 
triggered when police were allegedly lured into the Glenville sec­
tion of Cleveland and ambushed by a group of black nationalists. 
Fred (Ahmed) Evans, a well-known Cleveland black nationalist, 
was arrested and charged with leading the attack.17 Word of the 
gun battle between black nationalists and the police quickly 
spread, crowds of community residents formed, and a full-scale 
urban riot precipitiously developed. 
Mayor Stokes was informed of the crisis about one hour after 
the violence in Glenville erupted. Stokes immediately conferred 
with police officials and set up a command post at city hall. 
The mayor then worked through the night to bring the violence 
under control. Early the next morning Stokes met with more 
than one hundred black leaders to discuss strategies for prevent­
ing a further outbreak of violence. No concensus was reached. 
Later that afternoon, Stokes met with black leaders again and ap­
proved a plan to defuse tensions by withdrawing white police­
men and national guardsmen from the riot area and replacing them 
with about five hundred black citizens and policemen. In making 
this decision, Stokes was aware that he ran the risk of alienating 
white policemen infuriated by the death of their comrades. But 
at the time the decision was made, he was concerned primarily 
with avoiding further lost of life and was persuaded by arguments 
by black leaders that the black community should be given a 
chance to solve its own problems. The strategy agreed upon 
was implemented on the second night of the disorder. Only black 
persons with appropriate placards and armbands were allowed 
into the interior of the riot area. Black mayoral representatives 
walked the streets, breaking up crowds, cooling tempers, and keep­
ing the peace. The mayor's strategy was a qualified success; 
although occasional lootings and burnings were reported, no 
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further violent clashes took place. Stokes had gambled, and ap­
parently won. On the next night black emotions had sufficently 
subsided to permit the imposition of a curfew and a return to 
patrols by white police and national guardsmen. 
Stokes's bold action in removing white guardsmen and police­
men from the riot area was warmly appluaded by the local press 
and the black community. At the same time, the decision was 
roundly condemned by white ghetto merchants whose stores were 
looted, some members of the city council, and rank-and-file 
policemen. White policemen angered by the previous days' events 
were anxious to move into the black community and take retalia­
tory action against militants of every description. In the heat of 
the first night's violence, some white policemen had already been 
reported involved in the shooting up of a black militant club 
house, and a nearby ghetto apartment building,18 and the beating 
and tear-gassing of black patrons in a ghetto tavern. The restrain­
ing order issued by the mayor inflammed the passions of white 
policemen beyond the boiling point. Police radio messages 
bristled with obscene and derogatory comments directed toward 
the mayor and his committee. When the police dispatch broad­
casted for a car to answer an emergency in the black community, 
an anonymous voice replied "Get the hell off the air." A request 
for cars to respond to a fire call produced the reply, "Let Mayor 
Stokes go piss on it." Other calls elicited responses such as "Let 
'em burn the damn place down," and "To hell with the mayor." 
In the weeks following the Glenville rebellion, Stokes's relations 
with the police steadily deteriorated. One Cleveland police officer 
resigned in protest against the mayor's handling of the Glen­
ville incident; another sixteen-year police veteran traveled to 
Columbus in an attempt to persuade Governor Rhodes to remove 
Stokes for "willingfully neglecting to enforce the law, gross ne­
glect of duty, malfeasance, misfeasance, and non-feasance in of­
fice."19 The Cleveland FOP issued a strong denunciation of the 
Stokes administration and called for the resignation of Safety 
Director McManamon. Posters showing Stokes and McManamon 
together with the caption "Wanted to answer questions for the 
murder of three policemen," began appearing on the bulletin 
boards of police stations throughout the white community.20 
These incidents were clear signs that the breach between Stokes 
and the police was so wide that it could never be healed. 
In succeeding months, Stokes attempted desperately to mollify 
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the police by approving their requests for more equipment, higher 
salaries, more personnel, training in guerrilla-warfare tactics, the 
creation of a special backup unit to deal with dangerous felons, 
and special fringe benefits such as time-and-a-half pay for over­
time and the payment of tuition fees for policemen who com­
pleted college courses. These measures had little visible impact 
on the attitudes of Cleveland policemen toward their black mayor. 
Indeed, white policemen were so irredeemably hostile to the 
Stokes administration, that they felt compelled to actively cam­
paign against him in the 1969 general election. To circumvent 
state restrictions against police involvement in politics, members 
of the FOP secured petitions to act as election day judges to 
challenge the registration of citizens voting on Issue 1 concerning 
the extension of the right to vote to nineteen year olds. On elec­
tion day, the FOP concentrated its efforts in black precincts; 
some of the policemen involved refused to remove their fire­
arms at polling places. The effect of FOP election day activities 
was to give a powerful boost to the candidacy of Ralph J. Perk, 
Stokes's Republican rival, by driving blacks away from the polls 
through harassment and intimidation. Stokes won the election 
despite police opposition; however, during his four years in of­
fice, he was never able to win the support and cooperation of a 
significant portion of Cleveland's predominantly white police 
force. 
CONFLICT WITH THE CITY COUNCIL 
Political opposition to the policies of the Stokes and Hatcher 
administrations was by no means confined to the city bureau­
cracy. Both black mayors also faced serious and substained re­
sistance to their programs of urban reform from their respective 
city councils. Given Hatcher's background as a former city coun­
cilman and the presence of four blacks and one Mexican-Ameri­
can on the nine-man Gary council in 1967, many political observ­
ers predicted that his relations with the council would be 
extraordinarily productive. This assessment, however, proved to 
be almost totally inaccurate. Hatcher's first term as mayor was 
characterized by an uninterrupted series of confrontations with 
the city council. Only two councilmen, one black and one white, 
consistently voted to support the mayor on major policy issues. 
John Armenta, the Mexican-American who was expected to hold 
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the balance of power in favor of the administration, turned out 
to be one of Hatcher's most vociferous and persistent critics. 
In retrospect, it is clear that many members of the council 
viewed the election of a black mayor under controversial circum­
stances as a golden opportunity to reassert the council's author­
ity as a coequal branch of city government. To fulfill this objec­
tive they went to extraordinary lengths to embarrass, rebuff, 
and antagonize the mayor—all for the purpose of whittling his 
perogatives and authority down to managable size. For example, 
one of the first actions taken by the council after Hatcher's elec­
tion was to revert to the procedure of requiring a three-fourths 
vote to pass a measure returned to the council from the city plan­
ning commission. This action effectively killed efforts by the 
commission to rezone certain areas of the city to facilitate the 
construction of new public housing units; it also sent a firm 
message to city hall that the council did not intend to rubber 
stamp administration proposals. Upon formally declaring its inde­
pendence from city hall, the council quickly proceeded to turn 
back one measure after another transmitted for its considera­
tion by the mayor.21 
The climate of conflict surrounding Hatcher's relationship 
with the city council resulted in the imposition of huge revisions 
by the council in the mayor's annual budgetary requests. Thus 
in 1970 the council trimmed nearly one million dollars from the 
administration's proposed public-employee salary schedule. 
Hatcher's request for $1,000 across the board raises for fire­
men was reduced by the council to $600, an act of economy 
precipitating the disastrous firemen's strike discussed earlier. 
Additional council cuts eliminated the entire staff of the Gary 
Youth Commission. And in an action clearly designed to humili­
tate the mayor, the council voted to reduce the salary of human 
relations commission director Charles King from $14,000 to 
$13,000. King had consistently been one of the council's most 
vocal critics and one of Hatcher's strongest supporters. 
Hatcher's most serious conflict with the council centered 
around the attempt by the council in 1969 to dilute the formal 
powers of the office of mayor. This action took the form of a 
proposal by councilman John Armenta to reduce the number of 
Hatcher's appointees to the fifteen-man human relations com­
mission (HRC) by nine and distribute them equally among the 
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members of the council. Armenta argued that such a redistribu­
tion would result in broader community representation on the 
commission. The Armenta proposal was headed for certain 
passage when two hundred members of black youth gangs 
crowded into the council and persuaded several councilmen to 
change their vote. One of the youthful spokesmen addressed the 
members of the council in the following emphatic terms: "What 
you want us to have? Nothing? You're crawling with us and 
we're tired. The game is over. If you mess with the mayor you'll 
have to talk to us about it. That's not a threat, that's a promise."22 
When asked why they consistently failed to support Mayor 
Hatcher's policies, most Gary councilmen were inclined to reply 
that Hatcher was not a practical politician—that he rarely at­
tended council meetings and did not make them privy to his plans 
in advance. In an interview with one of the authors, Hatcher 
rejected these charges, asserting that he was readily available for 
councilmanic consultation. Hatcher expressed the belief that 
the reasons for the council's opposition to his legislative pro­
gram were almost purely racial. 
Stokes also encountered considerable resistance to his policies 
from members of the Cleveland city council. For a city of its size, 
the Cleveland city council is unusually large. The council is com­
posed of thirty-three councilmen, all elected from wards. 
Throughout most of the Stokes era, blacks held twelve council 
seats; the balance—twenty-one—were held by whites. Early in the 
Stokes administration a deep split developed in the council along 
racial lines. White councilmen, seeking to protect the interests of 
their white constituents, lined up solidly in opposition to Stokes.23 
Black councilmen—with several notable exceptions24 generally 
supported the major legislative programs of the Stokes ad­
ministration. Opposition to Stokes by the dominant white coun­
cilmanic faction rendered Stokes largely ineffective in his 
political relations with the council. Lacking a voting majority, 
Stokes had to rely upon the veto or threat of a veto as his pri­
mary political weapon.25 Although his veto power provided 
some bargaining leverage, it was far from enough to give Stokes 
the kind of influence with the council he needed to transform his 
dreams of municipal reform into public policy. 
Stokes's first serious clash with the council came in February 
1968 when he proposed an increase in the city income tax from 
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.5 percent to a full 1 percent. Council leaders strongly opposed 
the tax increase on the grounds that such an increase lacked 
popular support and had not been satisfactorily justified by the 
administration. In the wake of stiff council opposition, Stokes 
decided to take the political offensive. His first step was to 
engage in a round of political speeches designed to mobilize 
support for the tax increase from important community or­
ganizations. Next, Stokes took out full-page ads in both Cleve­
land daily newspapers urging citizens to pressure councilmen 
to support the tax proposal. This tactical maneuver enraged 
Stokes's councilmanic opponents. Councilman Anthony Garofoli 
accused Stokes of attempting to blackjack the council and vowed 
not to be intimidated. Council President Stanton observed that 
he had never been subjected to such pressure in all his years on 
the council, and added: "I'm not impressed by the newspaper 
camapign to stampede this council without proper documenta­
tion."26 
Stokes's campaign to secure a tax increase was given a sub­
stantial boost by the passage of a referendum proposal that 
decreed that Cleveland policemen and firemen be paid salaries 
3 percent higher than those paid to policemen and firemen in 
any major city in Ohio. The passage of this proposal produced 
immediate demands by other city workers for higher wages. In 
light of these developments, the council voted to approve Stokes's 
request for a tax increase. 
The skirmish over the 1968 tax increase marked the beginning 
of a period of continuous conflict between the council and the 
Stokes administration. Like their counterparts in Gary, white 
Cleveland councilmen took advantage of the special political 
problems faced by the city's black mayor to assert their inde­
pendence from the city administration. Operating as a cohesive 
unit, the council majority subjected the administration to a num­
ber of political defeats. For example, a vigorous campaign by 
Stokes to get a tough gun-control law established was defeated 
in the council by a two-to-one vote. Despite the tradition of 
pro forma council approval of mayoral appointments, two key 
Stokes appointments—one to the Transit Board and one to the 
City Planning Commission—were rejected by the council. In 
1969, the council took the unprecedented step of withdrawing $7 
million from Stokes's prepared budget and placing it in a reserve 
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account that could not be tapped without prior council approval. 
The intent of this action was to diminish the independent ad­
ministrative authority of the mayor. 
The most serious setback suffered by Stokes at the hands of 
the council was his failure to induce council action on the Lee-
Seville public-housing project. This project involved plans by 
Stokes to build 277 units of public housing in a middle-class 
black neighborhood called Lee-Seville at a cost of $4.5 million. 
The Lee-Seville housing proposal ran into strong opposition in 
the city council. Leading council opposition to the Stokes pro­
posal was Lee-Seville councilman Clarence Thompson, who ob­
jected to the housing project on the grounds that it would lead 
to the overcrowding of schools and recreational facilities and 
impose a severe strain on existing sewer lines. In view of Thomp­
son's objections, the chairmen of council committees consider­
ing various aspects of the Lee-Seville proposal agreed to invoke 
the principle of councilmanic courtesy and pigeonhole the legis­
lation until differences between the mayor and Thompson were 
ironed out. 
Beginning as a minor dispute, the Lee-Seville issue mush­
roomed into a major political battle between Stokes and the city 
council. Stokes denounced Thompson's position as a subterfuge to 
hide the class prejudice of Lee-Seville residents toward low-
income blacks. He called upon the council to allow the people to 
decide the issue by holding public hearings on the Lee-Seville 
project. Thompson remained adamant, arguing that he was not 
against the construction of public housing for the poor but was 
concerned about the deleterious physical effects of such housing 
on his neighborhood. 
Charges and countercharges generated by the Lee-Seville 
controversy locked Stokes in the most intense political battle of 
his administration. Stokes took his campaign for public housing 
to the public, exhorting community leaders to organize mass 
rallies to pressure the council to begin public hearings on Lee-
Seville legislation. In doing so, he clashed sharply with Lee-
Seville residents who assailed him for making their neighborhood 
a laboratory for his experimental housing program. They also 
roundly condemned Stokes for insinuating that their resistance 
stemmed from class bigotry rather than honest concern for the 
physical well-being of their neighborhood. 
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The battle over Lee-Seville raged for more than a year. A vote 
in the council to reactivate Lee-Seville legislation on 17 June 1969 
set the stage for the demise of Lee-Seville as a major public 
issue. Consistent with its previous stand, the council voted twenty 
to thirteen to keep Lee-Seville legislation pigeonholed in com­
mittee. Viewing the council action as the end of the road, Stokes 
announced that he was abandoning his campaign to establish 
public housing in Lee-Seville. 
Ladies and gentlemen of the Council, from this point on, the issue
of public housing in Lee-Seville is entirely up to you. My responsi­
bility as mayor has been fulfilled.27 
Underlying Stokes's monumental defeat on the Lee-Seville 
project was the unflagging political opposition of the council 
president James Stanton to the programs of the Stokes adminis­
tration. Conflict between Stokes and Stanton dated back to 1968 
when rumors began to spread that Stokes was maneuvering to 
oust Stanton as council president by defeating his councilmanic 
allies in the 1969 city elections. Stanton—who was known to be 
politically ambitious—had maintained tight reigns on the council 
through his power as president to make committee assignments. 
If Stokes succeeded in removing him as council president, Stan­
ton stood not only to lose his power, but would also be robbed 
of his chances for higher political office. 
Seeking to protect his political interests, Stanton became one 
of Stokes's most persistent and vociferous opponents. It was 
Stanton who first raised the issue of the foundation grant to 
William Silverman and led the charge to force Stokes to fire 
Silverman. Stanton also played a crucial role in the Lee-Seville 
controversy, backing Councilman Thompson fully, and holding 
a majority of the council in line against pressure by Stokes to 
force Lee-Seville legislation out of committee. On the floor of the 
council, Stanton played Brutus to Stokes's Caesar, taking ad­
vantage of every opportunity to project potshots at the Stokes 
administration. The tug of war between Stanton and Stokes 
reached its apex in the 1969 city elections with both men 
fielding opposing slates of candidates for the city council. This 
contest proved to be a standoff, with Stokes as well as Stanton 
picking up new seats and losing old ones. Failing to substantially 
break Stanton's grip on the council in the election, Stokes joined 
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a dump Stanton bid in the postelection reorganization of the coun­
cil. With strong support from county party leaders, Stanton was 
able to easily defeat his opponent—twenty-first-ward councilman 
Edward Katalinas—in the party caucus, and retain his position 
and power as council president. Although a virtual shoo-in for 
Congress in 1970, Stanton continued to vigorously oppose Stokes. 
His unceasing opposition so crippled Stokes's legislative pro­
gram that Stokes was prompted to accuse Stanton of stopping 
the wheels of city government single-handedly: "In my 20 years 
in public life, I have never seen government brought to a halt 
by one man, such as Council President Stanton has done."28 
Thus, both Stokes and Hatcher faced deep-seated and enduring 
opposition from the Cleveland and Gary city councils. The con­
sequences of this opposition were far-reaching, affecting sig­
nificantly their ability to implement programs of social reform. 
COMMUNITY CONFLICT 
Policies of the Stokes and Hatcher administrations were also 
strongly influenced by conflict and tension in the black and 
white communities of Gary and Cleveland. One of the most 
important sources of conflict in the black community was the 
inability of both black mayors to immediately fulfill the social 
and economic aspirations of their black constituents. Apparently, 
promises by Stokes and Hatcher during the mayoral campaign 
established in the minds of many black citizens unrealistic ex­
pectations of the extent to which their administrations would be 
able to solve pressing problems in the black community. In Gary, 
for example, many blacks viewed Hatcher as a miracle worker 
who would solve over night community problems that had been 
ignored for decades. This perception of Hatcher's powers was 
an inevitable by-product of the high-pitched, emotional cam­
paign waged in the black community to achieve his election to 
the mayor's office. As one respondent explained: 
Dick [Hatcher] tried to be everything to everybody. That poor
fellow in the street felt that things were going to be different once
Hatcher took office. Everybody who wore a button or carried a 
placard felt "I'm going to get something out of it. Everything is 
going to change." Not that Dick said these things were going to
happen, but this was the feeling—that Dick was going to be a cure-all
for all the ills of the ghetto. Dick was going to be a cure-all for all
the problems of the community. 
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Neither Stokes nor Hatcher could satisfactorily explain to rank-
and-file blacks the constraints on their power that prevented 
them from living up to their campaign promises. The upshot was 
a tremendous sense of disillusionment by many of their most 
ardent black supporters. Having placed total faith in the election 
of a black mayor as the answer to their problems, these citizens 
began to suspect that they had become victims of yet another 
act of political betrayal—that the black man they had put in the 
mayor's seat was selling them out. Consequently, within weeks 
of their election, Stokes and Hatcher were faced with the im­
mense problem of growing hostility toward their administrations 
in the black community 
To cope with this problem, both Stokes and Hatcher sought 
to establish programs that would demonstrate beyond the shadow 
of a doubt that they were sensitive to the needs of the black 
community. Thus, one of Hatcher's first formal acts as mayor 
was the announcement that his administration would give priority 
attention to problems in the areas of housing and employment. 
This announcement was designed as an unmistakable signal to 
the black community that Hatcher intended to live up to his cam­
paign promises that he would use the office of mayor to reverse 
the cycle of poverty and dependence among low-income black 
citizens. 
Hatcher fully recognized that he could not successfully tackle 
social and economic problems in the black community without 
obtaining outside funds—especially funds from the federal gov­
ernment. Consequently, much of his time—and that of his staff 
—was devoted to identifying and vigorously pursuing outside 
funding sources. These efforts enjoyed remarkable success. 
By the end of his first year in office, Hatcher had successfully 
obtained federal commitments to Gary in excess of $30 million.29 
This achievement earned him the title of master of the art of 
"grantsmanship" from local officials across the country. By June 
1970, the total amount of federal assistance to Gary had climbed 
to $86 million, with $10 million from HUD still to be released. 
Federal funds secured by Hatcher were supplemented by sub­
stantial donations from private foundations, businesses, and 
local civic associations. Most of the funds raised by Hatcher 
from public and private sources were used to establish housing 
and employment programs in the black community. 
Stokes also launched an aggressive campaign to secure public 
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and private funds to underwrite social and economic programs 
for low-income black citizens. In March 1968, he traveled to Wash­
ington and returned with a pledge of $12 million in federal funds 
to reactivate the University-Euclid urban-renewal project. Fed­
eral money for this program had previously been held up because 
of deficiencies in Cleveland's renewal efforts under the Locher 
administration. Stokes successfully argued that in the few months 
he had been mayor, substantial progress had been made in im­
proving the city's ability to establish and maintain a workable 
renewal program. Another request for federal funds by Stokes 
resulted in a $1.5 million grant from OEO to the Hough Area 
Development Corporation to promote and develop small business 
enterprises in the black community. Stokes was also able to se­
cure a pledge of $1.5 million from the New York Life Insurance 
Company to improve the quantity and quality of housing in the 
Hough area. 
By far Stokes's most impressive fund-raising venture, however, 
was a program labeled by Stokes's publicity assistants as Cleve­
land Now. This program, established in May 1968, involved a vig­
orous effort to raise $177 million over a period of eighteen months 
to attack problems in housing, jobs, and health. Specifically, 
the money would be channeled into six separate programs in the 
areas of employment, youth resources, health and welfare, neigh­
borhood rehabilitation, economic revitalization, and planning. 
The bulk of the funds for the program—about $142 million—would 
come from the federal government. About $23 million would be 
provided by state and city governments. The balance of the funds 
—some $11 million—would be raised through solicitations from 
business and industry and private citizens. To facilitate the col­
lection of private funds, Stokes assigned the Greater Cleveland 
Growth Association the task of raising $10 million from the 
business community. At the same time, a special organization 
called Group 66 was established to raise $1.5 million from pri­
vate citizens. 
In its totality, Cleveland Now represented the largest most am­
bitious program of urban reconstruction in the history of the coun­
try. In announcing the program, Stokes stressed its importance 
as an avenue through which citizens from every walk of life could 
participate in the redevelopment and revitalization of their city. 
Response to the mayor's plea for communitywide support of 
Cleveland Now was instantaneous and overwhelming. John 
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Sherwin, cochairman of the business fund-raising effort an­
nounced on 2 May that $350,000 had already been pledged from 
industry and foundations to support a $750,000 summer-activities 
program. Numerous other contributions from business and in­
dustry quickly followed. The campaign for public contributions 
was given a spectacular start by a $1 million donation from Dr. 
Leland Schubert, a retired college professor and resident of the 
Cleveland suburb of Bratenahl Place. Gifts of all sizes soon be­
gan pouring into Cleveland Now offices from across the city. 
Cleveland Now containers were placed in shopping centers and 
schools; special projects were developed by youngsters, civic 
clubs, and other groups to raise money in support of the mayor's 
community development program. 
During the first phase of the Cleveland Now campaign more 
than $5,678,000 was raised. This money in turn earned over 
$188,000 in interest, for total receipts of over $5,860,000. The 
overwhelming proportion of these funds were spent on projects 
designed to revitalize and rehabilitate the black community. 
Thus a report published in November 1969 showed that more than 
$1 million was spent on improving the quality of ghetto housing; 
$205,000 on job development in the black community; $557,000 
to promote small-business development in the black community; 
and more than $1 million on black youth-services activities.30 
In sum, Cleveland Now represented a tremendous effort on the 
part of the Stokes administration to provide viable solutions to 
the social and economic problems of Cleveland's black citizens. 
The vigorous pursuit by Stokes and Hatcher of public and pri­
vate monies to tackle pressing problems in the black community 
removed much of the doubt from the minds of rank-and-file 
citizens in Cleveland and Gary regarding their sensitivity to the 
needs of the black community. These programs constituted in­
disputable proof that the priorities of city government had 
changed drastically under the leadership of a black mayor. The 
political payoffs to Stokes and Hatcher of this perception of their 
administrations by blacks were inestimable. Essentially, both 
mayors were able to effectively reverse the trend of waning sup­
port for their administrations established during their first 
months in office. By the end of their first year as mayor, both 
Stokes and Hatcher were riding new crests of popularity in the 
black community.31 
This is by no means to suggest that Stokes and Hatcher were 
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able to mobilize support for their administrations by all sectors 
of the black community. To the contrary, long after their pro­
grams of social and economic reconstruction had begun to show 
significant results, they continued to receive substantial opposi­
tion to their administrations from some important elements of the 
black population. For example, blacks associated with organized 
crime in Gary continued to be dissatisfied with the Hatcher ad­
ministration, because Hatcher sought to follow through on his cam­
paign pledge to crack down on syndicate operations, including 
numbers and prostitution rackets in the black community. Legiti­
mate black businessmen were also at odds with the policies of 
the Hatcher administration. Many of these individuals had been 
accustomed to receiving special funds through the Lake County 
political machine in return for their political support. Hatcher 
refused to honor this hoary tradition, thus depriving these black 
businessmen of thousands of dollars in patronage benefits. 
The most serious opposition Hatcher had to face in the black 
community, however, came from members of his campaign orga­
nization who believed that he was not faithfully executing the ob­
jectives of the campaign. Specifically, complaints by Hatcher 
volunteers centered around the following issues First, many 
were bitter because they were not consulted on initial appoint­
ments to Hatcher's administration. Some of these persons had ex­
pected to receive appointments to positions in the Hatcher ad­
ministration themselves but were bypassed; others merely wished 
to have a say in major appointments and were dismayed when 
persons they did not support were given key positions in the new 
administration without their consent. Second, many volunteers 
were disturbed by the fact that Hatcher did not take significant 
steps to remove his enemies from the city bureaucracy and re­
place them with his political allies. Third, and most important, 
many volunteers sharply criticized Hatcher for not using the of­
fice of mayor to build a power base in the black community. 
On this issue volunteers observed that Hatcher had neither es­
tablished an ongoing political organization of his own nor at­
tempted to destroy the machine organization in the black com­
munity. Volunteer members had hoped that the campaign 
organization would be transformed into a permanent political 
force working on a continuous basis to expand the influence of 
the black community in the political process. Hatcher and his ad­
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visers, however, vetoed the maintenance of the campaign or­
ganization as an instrument of power after the election. They 
contended that the organization was tired from the grueling cam­
paign and needed a rest and that they were compelled by the 
rush of events to shift gears from electoral politics to administra­
tive politics. Quizzed on this point a Hatcher aide told one of the 
authors: 
We don't have time to give the organization right now. We're strug­
gling for our lives down here and if we don't produce, we won't 
need an organization. It would not be in our best interest to start 
right now. There are certain dynamics that have to be worked out.
We've talked about this and we're waiting until the next election to
get people involved again.32 
Few of the black volunteers agreed with this approach. Most of 
them felt as if they had been used to place Hatcher in office and 
then arbitrarily cast aside. 
The upshot of the decision to disband the campaign organiza­
tion was to drive a substantial political wedge between Hatcher 
and many of his closest political allies. Dejected and disenchanted, 
a number of the volunteers vowed not to work in another cam­
paign; others suggested that if they worked, they would do so 
only after extracting definite commitments from Hatcher in ad­
vance. The decision to disband the campaign organization in the 
black community left no effective political organization in the 
black community to challenge the influence of the black precinct 
organization. Consequently, the roots of the machine's power in 
the black community remained intact, making it nearly impos­
sible for independent black candidates—even those with the 
support of the mayor—to successfully compete for major public 
offices.33 
Lingering opposition to Stokes in the black community ema­
nated fundamentally from two sources. Cleveland black national­
ists continued to be a major thorn in the side of the Stokes ad­
ministration. The chief complaint of the nationalists was that 
Stokes did not project the image of a relevant and committed 
black politician—that he was too much wedded to the system. As 
evidence, they cited the disproportionate number of white mod­
erates and black conservatives appointed to key positions in the 
Stokes administration. They also pointed to the law and order 
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orientation of the police department, and Stokes's own public 
attacks against hoodlumism in the black community. Tension be­
tween the Stokes administration and the black nationalists be­
came very severe in the wake of Stokes's dismissal of Geraldine 
Williams as one of his administrative assistants. Many nationalists 
considered Miss Williams their only link to city hall. 
Criticism of his administration by black nationalists was not a 
matter of small concern to Stokes; he was very cognizant of the 
fact that his credibility among this element of the black commu­
nity might very well mean the difference between tranquillity 
and violent social unrest. To strenthen his rapport with black 
nationalist groups, Stokes agreed to participate in a nationalist-
sponsored parade celebrating the anniversary of the Hough riots. 
Although the image of the mayor of Cleveland marching in a 
parade with black nationalists carrying rifles (which turned out to 
be fake) was shocking to many Clevelanders, this gesture by 
Stokes went a long way toward salvaging his reputation in the 
eyes of radical blacks who had tremendous influence in the black 
community. This bow in the direction of black nationalism was 
followed up with the allocation of Cleveland Now funds to black 
nationalist groups for community service programs, the appoint­
ment of Baxter Hill, a leading Black nationalist spokesman, to 
the community relations board, and the close monitoring and 
control of police action against black nationalist groups. These 
steps by Stokes eventually reaped huge benefits. After the as­
sassination of Martin Luther King, Stokes was able to keep the 
lid on violence in Cleveland by calling on black nationalists to 
serve as agents of peace in the black community. Similarly, 
during the Glenville disorders black nationalists were among the 
most effective of the black leaders dispatched to the black com­
munity by Stokes to quell further violent upheavel. By the end of 
his first term, relations between Stokes and black nationalists 
had improved to the point that many nationalists were motivated 
to actively campaign for his reelection. Indeed, a number of na­
tionalists by that time had become convinced that Stokes was 
not only a relevant and committed black leader but their best 
insurance against massive assaults against them by the police. 
Asked by an interviewer in 1969 what would happen if Stokes 
lost, one nationalist leader morbidly replied: "The police will 
open war on us. We'll catch hell."34 
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The other major source of opposition to the policies of the 
Stokes administration in the black community was middle-class 
blacks. One issue of tremendous concern to middle-class blacks 
was law and order. Many middle-class blacks frequently com­
plained to Stokes about the ineffective protection they were re­
ceiving from the police department against black hoodlums who 
roamed the streets beating up people and breaking into their 
homes in the name of black nationalism. Councilman Leo Jack­
son was so enraged by the wave of black-on-black crime in his 
district that he led several demonstrations to city hall to demand 
that the police department upgrade its law enforcement activities 
in the black community. 
The most intense criticism of the Stokes administration regis­
tered by the black middle-class, however, came from the citizens 
of Lee-Seville over the issue of public housing. As we have 
seen, despite a determined effort by Stokes to convince them 
that they had an obligation to open the doors of their community 
to low-income blacks, the overwhelming majority of Lee-Seville 
citizens remained adamantly opposed to Stokes's plan to locate 
a major public-housing development in their neighborhood. 
Opposition in the white community also presented a host of 
political problems for the Stokes and Hatcher administrations. 
The election of a black mayor tends to inspire automatic hostil­
ity and resistance in the white community. This reaction by whites 
stems in part from the fact that the election of a black mayor 
means the reduction in white control over city government. For­
mer mayors in Cleveland and Gary customarily catered to the 
special needs of white groups, giving to whites reassurance that 
city government was being run in their interest. The election of 
Stokes and Hatcher changed all of this. To their chagrin, white 
citizens who had always been first in line when benefits were 
distributed were now forced to stand back and watch the pri­
orities of city government shift toward the black community. 
This shift in priorities, coupled with the natural inclination of 
whites to find the idea of a black mayor repulsive, served to 
make white opposition to the policies of the Stokes and Hatcher 
administrations virtually unavoidable. 
Gary whites viewed Hatcher with an unusual degree of cynicism 
and suspicion because of his reputation as a black militant. 
Hatcher's ringing defense of black power in numerous speeches 
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around the nation led many white citizens of Gary to the con­
clusion that he was the worst kind of black official—one who was 
supersensitive to the needs of blacks, to the detriment of whites. 
In this context it is interesting to note that a number of our white 
respondents in Gary suggested that they would readily accept a 
more moderate black as mayor, but were unalterably opposed 
to Hatcher because he had gone overboard in his advocacy of 
black causes. As evidence of the rampant bias of the Hatcher ad­
ministration they pointed to the fact that nearly all the federal 
programs were established for the black community. At the same 
time, they charged that services by the city administration to the 
white community had declined to an all-time low. Specifically, 
they complained that under Hatcher, garbage collection in the 
white community had become erratic, streets and curbs had de­
teriorated, and fire protection had become substantially ineffec­
tive. White citizens also blamed the Hatcher administration for a 
sharp rise in street crime. They contended that the presence of a 
black man in the mayor's office had given blacks the impression 
they could do whatever they wished and get away with it. Letters 
to the Post Tribune frequently accused Hatcher of handcuffing 
the police and coddling black gang members through federally 
sponsored programs. 
Unlike his relationship with the black community, Hatcher's 
relationship with the white community did not improve. To the 
contrary, the longer Hatcher remained in office, the more in­
tolerable he became to a sizable proportion of the white elec­
torate. By the end of his first year in office, Hatcher's relation­
ship with the white community had reached such a low point 
that a serious campaign was underway to disannex predominantly 
white Glen Park from the rest of the city. The campaign for 
disannexation centered around the issues of law and order, im­
proved services, a moderate tax rate, and protection of neigh­
borhoods, jobs, and schools from black encroachment. Spear­
heading the drive was Gary Councilman Eugene Kirkland and 
state Senator Bernard Konrady, both of whom perceived the 
annexation issue as an excellent device for promoting their 
political careers at Hatcher's expense.35 
Serious opposition to the Hatcher administration was ex­
hibited not only by Gary's white citizens, but also by its white-
dominated institutions. For example, Hatcher was at war with 
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the white press in Gary from the day he stepped into office. 
The Post-Tribune, Gary's only daily newspaper, was extraor­
dinarily harsh in its coverage of the Hatcher administration, 
playing up mistakes and underplaying important accomplish­
ments. Hatcher did not find the response by the Post-Tribune 
to his administration either surprising or difficult to explain. 
In his view, the paper represented the very personification of a 
racist institution that refuses to accommodate itself to the reality 
of black mayoral leadership: 
Behind its [Post-Tribune's] criticism of me is the notion that a black 
man could not possibly be capable of running the city better than 
white men have been able to do. So they criticize me for being an 
incompetent administrator. . .  . In any other city, if the mayor went 
to Washington and brought back millions of dollars in federal funds, 
he would be greeted at the airport with a brass band. Yet when I 
come home I am criticized by the local press for being out of the 
city too much, or for going around the country making black power 
speeches.36 
Another major white institution that refused to reconcile itself 
to Hatcher's control over the mayor's office was the Lake County 
Democratic machine. Hatcher's tenure as mayor was marked by 
intense conflict between his administration and the regular Demo­
cratic organization. Hatcher was able to beat but not destroy the 
county machine. The survival of the black precinct organization 
in the black community after 1967 left the machine in an ex­
cellent position to continue to compete with Hatcher for black 
political support. In the 1970 Democratic primary, control over 
the black precinct organization in Gary by the machine resulted 
in the defeat of every candidate endorsed by Hatcher. Hatcher's 
political influence was successfully challenged by the machine 
again in 1971 when Dozier Allen defeated him in an intraparty 
contest for the chairmanship of the Gary Democratic organiza­
tion. Allen ran for the party chairmanship with the solid back­
ing of the county machine. 
The Allen victory was a prelude to an all-out attempt by the 
machine to beat Hatcher in the 1971 mayoral primary. Tapped 
to run as the machine candidate in the 1971 primary was Dr. 
Alexander Williams, black county coroner and long-time mem­
ber of the regular Democratic organization. The results of the 
1971 mayoral primary were surprising given the substantial in­
368 / Electing Black Mayors 
roads the machine had previously made—or appeared to have 
made—into Hatcher's base of power in the black community. 
Hatcher won the 1971 primary by a comfortable margin of 
13,908 votes. It is important to point out that Hatcher's victory 
in 1971 did not rest on an organized mobilization effort as in 
1967 but upon his continuing personal popularity with rank-
and-file black voters.37 Apparently, leaders of the machine 
grossly overestimated the extent to which Hatcher's rapport with 
the black community had been damaged by his frequent clashes 
with his 1967 campaign volunteers and sundry other elements 
of the black political power structure. The overwhelming support 
for Hatcher by blacks in the 1971 mayoral primary (Hatcher 
received 90 percent of the black vote) clearly demonstrated the 
resiliency of his image in the black community as a strong, honest, 
progressive, and effective black administrator. 
Contributing also in important ways to Hatcher's 1971 victory 
was the weak popular appeal of Dr. Alexander Williams in the 
black community. Running with the full force of the Lake County 
machine behind him, Williams was able to poll less than 9 per­
cent of the black vote. Central to Williams's poor performance 
in the black community was his image as a racial moderate and a 
puppet of the white-controlled Lake County machine. Despite 
constant denial that he was a machine candidate, Williams could 
not exorcise from black minds the conviction that white machine 
bosses were calling the shots in his campaign and would exercise 
commanding influence in city government if he became mayor.38 
During the first six months of his administration, Stokes's 
relationship with the white community—in comparison with 
Hatcher's—was fairly good. Stokes did not present as militant 
an image as Hatcher and thus was not viewed to be as much of a 
threat by rank-and-file white citizens. Moreover, a higher per­
centage of Stokes's cabinet was white, moderating to a large 
degree the impression of a black takeover. Stokes also went to 
greater lengths than Hatcher to win over large segments of the 
white community. He employed the concept of the town-hall 
meeting to move his entire cabinet into white neighborhoods for 
a series of face-to-face encounters with white citizens. These 
meetings served Stokes extremely well. Drawing on his famous 
wit and charm, Stokes was able to transform hostile white citi­
zens into responsive admirers who competed with each other for 
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handshakes with the mayor at the end of the evening. Stokes 
was able also to prove his courage by dueling with hecklers 
planted in the audience. Invariably the overriding impression that 
he created was one of fairness and genuine concern for the 
problems of all Cleveland citizens. As a result, he was able to 
significantly diminish the fears many whites had that a black 
mayor would be insensitive to the needs of the white community. 
Stokes's relationship to the white community was strength­
ened considerably by the strong support he received from the 
white business establishment. Leaders of the Greater Cleveland 
Growth Association were among Stokes's closest advisers and 
political allies. Stokes relied upon these business leaders to 
not only spearhead major civic programs like Cleveland Now but 
to also intervene politically in his behalf to enhance his ability 
to compete with other important city and county institutions.39 
Cleveland newspapers also helped to promote Stokes's ac­
ceptance in the white community. Both the Plain Dealer and the 
Cleveland Press were "cautiously supportive" of the Stokes 
administration. Although their treatment of some issues—such as 
the fight over public housing—was extremely damaging, the 
white Cleveland papers generally sought to defend Stokes against 
attacks from some of his most abrasive white critics. Both papers 
displayed considerable pride in the fact that Cleveland was 
governed by a black mayor, and consistently emphasized how 
well Stokes was managing to cope with the "handicap" of his 
blackness. 
Stokes's relationship with the white community took a de­
cisive turn for the worse after the July 1968 Glenville rebellion. 
Many whites had looked upon Stokes as a safety valve against 
unrest in the ghetto. Although not blaming Stokes directly for 
the Glenville uprising, few whites could hide their disappoint­
ment that a black mayor could not keep the black community 
under control. Feelings of disappointment turned to hostility when 
it was revealed that $10,000 in Cleveland Now funds had been 
awarded to Ahmed Evans to conduct a summer youth program and 
that part of these funds had been used to buy the weapons that 
had killed the three white policemen slain in the Glenville dis­
turbance. After Glenville, Stokes was the object of bitter de­
nunciation by white Cleveland policemen. These attacks were 
played up in banner headlines by the Plain Dealer. White ex­
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tremists began coming out of the woodwork, espousing doctrines 
of racial hatred. One faction of George Wallace's American 
Independent Party started an abortive move to disannex the 
Westside from the rest of Cleveland. Many white Clevelanders 
began making plans to move to the suburbs; others who stayed 
in the central city remained profoundly suspicious of Stokes's 
cozy relationship to militant elements in the black community. 
These white attitudes dictated that Stokes make an all-out effort 
to sell himself again to the white community in the 1969 mayoral 
elections.40 
Stokes's most serious political problems in the white com­
munity centered around his poor relations with the Cuyahoga 
County Democratic party organization. Relations between Stokes 
and county officials were strained to the breaking point by the 
1967 mayoral primary. Rivalry between Stokes and party officials 
continued after the 1967 election, with the party chairman Porter 
seeking to combat what he viewed as efforts by Stokes to con­
solidate all power in the mayor's office. When Stokes announced 
for reelection in 1969 Porter first opposed him, and finally 
reluctantly acceded to county party endorsement of Stokes in 
the primary. As soon as the official party endorsement of Stokes 
was validated, Porter announced his resignation as party chair­
man. Dr. Samuel R. Geber succeeded Porter as acting county 
chairman. Reversing Porter's stand, Geber pressured county 
party officials and rank-and-file workers to campaign actively for 
all endorsed candidates, including Stokes. 
The truce established between Stokes and the county party 
organization was short-lived. Reelected mayor by a comfortable 
margin, Stokes made the decision early in his second term to 
begin to vigorously press for representation and power for the 
black community in all major areas of Cuyahoga County poli­
tics. Stokes was particularly concerned about increasing black in­
fluence within the structure of the county Democratic organiza­
tion, since blacks had been one of the prime contributors to 
party success, but had never received benefits commensurate 
with their contributions. To facilitate a concerted drive to wring 
concessions from party officials, Stokes joined with a number 
of prominent Cleveland black politicians to form the Twenty-
first District Democratic Caucus. The caucus would serve as an 
independent force to mobilize black political resources with the 
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view toward enhancing the bargaining power of the black com­
munity within the Democratic party. Congressman Louis Stokes, 
brother of Carl Stokes, was elected chairman of the caucus. 
The caucus launched its first assault against the power struc­
ture of the county organization at the May 1970 county conven­
tion. Seeking to establish a firm foothold in the leadership 
hierarchy of the county organization, the caucus recommended 
the selection of the black Cleveland councilman George Forbes 
as vice-chairman of the County Central Committee. Forbes's 
selection was vigorously contested by the Cleveland city council 
president James Stanton who accused Forbes of maintaining un­
swerving loyalty to Mayor Stokes. As an alternative to Forbes, 
Stanton recommended Dr. Kenneth Clement, former Stokes cam­
paign manager, who had become an arch foe of the Stokes ad­
ministration. When the county convention met, Clement was 
elected vice-chairman. Stokes issued an immediate denunciation 
of the convention proceedings as a farce and an affront to the 
mayor of Cleveland because he was not consulted in the selec­
tion of party officials. Declaring his independence from the 
county organization, Stokes described himself as a "national 
Democrat" and said that in the future he would endorse candidates 
for public office as mayor of Cleveland not as a party official. 
Following Stokes's lead, the Twenty-first District Caucus an­
nounced its formal withdrawal from the Cuyahoga County Demo­
cratic party. At a meeting held on 23 May, the caucus voted to 
forbid its members from holding any office in the Democratic 
party organization or accepting membership in its executive 
leadership. Further, the caucus pledged to enter its own slate 
of candidates for the November election. Announcement of the 
caucus slate in September sent shock waves through Cuyahoga 
County politics. Viewed previously as a satellite of the county 
party, the caucus struck a crucial blow for independence by 
endorsing ten Republicans along with a number of Democrats. 
To underscore the fact of independence, the caucus also an­
nounced that it was dropping the word "Democratic" from its 
name. County party officials were enraged by the endorsement 
of Republicans by the caucus and vowed to take revenge against 
Stokes, whom they held responsible for the action. Responding 
heatedly to the caucus action State Representative Anthony 
Russo declared: "I don't see how there can ever be a reconcilia­
372 / Electing Black Mayors 
tion with the party. I don't think Mayor Stokes wants to run for 
reelection next year with the party endorsement."41 The most 
drastic reaction to the caucus came from Cleveland Congress­
man Charles A. Vanik, who announced that he was withdrawing 
his offer to recommend Louis Stokes to the powerful House 
Appropriations Committee because Stokes had lost his credentials 
as a Democrat in view of caucus endorsement of Republicans. 
Vanik's action had the effect of making the split between the 
caucus and the county organization permanent. Mayor Stokes 
announced that in light of Vanik's decision, he was closing off 
all discussions with party officials relative to the return of the 
Twenty-first District Caucus back to the Democratic party. In a 
strongly worded statement, the caucus echoed Stokes's position, 
declaring Vanik's actions as contemptible, and asserting that 
it would not be blackmailed into deserting its principles, organiza­
tion, and unity. "The 21st District Caucus reafirms its inde­
pendence and rejects Mr. Vanik's conditions."42 
Stokes's troubles with the county organization served to rein­
force the growing feeling he had that he should not run for re­
election in 1971. His revolt from the party organization virtually 
guaranteed that his reelection would be an uphill battle. As in 
1967 and 1969, his election in 1971 would depend heavily on his 
ability to mobilize substantial support in the white community. 
However, this time, unlike 1969, there would be no major push 
by party officials to open the doors of ward clubs in the white 
community. Indeed, party regulations prohibited campaign ac­
tivities at party meetings by nonendorsed candidates. Without 
substantial party support in the white community, Stokes's ability 
to pull enough votes out of the white community to win reelec­
tion was a major question mark. 
Beyond electoral considerations was the larger question of 
whether or not the rewards of the mayorship in terms of con­
crete achievements were worth the efforts that would have to be 
summoned to win reelection. During his second term, Stokes 
found himself at war with practically every major political or­
ganization in city government, including the press, the city 
council, and disparate elements in the black community. And a 
number of searing battles still lay ahead. Rejection of a proposed 
tax increase by the voters had left the city in such desperate 
straits that a sizable proportion of the city bureaucracy would 
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have to be laid off. Stokes did not relish the storm around the 
mayor's office that these necessary economies would produce. 
These considerations weighed heavily on Stokes's mind as he 
contemplated his political future in the spring of 1971. His 
ultimate decision came as a shock to his friends and enemies alike. 
In April 1971 Stokes announced that he had decided not to run 
for reelection. The official reason given by Stokes for retiring was 
his desire to expand his political influence to the national level. 
Behind this public position stood the stark reality that Stokes 
had come to the conclusion, after months of soul-searching, that 
he had gone as far as he could as mayor of Cleveland. Having 
labored diligently for four years to bring about major reforms in 
city government, Stokes was discouraged by the results. Rather 
than endure the mental anguish, personal sacrifice, and physi­
cal dangers of mayor for two more years, without a reasonable 
prospect for making major improvements, Stokes decided to bow 
out. 
It would have been highly uncharacteristic of Stokes to retire 
from politics altogether. Having stepped out of the 1971 race, 
Stokes assumed the role of back-stage manipulator. In the primary, 
he supported James M. Carney, who defeated the city council 
president Anthony J. Garofoli in the mayoral race. The general 
election witnessed the entrance of Arnold Pinkney, black school-
board member, as an independent candidate for mayor running 
with the support of the Twenty-first District Caucus. Stokes 
made the interesting move of shifting his support in the general 
election from Carney to Pinkney. In a magazine article, Stokes 
explained the factors underlying this shift in his political support: 
I felt the city was entering a period when there could be no more
change or movement; the need was for someone to hold what we had
won until the mood changed and someone else came along to build
on it. I wanted it to be a Black man. I sought out Arnold Pinkney,
my former administrative assistant, who was then president of the
School Board, and asked him to run.43 
Despite an all-out effort in the black community, Stokes was 
not able to transfer his political prestige and popularity to Pinkney. 
To the surprise of many political observers, the 1971 mayoral 
election was won by the Republican candidate Ralph Perk. The 
key to Perk's victory was the overwhelming support he received 
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in the white community. While whites were voting en bloc for 
Perk, blacks were splitting their votes between Pinkney and 
Carney. In contrast to Stokes's massive sweep of the black com­
munity, Pinkney was able to poll only 75 percent of the black 
vote. The other 25 percent was cast for Carney. 
Pinkney's inglorious defeat in 1971 marked the end of Carl 
Stokes's career in Cleveland politics. Immediately after the elec­
tion, Stokes hit the speaking circuit, seeking to develop a national 
constituency. His quest for national stature culminated at the 
1972 National Black Political Convention, where furious efforts 
were made by Cleveland delegates to obtain convention en­
dorsement of Stokes for president. This move was quickly de­
flected by a resolution passed by the convention not to endorse 
a candidate for president prior to the Democratic and Republi­
can conventions. 
The reelection of Richard Nixon as president in 1972 repre­
sented the final event in Stokes's political career. With all viable 
options in politics closed to him, Stokes decided to accept an offer 
to become anchor man of a local television news program in 
New York City. At the time Stokes departed for New York City, 
the political future of blacks in Cleveland appeared nearly as dim 
as in 1965, when Stokes suddenly emerged to shake the founda­
tions of American urban politics. 
EVALUATION OF THE STOKES AND HATCHER ADMINISTRATIONS 
The trials and triumphs of the Stokes and Hatcher adminis­
trations discussed above point to both the possibilities and the 
limitations of the electoral process as an instrument of power for 
the black community. That the election of black mayors in Cleve­
land and Gary has made a difference in the lives of black citizens 
in these cities is beyond dispute. Reforms in the city bureau­
cracy introduced by Stokes and Hatcher produced substantial 
improvements in the housekeeping functions of city government. 
These improvements resulted in savings totaling millions of dol­
lars in public funds.44 Reforms of this sort laid the basis for a 
significant reordering of the priorities of city government. Stokes 
and Hatcher attempted more vigorously than had any previous 
mayors to harness available resources and direct them toward 
the alleviation of poverty and hopelessness in the black com­
munity. 
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In Cleveland, under Mayor Stokes, this vigorous search for 
resources resulted in the construction of an unprecedented num­
ber of public-housing units for the black poor, the establishment 
of day-care centers and health clinics in the black community, 
the generation of seed money to establish businesses owned and 
operated by blacks, and many other important benefits. Simi­
larly, in Gary, under Mayor Hatcher, the first public housing 
was built since the Korean war; programs to attack problems in 
the areas of employment, drug abuse, and health were launched; 
and poverty funds previously centralized in the county were 
transferred into the economy of the central city. In both cities 
blacks were hired in significant numbers for the first time in 
supervisory and skilled jobs in city government. The entrance of 
blacks into the city bureaucracy in professional capacities re­
sulted in the generation of millions of dollars in additional reve­
nue for the black community. For example, before Stokes took 
office in Cleveland, few blacks were employed by the city gov­
ernment. Those who were on the city payroll usually held menial, 
low-paying positions. When Stokes took office, he made the es­
tablishment of an effective affirmative-action program to recruit 
talented minorities into city employment one of the priority goals 
of his administration. Over a period of four years he was able to 
dramatically reverse the pattern of black exclusion. During this 
period more than 270 minority individuals—most of them black 
—were hired in high-level, professional positions. The annual 
aggregate income of these new city employees was more than 
$3 million.45 Similar programs were adopted in both cities to 
facilitate competitive bidding by black firms for city contracts. 
The resulting increase in the profits of black businesses had an 
appreciable affect on the social and economic condition of many 
blacks in Cleveland and Gary. In general, the economic benefits 
that Stokes and Hatcher were able to transfer to the black com­
munity had the effect of lifting many blacks into the middle 
class, and paving the way for the forging of new career op­
portunities for blacks with training, skill, and initiative. 
Perhaps as important as the tangible benefits were the 
psychological rewards. The aggressive attempt by Stokes and 
Hatcher to root out the underlying causes of black poverty had 
the latent consequence of diminishing black distrust of city 
government. These efforts stood out as incontrovertible proof that 
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a black mayor could be trusted not to forsake his race once he as­
sumed office. Moreover, they provided impressive evidence that 
the black community could expect to receive greater sympathetic 
understanding from a black mayor than from a white mayor, 
irrespective of his ideological inclinations. 
Stokes and Hatcher were also important symbols of black 
pride and achievement. Their political exploits were vicariously 
shared by masses of blacks who looked upon them as the 
quintessence of the successful and effective community leader. 
Feelings of racial pride produced by the election of black mayors 
tend to be especially strong among black youth. Commenting on 
this phenomenon one black respondent in Gary observed: 
Mayor Hatcher's election has taught black youngsters one important
thing: the only thing standing between my being mayor or fire 
chief or city engineer or city attorney is education. If I can get the
education I can get the job. The proof of the pudding is in the tasting.
I don't believe my son can be president until I see a black president.
I can't encourage my son to be [President] Johnson because Johnson
is white. But I can encourage him to be Richard Hatcher because
Hatcher is black—and we tried to get the blackest one we could find
so white folks couldn't claim him. 
Although the accomplishments of the Stokes and Hatcher ad­
ministrations are undeniably important, they have not been 
enough to ignite the process of decolonization in the black com­
munity. One crucial aspect of such a process would be black 
control over major public and private institutions in the city and 
county, and the utilization of the resources of these institutions 
to place the management of social, economic, and political mat­
ters affecting the black community in black hands. No such 
change in the power position of the black community in Cleve­
land and Gary has begun to emerge. Nearly a decade after the first 
successful mass mobilization of blacks in the electoral process, 
the power structure of both cities remains overwhelmingly white. 
Few blacks own major businesses in the downtown area or play 
major roles in the operation of such establishments. Banks, de­
partment stores, automobile agencies, insurance companies, 
indeed all moneymaking institutions of great significance, are 
still managed and controlled by white suburbanites. In Gary, 
U.S. Steel stands as a corporate giant, absorbing the labor of the 
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black community, despoiling the environment, and causing 
irreparable injury to health, yet beyond the effective economic 
and political control of the black city administration.46 Conse­
quently, blacks remain concentrated in semiskilled positions in 
the corporation, and major corporate profits flow out of Gary 
into the accounts of company officials in Pittsburgh and stock­
holders across America. The Cleveland Browns football team 
constitutes another corporate enterprise heavily dependent upon 
black labor. Yet black interest in the team is almost purely 
athletic not financial. Black participation in corporate profit-
sharing—as in the case of U.S. Steel in Gary—is minuscule. 
Colonial economic relations remain fixed. Stokes did much to 
assist the development of small businesses in Cleveland; how­
ever, the larger imperative of black expansion into the cor­
porate structure represented the kind of political issue that lay 
far beyond the competence of his administration. 
In no area where substantial power to influence the distribu­
tion of resources in Cleveland and Gary resides are blacks ade­
quately represented. Blacks in both cities are most heavily 
represented in city governments; but even in this area it is clear 
that black visibility greatly surpasses black power.47 
Outside the central city, black representation and influence 
have not been significantly broadened by the election of black 
mayors in Cleveland and Gary. County government remains a 
sacred white preserve, and blacks continue to have only token 
representation (and practically no influence) at the state level. 
The impact of black power in the city has therefore been sub­
stantially diluted by countervailing powers exercised by whites 
in control of important state and county agencies. 
Underlying the absence of adequate black representation and 
influence has been the failure of Stokes and Hatcher to insti­
tutionalize black power by building permanent bases of black 
political strength in the black community. Hatcher had a golden 
opportunity after the 1967 election to weld the black community 
into a cohesive political machine that could control elections and 
make demands on party officials for significant representation 
at all levels of the party structure. A calculated decision was made 
not to move in this direction; as a consequence, the black 
community remained unorganized for political purposes in the 
interim between elections. 
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The push by Stokes to consolidate power in the black com­
munity after the 1969 election is precisely the kind of effort 
that must be made if progress toward the institutionalization of 
black power is to be achieved. The Stokes experience serves to 
highlight the fact that this process will be fraught with tension 
and frustration. Party officials will not readily accede to demands 
by independent black political organizations like the Twenty-first 
District Caucus for representation and influence. The struggle for 
power is likely to be quite protracted, requiring a high degree of 
discipline and commitment on the part of black leaders and their 
constituents. It has been the absence of such sustained discipline 
and commitment that has rendered the Twenty-first District 
Caucus in Cleveland largely ineffective as an instrument of power 
in recent times, much of its potential diluted by internal feuding 
among the top leadership. It is hoped that future generations of 
black politicians will be able to avoid the pitfalls that have so 
shattered the black political movements begun so auspiciously 
in Cleveland and Gary in 1967. 
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11 
Conclusions and Lessons 
The crucial lesson to be learned from the Cleveland and Gary ex­
periences is that the election of a black mayor does not automati­
cally mean that the colonized position of the black community 
will be significantly changed. Constraints placed on the adminis­
trative authority of black mayors by a host of economic, politi­
cal, social, and psychological factors make it impossible for their 
administrations to effectively satisfy the quest for black libera­
tion. That is, black mayors simply do not have the political power 
to insure that black people can attain well-paying and meaning­
ful jobs, effective health care, decent shelter and food, liberating 
educational opportunities, cultural activities, and all the other 
dimensions of a life-style that would encourage the development 
rather than the oppression of black people. Consequently, strat­
egies and the accompanying tactics for liberation must look be­
yond the election of black mayors. 
Indeed, one of the significant findings of this study is that 
the election of black mayors and the subsequent increase of black 
administrators is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, the 
increase of black urban officials does have symbolic and substan­
tive payoffs for ordinary black people. In some cases (but not 
all), it may help to have a black person who understands and 
can relate to black people administering urban services—particu­
larly police services. In several cities black policemen, for exam­
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pie, have formed separate organizations to challenge the racism 
of the local police department. On the other hand, however, the 
increase of such black officials suggests that the general relation­
ship of black communities to the larger society will shift from a 
colonial to neocolonial relationship. That is, that the historic re­
lationships of economic, political, and sociocultural domination 
between white society and black society will continue, but the 
administrators of this fundamentally exploitative and oppressive 
association will change from whites to blacks.1 
When Carl Stokes, for example, was confronted by a just rebel­
lion in the black community of Cleveland he may have agonized 
more about how to handle the situation than former mayor Locher 
would have; but since the white community, the downtown busi­
ness interests, the media, and the state and national governments 
expected him to control the rebellion, that is exactly what he did. 
His method was less repressive, but the basic point is that he did 
not support the rebellion of his people; he opposed it by using his 
position as mayor to restore law and order in Cleveland's black 
ghetto. Likewise, he used his mayoralty resources to end a strike 
by sanitation workers (who were mostly black workers) fighting 
for a decent wage during a period of runaway inflation because 
his institutional role was essentially that of a neocolonial adminis­
trator. Black mayors, urban renewal and housing officials, police­
men, teachers, and social welfare workers may well include 
numerous sincere people who are vigorously attempting to serve 
the needs of the black community; however, it is apparent to us 
that the changing of personnel skin color in an unaltered value 
system and exploitative institutional structure can at best achieve 
only marginal changes. If basic changes concerning the life op­
portunities and quality of life for masses of black people are to 
be accomplished, then basic systemic changes must occur. The 
evidence of this study and everything else we have learned about 
American politics compels us to conclude that black liberation re­
quires fundamental structural changes in the society as a whole. 
A brief look at some of the economic constraints placed on 
Stokes and Hatcher can illustrate the point. From the perspec­
tive of the black community, both men were certainly vast im­
provements over the mayors they replaced. Yet, as we have seen, 
neither of them, despite incredible hard work and innovation, 
could significantly affect the level of unemployment and under­
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employment among blacks in Cleveland and Gary. They could 
not because the economic base of both communities continued 
to be controlled and influenced by national corporate elites who 
make their decisions on worldwide profit-making possibilities, 
not on what is good for the people of Cleveland and Gary. The 
large economic interests in Cleveland and Gary focused their at­
tention on how to make more money in the future; they did not 
base their decisions on how to organize resources and technology 
to meet the material and social needs of all people in the commu­
nity. As we have seen, within this framework of a profit-making 
economic system controlled by multimillionaires, black people 
have always been used (and continue to be used) as a source of 
cheap labor for, at first, southern plantation owners, and more 
recently, northern "plantation" (factory) owners. In both cases, 
blacks were and continue to be used as a means for wealthy 
people to increase their wealth—and as a means for pitting black 
workers against white workers; thus driving wages down, increas­
ing competition for the available jobs, and stimulating racism be­
tween people. Historically, and at the present, black people have 
been at the bottom of this economic system, and, according to all 
the evidence we have, will remain there as long as the American 
economic system and the social system that accompanies it is based 
on profit-making rather than on meeting human needs. This 
conclusion has been reached in light of the fact that the less than 
one percent of the American population that controls the econ­
omy (and thus the lifeblood of every major urban center) has ac­
cumulated billions of dollars in profits from this colonial rela­
tionship with black communities and has historically proven itself 
unwilling to provide black people with full employment. The only 
time blacks have approached full-employment conditions in the his­
tory of this system has been during times of war when blacks 
have been expected to give their lives so that American economic 
elites may protect their international access to cheap labor, 
raw materials, and markets.2 Indeed, as this is written (Win­
ter, 1976), the national unemployment rate hovers around 8.5 per­
cent (in reality it is higher),3 and thousands of white workers at 
all levels of skill and formal education have joined the multitude 
of black unemployed and underemployed. This economy, as it is 
presently based, is simply not geared to provide black workers 
(and many white workers) with a job that can support a decent 
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standard of living nor that can stimulate the creative capacities 
within people.4 It is this fundamental fact that both Stokes and 
Hatcher were unable to overcome. They were forced to conduct 
their electoral campaigns and subsequent administrations in the 
existing political and economic framework and were unable in 
their own communities to successfully challenge the ownership 
and control of production and resources by the economic elites 
and their political allies. 
This inability to attack the fundamental character of the econ­
omy and the political order was related to their reluctance to use 
the mayor's office and resources in an effective attack on white 
racism. Both Stokes and Hatcher took the position that they saw 
themselves as mayor for all people in their cities not just the mayor 
for black people. Their strategy for playing this role, however, 
did little to actually educate white people about their racism and 
thus to lay the basis for the elimination of social and economic 
inequality in American society. They both sought to resolve the 
common problems confronting black and white people in their 
cities by turning to the federal government to fund various kinds 
of urban reform programs. By pursuing this strategy they tended 
to reinforce the notion among both blacks and whites that their 
problems could be resolved within the present socioeconomic 
system by relying on the federal government as well as to con­
tinue the competition between the races for the limited urban 
reform resources that were available. They did not attempt to edu­
cate their constituents to the basic facts concerning the socio­
economic system nor to challenge white racism as a main foun­
dation of that system. Instead of attempting to show white people 
how they are also oppressed by a socioeconomic system that de­
humanizes people and why they should join black people in a 
common struggle against this system, Stokes and Hatcher fell 
into the trap of promising whites that their problems could also 
be solved by more federal programs. Because they lacked a cor­
rect perspective on the root causes of urban problems plaguing 
Cleveland and Gary, Stokes and Hatcher basically had no effec­
tive means for combating the white racism they encountered. 
Many white people in the city bureaucracy, the media, on the city 
council, in the Democratic and Republican parties, and in the 
neighborhoods did all they could to obstruct the efforts of the 
newly elected black mayors instead of supporting their leadership. 
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These people were no doubt attempting to protest the rather 
marginal material and psychological benefits they had carved 
out within the status quo and were determined to thwart what 
they perceived as a black power take over that would eliminate 
them from their positions to be replaced by blacks. To some ex­
tent this was the case. Given the fact that the economy in these 
cities was not expanding, the availability of jobs and thus money 
for housing, education, medical care, food, and so forth was on 
the decline, and thus competition between the races was intensi­
fied, it is not difficult to understand why whites would be threat­
ened by the ascension of blacks to positions of power in the politi­
cal system. Thus, instead of joining blacks in a common attack 
against the controllers of the economy, the whites in Cleveland 
and Gary acted in a way that most whites have acted historically 
in this country. That is, they sought to secure and protect their 
own economic slots regardless of the human cost to others and to 
blame people of color for their problems. Stokes and Hatcher 
did little to shift white people's focus from this outlook to an out­
look that would challenge white racism and thus erode one of the 
main barriers that divides people. Because of this fact, the racial 
situation in both cities did not improve. 
Our basic conclusion from this analysis, therefore, is that the 
effort for black liberation cannot be achieved within a societal 
framework that is based on economic exploitation and the racism 
that accompanies it. In our opinion, black people must devise a 
strategy and set of tactics that will move them in the direction 
of alternative economic and political arrangements in which they 
and all working people will own and control the economic and 
political resources in their communities and through them control 
the political and sociocultural dimensions of life. 
The organizational manner in which these goals may be realized 
is currently a wide-open question deserving much debate and 
practical experience. Robert Allen, for example, has suggested 
that an independent black political party be established as a van­
guard social, economic, and political institution in the ongoing 
struggle for black liberation. Such a party, according to Allen, 
"must devise a mixture of tactics to fit a variety of contingencies. 
. . . Tactical innovation should be the order of the day, and any­
thing workable goes—depending on specific conditions and the 
relation of forces—from legal struggle, to electoral politics, to di­
rect action campaigns, to force."5 
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Earl Ofari has cautioned that there can be no shortcut to funda­
mental change for blacks in this country. He calls for "patient 
organizing—away from the ruler's media—and class struggle" on 
the part of black people as a means for developing a "mass­
based working class consciousness united against capitalism."6 
In order to develop such consciousness, Ofari suggests three 
consciousness-raising tactics that could be utilized in the present 
context: 
. . . the running of independent candidates in local elections to agi­
tate for working class needs and spread radical ideas to a broader
base of people; founding of unemployment councils to fight lay­
offs for jobs, increased social security, welfare, and workmen's 
compensation benefits; and a working class united front around 
inflation, layoffs, the wage-pricefreeze and other related issues.7 
He suggests that within the united front, black workers should 
be in the position of leadership to counter middle-class domina­
tion and that "where white workers are involved, the obvious 
way to beat down racism is for black workers to educate through 
leadership and practice while keeping paramount a class perspec­
tive."8 
The people who have given the most penetrating and careful 
thought to providing theoretical direction to the black struggle 
are James and Grace Boggs.9 They have pointed out that black 
people must go far beyond spontaneous rebellion to achieve fun­
damental change. Their analysis of the world revolutionary pro­
cess and the development of the black struggle within the United 
States makes clear that a key factor in a successful liberation 
struggle is the leadership of a revolutionary party. Such a party 
would help to mobilize masses of people around their own griev­
ances, project a vision of a new social order that would solve their 
grievances, develop a cadre of leaders with whom people can 
identify, and devise programs "that will take the masses stage by 
stage to ever higher levels of political struggle, political con­
sciousness, and actual control of power." The creation and de­
velopment of such a party is a primary responsibility of black 
leaders, according to the Boggses. 
Many writers on the black liberation struggle have included a 
consideration of local electoral politics as a tactic within the 
liberation process. Consequently, we believe that it is important 
to specify what we think are the key lessons of this study and 
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other historical experiences as they relate to the issue of electoral 
politics as an instrument of change. Perhaps the first point that 
should be made is that there should not be any confusion concern­
ing electoral politics as a strategy for liberation versus electoral 
politics as a possible tactic among many tactics for liberation. 
We feel that it is a basic mistake to view electoral politics as 
the main strategy for black liberation (strategy here meaning the 
key instrument or form of struggle for gaining political power to 
resolve the social problems confronting black people). In other 
words, we maintain that if all of the cities in the nation with a 
substantial black population had a black mayor, and that approxi­
mately 20 percent of all other local, state, and national elected 
of&ces were held by black people, life opportunities would be bet­
ter for blacks, but they would still be in an oppressed neocolonial 
position in this society. We say this because the formula that 
argues for political equality within a capitalist-racist framework 
as the main route to black liberation ignores three crucial fac­
tors: (1) the historic and continued tension between the black 
middle class (those most likely to run for elected posts) and the 
black working and under class; (2) the continuing role of deep-
seated racism in this society, which can not be overcome by vot­
ing; and (3) the high correlation between economic power and po­
litical power. Those with unusual wealth have enormous power 
within the American political system and can make extremely 
important decisions concerning the quality of life within any 
community without the consent of those who live and work 
there.10 Our understanding of these three factors forces us to con­
clude that getting a "fair share representation" (which might in­
clude more than 20 percent for historical compensatory purposes) 
is not sufficient to insure that black people will gain community 
control over their own economic, political, and sociocultural en­
vironment. 
Additionally, we think that it is important to be clear on the 
point that electoral politics cannot bring social, economic and 
political equality to black America. The fundamental difference 
between capitalism and socialism is that under capitalism a rela­
tively small percentage of the population own and control the 
means for producing human amenities and through such economic 
control exercise inordinate political and social influence. Under 
democratic socialism (as we define it), the means of production 
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would be communally owned; the social surplus would not go to 
profit-making individuals but into community services (schools, 
hospitals, housing, food stuffs, cultural events, and so forth); and 
people would be organized in real democratic structures so that 
they could participate in making such allocation decisions and 
all the other basic decisions which affect their life situation. 
There is no historical evidence to suggest that such fundamental 
changes can be made through the voting process. We doubt that 
the owners of General Motors, ITT, Standard Oil, Chase-Manhat­
tan, and so forth, would allow their wealth to be appropriated 
through popular elections without resorting to expanded police-
state measures to forestall such change. In fact, the evidence 
points to the conclusion that American corporate elites and the 
people who work for them will do all in their power to protect 
their current status, including calling off elections at anytime or 
violently over-throwing duly elected governments. A few exam­
ples should suffice to support this point. During the "red scare" 
of the early 1920s, several socialists in the New York state leg­
islature were expelled for not having supported World War I;11 
in 1955-56 the U.S. government under Eisenhower prevented 
elections in Viet Nam when it became apparent that Ho Chi Minh 
would gather about 80 percent of the vote; in the early 1960s, 
Julian Bond was denied his seat in the Georgia Legislature be­
cause of his color and politics; in Chile a duly elected govern­
ment has been overthrown by a military coup supported by 
American corporations and the U.S. government. In recent years, 
thousands of Chileans have been killed, tortured, and imprisoned 
for supporting the administration of Salvadore Allende who was 
attempting to radically change the social, economic, and politi­
cal system of Chile via the parlimentary system. In short, we feel 
that black people cannot afford to trust the rulers of this country 
to relinquish their control on the basis of elections. They are 
more likely to change "the rules of the game" than face defeat. 
Using electoral politics as the main strategy for liberation is a 
losing strategy and one that could be very costly in black lives. 
What about local electoral politics as a tactic? We feel that this 
is a more knotty problem. As we understand the situation in early 
1976, it is clear that both the government (Watergate) and cor­
porations (the energy crisis and economic depression) are losing 
their grip on legitimacy in the eyes of many Americans. With 
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the addition of these issues to the long list of crises that emerged 
in the 1960s, the very foundation of the American political 
economy and social life is in a state of decline. As this decline 
continues and political struggles intensify in this country, we 
expect that the past pattern of using black people as scapegoats 
and as targets of repression will increase. Support for this view 
can be drawn from the fact, for example, that in recent times 
the Black Panther Party in Oakland, California, has been raided 
by the police and eleven Panthers have been arrested for no ap­
parent reason. Across the bay in San Francisco, the police were 
stopping young black males between 5'7" and 6'2" on the 
street, questioning them concerning the so-called Zebra murder 
cases, and issuing them pass-cards as though San Francisco were 
South Africa. In Boston thousands of whites have demonstrated 
and engaged in mob action against bussed black students. In 
Quincy, Massachusetts, the police have adopted the use of 
machine guns in unmarked cars; and in Seattle, the police have 
been issued dum-dum bullets, despite the united opposition of 
the entire Third World community to such action. We suspect 
that the political situation in America could become more reac­
tionary as those in power attempt to retain their privileges and 
that the bulk of police-state tactics are most likely to be used 
against blacks and other Third World people. Although the elec­
tion of a black mayor and other black officials is no guarantee 
against police repression, it is possible that black officeholders 
could help curb such developments. As we have indicated, black 
mayors do not have the power and resources to liberate black 
people; however, their presence in city hall could be used as a 
means for providing some protection and assistance for blacks 
using other means to move toward liberation. 
With this basic advantage in mind, we would still like to call 
attention to the main shortcomings of using electoral politics as 
a tactic. We do not think that these shortcomings dictate that 
electoral politics should never be used. To the contrary, given 
the resources that reside in public positions that can only be ob­
tained through electoral office, we believe that it would be un­
wise for black people not to attempt to place as many repre­
sentatives of the black community as possible in these positions. 
Further, we recognize that the black vote can be a vital resource 
for influencing the decisions of public officials and turning public 
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policy in the direction of the satisfaction of basic socioeconomic 
problems in the black community. Finally, the involvement of 
the black masses in electoral campaigns can serve as a pivotal 
mechanism for the forging of group unity and the arousal of 
political consciousness. These benefits notwithstanding, it is 
nevertheless essential that the following shortcomings of elec­
toral politics as a tactic also be clearly recognized. First, utilizing 
a great deal of political energy to put a black person in the 
mayor's seat has the tendency to reinforce the erroneous notion 
that someone in a high governmental office will free black people 
instead of each person taking the responsibility for freeing him 
or herself and also making a contribution to total community 
freedom. Many black people in Cleveland and Gary made this 
psychological error and then were deeply disappointed when 
Hatcher and Stokes were unable to significantly improve the 
situation. The danger is that this kind of thinking could lead to 
political apathy (nothing works) instead of encouraging careful 
appraisal of the advantages and disadvantages of a particular 
tactic. As Boggs has noted, each person must be involved in the 
liberation process; to rely on a few leaders in high places would 
be to fail to take advantage of the tremendous desire and talent 
of all black people. In the struggle for liberation, we must look 
to each other, not to someone above us. The second shortcoming 
is that electoral politics includes the tendency of mobilizing 
people and their skills into a campaign organization that func­
tions around election time but then usually falls into a dormant 
state thereafter. People who have learned to work together and 
have increased their skills through cooperative experience find 
that after the election there is little or no opportunity for them 
to continue their work; thus there is an inclination for the or­
ganization to fall apart. Since the struggle for liberation is a 
continuous process, organizational forms and operations should 
reflect that fact. If campaign organizations are to be built, then 
thought should be given to how they relate to on-going com­
munity organizations. Third, there is the consideration that the 
type of campaigns required are all-consuming. That is, if a seri­
ous effort is to be made to elect a black mayor, that effort will 
require virtually the total energy of the key participants. If 
people are deeply involved in an election campaign they will 
have little time left over for engaging in other kinds of organiz­
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ing. Finally, an election campaign tends to focus the struggle 
around what happens in the voting booth rather than in the 
community and work places, thus reinforcing the establishment 
point of view that change can be brought about within the sys­
tem instead of in the streets. 
The history of black struggles in this country points to the op­
posite conclusion; to the extent that black people have made 
progress, that progress has been won in direct community and 
work-place action that went beyond the "legal" constraints of 
the political system as it is structured. In fact, such direct action 
makes an election effort possible by creating a more aroused 
and united community. It is doubtful that Stokes and Hatcher would 
have experienced the success that they did had it not been for 
the civil rights action and rebellions that occurred prior to their 
elections. In short, we feel that if local elections are to be used as 
a tactic, caution should be exercised in relying too heavily on 
electoral politics and the relation between electoral tactics and 
other tactics should be deeply investigated. 
In considering other kinds of tactics it is important to take into 
account the characteristics of the opponent. According to our 
analysis, the main barriers to black liberation are white racism, 
the exploitative economic system of the United States, and the po­
litical and social features that accompany these two factors. 
Racism and economic exploitation not only relegate black people 
to a colonial position here but have similar consequences for other 
Third World people in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Accord­
ingly, it is to the advantage of black people in this country to 
forge linkages with and learn from the experiences of other 
people in the world who are struggling to win their freedom. In 
this sense, the resurgence of Pan-Africanism as an important 
philosophical and political issue in the black community may 
significantly enhance the prospects that meaningful alliances 
will be formed between blacks in the United States and blacks 
on the African continent. It is important for American black 
people to encourage alliances between progressive people 
throughout the world and those within the United States be­
cause they can lead to a many-sided front against the common 
enemy. 
Similarly, we believe that the black liberation struggle in this 
country will strengthen its prospects of victory by forming link­
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ages with other Third World communities within the United 
States and progressive white people who are struggling to over­
come economic exploitation and racism and to build viable al­
ternatives. If black (and white) liberation is to become a reality 
in the United States, it must be understood and fought for by 
millions of Americans, it cannot be won by a minority of the 
population, although a minority can play a key educational and 
leadership role. As Boggs has pointed out: "It has always been 
blacks who pioneered in rebelling against the system, now it is 
blacks who will pioneer in creating a new system."12 And in this 
pioneering effort to build a more humanistic way of life, white 
people would do well to reexamine their own position in this 
society. Despite all the talk about "white ethnic" power in cities, 
most ordinary white workers have very little political power to 
control their lives and are economically marginal in the work 
world.13 It is true that they are one step above most Third 
World people on the economic ladder, but that one step is much 
smaller than the numerous steps between most white workers 
and the multimillionaires who control the economy and gov­
ernment. It is in the interest of white people to unite with black 
people rather than allowing their historic racism to be used by 
the rulers of this country to divide the masses of people. Rather 
than oppose progressive black leadership in the cities, working-
class white people must come to the understanding that they 
could learn much from black leadership. There can be no hu­
mane future for this country unless racism is overcome, and 
white people have the primary responsibility in eliminating this 
social disease. 
The issues raised above are by no means exhaustive. Specific 
events will no doubt occur that will shape the struggles ahead, 
and black people will be called upon to utilize a wide variety of 
tactics to secure freedom and build a new social order for all 
human beings in this country. 
Whatever form the struggle takes, it is important that lessons 
be drawn from past experience and much reflection be given to 
the current situation in the United States as the economy 
plunges into a deeper depression and the liberation struggles of 
people throughout the world gain strength. The second half of 
the 1970s and the 1980s promises to be a period of major up­
heaval within the United States and the world. Those who seek 
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to provide leadership for the social changes pending must pro­
ject ideas that will stimulate people to struggle for a more 
humane future, provide a workable program to guide the strug­
gle, and build the necessary people's organizations that can lead 
these struggles. In all of these efforts the relationship between 
theory and practice is a never-ending process, and the election 
of black mayors is a "lesson-pregnant" development in this un­
folding process. 
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(Continued from front flap) 
of municipal elections. The pivotal unan­
swered question was whether or not these 
demographic trends could be translated into 
political power. 
Professors Nelson and Meranto examine 
in rich and fascinating detail the successes 
and failures of blacks in the exercise of 
political power in the urban North. Using a 
wide range of empirical data derived pri­
marily from interviews with more than 150 
urban political activists, they demonstrate 
conclusively that sheer numbers and geo­
political density, while important political 
resources, are not sufficient to assure the 
election of black candidates to major offices 
in American cities. Focusing their attention 
on the election in 1967 of Richard Hatcher 
as mayor of Gary, Indiana, and Carl B. 
Stokes as mayor of Cleveland, Ohio, the 
authors analyze key factors underlying the 
successful mobilization of the black elec­
torate in major northern cities. This analysis 
includes discussions of black voter attitudes 
toward black politicians and the political 
process; the impact of the civil rights move­
ment in the development of black political 
consciousness and unity; strategies and 
tactics for canvassing, registration, turnout 
and fund-raising; problems influencing the 
forging of viable electoral coalitions between 
black and white citizens; and the myriad 
political problems affecting the governing 
ability of black mayors. 
William E. Nelson, Jr., is chairman of the 
Department of Black Studies and associate 
professor of political science at the Ohio 
State University. Philip J. Meranto is as­
sociate professor of political science at the 
University of Washington. 
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